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PREFACE
The chief negative aim of this thesis is to avoid 
duplicating the narrative accounts of post-war negotiations 
already published by certain Western authors.^ Bechhoefer’s 
book is the most thorough narrative account of post-war 
negotiations, and also the only account which systematically 
goes behind the negotiations to study policy debates in the 
Western camp, and especially in the United States. I have 
avoided this large subject almost completely in order to 
focus attention on the more formal elements of the 
negotiating process.
I have also tried to avoid duplicating the work of 
Nogee and Spanier in emphasizing the role of political 
warfare as a function of, or motive in, disarmament
1
See Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race. Atlantic Books, 
London, 1958; Anthony Nutting, Disarmament: An Outline of 
the Negotiations. Oxford University Press, London, 19^9; 
William R. Frye, MThe Quest for Disarmament Since World 
War II", in Louis Henkin (ed.), Arms Control: Issues for 
the Public. Spectrum Book, New Jersey, 19^1; Bernhard G. 
Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control. The 
Brookings Institution, Washington, 1960; J.W. Spanier and 
J.L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament. Praeger, New York, 1962.
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2negotiations. However, in Part Four I have given reasons 
for doubting whether, as Nogee and Spanier believe, 
disarmament diplomacy is effective as political warfare, 
and whether it is inevitably frustrated by the propaganda 
motive.
Parts Two and Three, concerning proposals and 
negotiation in general respectively, may be considered an 
attempt to analyse the practice of negotiation in the 
interests of establishing a theory of negotiation and 
suggesting improvements in negotiating strategy and tactics 
from the viewpoint of effective negotiated control of the 
arms race. Part Four deals with the theories of other 
authorities, chiefly academic and Western, which seek to 
explain the failure of negotiation for arms control and 
which suggest ways of making it succeed.
Part One is a theoretical analysis of the arms race 
at a high level of abstraction. It is meant to establish 
the validity of a method for analysing the arms race which 
underlies much of the argument of the theis, and also to 
put forward several strategic analyses employed in the 
discussion of proposals in Part Two.
The Politics of Disarmament, op. cit.
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Choice of empirical material is explained in the 
Introduction to Part Two, and in Part Three, Chapter 2, 
where a ’detailed1 negotiation is distinguished from other 
kinds. The period 1955-60 was chosen in order to keep the 
study close to contemporary problems, without it being 
submerged by them. Six years of negotiation have been 
found to provide an adequate selection of proposals and a 
perhaps excessive quantity of verbal exchange for the 
purpose of theorizing. It has also been possible to study 
the vicissitudes of particular proposals over time and to 
speculate about the long-term effectiveness of negotiating 
pressure.
’Arms control’ and ’disarmament’ are terms used to 
some extent interchangeably in this thesis. It will be 
clear from the context when I wish to give one or the other 
a distinct meaning - ’disarmament' having radical overtones 
and ’arms control’ conservative ones. ’Arms control’ (and 
’disarmament’) will be always used in the sense of 
negotiated, multilateral, formal agreement for limitation 
on the arms race. There are good conceptual and practical 
reasons for rejecting the blanket use of the term ‘arms 
control’, as favoured by many scholars in the United States,
iv
to cover unilateral and multilateral, formal and informal,
tacit and explicit restraints on the arms race.
Here is how Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin of
Harvard dissent from ‘classical1 usage.
...a more variegated and flexible concept of 
arms control is necessary - one that recognizes 
that the degree of formality may range from a 
formal treaty with detailed specifications, at 
one end of the scale, through executive 
agreements, explicit but informal understandings, 
tacit understandings, to self-restraint that is 
consciously contingent on each other’s behaviour....
The essence of arms control is some kind of 
mutual restraint* collaborative action, or 
exchange of facilities between potential enemies 
in the interest of reducing the likelihood of 
war, the scope of war if it occurs, or its 
consequences.3
The authors go on to propose ‘that limited war itself 
is a form of arms control’. It is clear that ‘arms control’ 
is thus made indistinguishable from strategy and military 
policy except in the extreme case of annihilating general 
war - the only case in which 'restraint' would be 
abandoned completely. Thermonuclear counterforce warfare, 
for example, would be ‘arms control’, according to the 
Schelling/Halperin proposal, and negotiation for arms control 
would be indistinguishable from day-to-day military activity.
3 Strategy and Arms_Control, The Twentieth Century Fund, 
New York, 1951, p. 77*
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CHRONOLOGY OF NEGOTIATIONS
A chronology of major, detailed negotiations, 1955-60. 
Other rounds of negotiation which touched on arms control 
are mentioned in brackets. The United Nations General 
Assembly debated disarmament annually and the full 
Disarmament Commission met occasionally during the period.4“
1955 Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission
February 25-May 18 (PV.s 22-*+9)
/July 18-23, Heads of Government Meeting/
August 29-October 7 (PV.s 50-68)
/October 27-November 16, Foreign Ministers Meeting/
1956 Sub-Committee
March 19-May b (PV.s 69-86)
1957 Sub-Committee
March 18-May 16 (PV.s 87-116)
May 27-September 6 (PV.s 117-157)
1958 Conference of Experts
July 1-August 21 (PV.s 1-30)
Conference on Surprise Attack
November 10-December 18 (PV.s 1-30)
+
See Part Three, Chapter 2, ”The Grand Tactics of the 
Negotiating Powers and Other Preliminaries”.
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1958-60 Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests 
(PV.s 1-273)
1958 October 31-December 19
1959 January 5-March 19 
April 13-May 8 
June 8-August 26 
October 27-December 17
1960 January 12-April 1*+
April 25-August 22 
September 27-December 5
i960 Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament 
March 15-April 29 (PV.s 1-32)
June 7-June 27 (PV.s 33-^8)
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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN CITING DOCUMENTS
United Nations Documents (Official Abbreviations)
1. General Assembly
A/ Assembly Documents
A/PV. Plenary Session, Verbatim Records
A/C.1/L. /Rev. Resolutions moved in the First Committee, 
/Corr. plus revisions and corrections
A/C.1/SR. First Committee, Summary Records*
2. Disarmament Commission
DC/ Official Records
DC/PV. Verbatim Records
DC/SC.1/ Sub-Committee, Official Records
DC/SC.1/PV. Sub-Committee, Verbatim Records
3* Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of
Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on 
the Suspension of Nuclear Tests
EXP/NUC/ Conference Documents
EXP/NUC/PV. Verbatim Records
4. Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests
GEN/DNT/
GEN/DNT/PV.
Conference Documents 
Verbatim Records
+
Always given in the third person.
i x
5. Geneva Conference to  S tudy Measures Which Might be
H elp fu l in  P rev en tin g  S u rp r is e  A ttacks
GEN/SA/ C onference Documents
GEN/SA/PV. V erbatim  Records
6. Ten N ation  Committee on Disarmament
TNCD/ C onference Documents
TNCD/PV. V erbatim  Records
Document C o lle c tio n s
1. Departm ent o f S ta te  P u b lic a tio n s
Documents on D isarm am ent,
v o l. I Volume I  Z l9^5-567? Pub. 7008
(August I960)
v o l. I I  Volume I I  Zi 957-97, Pub. 7008
(August i 960)
i 960 Pub. 7172 (September 1961)
Geneva C onference -  Geneva Conference on th e
D iscon tinuance of N uclear Weapon T e s ts ,  
H is to ry  and A nalysis of N e g o tia tio n s ,
Pub. 7258 (O ctober 196O
2. Her M ajesty*s S ta t io n e ry  O ff ic e . London, Command
Documents
Cmd.s 9204 (Ju ly  195*0 > 9636 (December 1955)?
9770 (May 1958), and Cmnd. 333 (December 1957) 
a re  R eports on th e  P roceedings of th e  Sub-Committee 
of th e  Disarmament Commission, 195^-7 ("P resen ted  
to  P a rliam en t by th e  S e c re ta ry  of S ta te  fo r  
F o re ig n  A ffa irs  by Command of Her M a jes ty ").
XCmd.s 9648-51 (January 1956) contain the Verbatim 
Records of the 1955 Sub-Committee*
Cmnd. 1152 (September 1960) contains the Verbatim 
Records of the Ten Nation Committee on 
Disarmament, conference documents and other 
relevant documents.
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GLOSSARY OF SPECIAL TERMS
freeze agreement not to raise armaments,
forces and/or budgets above a level 
obtaining at some date in the past.
'weapon1 cut-off cessation of production of nuclear
weapons.
'materials' cut-off cessation of production of fissionable
materials for weapon purposes.
transfers transfers of past production of
weapon-grade fissionable materials 
to peaceful purposes.
the Two United States and Soviet Union,
(the superpowers)
the Three U.S., U.S.S.R., and United Kingdom.
the Four U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K. , and France,
(the great powers)
the Five U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., France and China.
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PART ONE
THE ARMS RACE : A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
"A slow sort of country!” said the 
Queen. MNow here, you see, it takes all 
the running you can do, to keep in the 
same place. If you want to get somewhere 
else, you must run at least twice as fast 
as that!”
—  Through the Looking Glass
1
2
The 'arms race' has not often been precisely defined 
or rigorously studied by theorists, historians or 
practitioners.^ There is not yet a literature of the arms 
race comparable to the rest of the literature on strategy 
which has become particularly rich in recent years. In this 
study the arms race is defined very broadly as competition, 
stemming from a conflict of interest, between two or more 
states in all forms of military power. The aim is to 
analyse in abstract, dynamic terms the principal features of 
the military competition between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in the early thermonuclear years. This 
analysis leads on to a study of the cogency and implications 
of arms control proposals made during 1955-60 in Part Two.
Huntington has defined the arms race as competition in
2'the decisive form of military force1. This approach is 
not followed here, even though the thermonuclear weapon is a 
far more decisive form of force than any pre-nuclear weapon. 
Rather, the unity of all military activity - the fact that
1
See Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and 
Results", in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris (eds.), 
Public Policy. Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public 
Administration, Harvard University, 1958, p. 81* ("Biblio­
graphical Note").2
Ibid.. p. ?2.
3military programmes and weapons reinforce each other's 
deterrent or war-making capability - is stressed. This 
study also departs from Huntington's approach in doubting 
whether an arms race between powers with conflicting 
interests should be said to 'end' as long as the powers 
remain in conflict.^ It may become dormant: one side may 
temporarily accept an inferior arms ratio; but, especially 
in modern conditions, military innovation, which 
incessantly abolishes the significance of existing 
quantitative ratios, tends to continue irrespective of a 
nation's relative power. Powers are less likely than ever 
before to 'give up'; the endless frontiers of technology 
beckon to weak and strong alike.
Strictly speaking, 'arms’ is too narrow a term to 
cover men and material, active and passive defence efforts, 
warning and communication networks, etc. as well as 
armaments proper; but there is no logic for excluding key 
components of armed strength in the analysis of military 
competition. Similarly, 'race' conveys well the idea of 
competitive increase but not very well the idea of 
competitive innovation (which may be accompanied by a 
competitive decrease in numbers of weapons and combat
3 Ibid.. p. 43.
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effectives). However, ’the arms race' is a phrase without 
a rival.
The arms race may be analysed in terms of the strategic 
programmes of the competitors. President Eisenhower’s 
Budget Message of i960 laid down six programmes: ’strategic 
forces’; 1 air defense forces’; 'sea control forces’; 
’tactical forces’; ’military assistance’; and ’stockpiling
Ifand defense production expansion’. The arms race may be 
conceived as a series of challenges thrown out by one power 
to another in terms of strategic programmes rather than 
particular weapons, although the weapons may determine the 
choice of programme rather than the programme determining 
choice of weapon. For instance, the atomic bomb led to the 
U.S. strategy of threatening massive retaliation to deter 
Soviet occupation of Western Europe after World War Two; but 
the hydrogen bomb was fitted into the established programme 
of strategic retaliation, where it first supplemented and 
later replaced the atomic bomb.
Strategic programmes may be further analysed. The 
strategic forces break down into strategic counterforce and 
strategic countercity components in theory. (In practice the 
same weapons contribute to both programmes.) Air defence
New York Times. January 19> 1960.
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includes defence of weapons and defence of 1 values1.
Tactical capability includes: front-line troops stationed 
extraterritorially; mobile, alert theatre and central 
reserves; and reserves which can be mobilized after delay. 
'Sea-control forces' enhance tactical capability and 
protect (or threaten) economic life-lines and sea-mobile 
strategic forces. Military assistance tends to keep allies 
loyal and enhance the tactical position of the donor.
Once a programme is established there will be 
continuous innovation, expansion and phase-out of weapons 
and facilities in the programme. Particular types of 
weapons may feature in several programmes (nuclear weapons, 
for example), although types will usually be developed for 
special roles required by the programme. A programme may 
become impossible to sustain for technical or economic 
reasons. (This has been predicted for active defence against 
missiles, and for civil defence.) The results of dropping 
a programme illustrate well the unity of the arms race. If 
active defence were abandoned by one side, for example, the 
opponent could either reduce his planned ICBM inventory or 
cut back programmes for neutralising and evading anti-missile 
defences (e.g., stand-off rockets, radar jamming, decoys, 
tortuous trajectory devices, super-powerful warheads, etc.).
With the definition suggested most cases of war and 
arms control may be regarded as moves in the arms race. In 
both war and arms control, the attempt to make the opponent* 
forces obsolete and inferior by outbuilding him is replaced 
by the attempt to destroy and prevent his military build-up 
- at the risk of one's own, in the case of war; at the cost 
of one’s own in arms control. In general, both in war and 
arms control, innovation and expansion will continue in 
some categories of strength. However, in the limiting 
cases - annihilating war and general and complete 
disarmament - the arms race comes to a stop. In all other 
cases - local war, limited general war, selective arms 
control - it continues.
Alliance may also be considered a move in the arms 
race, being a political arrangement designed to achieve for 
the proposer of the alliance a strategic or tactical 
increase in military power. However, where disparities of 
power between allies are very great (as in both the Eastern 
and Western military blocs in the period 1955-60), it is no 
great distortion to disregard the contribution of allies of 
the superpowers to the strategic balance.
’Military power’ is not here taken to include such 
factors as G.N.P., military manpower (as distinct from
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trained reserves), spare industrial capacity and so on - 
which represent potential as opposed to actual military 
strength. Contemporary strategic doctrine rightly stresses 
forces in being for both local and general war, and forces 
which are not quickly able to mobilize carry little power 
political weight in any kinds of diplomacy, including arms 
control. Certainly ’the arms race* has never been 
conceived as a competition in war potential in its widest 
sense.
As conceived here, the arms race involves subjective 
factors - competitiveness, hostility and conflict of 
interest - as well as the objective factors discussed so 
far. Thus we may continue to speak of an arms race even 
when the tempo and burden of the competition are decreasing, 
provided there is a continuing background of political 
conflict between the nations concerned. We call the arms 
race latent, although armaments may be increasing, where 
there is no conflict of interest between powers. Internation­
al society is only potentially a war of all against all - 
thanks to alliance and indifference.
Formerly, arms races were a question of quantities.
The armament of the sides tended to be of roughly the same 
quality over long periods; who was ’ahead’ depended on who 
disposed of most weapons and forces in major categories. If
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one side could have placed itself one ‘technological 
revolution' ahead of another, that would have been 
decisive; but in practice new civilian technologies arrived 
and developed slowly, and their military application was a 
haphazard, dilatory process.
Theories of the arms race are bedevilled by the 
difficulty of keeping both quantitative and qualitative 
changes constantly in mind. The commonest errors seem to 
flow from language. Words such as 'race', ‘increase' and 
‘ratio' constitute a developed vocabulary for describing 
quantitative aspects of an arms competition. Constant use 
of these words leads to neglect of qualitative 
distinctions. The armaments of the parties to a pure 
quantitative arms race may differ greatly in quality, 
making a numerical comparison misleading. Or, if the 
parties are making innovations, the old and the new in a 
category like strategic bomber aircraft must not be lumped 
together as though every unit was qualitatively identical.
On the other hand, theorists who write as though the 
arms race has become entirely qualitative are guilty of 
absurdity. In a pure qualitative competition no 
operational weapon would ever be produced - only theories, 
blueprints, prototypes and paper modifications.
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What feature does make an arms race 'primarily 
qualitative’? This phrase has often been used without 
explanation to describe the superpower arms race since 
19^5. If the analyst is to avoid surrendering to 
impressions he should probably compare research and 
development expenditures with production, maintenance and 
manning expenditures for individual weapon systems and 
programmes and for the military effort as a whole. He would 
probably find that the postwar arms race has not been 
'primarily qualitative', except in particular weapon 
systems that have failed.
The level of military effort in an arms race is a 
function of the general level of hostility between 
competitors, among other things; but also particular moves 
in the arms race may be traced to particular increases in 
tension, to crises, and diplomatic pressures. Often such 
moves will have little purely military logic, but will be 
designed to restore a battered prestige, comfort a nervous 
domestic audience or reassure an apprehensive alliance. 
(United States I.R.B.M.s in Europe, 1958).
The economizing instinct is also important in the 
dynamics of the arms race. Nations wish to avoid buying the 
obsolete, the redundant and the inferior in the light of a 
given strategy. Of course the given strategy itself will be
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dictated in part by economics; by the burden that a 
strategy will involve for a given set of resources.
Economy in an arms race is not just a question of providing 
rationally for a given strategy; it may also mean taking 
calculated risks in neglecting expensive but necessary 
items, and bluffing or relying on the psychological impact 
of spectacular developments to deter an opponent (Sputnik),
In general, risk-taking and bluffing appeal to the nation 
with smaller, tightly managed resources, rather than the 
affluent power which finds a high and stable defence budget 
an attractive alternative to sustaining high public spending 
of other kinds.
In studying the response of each side to the other*s 
effort, the theorist must distinguish estimates of present 
strength from projections, predictions and fear of the 
future strength of the opponent. Each side is busy studying 
not only the deployed forces, but the planned expansion and 
innovation of the other, and the likelihood of technological 
surprise. Surprise may be either a question of some 
development already conceived suddenly becoming feasible, or 
of something unsuspected appearing. Each side will not ever 
have * perfect information* about the existing capabilities of 
its opponent, especially if that opponent is politically and 
technically able to keep important military secrets. How
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much less can a nation confronted with an exponentially- 
expanding technology hope to predict the strength of an 
opponent a decade ahead? Thus arises the tendency to 
pursue every novelty at least through the research stage.
Nuclear weapons have made it necessary to distinguish 
quite sharply between tactical and strategic moves in the 
postwar arms race. The tactical and strategic arms races 
have been run in considerable degree independently of each 
other.
Strategically, the fundamental choice is between a 
counterforce and a countervalue strategy. Various mixtures 
are possible. Active and passive defence complement both 
these strategies in various ways. So-called tactical nuclear 
forces are an important component of the strategic balance; 
tactical conventional forces seem to matter less and less in 
the general war equation.
Participants in the tactical arms race worry chiefly 
about each other*s local troop strengths and ability to 
reinforce. However, one side may opt out of the tactical 
competition and extend a strategic threat (realistically or 
otherwise) to deter provocations at the tactical level. 
(‘Massive retaliation’, the NATO ‘trip wire' concept.) 
Tactically, a defensive or offensive posture may be assumed; 
if the former, armament policy is likely to emphasize
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conventional weapons; if the latter, nuclear weapons.
The dynamics of the tactical and strategic arms races 
will be dealt with in turn. The diagram below (Fig. 1) 
conveys the purely military dynamics of an arms race in 
strategic weapons between two advanced nuclear powers. It 
indicates that there is a balance to be struck between the 
various elements of strategic strength, depending always on 
the nation1 s assessment of the opponents programmes, the 
state of the military arts, and the need to hedge against 
uncertainty.
The diagram stresses challenge and response.
Figure 1
Blue (Counterforce 
Policy)
Red (Countercity 
Policy)
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-------- »
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'Counter-measures 
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greater Accuracy 
.Larger Warheads
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of Weapons -- * Counter-measures
Mobility
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Alerts
Fast Reaction
Quantitative__  Quantitative
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Blue is attempting to maintain a first-strike 
counterforce deterrent; Red sets himself to preserve a 
retaliatory capability. A many-faceted qualitative and 
quantitative arms race develops. ‘Red’ and ’Blue* are not 
the United States and the Soviet Union. In the real world 
of 1955-60 these nations pursued a mixed counterforce- 
countercity strategy with the emphasis varying from time to 
time.
For a power bent on being great the need for a 
countercity force is beyond argument. A counterforce 
capability is more expensive, more difficult to obtain, and 
less obviously required. Nations may seek to obtain one 
for several reasons.
1. It may become possible to neutralize the enemy’s 
deterrent - that is, render it completely obsolete. (Given 
modern technology, if one side stands still, this 
development seems likely over any ’long run’, say ten years.) 
There can be a military, a political or an economic motive 
in building a ’splendid’ counterforce capability.
Militarily, a successful surprise attack becomes possible. 
Politically, such a capability is a powerful diplomatic 
lever. Economically, the opponent may be forced into an 
expensive rejuvenation and replacement programme.
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2. Any degree of counterforce capability may make the 
threat of massive retaliation less suicidal and hence more 
credible.
3- Counterforce capability is an insurance against the 
inadvertent failure of deterrence: it enables some damage to 
be averted; it affords some prospect of ’victory1. 
b. Active and passive defence of cities and the civilian 
economy - policies which complement a counterforce 
capability - discourage the exploitation of strategic 
nibbling tactics by an enemy; they force him to attack in some 
strength if at all; and, incidentally, they reduce the 
likelihood of isolated, disastrous accident, since solitary 
unauthorized attack will be averted by a good active defence. 
5. A power possessing some counterforce capability in 
relation to a major nuclear antagonist inevitably will enjoy 
almost overwhelming counterforce capability in relation to 
a minor nuclear antagonist. Thus Nth powers are faced with 
a permanent crisis of obsolescence if they attempt to join 
in the strategic arms race.
But, equally, a power in a nuclear arms race has 
incentives to be moderate, to eschew the counterforce 
strategy. Not only may the attempt to obtain a counterforce 
capability be futile and expensive, but it may drive an 
opponent to building a much larger force than he otherwise
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would have. Especially if such a force is poorly controlled 
and depends on alerts and fast reaction, the situation of 
the counterforce power will be more dangerous in some 
respects than it otherwise would have been. By being able 
to pre-empt to some purpose, a counterforce power whose 
deterrent is rather vulnerable gives an opponent an incentive 
to pre-empt if he can in a desperate situation. However, it 
seems unlikely that America, which pursued a counterforce 
strategy based on nuclear superiority in the postwar period, 
was ever in danger of pre-emptive attack: its nuclear 
superiority was too great.
As defined here, ’moderation’ is synonymous with 
accepting at least temporarily the situation which Thomas 
Schelling has called ’total exchange of all conceivable 
hostages’. The implications can be seen by studying 
Figure 1. A moderate power will play down or abandon 
industrial dispersal, civil defence, active defence of 
cities, certain surveillance and detection programmes, 
programmes for hyper-accurate weapon delivery, programmes 
for achieving tactical surprise, some phases of anti­
submarine warfare, etc. Moderation may be chosen out of
5 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard 
University Press, 19o0, p. 230.
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’goodness’ or because the technological situation and the 
enemy’s scale of effort impose it.
Having dealt with the strategic or ’central’ arms race, 
we are in a better position to deal with the tactical arms 
race. Firstly we shall study the tactical balance as a 
factor in the strategic balance. In so far as general war 
is a war of forces, close-in tactical atomic forces have a 
significant role of pinpoint bombardment to play; and the 
tactical forces generally might assume an offensive and 
occupying, or a defensive and holding role in the wake of a 
thermonuclear exchange. But such an exchange could effective­
ly annihilate the tactical forces or destroy the power of the 
supporting societies to maintain them.
The tactical arms race is the net effect of a number of 
contributory programmes, like the strategic arms race; 
however, there are more varieties of tactical than strategic 
warfare. The possible forms of tactical conflict range from 
local nuclear and large-scale conventional war between the 
superpowers to ‘incidents’, ’brushfires’ and guerilla war 
involving only one superpower. The tactical programmes 
include: overseas and extraterritorial forces, including 
marine deployments; sea and air mobile reserves, centrally 
based; and the less available trained reserves. Raw material 
and machine tool stockpiles, spare industrial capacity, etc.
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- the so-called ’mobilization base’,which might be activated 
in a Korea-type conflict that was not won or stalemated by 
forces in being - is excluded from this analysis.
At the tactical as well as the strategic level forces 
in being have far greater importance than ever before. Not 
only would tactical nuclear war probably preclude mobiliza­
tion, but a fait accompli becomes a far more serious challenge 
under circumstances where great concentration of forces may 
be needed to restore a status quo. Such concentration 
invites deliberate tactical use of nuclear weapons. On the 
other hand, it appears that the advent of nuclear weapons, 
especially since they have been adapted to everything from 
’city-busting’ to close-in battlefield use, has introduced 
greater uncertainty in the tactical as well as the strategic 
balance. Before tactical nuclears were made standard 
equipment there was a chance that conventional tactical 
warfare would escalate into nuclear tactical warfare by 
deliberate decision (for example, this could have happened 
in Korea); with a wide spectrum of tactical nuclears 
available, not only will some tactical conflicts be vastly 
more difficult to keep non-nuclear, but chance will be added 
to deliberation as a factor tending to generate strategic 
conflict, because the line between tactical and strategic 
nuclear warfare is thin and blurred. In consequence of
this deterrence’ has become the principal preoccupation 
of tacticians as well as strategists.
Just as tactical strength is a factor in the strategic 
balance, strategic strength is a factor in the tactical 
balance, as was pointed out earlier: one side may compensate 
for tactical inferiority by means of strategic superiority.
In reality there is no one tactical balance as there is 
a strategic balance; or rather such a balance has little 
operational significance. The statics of the tactical 
competition must be based first on a theatre-by-theatre 
analysis of the balance of deployed tactical forces. Of 
course this must be supplemented by considering: deployed 
forces of a mobile kind not limited to one theatre, such as 
carrier-based marines; strategic mobile reserves based on 
home territory (together with their sea and air lift); and 
trained, non-mobilized reserves. But even so the upshot of 
such a supplementary analysis is to add the potential force 
which can be brought to bear in a given theatre in a given 
time to the actual force present in that theatre at any time. 
This potential force is usually only summoned to the theatre 
in case of war (Korea, for example), or acute crisis (Berlin, 
1961). In local war, attrition is accompanied by an 
intensification of the arms race. This usually involves both
the concentration of mobile forces, mobilization of reserve 
forces and activation of the war economy.
The competition in tactical forces as a whole has both 
a quantitative and a qualitative side, but it is on the 
whole a far more old-fashioned affair than the strategic arms 
race. This may be true because rather than despite the fact 
that the decisive forms of tactical warfare under nuclear 
conditions - short and middle range atomic rockets - are 
exceedingly difficult to confine to what an enemy will 
consider tactical purposes. These weapons may seem too 
decisive to use; they may be withheld in consequence. Thus 
what Stalin called the ‘permanently operating factors’ of 
warfare may well be used decisively at the tactical level, 
especially in areas where troops have not been extensively 
equipped with nuclear weapons, or where the withholding of 
nuclear weapons in tactical conflict is thought possible and 
likely. Nevertheless, just as tactical strength may be 
futile without a strategic atomic cover in modern conditions, 
so conventional tactical strength may be futile without a 
tactical nuclear capability on call. Such a force must be 
able to discriminate between populations and troop concen­
trations, military supply lines and communications, etc., if 
it is hoped to keep tactical nuclear war limited.
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The tactical arms race is thus a mixture of old and 
new* Especially in offensive nuclear rockets and fighter 
bombers, it resembles the strategic race very closely.
There is the same problem of achieving invulnerability 
through good warning and mobility: this leads to a strenuous 
qualitative race in techniques of penetration, detection, 
interception, etc.; and in methods of achieving weapon 
compactness and improving fire-power. This race is 
complicated by the need for delivery vehicles which have 
dual (nuclear and conventional) capability.
The tempo of innovation in the more traditional 
components of the tactical balance - such as infantry, 
mechanized cavalry and non-atomic artillery - has risen, but 
is well below the tempo of strategic innovation and far less 
expensive. Conventional weapons such as the rifle still 
remain in inventory for over a decade rather than for just 
a few years, and new models are not hundreds of times as 
costly as those they replace.
The number of men under arms is widely regarded as the 
key index of both the overall tactical balance and of local 
tactical balances. The dynamics of the tactical competition 
are commonly measured by changes in force levels, especially 
by arms control negotiators. This is understandable, like 
the simple comparison of long range missile strengths at
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the strategic level; but it is equally unsatisfactory.
Western disarmament negotiators in the 1950s stressed the 
importance of a balance of armaments rather than forces, 
but they found it difficult, for obvious reasons, to produce 
a formula for armament reduction as compelling as fixed 
force levels for all powers. There are many fundamental 
types of tactical armament; the man-to-weapon ratio varies 
greatly between various countries; and the demonstrable need 
of countries for various weapons differs greatly.
The diagram below (Fig. 2) conveys the dynamics of a 
tactical competition between two thermonuclear powers. It 
takes account of the fundamentals of the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship. Thus one power (Red) is almost exclusively a 
land power, tactically. It, or its allies, have interior 
lines of communication with most disputed areas; it has 
enormous conventional land forces, a tactical air force 
devoted to the support of these forces, and naval task forces 
also geared to the support of land operations. This power 
has the tactical initiative; it has the ability to exert 
pressure at a series of rapidly changing fronts by manipul­
ating central reserves. It maintains forces at the 
periphery of its sphere of influence far more cheaply than 
its sea-air power rival (Blue), which has difficulty in 
attaining a capability to threaten and apply tactical force
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flexibly and proportionately in (for it) a series of 
changing, far-flung disputed areas. Hence the sea-ai’ 
power1s preferred strategy, if credible, would be: masivre 
retaliation. This strategy ceases to be safe or effe;tivre 
as the rival land power develops an atomic arsenal; i; is; 
replaced or supplemented by the strategies given in tie 
diagram.
Figure 2
Red (Offence) Blue (Defence) 
'Massive RetaliationLocal and Overall 
Tactical Force 
Preponderance
plus (later)
Strategic Nuclear 
Capability
Conventional Reinfor:ement 
Mobile Reserves - lo;al and
^ 'strategic' (i.e. cuitiral) 
Tactical NuclearrrCapibility
PART TWO
THE ARMS RACE AND CONTROL PROPOSAIS : 1955-60
"I wish you wouldn’t squeeze so," said 
the Doormouse, who was sitting next to her.
"I can hardly breathe."
"I can’t help it," said Alice very meekly: 
"I’m growing."
"You’ve no right to grow here." said the 
Doormouse.
"Don’t talk nonsense," said Alice more 
boldly: "you know you’re growing too."
"Yes, but I grow at a reasonable pace," 
said the Doormouse: "not in that ridiculous 
fashion." And he got up very sulkily and 
crossed over to the other side of the court.
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
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INTRODUCTION
In Part One I promised to examine the ‘cogency1 of
proposals for arms control in the period 1955-60. The
proposals selected for analysis in Chapters 1-2 were all put
forward by great powers (sometimes jointly with allies) for
negotiation in detail. All of them were in fact the subject
of negotiation in some detail; or at least the plans which
they modified were. (For example, the Soviet plan,
■1September 20. 1957. was put forward for negotiation at the 
Twelfth General Assembly. Detailed negotiation on it did 
not occur, but its predecessor, the comprehensive partial 
plan of April 30, 1957? had been discussed in detail during 
the 1957 Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. The 
proposal of September 20 contained changes which reflected 
Western criticism of the April 30 proposal.) Thus, most of 
the proposals chosen for analysis were highly evolved or 
•mature' proposals: most of them were the end product of 
much pressure and compromise. The proposals of the period
1 See Chapter 1. Henceforth, the leading plans, and also 
the analyses of them in Chapter 1, are referred to in this way.
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which have not been analysed were omitted either because 
they were not submitted to detailed negotiation, or because 
they very closely resembled some of the proposals analysed. 
Proposals made by small powers and middle powers (except 
when co-sponsored by a great power), and proposals made by 
opposition political parties and private individuals, etc. 
are entirely omitted.
Since the numerous offers of East and West which 
constituted the test ban 'proposal* 1 of each at the end of 
1960 were first made at varying times between 1957 and i96 0, 
the test ban has been discussed in a separate chapter. The 
length of that chapter is a tribute to the length and 
complexity of proposals and negotiations on the test ban, and 
to the superior possibilities of analysing its military 
implications.
Of each proposal considered in Chapters 1-2 I shall
2inquire what sort of military 'world' it envisaged, studying 
the details provided by the proponent, both in his text and 
in the negotiating record, and also setting down unstated
2
I am indebted for this term,and for the conception behind 
much of what follows, to Arthur Lee Burns. See his "Prospects 
for a General Theory of International Relations", World 
Politics, October 1961, p. 41. See also Thomas C. Schelling 
and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control. The 
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961, Part II, "The 
Evaluation of Arms Control Proposals".
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implications of the plan. Obviously, not all the materials 
for the proposed analyses are available, and in any case 
only sketches of the various military situations are 
possible in the space available. In Chapter 3 I shall 
comment on the vagueness, onesidedness and radicalism of 
most proposals.
Some uncertainty about the effect of a proposal for 
arms control is inevitable. Even an exhaustively detailed 
agreement could not possibly control the future of the 
arms race in fully predictable ways; yet radical proposals 
are often presented for immediate adoption and indefinite 
continuation as though they constituted a ‘final solution* 
of the arms problem.
A proposal is not itself (except metaphorically) 
a military world; rather it is a set of rules put forward 
to compete with other influences in the world of the 
future. Any proposal implies not just a succession of 
different military worlds evolving out of each other in 
time, but the possibility of many different worlds at 
any point in the time-span of the proposal, depending 
on developments in technology, political developments, 
whether participants are cheating, and many other 
factors.
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Of course no military planner could closely predict 
the worlds to be expected in the absence of arms control 
either; nevertheless planners resolutely rejected the 
control proposals of opponents in the years under study, 
and the analyses which follow attempt to make a modest 
contribution to the understanding of this fact. Moreover 
the proposals studied form the stock-in-trade of thinking 
about the control of the arms race in the postwar period, 
and are worth studying also on that account.
Some of the technical nomenclature adopted below is 
defined in the Glossary of Special Terms. The method of 
classifying and naming proposals is set out and justified 
in the Appendix to Part Two.
Table 1 below presents some figures on budgets and force 
levels for the Soviet Union and the United States in the 
period 1955-60. The figures on the Soviet defence budget 
should be treated with caution, because many military items 
are hidden in other parts of the Soviet budget, notably 
atomic weapons. Force levels are not a reliable index of 
strength either - for East or West. As Secretary of State 
Dulles said in response to news of the Soviet force 
reduction of 1955:
...the number of men under arms is only one index 
of military strength. The Soviet Union also 
maintains very large organized reserves of men
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and equipment capable of being mobilized 
rapidly. And the capacity to utilize modern 
weapons greatly affects the value of mere 
numbers in the armed forces.3
Statement by Dulles, August 16. 1955? Department of State 
Bulletin. August 29, 1955? p. 33° *
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TABLE 1
Budgets  and F o r c e  L e v e l s :
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and S o v i e t  U nion ,  1955-60
U.S. U .S .S .R .
" N a t i o n a l  
D efen se  1 
S p e n d in g ” 
( b i l l i o n s  of  
d o l l a r s )
F o r c e
L eve ls
( m i l l i o n s  o f  
men)
”D efence  
E x p e n d i t u r e ”
( b i l l i o n s  of 
r o u b l e s )
F o rc e
L eve ls
( m i l l i o n s  o f  
men)
1955 39.1 2 .9 3 5 * 12 3456 112. 17 8 5 - 7631C
1956 4 o . 3
m
0000CM _ 5 .1 2 3 11
1957 4 4 . 4 2 . 658^ 96 . 7s 3 .923(M ay ) 12
1958 4 4 .8 2 . 582-’ 9 6 . 37 3 .923
1959 4 6 . 0 2 .545^ 96 . 19 3 . 62313
i 960 45.1 2 . 5002 96 . 19 3 . 6 2 3 10
N o t e s :
1 Samuel  P. H u n t i n g t o n ,  The Common D e f e n s e , Columbia 
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  New York and London, 1961, p. 282.
2 New York T im e s . J a n u a r y  17? 1960.
3 I b i d . , November 13? 1956.
4 I b i d . , F e b r u a r y  3 ,  1957«
5 I b i d . , June  6 , 1958.
6 I b i d . ,  Augus t  1, 1959.
7 V. Lavrov ,  The S o v i e t  B u d g e t . F o r e i g n  Languages P u b l i s h i n g  
House ,  Moscow, 195^4 p." l5 . '~
( O f f i c i a l  r a t e s  i n  1955-60:  4  ro u b le s= 1  d o l l a r )
8 New York T im e s . F e b r u a r y  6 , 1957.
Notes  ( c o n t . ) s  
9 I b i d . ,  O c to b e r  28 ,  1959.
10 R e p o r t  by N .S .  Khr u sh ch ev  t o  t h e  Supreme S o v i e t  o f  t h e  
U .S ,S .R .  . J a n u a r y  1V, i 9 6 0 , i n  S o v i e t  B o o k le t  No. 6V, 
London, J a n u a r y  1960, p. 26.
(T h is  sp e e c h  r e v e a l e d  S o v i e t  f o r c e  l e v e l s  f o r  
t h e  f i r s t  t im e  i n  t h e  p o s tw a r  p e r i o d .  The 
i 960 r e d u c t i o n  was t o  be co m p le ted  i n  two 
y e a r s ,  b u t  i t  was suspended  on J u l y  8 ,  1961.
See The Communist B loc  and t h e  W es te rn  
A l l i a n c e s .  The M i l i t a r y  B a l a n c e .  1 9 6 1 - 2 . The 
I n s t i t u t e  f o r  S t r a t e g i c  S t u d i e s ,  London,
November 19 6 1, p .  2 . )
11 T ass  s t a t e m e n t  r e g a r d i n g  r e d u c t i o n  o f  S o v i e t  f o r c e s ,  
August  12, 1955, i n  Documents on D isa rm am en t , v o l .  I ,  
p .  V96.
(The r e d u c t i o n  -  o f  6V0,000 men -  was t o  be 
com ple ted  by December 15, 1955* The 1955 
f o r c e  l e v e l  was n o t  d i s c l o s e d  u n t i l  i 9 6 0 . )
12 S t a t e m e n t  by t h e  S o v i e t  Government on t h e  d isa rm am en t  
p ro b lem ,  May 1V, 1956, i n  Documents on D isa rm am en t , 
v o l .  I ,  p. 638.
(The r e d u c t i o n  -  o f  1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0  men -  was t o  be 
com ple ted  by May 1, 1957 .)
13 V. L avrov ,  op. c i t . . p. 15.
( R e d u c t io n  by a f u r t h e r  300 ,0 0 0  men was 
o r d e r e d  by th e  S o v i e t  Government i n  J a n u a r y  
1958 .)
CHAPTER 1
FROPOSAIS , 1955-60
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FEBRUARY 25« 1955 ( S o v i e t  p r o p o s a l  f o r  a f r e e z e  and f o r  
t o t a l  n u c l e a r  d i s a rm a m e n t ,  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  Sub-Committee  
o f  t h e  Disarmament Commission .)
The S o v i e t  Union marked t im e  from F e b r u a r y  25 t o  March 
18 i n  t h e  Sub-Committee  w i t h  t h i s  p e r f u n c t o r y  and 
t r a d i t i o n a l  p r o p o s a l .  The f r e e z e  o f  b u d g e t s ,  armaments and 
armed f o r c e s  ( a t  1955 l e v e l s )  was t o  be a p p l i e d  t o  ‘ a l l  
S t a t e s ’ 5 t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  of  n u c l e a r  weapons was n o t  t o  be 
accompanied  by a c u t - o f f  o f  any k i n d .  The p r o p o s a l  p r o v id e d  
f o r  ‘ i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  ove r  t h e  o b s e r v a n c e ’ o f  t h e  
m e a s u r e s ,  w i t h o u t  d e t a i l s .
2
MARCH 8 , 1955 (W e s te rn  p l a n  f o r  com p reh en s iv e  and ’ c o m p le te '  
d i s a rm a m e n t ,  s u b m i t t e d  t o  th e  Sub-Com m ittee .  F i r s t ,  
A n g lo -F re n c h  v e r s i o n :  June  11, 195V.3 A n g lo -F re n c h  p r o p o s a l  
on f o r c e  l e v e l s  added :  March 2 9 ,  1955* Timing of  n u c l e a r
1
DC/SC.1 / 1 2 /  Rev. 1, i n  Cmd. 9 636 , p. 18.
( D r a f t  U.N. r e s o l u t i o n )
2
DC/SC.1 / 1 5 /  Rev. 1 , i n  Cmd. 9 6 3 6 , p .  2 1 .
( J o i n t  d r a f t  U.N. r e s o l u t i o n )  S p o n so red  by Canada,  
F r a n c e ,  t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom and t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .
3
DC/SC. 1/10, i n  Cmd. 920*f, p. 31.
H
DC/SC.1 /2 0 ,  i n  Cmd. 9 6 3 6 , p .  28.
The U.S. d e l e g a t e  ' s u p p o r t e d *  t h i s  p r o p o s a l  i n  d e b a t e .  
S e e  DC/SC. 1 /P V .32 ,  March 23 ,  1955, i n  Cmd. 96^-9, p. 18 9 .
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disarmament modified: April 19» 1955*^ The United States 
withdrew its support of March o on September 6, 1955* )
March 8, 1955 was a proposal for total nuclear and 
drastic conventional disarmament in three stages, to be 
followed by ’complete* conventional disarmament if possible. 
Stage One provided for ’the constitution and positioning of 
the control organ*, and then a freeze of manpower and 
expenditure, atomic and non-atomic.
Stage Two provided for the following measures to be taken after 
the control organ had reported itself able to enforce them:
(a) * One-half of the agreed reductions of conventional 
armaments and armed forces*. By the terms of the Anglo-French 
Memorandum of March 29, ’agreed reductions’ were to result in 
the following force levels: 650,000 men for the United 
Kingdom and France; and 1-1.5 million men for ’the three other 
permanent members of the Security Council*. (Since ’China’ 
meant different things to the various Western members of the 
Sub-Committee it is not clear what was involved in setting 
and enforcing a force level for her.) 'Considerably lower*
DC/SC. 1/2*+, in Cmd. 9636, p. 30.
(Anglo-French Memorandum)
6
Statement by Stassen. He announced that ’the United States 
does notr place a reservation upon all of its pre-Geneva 
/summit conference/ substantive positions taken in this 
Sub-Committee* - DC/SC. 1/PV.55> in Cmd. 9&51 > P* 7^*
- March 8, 1955 - 
levels would be reached by other states.
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(b) The cut-off in the production,of nuclear weapons. 
Stage Three consisted of:
(a) The third quarter of conventional reductions.
Then (b) ’A complete prohibition on the use’ of mass 
destruction weapons, and, ’simultaneously, the elimination of 
these weapons’. and ’the final quarter of the agreed 
reductions...shall begin; and both processes shall be 
completed within the time-limit laid down in the Disarmament 
Treaty’.^
March 8 expressed the ’hope' that after these 
reductions states would further reduce their forces and 
armaments to ’levels strictly necessary for the maintenance 
of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations 
of signatory States under the terms of the United Nations 
Charter’.
The plan was exceedingly unwieldly. It had to be 
agreed to as a whole by an indeterminately large number of 
states, conceivably the entire U.N. membership and other 
states as well; certainly Communist China. There was no 
provision for the great powers to do some disarming on
7 Proposal of April 19.
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their own if others were not willing; there was no 
suggestion that the earlier, less radical measures provided 
for by the plan might be taken unconditionally. A treaty 
was to be prepared by the Disarmament Commission, submitted 
to the General Assembly and a World Disarmament Conference, 
and would not enter into force until ’it had been ratified 
by those of the signatories who would be specified in the 
treaty’. Dozens of countries might have had a virtual veto 
power, and at the least it would have taken years to 
negotiate such a world-wide treaty, especially in view of the 
failure of the Sub-Committee, the Disarmament Commission and 
the General Assembly to develop a working body of ideas on 
world disarmament. No region except Europe and no powers 
except the Five had ever been the subject of close arms 
control study in the postwar period, yet the West’s plan 
implicitly set out to end many regional and local arms races.
The plan was lacking in many vital details. Although 
the Western delegates on the Sub-Committee often declared that 
limitation of armaments was more important than fixing force 
levels, they made little effort to develop doctrine or 
criteria for armament limitation.
Their effort in 1955 consisted of tabling a paper which
provided merely that:
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The levels and types of such /permitted? armaments and equipment shall be such as 
to prevent undue concentration of total 
permitted armed forces in a manner which 
might threaten international peace and security.°
No time limits were set for the individual stages of 
March 8. Western delegates merely mentioned a time limit
9of two or three years for the plan as a whole. In 
subsequent years they came to oppose setting time limits 
for a plan as a whole and to favour time limits for 
individual stages.
The plan was not fully controllable on the nuclear side. 
The Western delegates often declared that they would not 
agree to measures which could not be controlled, and yet 
they firmly proposed such measures. Quite apart from the 
elimination of chemical and bacteriological ‘weapons of 
mass destruction’, for which a control method was not even 
suggested, March 8 provided for the elimination of nuclear 
weapons, which the French delegate, Moch, had admitted for 
years to be uncontrollable by any known inspection techniques.
ö
DC/SC.1/17, in Cmd. 9636, p. 22.
9 For example, the British delegate, Nutting, on March 31, 
said that ‘three years should suffice’*- DC/SC. 1/PV.35, in 
Cmd. 9649, p. 323-
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The plan implied a far-reaching political transformation 
of the world, yet it had virtually no political provisions.
No analysis of the impact of near-complete disarmament on the 
various Cold War and other territorial disputes was offered; 
and in 1955 there was no Western plan for the political 
structure of a militarily transformed world, apart from an
extensive definition of control organ functions tabled
10separately on April 21.
Western views on the political preconditions of
disarmament were vague. Nutting said on May 12 that:
We have always held that there must be some 
relaxation of tension before disarmament can 
begin, but we have never held and will never hold 
that there can be no progress towards disarmament 
until all the problems and issues which cause 
international tension have been resolved.11
How much relaxation had to occur before disarmament 
could begin? No precise answer was forthcoming from the West 
in 1955} but it is quite certain that comprehensive and, 
especially, total nuclear disarmament would have been ■un­
thinkable without a far-reaching detente between East and 
West. Had a disarmament treaty on the lines of the Western 
plan been drafted in detail it would have been a dead letter.
1 0  — —
See DC/SC.1/25, April 21, 1955, in Cmd. 9636, p. 31.
DC/SC.1/PV.48, in Cmd. 9650, p. 638.
11
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A 2MAY 10, 1955 ' (Sov ie t  p lan  f o r  comprehensive and C o m p le te1 
disarmament,  submitted  to  the  Sub-Committee. Foreshadowed 
i n  the  p lan  of March 18, 1955.^3 Reaffirmed i n  1956.1*0
May 10, 19?? was a two s ta g e  program ( th e  f r e e z e  being
p a r t  of the f i r s t  s tage)  w ith  the  same fo rc e  l e v e l  goals as
March 8 , 1955» I t  a l s o  provided f o r  e l im in a t io n  of nuc lea r
weapons and dec lared  t h a t  i t  would be ‘d e s i r a b l e 1 to  reduce
fo rc e s  to  ‘ l e v e l s  s t r i c t l y  necessa ry  f o r . . . i n t e r n a l
s e c u r i t y 1 a f t e r  the  two s tag es  provided f o r .  These s tages
were to  l a s t  one year each.
S tage  One (1956) provided f o r :
(a) A f re e z e  of f o r c e s ,  armaments and budgets w i th in  
two months, and d i s c lo s u r e  of r e l e v a n t  f ig u re s  w i th in  one 
month.
(b) 50 per cent of conven t iona l  r ed u c t io n s  ( t o  be 
worked out in  r e l a t i o n  to  l e v e l s  a t  December 31, 195*0.
(c) A World Conference i n  the  f i r s t  h a l f  of 1956 to  
determine l e v e l s  fo r  ' o t h e r  S t a t e s * .
(d) 1 As one of the  f i r s t  measures*, a ban on n uc lea r  
t e s t s .
12  “
DC/SC.1 /26/Rev. 2, i n  Cmd. 9636, p. 33«
(D ra f t  U.N. r e s o lu t io n )
13
DC/SC.1 /19/Rev. 1, i n  Cmd. 9636, p. 26.
(D ra f t  U.N. r e s o lu t io n )
1*f
Statem ent by Gromyko to  the Sub-Committee, A p r i l  26, 1956. 
DC/SC. 1 A3, May 3, 1956.
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(e) Simultaneously with (b), a ban on the use of nuclear 
weapons except with Security Council approval.
(f) Liquidation of agreed extraterritorial bases.
There would thus have been some reductions of forces and
armament by the Five before levels for other powers were set; 
but unless the World Conference had succeeded in 1956 the 
agreement would presumably have broken down.
The ban on tests at an early stage was not in the Soviet 
interest; however there were no control provisions 
specifically mentioned for it.
The ban on use of nuclear weapons would have favoured the 
Soviet Union for the period before their elimination, 
especially in Europe where Soviet conventional superiority 
threatened the Western Powers, and especially until most of 
the proposed conventional reductions had taken place.
Stage Two (1957) provided for:
(a) the ’weapon* cut-off.
(b) The final 50 per cent of conventional reductions, 
and agreed reductions for other states.
(c) After 75 per cent of conventional reductions had 
been made, a 'complete prohibition’ of mass destruction 
weapons, their elimination from the armaments of states, and 
the final 25 per cent of conventional reductions.
40
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(d) Complete liquidation of foreign bases.
Wadsworth made it clear in the Sub-Committee that the 
United States envisaged dismantling some of its bases during
disarmament, but would keep a number adequate for its remain-
1ing forces and alliance commitments. y On the other hand the 
Soviets called for complete disengagement of the Two in 
Europe and the withdrawal of the American presence in the Far 
East, although not for the dissolution of either superpower’s 
alliance system. In a nuclearly disarmed world, with the 
British and French armies bottled up inside national borders 
and all American forces confined to the United States, the 
Soviets could have dictated terms to Western Europe.
The text of May 10 began with a draft General Assembly 
’Declaration’ which, after reviewing the Cold War and the 
existing detente over Korea and Austria, called for a 
withdrawal of occupying forces from Germany to promote 
’national unification’, and for a settlement of ‘outstanding 
questions in the Far East in accordance with the principles 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity’. The Soviet 
delegate, Malik, declared under pressure from Nutting in
T5
DC/SC.1/PV.39, April 5, 1955, in Cmd. 9649, pp. 365-6 and
369.
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the Sub-Committee that there was a ’direct link’ between the
16Declaration and the disarmament provisions. The third 
section of the plan, 'Concerning International Control', 
declared that there could be no disarmament without control 
but that
the necessary conditions for the institution of a 
control system which would enjoy the trust of all 
States and would fully meet the requirements of 
international security do not at present exist.
What would create these 'necessary conditions'? The
general review of the control problem ended:
The problem of instituting International Control 
and of the rights and powers of the international 
control organ must therefore be considered in 
close connexion with the execution of the above- 
mentioned measures /in the Declaration/ for the 
lessening of international tension, the strengthen­
ing of trust between States and the carrying out 
of other measures relating to the reduction of 
armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.
The introduction to the list of control organ rights
and powers for Stage Two began:
The carrying out of the measures provided for in 
the Declaration set forth above and of the measures 
for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and 
the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons 
envisaged for the first stage will create the nec­
essary atmosphere of trust between States, thereby 
ensuring the appropriate conditions for the extension 
of the functions of the International Control Organ.
DC/SC.1/FV.48, May 12, 1955, in Cmd. 9650, p. 644.
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It seems, therefore, that the Soviets believed that a 
first stage of disarmament was possible without political 
preconditions, but that the second stage would have to be 
preceded by political settlements. Although May 10 was far 
more specific than any Western proposal on the connection 
between tension and disarmament, there was nevertheless a 
rather studied vagueness in its provisions.
Unlike the West, the Soviets proposed firmly that 
disarmament start in 1956. Thus not only the adherence of 
an unspecified number of 1 other states’, but the settlement 
of a number of hoary Cold War disputes had to be secured by 
the end of 1956. The program was more utopian than March 8. 
1955.
The West’s plan probably would have broken down quietly 
when the control organ found itself unable to report that 
total nuclear disarmament could be controlled, thus 
dis-obligating states from proceeding with disarmament, and 
requiring decisions about how much accomplished disarmament 
to retain. May 10, on the other hand, provided inflexible 
time limits for its two major stages, and a breakdown would 
have been ’illegal’ and, no doubt, vituperative. The Soviet 
position reflected not only concern that the control 
organization might be Western-dominated, but awareness that
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unilateral denunciation of treaties is easier for Soviet 
diplomacy than for that of any Western democracy. Also, 
because of its more secret governmental operations, the 
Soviet Union would be in a better position to cheat in an 
agreement anyway.
The section of the May 10 plan on control contained 
the first provisions of any disarmament plan dealing explicit­
ly with surprise attack. During Stage One:
In order to prevent a surprise attack by one State 
upon another, the International Control Organ 
shall establish on the territory of all the States 
concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control 
posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on 
main motor highways and in aerodromes. The task 
of these posts shall be to see that there is no 
dangerous concentration of military land forces 
or of air or naval forces.
The rationale of this proposal was given in the preamble 
on control:
...preparations for a new war, the danger of which 
has been greatly increased by the development of 
atomic and hydrogen weapons, inevitably necessitate 
the concentration of large military formations at 
certain points together with large quantities of 
conventional armaments - aircraft, artillery, 
tanks, warships and so forth. Such concentration 
and the movement of large formations of land, sea 
and air forces cannot be effected except through 
important communication centres, ports and airfields. 
Under conditions of modern military technique, the 
importance of such points in the preparation of an 
aggressive war has not diminished, but is on the 
contrary increasing.
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In addition to atomic and hydrogen weapons, 
for all their destructive capacity, armies of 
many millions and vast quantities of convention­
al armaments, which are of decisive importance 
to the outcome of any major war, would inevitably 
be involved in military operations in the event 
of the outbreak of war.
As Raymond Garthoff^ and other authorities have shown,
Soviet military science was in process of breaking with the
Stalinist past in 19559 although the break was never complete.
The above statement reflects new views in so far as it admits
a 1 greatly increased1 danger of war under nuclear conditions.
However, the alleged 'increasing* importance of points for
the concentration of conventional formations and material
harks back to the Stalinist doctrine that war is decided by
18the ‘permanently operating factors' of military strength.
The strategic view underlying the proposal of May 10 
overlooks the important possibility that the outcome of a 
war could be decided by strategic atomic forces alone. There 
need be no prior conventional mobilization, in which case 
only airport, rocket site, and, to an uncertain extent, port
17Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age. Atlantic Books, London,
19W.
18
These were, in Garthoff's formulation, 'the basic morale, 
economic-military, command, and military qualitative and quan­
titative elements', as contrasted with 'transitory...factors 
such as surprise or advance mobilization'. Ibid., p. 82.
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inspection would detect preparations for surprise. Even if 
it were true that ‘armies of many millions...are of decisive 
importance’, this does not mean they would have to be 
mobilized in time for the opening blows of war. Mobilization 
would be a sure way to lose surprise, and might lead indeed 
to unnecessary losses. Dispersal of forces could be vital 
for their protection during an initial exchange of strategic 
nuclear strikes.
It is ironical that May 10 proposed measures primarily 
useful against the type of mass conventional surprise attack 
which the Soviet Union would have been best equipped to 
undertake. (The United States soon was to repeat this 
performance.) Malcolm Mackintosh has suggested that the 
Soviet military were anxious to obtain more information on 
the location and operation of U.S. Strategic Air Command
bases, and were therefore prepared to trade some of their own
19secrets. y However, it seems more likely that this proposal, 
like the later American surprise attack proposal, sprang from 
an uncritical importing of Soviet strategic doctrine into 
its arms control doctrine, rather than a careful calculation 
of advantages.
19’’Arms Control and the Soviet National Interest” in Louis 
Henkin (ed.), Arms Control: Issues for the Public. Spectrum Book, New Jersey, l"96T,"~p. 1 .
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JULY 21, 1955 - The Eden Plan (British proposal for joint
inspection of forces in Europe, submitted to the Geneva 
Heads of Government Conference. Later tabled in theSub-Committee.20)
Eden put forward the proposal in these terms:
I suggest that we...set up a simple, joint 
inspection of the forces now confronting one 
another in Europe. It should not be impossible 
to decide that over a specified area to be 
agreed between us, extending perhaps for a fixed 
depth on either side of the line which now divides 
East and West Europe, there should be supervision 
by inspecting teams appointed by the military 
commands on both sides.
He called the suggestion
a practical experiment in the operative 
inspection of armaments...which, if it were 
locally successful, might extend outwards from 
the centre to the periphery. In this way we 
might hope to establish a sense of security in 
Europe and begin the process of reducing tensions 
here.
The Soviet delegate on the Sub-Committee failed to 
discuss this suggestion at all in 1955; however it influenced 
his proposals for ’partial measures’ in March 27. 1956. as 
will be seen. While the Soviets were known to object to 
schemes of pure inspection for principled and practical 
reasons, it also became apparent in 1957 that the United 
States, deferring to West German susceptibilities, objected
DC/SC.1/30, August 29, 1955, in Cmd. 9636, p. 53. 
(Speech by Eden)
20
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to inspection schemes which lent lustre to the East-West
21dividing line in Europe.
AUGUST 291 1955'"^'- The Faure Plan (French proposal for 
budgetary disarmament, submitted to the Sub-Committee. 
Original proposal by Premier Faure at the Geneva Heads of 
Government Conference, July 21, 1955. 3)
Faure proposed in his Memorandum at Geneva that there 
should be 'percentage reductions in military expenditure 
for a particular budget period in relation to the preceding 
period* - the figure to be determined *by agreement between 
the Governments concerned*.
The percentage cuts would increase progressively from 
year to year. An 'international secretariat’ would draw up 
'a common definition of military expenditure*. The plan 
provided for transfers of savings 'in whole or in part* to 
international aid projects.
21
See discussion of August 2.9* 1957 and September 20, 1957 
below.
22DC/SC.1/27, in Cmd. 9636, p. 42.
("Draft Agreement on the Financial Supervision of Dis­
armament and the Allocation for Peaceful Purposes of the 
Resulting Funds")
23Conference document CF/D0C/13? in The Geneva Conference of 
Heads of Government, July 18-23. 1955» Department of State 
Publication 6o4£, 195?* pp. 6>0-2.
("Memorandum,..by the French Delegation")
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No other method of disarmament was proposed by Faure 
at Geneva.
The supplementary Draft Agreement tabled in the
Sub-Committee on August 29 made further detailed proposals
on the method of assessing and executing the percentage cuts.
It also provided for a fund to be set up to handle financial
resources released for international aid. Unlike the
original proposal it seemed to envisage budgetary disarmament
being linked to traditional-style disarmament.
...percentage reduction...will be calculated in 
such a way as to correspond to the reductions in 
conventional armaments and armed forces and the 
abolition of the weapons of mass destruction as 
provided for in each stage of the Disarmament 
Convention /unspecified^7.
The French proposal for distributing the savings brought 
about by disarmament to underdeveloped countries became a 
commonplace in later proposals of East and West.
Pure budgetary disarmament would be an invitation to 
governments to use their skill to conceal military expendi­
tures. Unless budgetary inspection was backed up by conven­
tional inspection of men and armaments it would be a simple 
matter to conceal the budgetary manifestations of massive 
illegal military preparations under a disarmament agreement, 
even for those governments not already skilful in such con­
48
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AUGUST 30» 195?2^- The Eisenhower Plan (United States plan 
to prevent surprise attack, submitted to the Sub-Committee. 
Original proposal by President Eisenhower at the Geneva Heads 
of Government Conference, July 21, 1955. ? Supplementary 
Memorandum submitted to the Sub-Committee, October 7, 1955.2°)
At Geneva on July 21, Eisenhower had proposed a
three-part plan 1 to provide against the possibility of
surprise attack* as between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The first element of the plan as laid down in the
proposal of August 30 was an exchange of ’blueprints* of
military establishments. The blueprints were defined as
consisting of information on
the identification, strength, command structure 
and disposition of personnel, units and equipment 
of all major land, sea and air forces including 
organized reserves and paramilitary; and a complete 
list of military plants, facilities and installa­
tions with their locations.
Each side was to 'prepare lists of major military 
forces and establishments showing the deployment of forces 
and the locations of installations and facilities by 
geographical co-ordinates'. The proposal listed 'the
24
DC/SC. 1/31, in Cmd. 9636, p. 55.
("Outline Plan for the Implementation of the July 21 , 
1955 Presidential Proposal at Geneva")
25
DC/SC.1/28, in Cmd. 9636, p. 48.
("Statement on Disarmament by the President of the 
United States")
26
DC/SC.1/3 6, in Cmd. 9636, p. 64.
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elements of information considered essential to preclude 
surprise attack1. These were:
1(a) Weapons and delivery systems suitable for 
surprise attack.
(b) Transportation and telecommunications.
(c) Armed forces, structure and positioning of armed forces.
(d) Additional facilities as mutually agreed...1
The lists were to be exchanged and verified progressive­
ly. This was the second element of the plan. Each side 
would post ’on-the-spot observers' with the other side’s 
’operating land, sea and air forces, at their supporting 
installations, and at key locations as necessary for the 
verification, continued observation and reporting of each 
category of information’.
Finally, the third element of the plan (from which its
most popular but misleading name derived) provided that:
Aerial reconnaissance will be conducted by each 
inspecting country on an unrestricted, but 
monitored basis to augment the efforts of the 
posted observers...Liason personnel of the country 
being inspected will be aboard each reconnaissance 
aircraft during all over-flights.
Inspectors would employ ’visual, photographic and
electronic means’.
This plan’s impact on the world military situation 
has been more thoroughly studied than that of any other
- August 30, 1955 -
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post-war arms control plan except the test ban. It is 
usually pointed out that the Soviet Union can easily obtain 
most of the information on the size and general disposition 
of United States forces that would be needed to estimate the 
United States’ (or the Soviet Union’s) prospects in a 
surprise attack. However, the ’open skies’ part of the U.S. 
plan would have given the U.S.S.R. more accurate and up-to- 
the-minute information on the deployment and status of U.S. 
strategic systems than could otherwise have been obtained 
before the satellite era, and the proposal for on-the-spot 
observers would have given even more ’tactical warning’2 i^f 
it had been implemented on a broad scale.
U.S. ignorance of Soviet force sizes and dispositions 
was considerably greater than comparable Soviet ignorance 
in 1955. The United States lacked provision for both 
strategic and tactical warning. ’Legal’ arms inspection or 
a greater ’illegal’ espionage effort was required to remedy 
this lack, and the rejection of 'open skies' was followed by 
unreciprocated U.S. overflights of Russia.
27
Tactical warning warns of an attack already under way. 
Strategic warning warns of an attack being planned or 
prepared. For a discussion of the surprise attack problem 
in general, see Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age 
Princeton University Press, 1959, Chapters 7-Ö.
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The whole program of August 30 - exchange of 
‘blueprints1, open skies and on-the-spot observers - was 
presented as a way of reassuring each side (a) strategically, 
that the other side had inadequate forces for surprise 
attack, and (b) tactically, that a surprise attack was not 
in fact on the way. However, because the extensive 
inspection would have revealed otherwise secret Soviet 
weapon locations to U.S. military planners, U.S. ability to 
make a successful counterforce strike could have been 
enhanced despite the warning facilities enjoyed by the Soviets.
In 1955 the Strategic Air Command's counterforce 
capability was a central feature in NATO plans for the 
defence of Europe, which called for nuclear strikes against 
military targets in the Soviet heartland in the event of 
massive and successful ground attack on the Central NATO 
front. President Eisenhower did not renounce NATO strategy 
in proposing his surprise attack plan, yet in that plan the 
United States implicitly foreswore counterforce attack.
Inspection is no threat to a mobile and hardened 
strategic force of the type it became American policy to 
develop in the middle 1950s, but this policy was unattract­
ive to the Russians, who seem to have preferred to rely on
- August 30, 1955 -
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geographical secrecy until the observation satellite era. 
August 30 directly threatened Soviet secrecy.
It is interesting to note that the observers provided 
for in the plan were to be nationals of the inspecting 
country engaged in continuous ’reporting’, presumably to 
their own military authorities, since no other authority 
was mentioned. This situation would have been far more 
conducive to surprise attack than, say, a situation in which 
international inspectors reported to an impartial evaluating 
authority with a right to keep secrets. However the Soviets 
had no confidence in impartial authorities.
The charge of obsolescence is usually added to those of 
self-interest and danger in criticism of the Eisenhower 
plan. It is customary to point out that aerial inspection 
will detect the massing of bomber aircraft in forward areas 
but not the readying of missiles for firing. Although such 
criticism overlooks the provision in August 30 for ’the 
positioning of on-the-spot observers with operating land, 
sea and air forces’, it is true that the almost instantaneous 
salvo capability of solid fuel missiles would have made even 
this provision worthless in relation to them. However, 
long-range solid fuel missiles did not become operational 
until 1960, and in any case bomber as well as missile forces
- August 30, 1955 -
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would have been necessary for successful surprise attack 
well into the 1960s - a point overlooked by perfectionists. 
Obsolescence problems of surprise attack schemes will be 
raised again in discussing the more detailed suggestions 
put forward by the Western delegations at the surprise
p Qattack conference of 1958.
Under pressure from the Soviet Union in the 
Sub-Committee, the United States declared in the supplement­
ary memorandum of October 7 that 1 the Eisenhower plan is the 
gateway to agreement' on reduction of armaments, but the 
American delegate, Stassen, refused to say what lay beyond 
the gateway in 1955. The memorandum also bowed to the Soviet 
criticism that the proposal excluded inspection of foreign 
forces in declaring that an 'agreement...might also provide 
for the adherence and participation...of designated countries 
on an equitable basis, once the plan is in operation between 
the Soviet Union and the United States'. In their turn, the 
Soviets proposed aerial inspection in 1956, but as an 
accompaniment to disarmament, not in isolation from it. 7
28------------
See December 17. 1958. 
29See March 27. 1956.
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MARCH 19, 1956 ^  (Anglo-French proposal for comprehensive 
radical disarmament, submitted to the Sub-Committee.)
This plan 'synthesized* the traditional elements of 
the Western comprehensive plan of March 8, 1955 with U.S. 
and Soviet ideas on preventing surprise attack and French 
ideas on budgetary control and the allocation of savings to 
underdeveloped countries. For the first time in a Western 
plan the control of nuclear test explosions was specifically 
provided for. Total nuclear, chemical and biological 
disarmament was dropped.
The order of traditional measures in the plan was the 
same as in March 8. 1955. with two major exceptions.
Firstly, there was no provision for transfers of fissionable 
weapon materials to peaceful uses, but merely a proposal to 
convene an 'international scientific conference to examine 
the possibilities of eliminating stocks of nuclear weapons' 
after Stage Three. Secondly, the general assembly of the 
International Disarmament Organisation (I.D.O.) (which 
corresponded to the World Disarmament Conference in March 8) 
would not determine force levels for states other than the 
Five until after the entry into force of the treaty; and
DC/SC.1/38, in Cmd. 9770, p. 26.
("Working Document: Proposed Synthesis")
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these states would not begin their initial reductions until 
after the Five had begun theirs.
The plan provided explicitly in many places for 
1 development* of control progressively in anticipation of 
measures, and it supplied details on the various types of 
control.
Like March 8. the plan did not propose time limits for
its three stages individually or collectively. However,
once more Nutting declared informally in the Sub-Committee that
I should have thought that one year would be 
needed and might be sufficient to complete the 
operations in each stage of the plan.31
Stage One consisted of measures, some of which involved all
signatories:
(a) A ban on ’the use of nuclear weapons except in 
defence against aggression*.
(b) Appointment of a director general and recruitment 
of the ‘first elements’ of the control organ.
(c) A freeze, including declaration of levels, 
submission of blueprints, budgets and accounts, and an 
undertaking not to increase force levels or expenditures.
31DC/SC.1/PV.71, March 22, 1956, p. 6.
57- March 19, 1956 -
(d) Measures against surprise attack, including aerial 
surveys, control posts, mobile control teams and ’financial 
inspectors’ (sic).
(e) Meeting of the general assembly of the I.D.O. to 
determine armament and force levels for ’other participating 
States’, which ’should be considerably below the levels 
fixed for the five permanent members of the Security Council'.
(f) The executive committee of the I.D.O. accepts the 
reports of the control organ that it is ready to supervise 
reductions.
(g) ’Initial steps in agreed reductions by the five 
Powers and consequential reduction in military budgets’.
(h) Establishment of a control branch to supervise 
limitation of test explosions.
An Annex to the plan described an intricate transition 
procedure for passage to Stage Two. The transition would 
not be made unless, on receipt of a report from the control 
organ, the executive committee unanimously decided that 
first stage provisions had been carried out, that the 
control organ was ready to supervise Stage Two, and that 
’the necessary conditions of confidence' existed for
proceeding
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Failing unanimity there would be a six months interval 
followed by either Stage Two or a further lapse of up to 
three months, or, if no unanimous decision for these courses 
could be reached, reference to the Security Council.
The 'necessary conditions of confidence' were not 
specified, but political settlements were clearly implied 
by this phrase in the light of traditional Western policy. 
Anthony Nutting wildly overstated the case when he wrote 
later that the Anglo-French plan
spelled out the necessary link between the
achievement of political settlements and the
performance of disarmament.32
The 'necessary link' has never been spelled out by any 
Western delegation.
Stage Two provided for:
(a) 'Limitation of nuclear test explosions...'
(b) 'Completion of first half of agreed reductions by 
the Five Powers...A proportion of the savings would be 
allocated to improving standards of living throughout the 
world and in particular in the less-developed countries'.
(c) 'Other Powers start on first half of reductions...'
32
Disarmament; an Outline of the Negotiations. Oxford 
University Press, London, 19599 p. 23.
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Transition to Stage Three was as for transition to 
Stage Two,
Stage Three provided for:
(a) Prohibition of tests, and ’simultaneously1, the 
’weapon* cut-off.^
(b) The third quarter of five-power reductions, and 
on its completion:
(c) *.,,complete prohibition of the use of nuclear 
weapons *.
(d) Start on second half of reductions for other 
powers.
(e) Start on last quarter of five-power reductions, all 
states participating complete reductions together.
There was provision for twro ’final measures’. As
mentioned above, the elimination of nuclear weapons would
be discussed by a scientific conference, and the general
assembly of the I.D.O. would discuss the ‘possibility of
further reductions of armed forces and armaments’.
The plan did not specify final force levels for the
Five. In the Sub-Committee Nutting said that these were
ok’a detail’ and 'subject to negotiation’. Analysis of
33~In 1957 the lafest proposed a 'materials’ cut-off without 
a 'weapon' cut-off. See August 29, 1957.
34 ------
DC/SC.1/PV.71, March 22, 1956, pp. 5 and 2.
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the military situations envisaged by the plan is therefore 
difficult.
The plan was represented as a ’synthesis’. A minor 
part of the Soviet plan of May 10, 1955 - measures against 
surprise attack, had been joined to American proposals on 
the same subject, and attached to a traditional Anglo-French 
comprehensive disarmament plan. The national elements of 
the synthesis were very unbalanced.
The provision for a five-power veto on transition from 
one stage to the next was new in a Western plan: it was 
first suggested in a paper on control tabled by the French 
delegation late in the 1955 negotiations.^ The Anglo-French 
did not wish to be forced to choose between denouncing a 
treaty unilaterally and moving forward to new measures 
before they could be controlled, or before opponents had 
fully executed previous measures. The veto provision 
indicated that West as well as East could distrust a 
control organ. The Anglo-French expressed their distrust 
by a veto over proceeding from one stage to the next; 
the Russians expressed their distrust by a veto over not
35
DC/SC.1/33, September 2, 1955, in Cmd. 9636, p. 59-
("Proposals Concerning the Powers of the Control 
Administration")
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proceeding from one stage to the next - that is, by propos­
ing an inflexible time limit for the agreement as a whole, 
and by making suspension of the agreement a responsibility 
of the Security Council.^
March 19. 1956 as a whole was far more realistic than 
its predecessor in having no mandatory provision for 
complete nuclear disarmament. Although the plan would have 
limited the nuclear club, France was soon arguing that the 
cut-off was unacceptable unless the nuclear powers agreed 
to reduce their weapon stockpiles greatly, which this plan 
did not propose.
The plan was unwieldy in that it did require agreement 
in advance by a large number of states to comprehensive 
measures extending over three 3tages. The West has not yet 
conceived the idea of a comprehensive first step to be 
agreed independently of subsequent steps by a limited 
number of powers.
36
For example, May 10. 1955.
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MARCH 27 * 1956^  (Soviet proposal for radical conventional 
disarmament, submitted to the Sub-Committee.)
The Soviet Union proposed that the conventional and 
surprise attack provisions of May 10, 1955 be executed in 
isolation from the atomic and political provisions. May 10 
had seemed to accept the Western thesis that radical 
disarmament must be preceded by political settlements.
March 27 made no mention of settlements, and Gromyko stated 
in the Sub-Committee that it * can be executed forthwith, 
without...agreements being reached with reference to any 
other outstanding problems’. ^  This line persisted 
throughout the rest of the period under study in relation 
to all Soviet proposals.
March 27 also proposed, in isolation from conventional 
disarmament, a zone of arms limitation in Europe and 
’partial measures’ which will be described below.
The conventional measures were to be carried out ’in 
1956-8*, beginning with a three month freeze, during which 
forces, armament and expenditure would be held below levels 
obtaining on 31 December, 1955. The control organ would 
establish local branches and control posts within two of
—  "  ’
DC/SC. 1A1, in Cmd. 9770, p. 31.(Draft U.N. resolution)
DC/SC. 1/PV.81 , April 16, 1956, p. 32.
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these months; and within one month of the entry into force 
of the agreement states parties would submit1 complete 
official figures1 concerning their forces, armaments and 
’expenditure for military requirements’ to the control 
organ. These provisions were identical with those of May 10. 
except that the provision for local branches and the setting 
of a time limit for initial establishment of control were 
both new.
The force levels provided for the Five were not 
changed, but the 'considerably lower* manpower levels for 
non-Five participants mentioned in May 10 were now defined 
as being less than 150-200,000 men. The World Conference 
to set precise levels was now to meet before initial 
reductions (presumably in 1956), instead of before the end 
of the first half of the first year of reductions, and 
non-Five nations would do their disarming - like the Five - 
over nearly two full years, instead of entirely in the 
second year of the disarmament program.
For the first time in a Soviet plan, it was 
specifically provided, following the Faure Plan, that some 
released savings would be used 'to furnish assistance to 
economically underdeveloped countries'.
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The surprise attack and control provisions were as
for May 10« with three exceptions. Firstly, there was a
new provision that ’the agreed system of supervisions
shall be...applied...to such armed forces and material
as the States parties to the agreement may possess outside
their own frontiers’. Secondly, the ’objects of control*
mentioned in May 10 were at last defined as: ’military
units; stores of military equipment and ammunition; land,
naval and air bases, factories manufacturing conventional
armaments and ammunition’. Of course nuclear installations
were excluded from the list. Thirdly, a very tentative
concession to the American demand for aerial reconnaissance
appeared for the first time:
At a specified stage of the execution of the 
general disarmament programme, when 
confidence among States has been strengthened, 
the countries concerned shall consider the 
possibility of using aerial photography as 
one of the methods of control.
The ’Zone of Limitation and Inspection of Armaments’ 
in Europe was defined as ’including the territory of both 
parts of Germany and of States adjacent to them’. There 
were to be ceilings set for the forces of the Four in the 
area, a ban on atomic weapons, and ’joint inspection’ of
65
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forces - an idea first suggested by Eden at the 1955
99summit conference.
The ‘partial measures’ to be agreed 'independently of
•..disarmament' were: an immediate test ban (no control was
mentioned); removal of atomic weapons from Germany within
three months; and a 15 per cent reduction of military
budgets by 'States' (unspecified).
Anthony Nutting has argued that the Soviets proposed
conventional disarmament in 1956 because they were anxious
to press on towards nuclear parity with the United States.
...it is likely that by 1956 the Soviets 
realized that they were within measurable 
distance of catching up on the American lead 
in nuclear weapon development, and that the 
moment had therefore arrived to rid 
themselves of any commitment which might 
inhibit their nuclear development programme.
In fact, the comprehensive proposals of May 10. 1955
Li_ 1were not withdrawn by the Russians; and an immediate test 
ban which, even if uncontrolled, would have put a brake on 
the development of Soviet weapon technology, was now
39See July 21 , 1955.
40
Disarmament: an Outline of the Negotiations, o p. cit.,
|?p. 24-5’.
See statement by Gromyko in the Sub-Committee, DC/SC.1 A 3 ,  
26 April, 1956, in Cmd. 9770, p. M3.
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proposed in isolation instead of as an integral part of a
comprehensive proposal, as in 1955» In any case, ‘catching
up1 on an opponent in the development of a key weapon when
one is within reasonable distance is considerably less
important than catching up when one is lagging badly. Why
had the Soviet Union put nuclear disarmament first before
1956? Nutting1s argument overlooks the key fact that the
only type of nuclear disarmament the Soviets had ever
proposed was total. It was disarmament which would have
wiped out the United States advantage entirely.
Nutting*s interpretation assumes that the Soviet
proposal was not put forward cynically; that the Soviets
thoughtothers might agree to it, and, for their own part,
intended to implement it. However even if the Soviets
were not sincere r in 1956, March 27 may have been thought
a good proposal for a power which wished to preserve * the
spirit of Geneva* by seeming flexible. After all, the West
was increasingly opposed to total nuclear disarmament while
the Soviets had always objected to the cut-off in isolation
from total nuclear disarmament. However, France came out
vehemently against an agreement which would have permitted
4-2the nuclear arms race to continue, and in any case the 
If2 “
See speech by Moch, DC/SC. 1/PV.74-, March 28, 1956, p. 36ff.
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West had begun to insist more forcibly than ever that low 
force levels such as those proposed in March 27 were 
inappropriate to the political condition of the world. 
Nutting has summed up the British view in his book on the 
negotiations.
To adopt the jargon of the Sub-Committee, the 
Soviets were asking the West to accept, for a 
world political situation that was at best a 
fairly dark shade of grey, the kind of 
disarmament which the West had proposed for 
the world after it had become virtually snow- 
white. ^ 3
The United States was arguing more concretely that 
its alliance system would be needed until political 
settlements were made, and that effective alliance arrange­
ments were incompatible with very low force levels. It is 
interesting to note that in 1957 the Soviets themselves 
claimed that low, equal force levels for the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. were more to the Soviet interest than high, equal 
ones. The preamble to the proposal for comprehensive 
partial measures of April 30, 1957 stated, inter alia, that:
Whereas a reduction of armed forces to 2.5 
million men would not only give the United 
States security, but also enable it to 
maintain large armed forces outside its 
frontiers... the reduction of the Soviet armed
An Outline of the negotiations, op. cit. , pp. 25-6.*6
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forces to that level would impair the 
security of the Soviet Union, whose 
frontiers... are not protected by natural 
obstacles and are also over a considerable 
length common with those of countries 
belonging to.../hostile7 military groupings.
The situation would be different if the 
United States, the Soviet Union and China 
agreed to reduce their armed forces at the 
second stage to 1-1.5 million men.^
Nevertheless, by i960 the Soviets at least planned to
reduce their forces to below 2.5 million men when U.S.
forces stood at about the same level. The Soviets probably
objected strongly to the 2.5 million level in 1957 because
for them it would have meant a reduction of over 1.4 million
men, while for the United States the reduction would have
4^been under 200,000. J
It is difficult to decide whether East and West were 
correct in judging that the situation of high, equal force 
levels favours the United States, as compared to the 
situation of low, equal levels. But it is hard to believe 
that the situation in early 1956, when the Soviets had over 
5 million men under arms, compared to the United States’
44
DC/SC.1/55, April 30, 1957, In Cmnd. 333, p. 43.
45See Table 1.
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462.9 million, would have been more favourable to the 
United States than a situation of 1.5 million men apiece, 
with the nuclear deterrent to aggression in Europe still 
intact. (March 27 did not even call for a withdrawal from 
foreign bases.)
The Soviets were about to reduce their forces by 1.2 
million in March, 1956, and probably judged that Soviet 
nuclear strength would eventually make even further 
reductions realistic. Nevertheless, even if March 27. 1956 
was not seriously intended, it remains remarkable as a plan 
for abolishing the superior arm of its proponent while 
leaving the superior arm of a major opponent intact.
hn
APRIL 1, 1956 ' (United States proposal for comprehensive, 
partial disarmament, submitted to the Sub-Committee.)
April S« 1956 was the first American proposal for 
disarmament made after the ’reservation1 of ’pre-Geneva 
positions’ on September 6, 1955. It provided for ’two 
preliminary steps’, to be undertaken without further
Ibid.
i+7
DC/3C.1/42, in Cmd. 9770, p. 35-
("Draft Working Paper for the First Phase of a 
Comprehensive Agreement for Disarmament")
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commitments, which might be described as examples of joint
arms control research rather than arms control. The steps
were: ’a limited technical exchange mission for the analysis
of problems of control and inspection of conventional
armaments*, involving all five Sub-Committee powers; and
a small demonstration test of control and 
inspection including ground posts and aerial 
survey in a limited non-sensitive area in the 
United States and the Soviet Union of 20,000 
to 30,000 square miles, including at least 
one port, one airfield, and one railroad 
terminal...
48Both steps were supposed to ‘facilitate* agreement.
The proposal proper provided first for a series of
preparatory arrangements and decisions to be made. ’Without
49delay*, 7 the five powers on the Sub-Committee would set up 
a ‘preparatory armaments regulation commission*, which 
would fix force levels for the Four. (China was omitted at 
this stage.) The proposal listed some force levels ‘for 
illustrative purposes’ - 2.5 million for the U.S. and 
U.3.S.R., 750,000 for France and the U.K.
1+8
They were explained in detail in two ’’Working Papers” of 
March 21, 1956. See DC/SC.1/39 and 40, in Cmd. 9770, 
gp. 29-31.
The Sub-Committee would continue to meet.
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Armaments were to be reduced according to a new formula.
Western proposals had previously been vague on the relation
of armaments to force levels. April 3 proposed a
potentially very precise method of reduction. Each major
category of armament (for example, manned bombers of a
given type) would be assessed by the preparatory commission
as requiring a certain number of men to maintain and 
50operate. According to April 3« once force levels had 
been fixed, states could choose which types of armaments 
and how many of each type they would retain under 
disarmament:
...the application of the manpower measurement 
to the composition of the arms of each State 
shall be at the discretion of the State 
involved.
Budget reductions would be a ‘reflection’ of 
armament and manpower reductions.
The Eisenhower Plan on surprise attack was to be 
adopted by the Sub-Committee powers. Then, a ‘committee of 
jurists’ would draft a treay covering all phases of the 
plan. Control and communication would be organized by the 
preparatory commission, and after that ‘the following three
Jo
See speech by Stassen, DC/SC.1/PV.78, April 3? 1956, 
p. 20ff.
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steps will be taken interdependently and concurrently1 
by the Sub-Committee powers: exchange of ‘blueprints’, 
as in the Eisenhower Plan, and also of budgetary documents 
for 1955; a freeze of forces, armaments and budgets at 
December 31» 1955 levels; and installation of inspection 
and control* It would become mandatory to notify the 
preparatory commission of all force movements.
At this point, the Disarmament Commission of the U.N. 
would invite ’other States having a significant military 
potential to join in an armaments regulation organization’ 
(A.R.O.), Force levels below 500,000 men would be set for 
these states, with the exception of China (2.5 million).
The A.R.O. would then take over from the preparatory 
commission, and, after signatories had reported on their 
nuclear capabilities and testing plans, the control system 
would prepare to police the cut-off and monitor tests.
Only then, and after a report on control from the 
director general of the executive committee of the council 
of the A.R.O. had been adopted, would any reductions take 
place. They would consist of ‘first phase manpower 
reductions’, ’destruction’ of armaments, and reduction of 
appropriations.
- April 3, 1956 -
After a further report by the director, the ‘weapon1 
cut-off would begin, and transfers of 'past production of 
fissionable materials' to non-weapon purposes would be 
made. (There was no specific provision for dismantling 
weapons.) Testing would be ‘limited and monitored in an 
agreed manner'.
Thus ended 'the first phase'. Following it, the 
A.R.O. Council would be called back into session, and would 
'appraise the status of world tensions,...consider the 
feasibility of further reductions of armaments, armed 
forces and military expenditures,...study the possibilities 
for further decreasing the nuclear threat', and recommend 
further measures.
This American plan was more cautious than the Anglo- 
French plan of 1956 on the conventional side (assuming that 
the Anglo-French would have proposed force levels below 2.5 
million for the Three). However it was more radical on 
the nuclear side, since it proposed transfers as well as 
the 'weapon' cut-off, while March 19 proposed merely the 
cut-off. It was a less unwieldy instrument than March 19 
because, although its draftsman did not stress this point, 
under its terms the surprise attack proposals and the 
freeze could have been applied to the five Sub-Committee
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powers independently of agreement or action by any other 
states. Moreover no 'necessary conditions of confidence1 
(March 19) were required as a precondition for any of the 
measures.
In the Sub-Committee Stassen commended the plan as 
follows:
It is my impression...that the effect of our 
first phase proposal, if an equitable formula 
was worked out by the military experts, would 
be, that as regards conventional armaments, 
the United States would be making the greater 
reduction, and as regards conventional manpower 
the Soviet Union would be making the greater 
reduction.51
This statement seems to imply that, as compared with 
the Soviet Union, the United States was maintaining a remark' 
ably large surplus of armaments beyond the requirements of 
the normal military establishment in 1956. Under the U.S. 
proposal both powers would reduce their forces to 2.5 
million men, and that figure would be the basis on which 
each would claim its quota of armaments under the s pecial 
arrangement whereby 1,000 men would entitle a state to one
52submarine, two bombers, or 500 rifles, according to taste.
Ji
DC/SC.1/PV.78, April 3, 1956, p. 20.52
The figures are imaginary. Stassen proposed no specific 
f Ormulae.
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I f  t h e  U.S. armament r e d u c t i o n  was go ing  t o  be ’ g r e a t e r ’ 
t h a n  t h e  S o v i e t  r e d u c t i o n ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ’ 2 . 8  m i l l i o n  
men ( p l u s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e s e r v e s )  i n  1956 must have  had 
a c c e s s  t o  f a r  more armaments t h a n  t h e  S o v i e t  U n io n ’ s 5
cTo
m i l l i o n  men ( p l u s  v a s t  r e s e r v e s ) .  J The p a ra d o x  i s
p e r h a p s  e x p l a i n e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  America  en jo y e d
s u p e r i o r i t y  i n  long  r a n g e  s t r a t e g i c  weapons i n  1956.
S t a s s e n  may have  c o u n te d  t h e s e ,  n o t  by ad d in g  up t h e i r  number,
b u t  by computing  t h e i r  ’manpower e q u i v a l e n t s ’ .
The p r o p o s a l  f o r  a  f o r c e  l e v e l  o f  750 ,000  men f o r  t h e
U.K. and F r a n c e  would have  meant a r e d u c t i o n  o f  o v e r  100,000
f o r  B r i t a i n  (who, how ever ,  by i 960 p la n n e d  t o  r e d u c e  h e r
f o r c e s  t o  u n d e r  5 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) ,  and o f  o v e r  250 ,000  f o r  F r a n c e
(whose f o r c e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  m i l i t a r i z e d  p o l i c e ,  rem ained  a t  a
l e v e l  o f  ove r  one m i l l i o n  t h r o u g h o u t  our  p e r i o d ,  c h i e f l y
54b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  A l g e r i a n  w a r ) .
C h i n a ’ s f o r c e s  seem t o  have  been  o v e r  two m i l l i o n  
s t r o n g  t h r o u g h o u t  our  p e r i o d ,  b u t  p o o r l y  e q u i p p e d . ^  The
53“
S ee  T a b le  1.
54
S ee  New York T im e s . May 15> 1956 and F e b r u a r y  17? 1960;
55
See  i b i d . ,  March 1 5 5 1956, and The Communist Bloc  and The 
F r e e  World:  The M i l i t a r y  B a l a n c e 9 6 0 , The I n s t i t u t e  f o r  
S t r a t e g i c  S t u d i e s ,  London, November i 9 6 0 , p. 6 .
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p r o v i s i o n  f o r  ’ o t h e r  S t a t e s ’ a p a r t  from China  ( 2 . 5  m i l l i o n )  
t o  be r e s t r i c t e d  t o  a f o r c e  l e v e l  o f  500 ,000  men c o u ld  
have  p e r m i t t e d  t h e  f u l l  rearm am ent  o f  Germany which was 
g e t t i n g  und e r  way i n  1956. Such U.S. a l l i e s  as  T u rk ey ,  
S o u t h  Korea  and Taiwan c o u ld  have r e t a i n e d  f o r c e  l e v e l s  
which  were c o n s i d e r a b l y  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  c e i l i n g  s e t  by t h e  
S o v i e t  Union i n  i t s  1956 p l a n  -  200 ,000  men.
MARCH 18, 1957^  ( S o v i e t  p l a n  f o r  com p reh en s iv e  and 
’ c o m p l e t e ’ d i s a rm a m e n t ,  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  Sub-Com m ittee .  
Expanded and m o d i f i e d  a p r o p o s a l  o f  November 17» 1956,57  
s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  G e n e r a l  A ssem bly . )
With t h i s  p r o p o s a l  t h e  S o v i e t s  t u r n e d  away from 
c o n v e n t i o n a l  d i sa rm am en t  and back  t o  com prehens ive  ( i n c l u d i n g  
t o t a l  n u c l e a r )  d i sa rm am en t  i n  two s t a g e s  (1957-8  and 1959)* 
T h e re  was a h i n t  o f  t h i n g s  t o  come i n  t h e  p h r a s i n g  which  
c a l l e d  f o r  a c o n f e r e n c e  a t  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  of  t h e  second 
s t a g e  ‘ t o  d i s c u s s . . . t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  c o m p le te  a b o l i t i o n  
o f  armed f o r c e s  and armaments o f  a l l  t y p e s . . . ’
56
DC/SC. 1 A 9 ,  i n  Cmnd. 333,  p. 25.
57
D e p a r tm en t  of  S t a t e  B u l l e t i n . J a n u a r y  21 ,  1957» p. 90. 
( ’’D e c l a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  Government C o n c ern in g  t h e  
Q u e s t i o n  o f  Disarmament and R e d u c t io n  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
T e n s i o n ” )
- March 18 , 1957 -
March 18 differed from May 1 0 ,  1955 in that the U .S .  
method of executing a first stage now replaced the method 
formerly agreed between East and West of moving from levels 
existing before the entry into force of the treaty to final 
levels by means of two equal reductions. Thus under 
March 1S first stage disarmament would reduce the forces of 
the U .S .  , the U . S . S . R .  and China to 2 . 5  million men, and 
the forces of the U.K. and France to 750 , 0 0 0  men. The 
levels for these two groups of powers at the end of the 
second stage would be as for May 10: 1.5 million and 
6 5 0 , 0 0 0  respectively. Other powers would be limited to 
1 5 0 - 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  men, as in the Soviet conventional disarmament 
plan of March 2 7 ,  1956.
First Stage measures included: a three month freeze; 
conventional reductions; a ban on the use and the extra­
territorial stationing of nuclear weapons; aboliton of some 
foreign bases; and a reduction of the forces of the Four in 
Germany by one-third and in Europe generally by a substantial 
amount. These measures followed the lines of May 10 closely 
except that the abolition of bases was now to be spread over 
two stages instead of being completed in the first stage. 
Second Stage measures included: further conventional
reductions, the ’materials’ cut-off and the’weapon’ cut-off -
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to be followed by elimination of nuclear weapons when half
of the second stage conventional reductions had been
completed. The cut-off was thus placed earlier than ever
before in a Soviet plan*
Furthermore, in the second stage,
Simultaneously with the elimination of atomic 
and hydrogen weapons... international control 
shall be instituted over guided rockets in 
order to ensure that all types of such rockets 
which are suitable for use as atomic and 
hydrogen weapons shall be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes.
Finally, there came the 'abolition of all foreign 
military, naval and air bases' and 'measures for a further 
reduction' of the forces of the Four in Germany and Europe 
generally.
These final proposals implied that there could be 
foreign forces in the absence of foreign bases. Although 
Soviet negotiators have never defined 'foreign bases', 
Westerners have usually assumed that the term covered all 
foreign forces.^
W~ “  ~See, for example, the speech by the British delegate,
Ormsby-Gore, at the Ten Nation talks, June 16, i960.
This expression appears to be defined...as 
including all units or even groups of 
military personnel situated in territory of 
which they are not nationals.
- TNCD/PV.40, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 766.
- March 18, 1957 -
The control provisions included, in addition to the
Mav 10 surprise attack proposals, a plan for aerial
photography in Europe, which will be studied in connection
with the Soviet comprehensive partial proposals made later 
59in the year.'7
The proposal of November 17, 1956 had provided for a 
ban on nuclear tests 'as a first step...immediately', and 
this was the proposal pushed hardest by the Soviet delegate 
from the beginning of the 1957 Sub-Committee.
March 18 was dropped on April 30, and probably was 
intended mainly to assert the continuity of radical Soviet 
disarmament policy while 'partial' proposals suitable for 
Sub-Committee negotiations were being formulated. However 
March 18 also injected two new themes into the disarmament 
dialogue: a zone of aerial inspection confined to the 
'forward' areas of Europe, and special control over guided 
rockets.
5?See September 20. 1957.
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AUGUST 29, 1957 (Western proposal for comprehensive, 
partial disarmament, submitted to the Sub-Committee. 
Foreshadowed in a United States proposal submitted to the 
General Assembly, January 12, 1957- )
This plan drew into one system a series of Western 
(primarily United States) proposals put forward during the 
protracted Sub-Committee negotiations of 19575 many of 
which had been cleared one by one with the NATO Council. 
Its provisions were declared 'inseparable1, and it thus 
crushed speculation which the Soviet Union had seemed to
share that some of its parts might be negotiated separately 
- speculation caused by the somewhat inconsistent 
presentation of the original proposals, and by dissidence 
in the Western camp about what form the final offer should 
take.^
The plan was to be adopted by an unspecified number 
of parties'. The only way of judging who the parties
60 ...........
DC/SC.1/66, in Cmnd. 333? p. 96.
("Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America: Working Paper: Proposals for Partial 
Measures of Disarmament")61
A/C.1/783? in Documents on Disarmament, p. 731«
("United States Memorandum")62
See Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms 
Control. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. , 19?>0,
pp. ^08-9.
-  August  29 ,  1957 -
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m ig h t  have  b e e n ,  a p a r t  from t h e  F o u r ,  i s  t o  s t u d y  t h e  
p r o p o s a l s  t h e m s e lv e s .
The p l a n  c o n s i s t e d  c h i e f l y  o f  a s e p a r a b l e  f i r s t  s t a g e  
c o m p r i s i n g :  f o r c e  r e d u c t i o n s  by t h e  F o u r ,  t o  be co m p le ted  
w i t h i n  one y e a r ;  t h e  ' m a t e r i a l s ’ c u t - o f f ,  and t r a n s f e r s  t o  
p e a c e f u l  u s e s ;  a t e m p o ra ry  t e s t  ban ;  and i n s p e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  
s u r p r i s e  a t t a c k .  The o n ly  one of  t h e s e  m easures  which  need 
have  i n v o l v e d  a c t i o n  by s t a t e s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  F our  was t h e  
s u r p r i s e  a t t a c k  p r o p o s a l  which c a l l e d  f o r  ground and a e r i a l  
i n s p e c t i o n  i n  E u ro p e .
The f i r s t  s t a g e  f o r c e  l e v e l s  were 2 . 5  m i l l i o n  f o r  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and t h e  S o v i e t  Union ,  and 750 ,000  f o r  F r a n c e  
and t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom. (China  was o m i t t e d . )  I n  a d d i t i o n  
t o  t h i s  f i r s t  s t a g e ,  and as  a p a r t i a l  c o n c e s s i o n  t o  S o v i e t  
i n s i s t e n c e ,  i t  was p ro m ised  t h a t  t h e  F o u r  would make two 
f u r t h e r  r e d u c t i o n s ,  p r o v id e d  t h a t  t h e r e  had been  p o l i t i c a l  
’ p r o g r e s s ' ,  and t h a t  ’ o t h e r  e s s e n t i a l  S t a t e s '  u n d e r t o o k  a l s o  
t o  r e d u c e  f o r c e s .  The new l e v e l s  would be 2.1 m i l l i o n  and 
t h e n  1 . 7  m i l l i o n  f o r  t h e  U.S. and U . S . S . R . ;  700 ,0 0 0  and t h e n  
6 5 0 ,0 0 0  f o r  F r a n c e  and t h e  U.K. I n  t h i s  p r o p o s a l ,  f o r  t h e  
f i r s t  t im e  s i n c e  S e p te m b e r ,  1955? th e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  u n d e r t o o k  
t o  r e d u c e  i t s  f o r c e s  below 2 . 5  m i l l i o n  men.
- August 29, 1957 -
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In the first stage, ’specific quantities of designated 
types of armament to be agreed upon and set forth in lists 
annexed to the convention’ would be placed in ’storage 
depots’. Thus the Western search for a formula for 
armament reduction was apparently suspended, and, indeed, 
disarmament in its literal meaning was dropped.
There was provision for exchange of budgetary 
information, but no specific provision for budget reductions 
in the first stage.
The cut-off was to commence one month after the 
International Board of Control (I.B.C.) reported 
’installation of an effective inspection system'. 'The 
parties which were producers of fissionable material for 
weapons purposes' would then make 'equitable transfers, in 
successive increments... to non-weapon purposes'. For the 
first time a hint appeared that the existing East-West 
imbalance of nuclear military strength might be partly 
redressed: the parties would 'fix the specific ratios of 
quantities of fissionable materials of comparable analysis 
to be transferred by each of them'.
From the date of the cut-off 'each party undertakes 
not to transfer out of its control...or to accept transfer 
to it' of any nuclear weapons, or fissionable material for
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weapon p u r p o s e s ,  ' e x c e p t  w h e re ,  u n d e r  a r r a n g e m e n ts  be tw een
t r a n s f e r o r  and t r a n s f e r e e ,  t h e i r  u se  w i l l  be i n  c o n f o r m i ty
w i t h  p a r a g r a p h  I I I * .  P a r a g r a p h  I I I  p r o v id e d  t h a t :
Each p a r t y  assumes an  o b l i g a t i o n  n o t  t o  u se  
n u c l e a r  weapons i f  an  armed a t t a c k  has  n o t  
p l a c e d  t h e  p a r t y  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
or  c o l l e c t i v e  s e l f  d e f e n c e .
The t r a n s f e r  p r o v i s i o n  was meant t o  s a n c t i o n  t h e  
n u c l e a r  a rming (on t h e  ' d o u b l e - v e t o '  sys tem )  o f  some U.S. 
NATO a l l i e s .
On t e s t i n g ,  t h e r e  would be an  i n i t i a l  tw e lv e -m o n th  
s u s p e n s i o n ,  p r o v id e d  o n ly  t h a t  t h e r e  was ' a g r e e m e n t '  on a 
w or ld  wide i n s p e c t i o n  sy s te m  t o  be d e s i g n e d  by e x p e r t s .
A f u r t h e r  twelve-month  r e s p i t e  would be c o n d i t i o n a l  on t h e  
t e s t  ban i n s p e c t i o n  s y s t e m ' s  b e in g  i n  e f f e c t ,  and on 
' p r o g r e s s  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t o  each  p a r t y  c o n c e r n e d . . . i n  t h e  
p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  an i n s p e c t i o n  sy s te m  f o r  th e  c e s s a t i o n  of  
t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  f i s s i o n a b l e  m a t e r i a l  f o r  weapons 
p u r p o s e s . . . '  A f t e r  24 m on ths ,  ' a t  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  each  
p a r t y ' , a f u r t h e r  e x t e n s i o n  would depend on th e  c u t - o f f  
h a v in g  b e en  a c c o m p l i sh e d  and e f f e c t i v e l y  c o n t r o l l e d .
T h is  p r o v i s i o n  i m p l i e d  t h a t  i n s p e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  c u t - o f f  
m ig h t  have t a k e n  two y e a r s  t o  d e s i g n  and i n s t a l l .  Much 
would have  depended on how many powers were i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e
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cut-off. The West has never proposed definitely whether 
all powers with an industrial capability for producing 
weapon-grade uranium or plutonium should be bound by a 
'materials’ cut-off, or only those planning weapon production 
such as France in 1957« ~
Immediate expert discussions on the cut-off and the 
test ban were proposed in August 29. Also, within three 
months of the entry into force of the convention, a technical 
committee would meet 'to study the design of an inspection 
system which would make it possible to assure that the 
sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively 
for peaceful and scientific purposes'. Finally, the West 
proposed that a Sub-Committee working group of experts meet 
immediately to report on safeguards against surprise attack. 
Two systems for dealing with surprise attack were
64proposed in August 29« Firstly, the West offered the
3^For an analysis of Nth power nuclear production 
capabilities see The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control. 
National Planning Association, Washington, 1960.
64
For diagrams of the areas involved in Western and Soviet 
surprise attack proposals in 1957, see William R. Frye, "The 
Quest for Disarmament since World War II", in Henkin (ed.), 
Arms Control: Issues for the Public, o p. cit. , pp. 3*+ and 4o.
85
-  August  29 ,  1957 -
S o v i e t s  a c h o ic e  be tw een  i n s p e c t i o n  of  e i t h e r :  t h e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s ,  A la s k a ,  t h e  A l e u t i a n s ,  Canada and th e  S o v i e t  Union; 
o r  i n s p e c t i o n  o f
A l l  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  n o r t h  o f  th e  A r c t i c  C i r c l e  
o f  th e  S o v i e t  Union ,  Canada,  th e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  
( A l a s k a ) ,  Denmark ( G r e e n l a n d ) ,  and Norway; a l l  
t h e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  Canada,  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  and 
t h e  S o v i e t  Union w es t  o f  140 d e g r e e s  West 
l o n g i t u d e ,  e a s t  o f  160 d e g r e e s  E a s t  l o n g i t u d e  
and n o r t h  o f  50 d e g r e e s  N o r th  l a t i t u d e ;  a l l  t h e  
r e m a in d e r  o f  A l a s k a ;  a l l  t h e  r e m a in d e r  o f  th e  
Kamchatka P e n i n s u l a ;  and a l l  o f  t h e  Aleutian 
and K u r i l e  I s l a n d s . . .
P ro v id e d  t h e  S o v i e t s  a g re e d  t o  one of  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  
t h e  West f u r t h e r  p ro p o se d  i n s p e c t i o n  in :  an a r e a  o f  Europe 
1 bounded i n  t h e  s o u t h  by l a t i t u d e  40 d e g r e e s  N o r th  and i n  
t h e  West by 10 d e g r e e s  West l o n g i t u d e  and i n  t h e  E a s t  by 
60  d e g r e e s  E a s t  l o n g i t u d e . . . ’ Or t h e  West would a c c e p t  
’ a more l i m i t e d  zone o f  i n s p e c t i o n  i n  E u r o p e . . . b u t  o n ly  on 
t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  t h i s  would i n c l u d e  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
p a r t  o f  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  th e  S o v i e t  Union as  w e l l  as  t h e  
o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  o f  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e ’ .
’ I n s p e c t i o n ’ i n c l u d e d  ’ a e r i a l  i n s p e c t i o n ,  w i t h  ground 
o b s e r v a t i o n  p o s t s  a t  p r i n c i p a l  p o r t s ,  r a i l w a y  j u n c t i o n s ,  
main  h ig h w a y s ,  and i m p o r t a n t  a i r f i e l d s ,  e t c .  as  a g r e e d ’ , 
and a l s o  m o b i le  i n s p e c t i o n  teams and ground p o s t s  o u t s i d e  t h e  
p r i m a r y  zo n es .  I n v e n t o r i e s  would be s u p p l i e d  t o  th e  Board of 
C o n t r o l  c o v e r i n g  armaments and f o r c e s  i n  t h e  i n s p e c t e d  a r e a s .
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The proposal did not specify who was to participate
and how. Would all the powers whose territory was to be
inspected have the right to inspect the territory of all
other parties to the agreement? Or would only major powers
- perhaps only the Ü.S. and the U.S.S.R., in case no
European zone was acceptable - participate?
The structure of the International Control
Organization (I.C.O.) was designed to give very wide
freedom of action to the parties. In the Board of Control,
the affirmative vote of the representatives of 
the Governments represented on the Sub-Committee 
and of such other parties as may be agreed will 
be required for important decisions.
Such a wide distribution of the veto power was new in a
Western proposal.
It was also provided that:
Each party will have the right to suspend its 
obligations, partially or completely, by written 
notice to the International Control Organization, 
in the event of an important violation by 
another party...
In former Western plans the veto had been proposed 
only for preventing passage from stage to stage. Thus the 
attempt of 1955 to design a complicated procedure of 
suspension by an international authority was abandoned in 
favour of an unfettered unilateral right of withdrawal.
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Among commentators, 1957 is widely believed to have 
been the year when disarmament negotiations became 
realistic, when proposals were designed for acceptance 
rather than self-promotion. Secrecy still obscures part of 
the history of the blunder Stassen made when he revealed new 
American proposals prematurely to the Soviets in the middle 
of the Sub-Committee sessions. 1 We do not know what 
concessions on testing and aerial inspection zones might 
have been offered, or whether they might have been offered 
independently if Dulles had not seized firm control and 
hardened the U.S. psotion at the behest of some Western 
allies. The West’s final offer, in August 29. shared many 
of the defects of the sweeping plans of previous years.
The Western proposal was comprehensive and indivisible; 
it lacked precise timing provisions except for the first 
stage of conventional disarmament and the test ban; and it 
was as vague as previous Western proposals on many other key 
points, such as criteria for armament reduction, extent of 
nuclear disarmament, degree and nature of control for 
disarmament, width of participation in the treaty, and so on.
See Bechhoefer, op. pit., pp. 405-6.66
Ibid., p. 407.
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Western delegates defended the ‘inseparability’ of the
four major components of the plan - force reductions,
cut-off, the conditional test ban, and measures against
surprise attack - on the ground that only their combination
67would produce a fair and desirable military balance* 1 In
fact, each of the measures taken independently would
probably have favoured the West one-sidedly.
Zorin, the Soviet delegate on the Sub-Committee,
exaggerated a little when he declared that the Western force
level proposals for the first stage involved ‘virtually no
change in the present levels of the armed forces of the
68Western Powers’. However the Soviet Union’s own forces
had steadied at a level just below 4 million men in 1957*
and the 2.5 million level would have involved a considerable
69Soviet reduction. /
The 'materials’ cut-off and transfers alone would not 
have prevented the United States from continuing to 
fabricate its very large reserve stocks of fissionable 
materials into weapons for some time, or from improving
£7See speech by Moch, DC/SC.1/PV.1535 August 29, 1957? p. 9.68
Ibid., p. 47.
69See Table 1
8S
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designs and refabricating old weapons, or from incorporating 
improvements in new weapons. It may be significant that the 
U.S. switched from the ’weapon' cut-off to the 'materials' 
cut-off in the year that negotiations seemed to be taking a 
serious turn.
The Soviets remained hostile to all cut-off proposals 
which were not closely tied to the uncontrollable goal of 
total nuclear disarmament. They never attempted to work out 
a doctrine of proportionate transfers to make the cut-off 
less discriminating against them. In 1957, in so far as 
they wished to control the spread of nuclear weapons, they 
seemed to pin their hopes on the test ban, a far clumsier 
means than the cut-off.
The West's plan to use an arms control agreement to 
condone the controlled transfer of nuclear weapons did not 
attract the Soviets. They had no strategic need to transfer 
tactical nuclear weapons to their allies in Eastern Europe, 
(nor were these allies trustworthy); and it was becoming 
increasingly clear that China should not be given or helped 
to get nuclear weapons from the viewpoint of Soviet interests.
The West's test ban proposal was a unique attempt to 
graduate a measure and make its various parts a progressively 
increasing reward for an opponent's good behaviour in respect
- August 29, 1957 -
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of other measures in a plan. By rejecting the Soviet 
proposal for an immediate ban, August 29 permitted Britain 
to become a thermonuclear power; however it will be argued 
in the next chapter that the test ban was not strongly 
favourable to Soviet interests.
Since provisions for control and for surprise attack 
inspection in themselves tend to favour the West and damage 
the East, the East always expects considerable disarmament 
to accompany considerable control. August 29 may be 
described (to adapt a favourite saying of Jules Moch) as 
’little disarmament with much control’, especially since con­
ventional armaments were not to be destroyed but put in store.
The Soviet Union has never favoured aerial and mobile 
ground inspection on principle, but only in order ‘to meet 
these ZWestero7 Powers half-way’.' The zones proposed by 
the West in 1957 simply covered too much Soviet territory to 
be acceptable otherwise than in combination with measures 
strongly favourable to Soviet interests. Moreover, despite 
the Eden proposal of 1955? the West as a whole rejected an 
important political ’sweetener’ - basing a European zone of 
inspection on the East-West dividing line.
70
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SEPTEMBER 20, 1957^  (Soviet proposal for comprehensive 
partial disarmament, submitted to the General Assembly. 
Modification of the proposal of April 30, 1957*72 
submitted to the Sub-Committee.)
In the Soviet conventional disarmament plan of 1956, 
the supplementary provisions for a suspension of tests, for 
a ban on atomic weapons in Germany and for reduction of 
military budgets by 15 per cent were designated 'partial 
measures'. By 1957 the Soviet meaning of 'partial 
disarmament' had broadened considerably.
Under the proposal of April 30, 1957* the final force 
levels of May 10, 1955 were to be reached in two stages, but 
in September 20, 1957 the Soviets accepted the Western 
proposal of August 29, 1957 for reaching somewhat higher 
levels in three stages - the largest number of stages ever 
envisaged by the Soviets for conventional disarmament. The 
Soviets also accepted the Western figures: 2.5 million,
2.1 million and 1.7 million at successive stages for the 
Soviet Union and the United States; 750,000, 700,000 and 
650,000 successively for the United Kingdom and France.
71A/C.1/793* in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 87^. 
("Memorandum,..on Partial Measures in the Field of 
Disarmament")
72
DC/SC. 1/55* in Cmnd. 33* P* *+3*("Proposals...on the Implementation of Partial Disarmament Measures")
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(They even  f o l lo w e d  t h e  West i n  o m i t t i n g  m en t io n  of  C h i n a I ) 
The new d e t a i l ,  t h a t  ’ t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  armed f o r c e s  o f  
a l l  S t a t e s  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  ag reem en t  would i n c l u d e  p e r s o n n e l  
employed by t h e  armed f o r c e s  i n  a c i v i l i a n  c a p a c i t y ,  b u t  
engaged i n  s e r v i c i n g  m i l i t a r y  equ ipm ent  and i n s t a l l a t i o n ’ , 
was p e rh a p s  meant  t o  compensa te  f o r  th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
S o v i e t s  were now a c c e p t i n g  h i g h e r  n o m in a l  f o r c e  l e v e l s  f o r  
a f i n a l  s t a g e .  However, d r a s t i c  f o r c e  c u t s  were n o t  to  be 
l i n k e d  t o  p o l i t i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  as  i n  t h e  W este rn  p l a n .
B u d g e ts  and armaments were t o  be re d u c e d  by 15 p e r  c e n t  
i n  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e .  The S o v i e t s  a g re e d  ’ i n  p r i n c i p l e ’ w i t h  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  p r o p o s a l  f o r  m u tu a l  su b m is s io n  o f  s p e c i f i c  
l i s t s  o f  t h e  armaments t o  be r e d u c e d ,  b u t  n o t  t o  t h e  p r o p o s a l  
f o r  s t o r i n g  l i s t e d  a rmaments .  N e i t h e r  s i d e  o f f e r e d  
g u id a n c e  t o  t h o s e  who would have t o  draw up t h e  l i s t s .
As b e f o r e ,  i n  many S o v i e t  p l a n s ,  a ban  on u se  o f  a tom ic  
weapons was p ro p o s e d  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e ;  but,  f o r  th e  f i r s t  
t im e ,  i t  c o u ld  be t e m p o ra ry  -  l a s t i n g  f i v e  y e a r s  i n  t h e  
f i r s t  i n s t a n c e ,  i f  t h e  West w ish e d .  The o t h e r  n u c l e a r  
p r o v i s i o n s  were a ban  on e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l  a to m ic  b a s e s  and 
a ban on t e s t s .  On June  14, 1957 t h e  S o v i e t s  had a c c e p te d  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  c o n t r o l  f o r  t h e  t e s t  b a n , ' - '  and by
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September they were pressing harder than ever for a 
separate agreement on tests. A more evolved version of the 
Soviet test ban proposals will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
On the question of inspection to guard against surprise
attack, the Soviet retreated in relation to its 1955-6
proposals. Control posts at airfields were to be excluded
until the second stage, and this measure was said, somewhat
enigmatically, to require ’correlation with the relevant
measures for the final prohibition of atomic and hydrogen
weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States’.
(That is, apparently, airfield control was made conditional
on total nuclear disarmament, which September 20 itself did
not propose.) Moreover:
since we are now concerned only with partial 
measures... at the first stage, control posts 
should be set up only in the Western frontier 
areas of the Soviet Union, in the territory of 
France, the United Kingdom and other States 
participating in the North Atlantic Alliance 
and in the Warsaw Treaty, and also in the 
eastern part of the United States.
September 20 endorsed without recapitulating the
proposal of April 30, 1957 for aerial photography, which
insisted that a European zone should have the existing
East-West border as its bisecting line, and should extend
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for 800 kilometres east and west of this line. The earlier 
proposal also provided, for the first time in a Soviet plan, 
that large areas of the United States and the Soviet Union 
should be opened up to aerial inspection. All of the United 
States west of longitude 90 degrees West, and Alaska; and 
all of the Soviet Union east of longitude 108 degrees East 
was to be included.
September 20 repeated the proposals of March 27% 1956 
for force reductions in Germany and in Europe.
On the conventional side, September 20 was at once 
radical and nebulous - radical because it proposed drastic 
conventional disarmament and nuclear disengagement even in 
the absence of political settlements; - nebulous because 
it made no proposal on force levels for ‘other Powers' or 
on the timing of the stages of disarmament, even though 
new (Western) force levels and three (Western) instead of 
two (Russian) stages were being proposed.
As for the surprise attack proposal, the provision for 
confining control posts geographically in the first stage 
would have affected very little their ability to detect 
preparations for conventional attack. The exclusion of 
airfield control until the second stage was more important. 
Perhaps Soviet military leaders had grown more nervous of
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U.S. Strategie striking power since the proposal for airfield 
control was made in May 10 ? 1955.
Whereas the Soviets 'believed* in the control post 
concept they never presented aerial inspection proposals
71+except as a way of overcoming United States 'obstacles'.
However, Western negotiators argued that the European area
to be inspected under the terms of the Soviet proposal
comprised areas vital to NATO but marginal for the Warsaw
Pact, with its greater ability to maneuver in depth. They
further argued that the Siberian zone of inspection had few
vital industrial or military centres compared to the zone
in the western United States, which in any case was a far
greater proportion of the U.S. land mass than was the
75Siberian zone of the U.S.S.R. land mass. y
The ban on extraterritorial atomic weapons was 
intensely self-interested. The West would have been forced 
to rely on nuclear bombers operating from Strategic Air 
Command bases in the United States to deter aggression in
7^ 'The Soviet Government maintains its view that aerial 
photography can neither prevent surprise attacks nor ensure 
the necessary control over disarmament'. (September 20)
75Soviet negotiators pointed out in their turn that the 
Siberian zone was slightly larger than the zone in the 
western United States.
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Europe, while Soviet nuclear arrangements would have been 
left relatively undisturbed by this proposal.
NOVEMBER 28, 19587  ^ (Soviet proposal for preventing
surprise attack, submitted to the Geneva Surprise Attack 
Conference. Further explained in Soviet bloc proposal of 
December 12, 1958.77)
The Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible 
Measures which Might be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack 
and for the Preparation of a Report thereon to Governments 
was a ’technical' conference supposed to prepare 
recommendations to governments. While the Western experts 
wished to exclude discussion of disarmament measures 
altogether and merely evaluate various methods and 
instruments for monitoring the weapons of surprise attack, 
the Eastern experts (from Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Rumania and the Soviet Union) supported the Soviet Government 
proposal of November 28, which combined measures of 
inspection to prevent surprise attack with a proposal to 
reduce all foreign forces ’within the agreed control zone’
GEN/SA/7.Rev. 1, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, 
p. 1264. ' ~
("Declaration.. .Measures for Preventing Surprise Attack?)
77GEN/SA/11, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1298. 
("Proposal regarding the tasks and functions of ground 
control posts and aerial inspection")
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in Europe by one third, and to eliminate nuclear weapons 
from German territory.
The preamble of November 28 declared that a ‘reliable 
system’ for preventing surprise attack must include drastic 
disarmament, but that this was being blocked by the Western 
powers who ‘are not prepared to ban nuclear weapons and 
considerably reduce their stocks of conventional weapons’. 
November 28 was thus, like all Soviet limited proposals, 
presented as a ‘second best’.
Soviet delegates to the conference had criticized 
overflights of American nuclear bombers in Europe and 
elsewhere as a threat to peace. The first measure proposed 
in November 28 was
the assuming of an obligation by the United 
States of America not to allow from henceforth 
any flights of its military aeroplanes with 
atomic and hydrogen bombs aboard in the 
direction of the Soviet Union and over the 
territories of other States...
This was one of the most extraordinary proposals ever 
made at an arms control negotiation. It applied to only one 
power and its control would have involved inspecting every 
major air base of the Western alliances. (It illustrates 
excellently one political function of most Soviet proposals 
- agitation against Western military strategy).
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November 28 next stated that the ‘practical steps’ 
which were possible should be taken on the 'basis’ of ground 
control posts and aerial photography. For the first time 
the Soviets proposed a specific number of ground control 
posts and gave details of their personnel, organization and 
function. Also for the first time Greece, Turkey and Iran 
were included among the Western powers to be inspected - 
Greece and Turkey because they were members of NATO and had 
'military bases directed against the countries participating 
in the Warsaw Treaty organization...established on their 
territories’ ; Iran because she was a Baghdad Pact member, 
and ’has recently been getting more and more involved in 
the military measures carried out by members of this Pact’.
In the Soviet partial plan of September 20, 1957 
control posts were to be set up in the United States, France, 
the United Kingdom 'and other states participating in the 
North Atlantic Alliance’. In November 28 all NATO countries 
to be involved were listed specifically: the U.S., U.K., 
France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, as well as Greece and Turkey.
The Western allies were to share 5*+ posts, including six 
on the east coast of the United States. All Warsaw powers 
were to participate; they would share 28 posts, including
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six to be confined to the Soviet Union1s western frontier 
zone.
The ’tasks and functions’ of ground control were laid 
down in the proposal of December 12:
- keeping direct visual watch on the movement of 
troops and the movement of technical and other 
military equipment through railway junctions, 
major ports and on main roads.
- keeping watch on the preparations for putting 
out to sea of naval surface craft and 
submarines, as well as of troop transports with 
troops or on any concentration of such ships in 
major ports.
Eastern and Western personnel were to be equally
represented on the control post staffs, which would consist
of three or four 'control officers' and two interpreters.
As in early Soviet test ban proposals:
The post commander shall be appointed from 
amongst the representatives of the side over 
which control is to be exercised.
The control post staff would have access 'without 
hindrance' to host country communications, and would 'have 
at its disposal motor transport, optical equipment for 
visual observation, and also photographic and cinemato­
graphic equipment for obtaining documentary confirmation of 
the data obtained.' .
As in previous Soviet plans, November 28 provided that:
'The mission of the ground control posts... should include
100
- November 28, 1958 -
making sure that there are no dangerous concentrations of 
troops and military equipment1.
On aerial inspection, the Soviets repeated, with elabor­
ations and additions, the proposals of September 20, 1957.
The European zone extending 800 kilometres each side of the 
East-West dividing line was increased to include Greece,
Turkey and Iran. In addition to the zones in Siberia and the 
western United States 'all of Japan including Okinawa' would 
be inspected, because this area contained 'foreign military 
bases and foreign troops which would be used to carry out a 
surprise attack' (November 28). Neither of these two additions 
to the area of the Western zones was matched by additions to 
the Soviet bloc zones, and in fact the proposal for 
inspection of Japan and Okinawa was dropped on December 12.
The proposal of December 12 declared that:
The purpose of the aerial inspection is to 
reveal the concentration of armed forces in 
the designated zones or the regrouping of such 
forces and their being drawn up in a 
threatening manner.
Two 'air groups' - one for each of the blocs - would
be formed on the principle of 'self-inspection':
Each air group shall photograph the territory 
of its side within the limits of the zone 
designated for aerial inspection. In each 
air group there must be control officers who 
are representatives of the opposite side.
101
- November 28, 1958 -
The air groups would consist of ‘an airborne section
and a photography centre’: numbers of aircraft and
composition of staffs would be determined ‘by mutual
agreement’, subject only to the proviso that representation
of the blocs in the photography centres would be equal.
The photography centre of each group shall 
process, interpret and study the aerial 
photography material and draw up 
appropriate reports.
It was provided that the ’results’ of this activity 
’shall serve as a basis for generalized reports’ to the 
International Supervisory Body, on which the blocs were 
to be equally represented, and whose functions were to be 
determined by agreement.
The air groups would have their own transport and 
photography aircraft, and the host country would ’designate 
the necessary number of aerodromes and means of 
communication*.
November 28 reaffirmed the traditional doctrine ‘that 
ground control posts and aerial photography cannot of 
themselves reduce the danger of surprise attack1 and 
therefore proposed two other measures of arms control. The 
first, a 'reduction by at least one third of foreign armed 
forces stationed on the territories of European States lying
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within the agreed control zone*, was new in Soviet policy. 
(March 27, 1958 had proposed ceilings - unspecified - for 
the forces of the Four only in Germany and adjacent states.) 
The new proposal was also unspecific. Would each individual 
NATO power (including, for example, Canada) having forces 
stationed in the control zone be obliged to reduce its 
contingent by one third? Or would the alliance be permitted 
to determine the national composition of a one-third 
reduction?
The second arms control measure was ‘an undertaking on 
the part of States possessing nuclear weapons and rockets 
not to keep atomic, hydrogen and rocket weapons in either 
part of Germany’. Apparently neither German nor non-German 
states would have been permitted to deploy conventionally 
armed rocket weapons in Germany.
There was no control provision for either of these 
measures. They were presented as a way of reducing tension 
in Europe ’where even a minor incident carries within it 
the danger of grave consequences for the world'.
The inspection provisions of November 28 were entirely 
in line with those of Soviet proposals in 1957» Missile 
sites and air bases again were excluded from ground 
inspection, and aerial inspection was limited. The system
103
- November 28, 1958 -
would have detected preparations for massive attack in 
Europe, but only a small fraction of each side’s strategic 
forces would have been monitored by it, as the French
78delegate, General Genevey, pointed out at the conference. 
However, even a little inspection could paralyse part of a 
strategic force, and near-perfect coordination of all 
forces is probably required for successful surprise attack. 
On the other hand, inspection of a limited zone would tend 
to drive strategic forces out of that zone in the short run, 
and in the long run would accelerate development of weapon 
systems capable of being deployed outside the zone - on 
land, at sea or in the skies.
That there would have been more than twice as many 
control posts in the West as in the East could have been 
justified on the ground that the East had more to lose from 
inspection than the West. In fact, the Eastern negotiators 
did not attempt to justify this provision.
Like many original Soviet offers at the test ban 
conference, November 28 contained strong elements of ’self- 
inspection* . The impact of self-inspection on the
GEH/SA/PV.17) December 1, 1958, p. 12ff.
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effectiveness of control arrangements will be examined in 
the next chapter.
The proposal for a nuclear withdrawal from Germany 
would have prevented: (a) the nuclear arming of the 
Bundeswehr by the United States; and (b) a forward nuclear 
defence of the Central NATO front, which American and 
especially German strategists were coming to regard as 
essential to compensate for the West's deficiencies in 
conventional forces during the period of Soviet 'nuclear 
plenty1.
The proposal for a one third reduction of foreign 
forces 'lying within the agreed control zone' was a clumsy 
one. Several countries lay part in and part outside the 
zone, which was bisected by the Sast-VJest dividing line. 
However the proposal was much less invidious than an atomic 
withdrawal from Germany.
Like the original Soviet proposals at the test ban 
conference, November 28 may have been intended as a stiff 
*first offer’ to the West (if it was meant seriously at all). 
The Soviet Government tried hard to have the surprise 
attack conference continued in 1958, but the West was not 
prepared to continue discussing disarmament confined to 
Europe at a ’technical’ conference on surprise attack.
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DECEMBER 17? 19?8^  (Western ’statement* at the surprise 
attack conference.)
By a ’technical’ conference on surprise attack the 
Western experts meant one which might make recommendations 
to governments on inspection systems but not on 
disarmament measures. Although the Western experts made no 
concrete proposals at the conference, their exposition had 
definite implications.
We came to the conference with our own ideas 
of what might constitute an adequate system, 
but with an open mind, expecting to reach 
final conclusions after a joint assembly and examination of the facts.Su
The chief Western ’ideas’ were stated in the statement 
of December 17? and in what follows they are treated as 
constituting a proposal.
The Western experts were chiefly concerned to provide 
against ’a massive initial attack’ conducted with weapons 
having a ’high degree of readiness, of speed and range... 
and...great destructive power’.
GEN/SA/12, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1306. 
(”An explanatory statement regarding certain factors 
involved in the planning of an integrated observation and 
inspection system for reducing the possibility of surprise 
attack: submitted by the Western experts”)
The Western delegation comprised three nationals from 
each of the five powers which later represented the West in 
the Ten Nation Committee of 1960; U.S., U.K., France,
Canada and Italv.80December 17.
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Surprise attack seen in this light leads to 
the inescapable conclusion that land-based 
ballistic missiles, bomber aircraft, and 
missile-armed naval forces are those 
instruments of surprise attack about which 
one must be especially concerned.
Since total nuclear disarmament had become impossible:
It follows that the only practical step to 
reduce the danger of surprise attack by 
nuclear weapons is to monitor the vehicles 
of delivery...
The first purpose Zöf the monitoring/ is to 
keep each side informed when there are no 
preparations for an attack on the other 
side...
The second purpose...is to provide reliable 
warning of preparations for an attack and 
the quickest possible warning of an attack 
that has actually been launched.
The Western experts favoured a ‘comprehensive and 
integrated system* with the following ’features':
1. ’Exchange of force data*, which would make it 'possible 
to undertake some verification oh a sampling basis’.
2. 'Aerial survey and assessment', employing radar as well 
as photography. This method would have two purposes: 
'initial search for all instruments of surprise attack large 
enough to be identified by this means'; and 'verification
of weapon and force dispositions and strategic or long-term 
warning of intentions'.
3. 'Ground observers', who would 'verify the information 
received from aerial search and provide...means of critical
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observation of intentions or indications* of surprise
attack. Ground observers would enjoy: mobility, right of
access, and right of residence at some sites.
It appears possible so to define their 
rights of inspection that the observers 
do not acquire any detailed information 
on the military technology of the 
inspected country...
4. ‘Information evaluation centers*.
5. ‘Communications1, including radio transmitters.
6. ’Logistic and administrative support’, including 
equipment belonging to both the host and the inspecting 
country.
The Western experts concluded that ’thousands but 
probably not tens of thousands of personnel* would be 
needed for ‘effective integrated systems’. For political 
and technical reasons they suggested 'step-by-step 
implementation', which must be 'very carefully carried 
out.../or7 there might be such a temporary advantage to 
one side or the other as to be dangerous*.
The Western experts made an obeisance to disarmament 
when they concluded that 'inspection systems, especially 
if complemented by controlled disarmament measures, reduce
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O 1
t h e  d a n g e r  o f  s u r p r i s e  a t t a c k * .  J However, t h e y  d i d  n o t  
o f f e r  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  i n s p e c t i o n  r e i n f o r c e d  
by d i sa rm am en t  i n  p r e v e n t i n g  s u r p r i s e  a t t a c k ,  t h u s  a d o p t i n g  
i n  e f f e c t  t h e  American  p o s i t i o n  o f  l a t e  1955.
A s t a n d a r d  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  W este rn  e x p e r t s  i n  1958 
s a y s  t h a t  t h e i r  sy s te m  c o u ld  n o t  have  a d e q u a t e l y  m o n i to r e d  
what  was becoming t h e  weapon of  s u r p r i s e  pa r  e x c e l l e n c e  -  t h e  
g u id e d  lo n g  ra n g e  r o c k e t ,  b o th  l a n d - b a s e d  and s e a - b a s e d .
The e x p e r t s  d i d  n o t  even  s u g g e s t  i n s t a l l i n g  o b s e r v e r s  on 
m i s s i l e - f i r i n g  s u b m a r in e s ,  b u t  c r i t i c s  have a l l e g e d  t h a t  
even  o b s e r v e r s  a t  m i s s i l e  s i t e s  on l a n d  -  where countdowns 
a r e  re c k o n e d  i n  m in u te s  ( w i t h  s o l i d  f u e l s )  o r  t e n s  o f  
m in u te s  ( w i t h  l i q u i d  f u e l s )  -  would be u n a b le  t o  communicate 
w a rn in g  i n  t im e  t o  t h r e a t e n e d  p a r t i e s .  As p o i n t e d  o u t
82a b o v e ,  ^ how ever ,  m o n i t o r i n g  o f  o t h e r  weapons c o u ld  
e m b a r ra s s  a p o t e n t i a l  a g g r e s s o r  s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  d e t e r  him. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s  i t  i s  c e r t a i n  t h a t  c o n t i n u o u s  s u r v e i l l a n c e  of
Hi
T h i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  W es te rn  s t a t e m e n t  was f l a t l y  c o n t r a d i c t e d  
by a n  e a r l i e r  p a r t  a l r e a d y  q uo ted  which  re v ie w e d  t h e  prob lem s 
o f  n u c l e a r  c o n t r o l  and c o n c lu d ed  t h u s :
I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  o n ly  p r a c t i c a l  s t e p  t o  
r e d u c e  t h e  d a n g e r  o f  s u r p r i s e  a t t a c k  by 
n u c l e a r  weapons i s  t o  m o n i to r  t h e  v e h i c l e s  
o f  d e l i v e r y .
82
See  November 28 ,  1958.
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the solid fuel missiles of the 1960s would have been futile
from the viewpoint of tactical warning. Moreover,
comprehensive inspection and monitoring systems would
probably have had the effect of hastening the demise of
weapon systems with long countdowns and slow speeds - such
as liquid fuel missiles and bomber aircraft - unless coupled
with measures of arms control to prevent this.
The Soviet delegate at the surprise attack conference
opposed the Western ‘ideas’ on two principal grounds.
Firstly, Kuznetsov argued that ground observers would
discover information on ’military technology’, which the
West had denied.^ Secondly, reversing a favourite dictum
of American strategists, he argued that secrecy tended to
84discourage military rivalry. Curiously, he did not 
criticize the possibility that inspection would reveal the 
geographical co-ordinates of fixed strategic bases and 
thereby facilitate attack. This argument (borrowed from a 
Western authority on strategy) was first used publicly by 
the Soviets in i960.
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GEN/SA/PV.30, December 18, 1958, p. 38.
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Ibid., p. 40.
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O cfJUNE 7, 1 9 6 0 °^  (Soviet plan for comprehensive and •complete1 
disarmament, submitted to the Ten Nation Committee on 
Disarmament. Modified and developed the Soviet proposal of 
September 1 8, 1959>86 submitted to the General Assembly.)
The introduction to the proposal of September 18, 1959 
claimed that ‘general and complete disarmament1 was ‘a new 
way of solving the disarmament problem1. The newness of 
•g.c.d.1, as it came to be called, was supposed to be that 
it would lead to ‘the inability of States to wage war for 
lack of material means1.
In fact ’new1 plan was chiefly old ideas presented in 
a more radical terminology. In some substantive respects 
June 7 was less radical than its predecessor, May 10, 1955« 
For example, nuclear disarmament was complete within two 
years in May 10; but this measure was to take an 
indeterminate time of at least two years in June 7. The 
final goals of the two plans were in fact identical on the 
military side. June 7 provided for world-wide disarmament 
of all but militia internal security units within a specific
TNCD/6/Rev. 1, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 925.
("Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete 
Disarmament") The proposal was originally transmitted by 
Premier Khrushchev to other heads of government on June 2, 
1960.86
A/4219, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 911.("Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and 
Complete Disarmament")
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(although actually unspecified) time; May 10 declared 
’that the Powers should further reduce their armaments and 
armed forces to the levels strictly necessary for internal 
security1 after the first two years of disarmament.
However, like all Soviet plans after 1955? June 7 was not 
conditional on a political settlement.
The real novelty of June 7 was twofold. Firstly, 
with the single exception of conventional disarmament, its 
measures were not graduated: they had to be completed 
within the time limit of the stage in which they occurred. 
Secondly, June 7 enumerated some of the consequences of 
radical disarmament which were implied by previous radical 
plans like May 10, although not actually mentioned in them. 
Thus June 7 called for the abolition of military conscription, 
military education, war ministries, general staffs and 
military budgets, all of which followed from reducing 
forces to levels suitable for internal security according 
to the Soviet definition of internal security forces as a 
non-military institution.
June 7 was a three-stage plan to be concluded in 
’four years or some other agreed period’. (The West had 
objected to the fixed timetable of the September 1 8, 1959
112
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proposal.) The time for the first stage alone was 
specified: 1-1.5 years.
Whereas May 10 provided for a world conference to
discuss the adherence of ’other states’ during the first
six months of its first stage, June 7 called for such a
conference to be held before adoption of any measures.
General control provisions were the first listed. A
preparatory commission would be formed to set up ’a control
organization...within the framework of the United Nations
the moment the treaty comes into force'. All ’states
parties' to the treaty would form a conference which would
elect a ’Control Council'.
Except where otherwise especially agreed 
upon, decisions in the Control Council will 
be taken by a two-thirds majority of votes 
on substantive matters and by a simple 
majority on procedural matters.
This provision seems to have been meant to modify the 
great power veto which the ’framework’ of the U.N. might 
have otherwise imposed. However this would have been a 
very slight difference if equal representation of Eastern, 
neutral and Western countries had been required in the 
Control Council (unless, of course, the Eastern bloc 
representatives proved disunited).
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It was specified that:
The Control organization will distribute its 
inspectors over the territory of States in 
such a way as to enable them to start 
discharging their functions the moment States 
initiate the implementation of disarmament 
measures.
Stage One (1-1.5 years) would involve the following:
1. ’All means of delivering nuclear weapons will be 
eliminated.../and/ their manufacture will be discontinued’.
The ’means’ were listed:
- strategic and tactical rockets, pilotless 
aircraft of all types, and all military 
aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
- surface warships that can be used as vehicles 
for nuclear weapons.
- submarines of all classes and types.
- all artillery systems, as well as other means 
that can be used as vehicles for atomic and 
hydrogen weapons.
No way was suggested of distinguishing aircraft and 
warships capable of carrying nuclear weapons from those 
not', capable. This proposal in itself must have involved 
the virtual disbanding of all air forces and navies. It 
was presented in deference to the views of France; 
originally (on September 18, 1959) it had appeared in the 
third stage.
2. All foreign troops, bases and depots are withdrawn. 
This measure was carefully phased in May 10.
114
- June 7) I960 -
3» Transfer of nuclear weapons and information about them 
is forbidden; their manufacture by non-possessing countries 
is also forbidden. Both of these activities would have 
been permitted under the Western comprehensive partial plan 
of August 29, 1957*
Rocket launchings are permitted for peaceful purposes
only.
5. On-site control of nuclear vehicle destruction and 
production, base and troop withdrawals, and peaceful rocket 
launchings.
6. 'Joint studies relating to the discontinuance of the 
manufacture of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
and to the destruction of stockpiles'. This proposal was 
entirely new, in deference to Western demands.
Stage Two would involve:
1. Nuclear prohibition, the 'weapon' cut-off and 
complete stockpile destruction.
2. Reduction to fixed force levels for all states - 
1.7 million for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Weapons 'thus 
released' to be 'destroyed or used for peaceful purposes'. 
Expenditures to be reduced correspondingly.
3. On-site control of the two above measures.
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The control organization will have the right 
to inspect all enterprises which extract raw 
materials for atomic production or which 
produce or use fissionable materials or 
atomic energy.../and/unhindered access to 
documents pertaining to the budgetary 
allocations of States for military purposes.
b. Joint studies of treaty observance and maintenance of
peace in a disarmed world (in deference to Western views).
5. Control organization review and report.
Stage Three would involve:
1. ‘The abolition of the armed forces.... police (militia) 
...will be equipped with light firearms'.
2. Destruction of all other armaments. Termination of 
armament production.
3. War ministries, general staffs and military training 
abolished.^
b. End of military appropriations. Funds released to be 
used for reducing taxation, national economic development 
and assistance to underdeveloped countries.
5. Inspection of these measures, plus ‘where necessary, 
a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over 
the territory of States’.
07The proposal of September 18, 1959? also abolished 
‘scientific research for military purposes’.
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States would supply information on the strength, 
deployment and movements of their militia, which would be 
verified.
The control organization would be permanent, and:
The Control Council will have the right to 
send mobile inspection teams to any point or 
to any establishment in the territory of States.
Thus for the first time not only 'objects of control'
but all 'objects' were made liable to inspection in a
Soviet plan, even though the Soviets might have enjoyed a
virtual veto in the Control Council.
6. Measures for peace and security 'in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations' enter into effect.
States will undertake, where necessary, to 
place at the disposal of the Security 
Council units from the contingents of the 
police (militia) remaining at their disposal.
June 7 made no provision for partial measures,
although the proposal of September 18 had listed several
traditional measures in general terms and 'recalled' the
May 10 partial proposals as a 'sound, basis for agreement'.
This omission may have been due to the vulnerability of the
West on the question of general and complete disarmament.
June 7 was the most comprehensive list of measures
ever compiled by either side. The Soviets incorporated
- June 7j 1960 -
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specifically all the major measures which the West had
singled out as especially important in the previous few
years, as well as Ithose which the Soviets had emphasized
themselves. This gave an appearance of conciliation to
a plan which was uncompromisingly radical. The West was
not contemplating radical disarmament before experience of
’initial measures’ in i960, as in 1957*
The fundamental claim made for general and complete
disarmament - that it would ’exclude the very possibility
of war’ - is baseless.
The objection to total disarmament is not 
that it is impracticable, but that there 
can be, in principle, nothing of the kind: 
the physical capacity for organized violence 
is inherent in human society. Even the most 
thoroughgoing disarmament treaty must leave 
nations with the capacity to raise this level, 
to re-establish what has been dis~esta.blished, 
to remember or to re-invent what has been laid 
aside...Moreover, the most thoroughgoing 
disarmament treaty must leave some powers with 
a greater capacity for war than others....A 
nation’s war potential does not reside merely 
in its "armaments", but in the whole complex 
of its economic and demographic resources, 
strategic position, technological and 
industrial skill, military experience and 
ingenuity, morale, commitments and more besides...88
88
Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race. W.eidenfeld 
& Nigholson, London, I961, pp. 3^ — 5*
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In fact the Soviets implicitly admitted that total 
disarmament could not put an end to war in their proposal 
for Security Council forces to 'ensure the maintenance of 
peace1. Maintenance would not be necessary unless there 
had been a breach.
The Soviet plan, for all its careful comprehensiveness, 
would have produced great confusion by comparison with 
earlier radical plans. The first-stage measures for the 
elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles and foreign 
forces and bases was not matched by any mandatory force 
reductions for the affected powers. These began in Stage 
Two. Enormous forces of the nuclear powers would thus 
have been d eprived of their previous reason for existence. 
Nothing in the proposal would have prevented them being 
equipped with conventional weapons of a single-purpose 
kind.; indeed nothing prevented the expansion of forces 
during Stage One; there were no force reductions until 
Stage Two.
By the end of Stage One the Soviets would have been 
in a dominating position in Europe, with their armies and 
armaments intact in Russia, save for nuclear delivery 
vehicles, and American forces withdrawn from Eurasia.
The only effective Western retaliation to aggression at
- June 7) I960 -
this point would have been primitively-delivered nuclear
weapons - none of which had yet been destroyed.
As pointed out above, June 7 was not conditional on
political developments in any respect, and, apart from
the placing of units at the disposal of the Security 
89Council, the ’measures for preserving peace and 
security’ in a disarmed world, which would come into force 
during Stage Three, were not specified.
89
This provision was in any case redundant:
All Members of the United Nations...undertake to 
make available to the Security Council, on its 
call and in accordance with a special agreement 
or agreements, armed forces...necessary for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security.
- Article 4-3, Charter of the United Nations
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JUNE 27, 1960^Q (United States plan for comprehensive 
and ’complete1 disarmament, containing a separable first 
stage of comprehensive , partial disarmament $ submitted 
to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. Modified 
txhe Western plan of March 16, 1960,91 also submitted to 
the Ten Nation Committee $ which was in turn based upon a 
proposal by the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, 
at the General Assembly, September 175 1959*92)
June 27 was a three-stage plan for drastic disarmament,
providing for a separable first stage. Tabling the plan,
Eaton, the United States delegate, said:
The Soviets insist that disarmament must be 
negotiated in detail at this table and approved 
by all nations of the world at a conference to 
be called some time in the distant future, 
before any real measure of disarmament is 
undertaken....
We have repeatedly sought to have this 
conference get down to business in drafting 
not generalities about Utopia, but agreement 
on specific, controlled measures of disarmament.
90
TNCD/7, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 933*
(”Programme for General and Complete Disarmament 
under Effective International Control”)
Eaton said, when introducing this plan: 'I table the 
paper as a United States document because none of my Western 
colleagues had had time to consult with his government’.
He had expected to table it as ’an agreed Western position’ 
within a week, but tabled it instead on the day the Soviets 
walked out of the Ten Nation Committee. See TNCD/PV.47)
June 27, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 891•
91
TNCD/3, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 921.
92
A/PV.798, pp. 24-6, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 908.
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T h is  would e n a b l e  us  to  g e t  s t a r t e d  toward  th e  
g o a l  o f  g e n e r a l  and com ple te  d is a rm a m e n t ,  
w h i l e  we t h e n  went on and c o n t i n u e d  our 
n e g o t i a t i o n s  on l a t e r  s t a g e s . . . 93
The p r o p o s a l  i t s e l f  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e  t a s k  o f  th e  Ten
N a t io n  Committee was t o  d r a f t  a  f i r s t - s t a g e  t r e a t y
c o n s i s t i n g  of  ‘ t h o s e  i n i t i a l  and c o n t r o l l a b l e  m easures
which can and s h a l l  be u n d e r t a k e n  w i t h o u t  d e l a y  by th e
S t a t e s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  t h e  Committee*.  These  measures
were l i s t e d  i n  S t a g e  One. Taken t o g e t h e r ,  t h e y  re s em b led
t h e  W este rn  com p reh en s iv e  p a r t i a l  p r o p o s a l ,  August  29.  1957 .
The W es te rn  n e g o t i a t o r s  were  so f e a r f u l  o f  S o v i e t
p ro p o g a n d a ,  o r  so s c e p t i c a l  o f  t h e  chan ces  o f  a g re e m e n t ,
t h a t  t h e y  d i d  n o t  p ro p o se  t h e s e  m easu re s  i n  some d e t a i l  i n
a s e p a r a t e  docum ent .  As i t  w as ,  t h e  d e t a i l  p r o v i d e d  was
l e s s  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t h a n  i n  1957.
The p r o p o s a l  o f  June  27 f a v o u r e d  ’ e ach  m easure  b e in g
c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  an  a g re e d  and s t r i c t l y  d e f i n e d  p e r i o d  of
t im e * .  I n  t r a d i t i o n a l  f a s h i o n  t h e  B r i t i s h  d e l e g a t e ,
Ormsby-Gore,  had i n f o r m a l l y  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  a l i m i t  o f  ’ say
94one y e a r ’ m igh t  s u f f i c e  f o r  a f i r s t  s t a g e .
9 3 ~
TNCD/PV.4 7 , Ju n e  27 ,  1960, i n  Cmnd. 1152, pp.  890 -1 .
TNCD/PV.2, March 1 6 , i 9 6 0 , i n  Cmnd. 1152, p. 31*
94
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There would be an International Disarmament Control 
Organization comprising conference, control commission and 
director general, but transition between stages was to be 
a Security Council matter.
The proposal called for joint technical studies during 
negotiations, and gave priority to the study of the control 
of nuclear delivery. The Western proposal of March 16 had 
listed other measures for study 'Immediately’:
1. Prohibition of orbiting mass-destruction weapons.
2. Prior notification of missile launchings.
3. The cut-off. 
b, Transfers.
5. Measures against surprise attack.
6. 'Measures to verify budgetary information’.
7. ‘Means of preventing aggression and preserving world 
peace and security as national armaments are reduced'.
8. 'Timing and manner of extending a disarmament 
agreement so as to include other States having significant 
military capabilities'.
The East had agreed, in June 7. to studies on the 
cut-off and on international security being conducted 
during disarmament, but not 'immediately'.
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Stage One of the proposal of June 27 provided for:
1. Establishment of control.
2. Ban on mass destruction weapons in outer space.
3. Measures against surprise attack including: ’ prior 
notification* of force movements; *a zone of aerial and 
ground inspection in agreed areas including the United 
States and U.S.3.R.’; and exchange of observers at bases. 
Zones were not defined.
b. Declaration and inspection of ’agreed* nuclear bases 
preparatory to controlling nuclear delivery systems in 
later stages.
5. » Initial force level ceilings: 2.5 million for the U.S. 
and U.3.S.R.; agreed levels for ’certain other States’. The 
Western comprehensive partial proposal of August 29, 1957 
had set levels for France and the U.K.
6. ’Agreed types and quantities of armaments... shall be 
placed in storage depots by participating States within 
their own territories... pending their final destruction or 
conversion to peaceful uses’.
7. ’Materials’ cut-off and transfers.
8. Submission of data relevant to military finances.
The second measure was new, but it anticipated an
unlikely development.
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S i n c e  S t a g e  One was d e t a c h a b l e ,  and would n o t
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  be f o l lo w e d  by a second  s t a g e ,  t h e  f o u r t h
m e a s u r e ,  on n u c l e a r  d e l i v e r y ,  was ’ c o n t r o l  w i t h o u t
d i s a rm a m e n t '  i n  t h e  most s e n s i t i v e  a r e a  o f  a l l *
F o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e  s i n c e  i t  was. p u t  fo rw a rd  i n  1956,
t h e  p r o p o s a l  f o r  a f o r c e  l e v e l  o f  2*5 m i l l i o n  would have
b o rn e  f a i r l y  e q u a l l y  on t h e  f o r c e s  o f  t h e  Two. American
f o r c e s  numbered a b o u t  2*5 m i l l i o n  i n  t h e  w i n t e r  o f  i 9 6 0 ;
S o v i e t  f o r c e s  were  d e c l a r e d  by Mr. K hrushchev  t o  number
3 , 6 2 3 ,0 0 0  i n  J a n u a r y  i 960 when he  announced a r e d u c t i o n
w i t h i n  two y e a r s  t o  2 , 4 2 3 ,0 0 0 .
I n  A p r i l  1960 Moch had d e fe n d ed  t h e  p r o p o s a l  f o r
p l a c i n g  weapons i n  s t o r a g e  d e p o t s  a g a i n s t  E a s t e r n  c r i t i c i s m .
I t  i s  a m easure  p r e l i m i n a r y  t o  th e  d e s t r u c t i o n  
o f  t h o s e  m a t e r i a l s ,  and i t s  e s s e n t i a l  p u rp o se  
i s  t o  a s se m b le  them f o r  i n v e n t o r y  purposes.96
’B u t ’ , he went  on ,  ’ any o t h e r  means p ro p ö se d  by t h e  E a s t e r n
d e l e g a t i o n s  f o r  e l i m i n a t i n g  t h e s e  s u r p l u s  m a t e r i a l s  would be
s e r i o u s l y  s t u d i e d  by u s ' .
The E a s t  c o n t i n u e d  t o  a d v o c a te  im m edia te  d e s t r u c t i o n  
o f  a rm am en ts ,  b u t  t h e  new American p l a n  o f  Ju n e  27 was
95
See  T a b le  1.
96
TNCD/PV.14, A p r i l  1, i 9 6 0 , i n  Cmnd. 1152, p. 2 7 3 .
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vague about the timing of ’final destruction* after 
’preliminary1 storing in Stage One. Destruction was not 
specifically proposed until Stage Two. It is interesting 
to note that if an agreement on storing armament had 
broken down, the United States would have been at a 
disadvantage compared to the Soviet Union because its 
stored weapons (under the proposal of June 27) would have 
been in the continental United States and not readily 
available for action in Europe.
The plan of March 16 had contained the first explicit 
Western proposal for separation of the two cut-offs. (The 
’materials’ cut-off came in Stage Two, the ’weapon’ cut-off 
in Stage Three.) However its draftsman seems not to have 
been keenly aware of this separation. Stage Three provided 
for:
2. Further reduction of existing stocks
of nuclear, chemical, biological and
other weapons of mass destruction. /Emphasis added/
June 27 made no provision for the ’weapon’ cut-off
in Stage One, even though it provided for reduction of
nuclear weapons in Stage Two.
The provisions of Stage Two were to be agreed in the
following way. The Ten Nation Committee would:
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a f t e r  r e a c h i n g  ag reem en t  on a t r e a t y  on t h e  
f i r s t  s t a g e  o f  t h e  program , p r e p a r e  f o r  
s u b m is s io n  t o  a w o r ld  d isa rm am en t  c o n f e r e n c e  
an a g re e d  d r a f t  t r e a t y  on th e  second and 
t h i r d  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  p r o g r a m . . .
One o f  t h e  t a s k s  o f  t h e  w o r ld  c o n f e r e n c e  was t o  a r r a n g e :
A. A c c e s s io n  t o  t h e  t r e a t y  c o v e r i n g  s t a g e  
one by S t a t e s  which  have n o t  a l r e a d y  done so .
S t a g e  One i t s e l f  p r o v i d e d  t h a t :
A f t e r  t h e  a c c e s s i o n  t o  t h e  t r e a t y  o f  o t h e r  
m i l i t a r i l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  S t a t e s  and a f t e r  t h e s e  
i n i t i a l  f o r c e  l e v e l s 9 7  have  been  v e r i f i e d ,  
f o r c e  l e v e l s  o f  2.1 m i l l i o n  s h a l l  be 
e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and t h e  
U .S .S .R .  and a g re e d  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r c e  l e v e l s  
s h a l l  be e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  o t h e r  m i l i t a r i l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  S t a t e s .
Thus ’S t a g e  One1 i n c l u d e d  a measure  which c o u ld  n o t  
be im plem ented  b e f o r e  t h e  b e g in n in g  o f  S t a g e  Two.
S t a g e  Two p r o p e r  p r o v id e d  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m e a su re s :
1. 1 .7  m i l l i o n  f o r c e  l e v e l  f o r  th e  Two; ‘ a g re e d  
a p p r o p r i a t e  l e v e l s '  f o r  o t h e r s .
2 .  ' Q u a n t i t i e s  o f  a l l  k in d s  o f  a rm am en ts . . . i n c l u d i n g  
n u c l e a r ,  c h e m i c a l , b i o l o g i c a l  and o t h e r  weapons of  
d e s t r u c t i o n  i n  e x i s t e n c e  and a l l  means f o r  t h e i r  d e l i v e r y ,  
s h a l l  be r e d u c e d  t o  a g re e d  l e v e l s  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  e x c e s s e s  
s h a l l  be d e s t r o y e d  or  c o n v e r t e d  t o  p e a c e f u l  u s e s ' .
T h a t  i s ,  2 . 5  m i l l i o n  f o r  t h e  U .S .  and U . S . S . R . ,  e t c .
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3. Reduction of expenditure.
4. ‘An international peace force, within the United 
Nations, shall be progressively established and maintained 
with agreed personnel strength and armaments sufficient to 
preserve world peace when general and complete disarmament 
is achieved1.
Stage Three provided for:
1. Force levels adequate for internal order and for 
‘providing agfeed contingents of forces to the international 
peace force’.
2. ‘The international peace force and remaining agreed 
contingents of national armed forces shall be armed only 
with agreed types and quantities of armaments. All other 
remaining armaments, including weapons of mass destruction 
and vehicles for their delivery and conventional armaments 
shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses'.
3. Further expenditure reduction.
4. Control of armament manufacture.
The American disarmed world would thus have been 
policed by an international authority having no nuclear 
weapons in an environment where there could be no certainty 
that nations had surrendered theirs. The Western proposal 
of March 16 was more modest on this point. It called for:
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further steps, in the light of the latest 
scientific knowledge, to achieve the final 
elimination of these weapons.
The United States delegate might well have been asked
who was guilty of 1 drafting...generalities about Utopia*.
It is interesting to note that in 19&0 the Western
delegations followed the lead first given by the Soviet
Union in 1956 and ceased to declare that radical
disarmament must depend on the settlement of political
issues. The emphasis of political discussion by both sides
in i960 shifted from settlements to structures, notably an
international peace force, which was apparently to be
superimposed on a world which would continue much as before,
politically. As Eaton put it, the international force
would 'prevent disagreements that will always exist from
98threatening the peace of the w o r l d N e g o t i a t o r s  of 
radical disarmament confront so many deep problems that 
they should perhaps not be condemned when they seem unable 
to confront more than one of the problems at a time.
98
TNCD/PV.47, June 27, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 890.
CHAPTER 2
THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN. 1960
The method used so far in analysing proposals is 
dropped at this point; Soviet and Western positions on the 
test ban will be discussed simultaneously. There is a good 
reason for this procedure. At the end of i960 the Three were 
in agreement on the essential point, that all tests should be 
banned under international control independently of other 
measures. They had also agreed formally or informally to a 
number of treaty articles, and it will be convenient to base 
a discussion of their differences on a discussion of the 
accords they had registered.
The justification for analysing the position at the end 
of i960 is not only that the main body of this thesis does 
not deal with developments after that year, but also that the 
chances of a controlled agreement on the broad basis of the 
Experts1 Report on international control of 1958 were 
probably best at that time. After the Kennedy-Khrushchev 
meeting in Vienna (June 3-*+5 1961), it became clear that the 
Soviets had withdrawn their endorsement of the Experts’
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principles, and wished the test negotiations to be merged
iwith general disarmament negotiations. When a partial
agreement was finally reached in 19^3 > there was no
provision for international control at all.
Donald Brennan and Morton Halperin, in their analysis
of the test ban which is a point of departure for this
chapter, set out to (a) ‘deal with the major policy
considerations of a ban on the further testing of nuclear
weapons1 2, and (b) ‘provide an example of a fairly complete
panalysis of an arms-control measure1. What they do in fact 
is to discuss the likely effect of the test ban on American 
strategy and weapon strength as of about i960. They also 
discuss carefully the effect of a ban on the Nth country 
problem. They consider the danger for the United States of 
various inspection systems permitting the Soviets to cheat 
on a ban, but they do not discuss the effect of proposed 
inspection measures on Soviet security, and their analysis 
of the effect of the ban on Soviet nuclear military technology 
is curiously perfunctory. ‘American Policy Considerations...1
1
See: Radio-Television Address by Khrushchev, June 6, 1961. 
Quoted in Geneva Conference, op. cit.. p. 1?6.2
"Policy Considerations of a Nuclear Test Ban", in D.G. 
Brennan (ed.), Arms Control. Disarmament, and National 
Security, George Braziller, New York, 19o1, p. 23^.
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could have been the title of their chapter. Some other 
omissions in their analysis are also taken up in what 
follows.
Since Brennan and Halperin believe in general that it
is not in the American interest to turn limited conventional
wars into limited nuclear wars, they reject the argument
that the test ban should be opposed because it would prevent
the refinement of low yield, varied tactical weapons. In
fact, they favour it because it would likely help increase4the conventional emphasis in American defence policy.
The authors state that 'America's NATO allies, 
particularly Britain, /sic7 France and Germany, are in effect 
asked by a test ban treaty to accept a permanently inferior 
military position vis-a-vis the United States as well as the 
Soviet Union', but they say that the ban, nevertheless, 'may 
be of value to all members of NATO'.' However, it is almost 
certain that if the Europeans do 'accept' inferiority it will 
be for reasons other than agreement on a test ban - expense, 
the difficulties of obsolescence, and political reasons 
which vary from country to country.
3 Ibid., pp. 235-9.4
Ibid., p. 240.
Ibid.. p. 242.
In discussing ^further weapon developments* Brennan 
and Halperin conclude their detailed technical exposition 
as follows:
These data..vindicate that current yield/weight 
ratios of large ZU.S*7 strategic weapons are in 
the region of 1 to 3 KT/lb /I.e., kilotons per 
pound/, depending on weight, and that further 
testing and development might improve these 
ratios by a factor of 5.. •
They then reveal the tacit assumption of their
chapter - that U.S. and Soviet nuclear bomb technologies
were of roughly equal quality in 1960.
If both we and the Soviets abstain from further 
improvements in efficiency, the situation will 
remain essentially as it is. If neither we nor 
the Soviets abstain from further testing, we both 
may increase the total deliverable yield by 
something like a factor of 5...6 /Emphasis adde&7
In fact, since the Soviets had done considerably less
testing than the United States at the end of 1953, when all
testing stopped, they would almost certainly have had more
room for improvement in yield/weight ratios. Hans Bethe
favoured a test ban in the early years of the negotiations
because:
6
Ibid., p. 249.
7 The exact number of tests conducted by the United States 
and the Soviet Union by the end of 1958 is uncertain. 
According to Jules Moch at the Fourteenth General Assembly 
the score for the Three was as follows: U.S.-I3I; U.S.S.R. 
55; U.K.-21. See A/C.1/SR.1043, November 4, 1959? p. 90.
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It would have been a great advantage to us 
/the United States/ to conclude a test ban 
treaty at the earliest moment because it would 
have stabilized the technical advantages we 
had in 1958.8
The Brennan-Halperin view cannot explain the Soviet
decision to resume tests in September 1961, or the hardening
of the Soviet position on the test ban which became clear
early in 1961. Indeed the authors declared in favour of a
first resumption of tests by the United States eventually,
because 'the domestic political effects and the consequences
for future arms-control negotiations would be much too
adverse to permit indefinite abstention from testing without
9any form of agreement'.
It is likely that the Soviet decision to push hard for 
a test ban in 1958 was not only a propaganda maneuver, but 
reflected a confidence in Soviet weaponry stemming from the 
rocket successes of 1957 and the big nuclear test series 
which immediately preceded the Supreme Soviet's announcement 
of a unilateral test suspension on March 31> 1958.
Strategists are generally agreed that it would not be in the 
Soviet Union's interest to introduce nuclear weapons into
b
Hans A. Bethe, "Disarmament and Strategy", Survival.
November-December 1962, p. 272. (Reproduced from The Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists. September 1962.)
9 Brennan and Halperin, ojd. cit. , p. 266.
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limited wars because of her superior conventional 
war-winning capabilities. Probably the Soviet military 
felt in 1958 that they did not need the varied and 
sophisticated tactical arsenal which America was developing. 
For strategic warfare the Soviets had developed multi-megaton 
bombs which, although very heavy relative to America's, 
could be delivered by the high-thrust rockets successfully 
tested in 1957»
Moreover, in 1958 the Soviets may have viewed the test 
ban as a useful way to put pressure on France and China to 
forego nuclear weapons, at leasttemporarily; at any rate a
test agreement would have made it politically easier to deny
10China nuclear military assistance.
The mood of military confidence was still apparently
dominant in Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on
January 14, i960, when drastic force reductions were
announced. At that time Khrushchev said:
The Government which was the first to resume 
nuclear weapon tests would assume a great 
responsibility before the peoples....the Soviet 
Government will continue abiding by the commit­
ment it has assumed not to resume experimental 
nuclear explosions.11
10
See Ciro E. Zoppo, The Accession of Other Nations to the 
Nuclear Test Ban. The RAND Corporation, RM-2730-ARPA, March 1961. 
11
"Disarmament: The Way to Secure Peace and Friendship Between 
Nations", Soviet Booklet No. 64, London, January i960, p. 20.
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A little over a year later Soviet confidence had
evaporated. Bethe says the decision to resume tests was
12probably taken in about March 1961, and the Soviet position 
on the test ban definitely hardened in that month with the
demand for a ’troika1 structure in the control
1 3administration. *■'
The explanation for the Soviet shift is complex and
obscure. The Russians seem to have found that their giant
liquid-fuel rockets were difficult to conceal or protect,
slow to react, and very expensive. The relatively primitive
warheads available for them were heavier than they would
have been with more testing, and it was thus more expensive
to land a given number of megatons on target than it need
have been. At any rate, production capacity for giant
rockets was never fully used. According to U.S. intelligence
reports which began to appear in 1961, the Soviet rocket
strength was not and had never been several times greater
than the American, contrary to widespread belief, but was
possibly inferior, and the Soviets were decisively inferior
1L. .in strategic bombers. Thus by mid-1961, not only was Soviet
_
Bethe, 0£. cit.. p. 272.
13Geneva Conference, op. cit.. p. 172ff.
14-
This intelligence was summarized in New York Times.
November 20, 1961.
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weakness exposed, but U.S. satellite observation programs 
combined with greatly increased U.S. striking forces 
threatened the security of the Soviet's vulnerable 
strategic weaponry.
By 1961 it was also clear that France would continue 
to brave the storm of criticism aroused by her nuclear 
testing. The fierceness of the storm was in large part due 
to the voluntary moratorium being observed by the Three. 
Would a test ban treaty be a much greater deterrent to 
French testing? The Soviets could not afford to stay as 
long as the United States in a suspension arrangement which 
did not prevent French testing. Soviet planners must have 
wondered whether they ought to join one at all if they were 
bound to be forced to denounce it quite soon.
From the beginning of the test suspension in 1958, 
Soviet strategists must have had doubts about the test ban, 
and Soviet policy 1958-60 may have been an aberration 
personal to Mr. Khrushchev. Since the Soviets seem to have 
had good reasons for disrupting a ban without controls in 
1961, it may well be doubted whether it was in their 
interest to agree to a ban with controls in i960.
Brennan/Halperin discuss the effect or non-effect of 
not testing on weapons, but not its effect on weapon 
laboratories. A test ban would tend to be unstable unless
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laboratories were put under surveillance. The test ban 
treaty as discussed during 1958-60 would not have forbidden 
weapon research or secret test preparations, Bethe!s 
discussion of the 1961 Soviet tests is interesting in this 
context.
...the kind of weapons tested show that their 
laboratories had probably been working full speed 
during the whole moratorium on the assumption 
that tests would (might?) at some time be resumed.
Our laboratories put their main emphasis on such 
improvements as could be used and go into stockpile without test.15
It is not certain that the Soviets intended to resume 
tests at some time, nor would test-oriented research during 
a controlled suspension mean this. The test ban is a clumsy 
means of controlling the qualitative arms race, and even 
expensive laboratory ’insurance’ against the other side’s 
breaking a test ban agreement might be militarily 
justifiable. Laboratory work would also be proved useful 
if it became possible to exploit weaknesses in the 
inspection net and test clandestinely.
It was notoriously difficult to hold American scientists 
in weapon laboratories during the informal suspension of test­
ing, 1958-61. For moral and political reasons it would be 
much more difficult to hold them during a formally agreed test
vTBethe, o£, cit., p. 272.
suspension. The Soviet Government has an advantage in 
being able to exert greater political pressure on 
scientists, and in the greater secrecy of its research and 
development activities which would facilitate clandestine 
testing.
It remains to discuss the control system as laid down 
in agreed treaty articles and disputed in East-West policy 
differences at the end of 1960. We shall be considering 
first the nature of the proposed control arrangements for 
detecting and identifying ’illegal* tests,and afterwards the 
probable effect of those arrangements on the security of 
the inspected powers (notably the Soviet Union) as well as 
the value of possible clandestine testing under the proposed 
arrangements.
. . • . •
The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear 
Weapons Tests between Great Britain, the Soviet Union and 
the United States began on October 31 > 1958 and was absorbed 
into general disarmament negotiations in 1962. It met as a
16
See G.P. King, ”0n Banning Nuclear Tests” , Australian 
Outlook. December i960. Many of the conference documents 
cited below are reprinted in Geneva Conference, Documents on 
Disarmament, vol. II, and Documents on Disarmament. I960.
result of a successful technical conference held on July 1, 
1958* and the Report of the Conference of Experts to Study 
the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement 
on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, August 21, 1958, ' became 
the basis of the control systems proposed at the political 
conference by East and West.
The Experts’ Report recommended a world-wide system of 
land and ship control posts plus aerial surveys to police 
the test ban. The recommendation was based upon an analysis 
of five ’methods’ of detecting and identifying nuclear 
explosions.
1. Acoustic Waves, including hydroacoustic waves. This 
method was found reliable for detecting and locating 
atmospheric (up to 50 kilometers) and underwater bursts at 
great distances.
2. Radioactive Debris. Control posts set 3-5,000 
kilometers apart would detect one kiloton explosions in the 
troposphere (i.e., up to ten kilometers) ’with a high degree 
of reliability’. Aircraft flights over the high seas would 
be useful for sampling and searching.
17EXP/NUC/28, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, pp. 1091 — 
1111. Official expert delegates came from the U.S.S.R. (8), 
Poland (3), Czechoslovakia (4), Rumania (1), the U.S. (3), 
U.K. (2), France (1) and Canada (1).
140
3. Seismic Waves. Control posts could identify one 
kiloton underground nuclear explosions 1 set off in 
unfavourable conditions for transferring energy1 during 
periods of favourable* seismic noise conditions, and five 
kiloton explosions during unfavourable periods.
Ninety per cent of earthquakes could be * distinguished 
from explosions with a high degree of reliability if the 
direction of first motion of the longitudinal wave is 
clearly registered at 5 or more seismic stations on various 
bearings from the epicentre1. And under certain conditions 
the epicentre could be localized within * approximately 
100-200 square kilometers'. However:
For those cases which remain unidentified
inspection of the region will be necessary*
b. Radio Signals. A one kiloton explosion could be 
detected by its radio signal ’at distances exceeding 6,000 
km.*, although thunderstorms and lightning might interfere.
5. High Altitude Explosions. °(i.e., above 30-50 kilometers). 
It would be 'possible to use for the detection of nuclear 
explosions at high altitudes the registration of gamma 
radiation and neutrons with properly instrumented earth 
satellites'. Radio and optical techniques might also be
TS- - - - - - - -
Not strictly a ’method'.
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used to  reco rd  io n o sp h e ric  phenomena r e s u l t in g  from 
n u c le a r  e x p lo s io n s . The ex p e rts  announced th a t  th ey  had 
'n o t  co n s id e red ' d e te c t io n  a t  'm i l l io n s  of k ilo m e te rs  from 
th e  e a r t h ' .
The e x p e rts  'recommended* th e  use o f th e  f i r s t  fo u r  
methods a t  c o n tro l  p o s ts ,  and consid ered  i t  'p o ss ib le *  to  
use th e  h ig h  a l t i t u d e  methods an a ly sed . T h e ir 'c o n c lu s io n s  
on th e  q u es tio n  o f the  te c h n ic a l  equipment of th e  c o n tro l  
system* s p e c if ie d  ap p a ra tu s  to  be i n s t a l l e d  a t  land  p o s ts ,  
on sh ip s  and in  a i r c r a f t ,  w h ile  t h e i r  'c o n c lu s io n s  on a 
c o n tro l  system* recommended 'a n  in te r n a t io n a l  c o n tro l  organ* 
which would 'e n su re  th e  c o o rd in a tio n  of the v a r io u s  
a c t i v i t i e s  of th e  c o n tro l  system *. They recommended a 
netw ork of 160-170 land  c o n tro l  and te n  sh ip  c o n tro l  p o s ts ,  
w ith  100-110 o f th e  land  p o s ts  on c o n tin e n ts  and 60 on 
o cean ic  i s la n d s .  They s p e c if ie d  th a t  spacing  between land 
p o s ts  would be 'a b o u t 1,700 k ilo m e te rs ' in  ase ism ic  and 100 
k ilo m e te rs  in  se ism ic  a r e a s ,  g iv in g  a w orld d i s t r i b u t i o n  as 
fo llo w s : N orth  America -  24 ; Europe -  65 A sia -  37;
A u s tr a l ia  -  7 ; South  America -  16; A fr ic a  -  16; A n ta rc t ic a  -  
4 . They recommended: 'ab o u t' 30 e x p e rts  o f v a r io u s  k inds fo r  
each c o n t ro l  p o s t p lu s  'some persons f o r . . . a u x i l i a r y  s e rv ic ­
i n g ' ;  r e g u la r  and , i f  n e c e ssa ry , s p e c ia l  a i r  sam pling 
f l i g h t s ;  and o n - s i te  in s p e c tio n  in  th e  fo llo w in g  c ircu m stan ces :
6. When the control posts detect an event 
which cannot be identified by the international 
control organ and which could be suspected of 
being a nuclear explosion, the international 
control organ can send an inspection group to 
the site of this event in order to determine 
whether a nuclear explosion had taken place or no t • • . •
It has been estimated on the basis of existing data that the number of earthquakes which would 
be undistinguishable on the hasis of their 
seismic signals from deep underground nuclear 
explosions of about five kilotons yield could be 
in continental areas from 20 to 100 a year. Those 
unidentified events which could be suspected of 
being nuclear explosions would be inspected as 
described in item 6. /i.e., on the sit$7
1QIn their ’communique1, the Experts ’noted’ that ’the
combined use of the various methods considerably facilitates
detection and identification’, and that detection techniques
and knowledge, and hence the effectiveness of the system,
would improve with time. They concluded:
The Conference reached the conclusion that it is 
technically feasible to set up, with certain 
capabilities and limitations, a workable and 
effective control system for the detection of 
violations of a possible agreement on the world­
wide cessation of nuclear tests.
Three other supplementary technical conferences and 
discussions were held between the submission of the Experts’ 
Report and the end of 1960. The first, Technical Working 
Group I, as it was later called, reported to the political
EXP/NUC/28, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1090.
19
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conference on July 10, 1959 in favour of a system of 
detection satellites - five to six in earth orbit for 
detecting gamma rays, neutrons and soft x-rays, one in 
earth orbit to detect electrons trapped in the earth’s
magnetic field, and four in solar orbit. Special equipment
20at ground posts for space detection was also recommended.
The second supplementary expert conference met at
American insistence on November 25, 1959 to review the
original Expert conclusions on seismic detection in the
light of: (i) new American data which suggested that the
difficulties had been underestimated, and (ii) a technique,
suggested and partly tested by American scientists, for
muffling explosions - the deep-hole ’decoupling’ method.
The group agreed on certain technical improvements to the
Geneva Experts’ system, but reported ’disagreement’ on the
new data and decoupling on December 18 , 1959. The expert
21delegations of the Three reported in separate Annexes. The 
Soviet experts concluded in opposition to their American 
colleagues that there were fewer rather than more earthquakes 
of given yields than the Experts had originally estimated.
20
/GEN//DNT/63
DNT/TWG.2/9, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1558
21
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They questioned ‘formal mathematical solutions’ to the
problem of decoupling, that is, they required experimental
data, and they also questioned ’the technical feasibility
of carrying out vast underground construction operations at
22a depth of the order of one kilometer’. The American 
experts reported that suitable cavities already existed or 
could be constructed fairly easily for decoupling purposes, 
and that their 'rigorous theoretical calculations' showed
2 ^that signals could be reduced ’by a factor of 300 or more*. *■'
24The British experts agreed substantially with the American.
The third extra meeting of experts was an informal
consultation designated 'the Seismic Research Program
Advisory Group’ which met on May 11, 19&0 for two weeks. The
experts of the Three reported individually to their delega-
2 ^tions without reaching agreement. y Their disagreements are 
discussed below in connection with the treaty.
When the Three began their political conference in 
October, 1958, they attempted jointly to draft a comprehensive 
agreement embodying the major recommendations of the Experts.
22
DNT/TWG. 2/9, Annex II.
23Ibid., Annex IV.24 --
Ibid., Annex III.
25
ZGEN/DNTZ7PV.207, May 31, I960.
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(As shown above, the Americans developed doubts about some 
of the Experts’ technical conclusions.) In this attempt, 
they agreed formally on the wording of some draft treaty 
articles, and disagreed about the wording and the content 
of other articles. They agreed about the content of portions 
of some articles but did not establish final wording. Some­
times they agreed on wording, but did not register this 
agreement formally. On some issues, which it was agreed the 
treaty must cover, either one side or both did not submit 
drafts at all.^
26
In the description which follows a ’formal agreement' is 
the result of a text being jointly tabled by the sides, an 
'informal agreement' is an agreement about wording not 
registered formally, an 'agreement in principle' occurs when 
one side supports generally the draft of the other without 
proposing any wording itself, and a 'rough agreement' occurs 
when the two sides submit drafts which are in substantial 
agreement.
The positions of the sides as described were often reached 
after several compromises involving 'package offers' - offers 
in which concessions were made on condition that other 
specified concessions be made in return. It is not necessary 
to examine all the contents of package offers. A package 
offer is not really much different to a 'bare' offer. In 
proposing a compromise on one aspect of an agreement a side 
does not thereby withdraw any of its offers on other aspects.
In what follows, if 'the West' is said to have adopted a 
position it means that either the United States or the United 
Kingdom or both powers jointly adopted the position. No 
disagreements of any moment occurred publicly between these 
allies at the conference.
The formally agreed Preamble of the Draft Treaty on 
the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests stated that:
The Parties...
Desirous of bringing about the permanent 
discontinuance of nuclear weapons test explosions;
Hoping that all other countries will join in 
undertakings not to carry out nuclear weapons 
tests and to ensure the satisfactory operation 
of that control throughout the world...
Have agreed as follows:27
Article 1 provided for parties to suspend their own 
tests, and
(b) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in 
any way participating in, the carrying out of 
nuclear weapons test explosions anywhere.28
29 10Articles 2 ' and 3 provided for a Control Organization 
consisting of a Control Commission, a Detection and 
Indentification System (‘the System1), a Chief Executive 
Officer (‘the Administrator1), and a Conference of Parties. 
Headquarters were to be in Vienna.
Articles 4-6 dealt with the Control Commission. Article 
4 made the U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S. permanent members, 
together with ‘four other Parties elected by the Conference1
27
DNT/15/Add. 9, April 17, 1959.
28
DNT/15, December 4, 1958.
29
DNT/15/Add. 1, December 8, 1958.
30DNT/15/Add. 2/Rev. 1, December 12, 1958. Revised: August 
11, 1959.
id?
who would serve for two years.^ On July 1, 1960 the
Soviet Union formally proposed an overall composition of
three Western allies, three Eastern allies and one neutral."
On August 95 I960 the United States proposed a 3;2:2 formula.^
The difference was never resolved.
Under Article 5> dealing with procedure in the Control
Commission, there was informal agreement on all but the
question of voting on finances. Voting would ordinarily be
by simple majority, but under the United States proposal of
June 17? 1959 decisions on financial and budgetary matters
qLwould be taken by a two-thirds majority.J The Soviet 
delegate on December 1 ,^ 1959 proposed the same formula, 
but under the Soviet proposal for the composition of the 
Control Commission this would have given a united Eastern 
(or Western) bloc a veto over the budget.
Article 6 was to deal with the functions of the Control 
Commission. The Soviets wished the Commission to ’direct the 
System’; the West preferred the formula ’shall maintain
31DNT/15/Add. 3.
32PV.223, p. !+1
33PV.240, p. 7.34
PV.97, pp. 5-6.
35PV.148, p. 11.
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supervision over the System*. Both sides agreed that 
the concurring votes of the original parties would be 
required for the appointment of the Administrator; and both 
agreed that there should be four Deputy Administrators, but 
the Soviets wanted them appointed by the Commission - ‘two... 
on the recommendation or with the approval of the Government 
of the U.S.S.R.; and two...on the recommendation or with the 
approval of* the U.K. and the U.S.,3  ^while the West wanted 
them appointed by the Administrator - ‘two...with the 
approval of’ the U.S.S.R., and two with Western approval.
Under the informally agreed parts of this article the 
Commission could lay down permanent flight routes for air 
sampling and the location of elements of the System (including 
control posts) in consultation with the host country.3<^
There was rough agreement that (in the terms of the 
Russian draft):
If any location or flight route recommended by 
the Commission should be unacceptable to the 
party concerned, the party shall provide, without
3oDNT/71, December 1, 1959.
37DNT/99, July 15, 1960.38
DNT/98, July 15, I960.
39DNT/78/Rev. 1, February 1. i960 (Soviet Union); DNT/76, 
January 14-, i960, and DNT/80, April 13, i960 (West).
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undue delay, an alternative location or flight 
route which in the judgment of the commission 
meets the requirements of the system. *^0
There was no agreed numbering for the remainder of the
proposed articles. Under an article adopted on May 8, 1959
the parties would agree ’to accept on territory under their
jurisdiction or control components of the system which is
established on the basis of the report of the Conference of 
LiExperts1.
The article dealing with on-site inspections was
related to a provision on ’criteria1 which was to appear in
Annex I of the treaty, and which would determine the
eligibility of a seismic event for on-site inspection. The
West required the Administrator to order on-site inspections
in certain cases upon request of one original party
Lpsuspicious of another. The East wanted the Control
If *5Commission by simple majority to order them. J Both sides 
proposed a limit on the number of on-site inspections, but 
they disagreed about the necessary formula. The East
40
DNT/78/Rev. 1. February 1, i960. For corresponding Western 
draft see DNT/70, January 14, i960.
41
DNT/15/Add. 16.
42
DNT/96, July 21 , i960. The Commission would order 
insoections on the territory of non-original Parties.
43DNT/60, July 13, 1959.
proposed a quota of on-site inspections:
...there may he made in each year on the 
territory of each of the original Parties up 
to 3 inspections at any place where, according 
to readings of instruments at control posts, 
an unidentified event suspected of being a 
nuclear weapon explosion has occurred.44
The Soviets would thus have enjoyed six inspections
per annum on the territory of the Western Two, as against
three for the West on Soviet soil. These inspections were
to cover all suspicious events.
The West had proposed a 1 partial* agreement on
February 11, 1960 whereby all tests except underground tests
below a ‘threshold1 of seismic magnitude 4.75 would be banned
in the first instance and there would be a moratorium on
tests below the threshold. For on-site inspection of seismic
events above the threshold during the moratorium the West
proposed a complicated formula whereby, at most,
30 per cent of the average annual number of 
underground events of seismic magnitude of 
4.75 or above occurring in territory under 
the jurisdiction or control of the party to 
which the number relates and remaining 
unidentified after the application of... criteria
45would be inspected on the site. '
44
The number of inspections was proposed on July 26, 19&0. 
See PV.234, p. 3« The wording of the provision was tabled 
on July 13, 1959.
DNT/96, July 21, 1960.
The West required on-site inspection groups to be on
1+6a permanent, stand-by basis with their own base locations.
The Soviets insisted that they be formed and equipped for 
each individual case from a permanent group of inspectors
L-7at headquarters. '
At this point it is convenient to interrupt the
description of treaty articles to portray the conflict over
the moratorium on underground testing below the threshold,
which only partially appeared in draft treaty proposals. The
final Western offer on this subject in i960 was made in
September. The United States proposed a joint research
program to improve seismic detection, but if this was not
acceptable to the Soviet Union, the United States would
begin its own program in any case before the treaty was
signed. As for the moratorium, it
should become effective, upon the signature 
of our treaty, for such period as there still 
remains of the two-year seismic research 
programme, plus a period of three months to 
review the results of that programme.1+”
Thus underground testing below the old,or, perhaps,
below a new, lower threshold might have become ’legal* at
55 ~
DNT/21, December 15, 1958«57
DNT/19, December 8, 1958, and PV.91, June 9? 1959, p. 19*
48
PV.247, September 27, 1960, pp. 8-10.
the entry into force of the treaty. Strange result of a 
successful negotiation!
An unmuffled test of roughly 20 kilotons would cause 
a seismic shock of magnitude *+.75 according to Western 
calculations. But there was no provision against decoupled 
testing during the moratorium and a 6,000 kiloton test, 
fully decoupled, would have been theoretically permissible, 
although the cavity required would have been prohibitively 
large and expensive to dig.
The Soviets declared that they agreed to a moratorium 
on March 19, 1960, and proposed a joint research program 
(to begin after the signing of the treaty) which would last 
4-5 years. The moratorium would continue during this period, 
and would also 'continue until the United States deemed it 
possible for itself to agree to a comprehensive treaty
49prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests without exception’. ' 
That is, in simpler language, the Soviet ’moratorium’ would 
be permanent!
The article ’concerning cooperation with the System’ 
was formally adopted on April 27, 1959. It provided among 
other things that parties would facilitate the entry of 
inspectors into and their travel through national territory,
PV.250, p. 7.
153
and would make transport and communications available to 
50the System,
Debate on the article dealing with the Administrator
and International Staff produced divergent wording on the
recruitment of staff. The West favoured personnel,.,
acceptable to the Governments of which they are nationals’;
the East proposed * staff...recruited on the recommendation
52of the appropriate governments concerned*. The sides 
were roughly agreed (to borrow the wording of the Western 
draft) that:
The permanent administrative, scientific and 
technical staff of the headquarters of the 
organization shall...be composed in equal 
proportions of nationals of the U.S.S.R., 
nationals of the United Kingdom or the United 
States of America, and nationals of other 
countries;53
It was agreed to apply the same formula to the 
scientific and technical staff of control posts on the 
territory of original parties and ship control posts. 
However there was disagreement about the ’third third* - 
’nationals of other countries’. The Soviets proposed that
50
DNT/15/Add. 12.
51
DNT/95, July 5, 1960.
52
DNT/92, June 20, i960.
53DNT/89, May 9, I960.
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this third third be itself divided into thirds, recruited
in equal proportions from specialists 
(a) recommended by the U.S.S.R., (b) 
recommended by the United States of America 
or the United Kingdom, and (c) specialists 
of other countries recommended jointly by 
the U.S.S.R. and the United States of 
America or the United Kingdom.?1*
The West merely proposed that in the appointment of the
third third preference shall be given...to nationals
of parties upon whose territories control posts are to be
established*. ' This provision would have left the
Administration free to recruit the third third from
among the nationals of any non-original party. East and
West were roughly agreed about the leadership of control
posts.
The sides disagreed about the leadership and com­
position of on-site inspection groups. The West wanted 
them to be composed of opponent nationals with ‘one or more 
observers* designated by the host country. The Soviets 
proposed ‘parity* (equal representation of the U.S.S.R. and
51*DNT/92.
??DNT/89.56
Ibid.
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the U.S./U.K.) for teams operating on the territory of the
57original Three, the chief to be a host country national.
Both sides agreed that:
The Administrator shall develop a program of 
research and development for the continuing 
improvement of the equipment and techniques 
used...in all elements of the System, and shall 
from time to time make recommendations to the 
Commission regarding improvements to be 
incorporated in the System,58
There was disagreement about the appointment of observers 
from the System staff on special radioactivity-sampling 
flights (which, it will be recalled, would be conducted by 
host country aircraft). The Soviets wished the observers to 
be appointed on a ’parity’ basis for flights ’over the 
territory of the nuclear /sic7 Powers*.^ For ’non-nuclear 
Powers’ a host national would be added to the observation 
party. The West proposed that the observers (who would 
’verify the execution of the agreed flight plan Zan47 operate 
the sampling equipment’) ’shall not be nationals of any 
country in whose territories the events under investigation
57PV.215, June 20, i960, pp. 14~15.58
DNT/595 July 1, 1959 (West); DNT/73, December 3, 1959 (East).
59DNT/80, February 4, i960. Within two weeks France became 
a nuclear power. The Soviets must have meant ’original 
Parties’ not ‘nuclear Powers’.
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may have o c c u r r e d ’ • However t h e  h o s t  m ight  ’d e s i g n a t e  a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t o  accompany t h e  o b s e r v e r s . . . ’o0 Under 
W es te rn  p r o p o s a l s  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t o r  would o r d e r  s p e c i a l  
f l i g h t s  ( i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i t h  th e  te rm s  o f  an annex  t o  t h e
61t r e a t y ) ; u n d e r  S o v i e t  p r o p o s a l s  he would m ere ly  e x e c u te  
them under  Commission o r d e r s .
An a r t i c l e  on t h e  C o n fe re n ce  was f o r m a l l y  a d o p te d  on 
May 8 ,  1959» Among o t h e r  t h i n g s  i t  empowered t h e  C o n fe re n ce  
t o  e l e c t  t h e  C o m m iss io n ,1 app rove  t h e  b u d g e t  recommended by 
t h e  Commission*, and ' a p p r o v e  amendments’ t o  t h e  t r e a t y .
S im ple  m a j o r i t i e s  would d e te r m in e  a l l  b u t  b u d g e ta r y  
q u e s t i o n s  and q u e s t i o n s  which  a s im p le  m a j o r i t y  made s u b j e c t  
t o  a t w o - t h i r d s  r u l e .
The a r t i c l e  c o n c e r n i n g  n u c l e a r  e x p l o s i o n s  f o r  p e a c e f u l  
p u rp o se s  was d i s p u t e d .  The s i d e s  a g re e d  t h a t  t h e r e  sh o u ld  be 
such  e x p l o s i o n s  on c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n  employing  them 
p e r m i t t e d  o t h e r  o r i g i n a l  p a r t i e s  t o  i n s p e c t  d e v i c e s  e x t e r n a l l y  
and i n t e r n a l l y ,  and t o  examine b l u e p r i n t s  o f  t h e m . ^  The
55
DNT/81 , March 1>+, i9 6 0 .
61
DOT/87, A p r i l  1 3 , i9 6 0 .
62
DOT/15/Add.  17 .
63
F o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t h i s  would have  i n v o lv e d  a change  i n  
t h e  Atomic Energy  A c t .
W este rn  p l a n  p r o v i d e d  f o r  s u r v e i l l a n c e  o f  d e v i c e s  and
o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  e x p l o s i o n s  by ’ r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  
614-
sy s tem '  . The S o v i e t  p l a n  r e q u i r e d  c o n t r o l  w i t h  'm an d a to ry
6
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f . . .  o r i g i n a l  p a r t i e s '  on th e  e x p l o s i o n  s i t e .
N e i t h e r  p r o p o s a l  p r o v id e d  f o r  a v e t o  t o  be e x e r c i s e d  i n  
c a s e  any d e v i c e  was judged  u s e f u l  f o r  ad v an c in g  n u c l e a r  
m i l i t a r y  t e c h n o l o g y .  Under t h e  W es te rn  p r o p o s a l  t h e  
Commission would judge  w h e th e r  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  s e t  ou t  above 
had been  co m p l ied  w i t h .  The S o v i e t  p r o p o s a l  d i d  n o t  m eh t io n  
t h e  Commission a t  a l l .  The W e s t ' s  p l a n  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
p e r m i t t e d  u n i l a t e r a l  weapon dev e lo p m en t  p ro g ram s;  t h e  S o v i e t  
p r o p o s a l  l e f t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  p a r t i e s  f r e e  t o  c o n d u c t  a  j o i n t  
weapons d eve lopm en t  programl
The S o v i e t s  p ro p o se d  t h a t  p e a c e f u l  e x p l o s i o n s  would be 
c a r r i e d  o u t  by t h e  U.S. and th e  U.K. ' o n  t h e  one h and ,  and by 
t h e  S o v i e t  Union on t h e  o t h e r ,  i n  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  one t o  
o n e . . . '  The S o v i e t  d e l e g a t e  n e v e r  madö c l e a r  w h e th e r  t h i s  
meant  t h a t  t h e  W este rn  powers would have  t o  w a i t  f o r  a S o v i e t  
e x p l o s i o n  a f t e r  c o n d u c t in g  one t h e m s e lv e s  b e f o r e  s e t t i n g  o f f
W ~
DNT/28/Rev. 2 ,  F e b r u a r y  2 j ,  i 9 6 0 .
6 5
DNT/3 2 , F e b r u a r y  2 3 ,  i 9 6 0 .
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another. The American delegate said that this interpretation
67would make the Soviet proposal unacceptable. ‘
An agreed article of March 19, 1959 provided for a
review of the System two years after the treaty came into
force, and annually thereafter. The Commission would evaluate
the System’s effectiveness and recommend improvements ’in
68the light of experience and scientific progress’.
An article on ‘Privileges and Immunities’ was adopted 
6 Qon May 6 , 1959. ' The Commission, ’with the approval of the
Conference’, might establish ’an appropriate relationship
between the Organization and the United Nations’, or with
70other future disarmament organizations.
An article, ’Definitions of Terms and Units’, adopted
on July 27, 1960, defined in technical terms a seismic event
’equal to or greater than magnitude 4.75*
The agreed paragraph of the ’Parties’ article established
72the Three as ’original Parties’. The West proposed that 
Paragraph 2 provide for membership for
67
68
PV.176, February 23, i960, p. 6.
DNT/15/Add. 5.
69DNT/15/Add. 15.
70DNT/1 5/Add. 8, April 16, 1959.
71DNT/15/Add. 19.72DNT/15/Add. 11, April 2b, 1959-
any other state or authority which tjae Commission decides to invite to become a 
Party in consequence of a finding that its 
adherence to the treaty is essential in order 
to achieve the fundamental treaty purpose of 
a permanent discontinuance of nuclear weapons 
test explosions on a world-wide basis or that 
elements of control are required to be in­
stalled in the territory under the jurisdiction 
or control of that state or authority...and 
which deposits an instrument of acceptance... ^
The American delegate explained that the word
’authority’ covered regimes not enjoying wide de .iure
74recognition/ but the Soviet delegate wanted the word 
removed on the grounds that all true states have equal 
status, and that the United States might use the article to 
obtain the adherence to the treaty of a ’usurper’ regime, 
such as that of Chiang Kai-Shek.'^
The American delegate interpreted the Western article 
to mean that if a regime did not respond to an invitation 
from the Commission other parties ’would then be free to 
consider whether... they were justified in taking...action
76lander the agreed article...on the duration of the treaty.
DNT/102, July 26, i960.74
PV.234, July 26, 1960, p. 3.
75PV.238, August 1, i960, pp. 3-5.
76
PV.234, p. 6. See below for analysis of the article on 
duration.
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The Soviets simply proposed that:
The Treaty shall be open for adherence by 
all other states which assume the obligations 
contained therein and deposit instruments of 
adherence... 77
The agreed article dealing with ‘Signature, Ratification,
Acceptance, Entry into Force’ provided that the treaty would
enter into force ‘when all the original Parties have deposited
78instruments of ratification...*'
The ’duration’ article,agreed on March 19? 1959? 
provided that:
This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely 
subject to the inherent right of a party to 
withdraw and be relieved of obligations here­
under if the provisions of the Treaty and its 
Annexes, including those providing for the 
timely installation and effective operation of 
the control system, are not being fulfilled and 
observed.79
There were formally agreed articles on amendments and
8oauthentic texts. After them three Annexes were to be set 
out. Final treaty language was agreed for only one of then-. 
Annexes. It will be convenient to mention first some of the 
provisions on the phasing of system installation in Annex I
DNT/103? August *+, 1960.78
DHT/15.Add. 14, May 4, 1959.
79DI«/15/Add. 4, March 19, 1959.
80
DNT/15/Add. 7 and 13.
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(’Detection and Identification System’), since a breakdown
of ’timely installation’ would have enabled parties to
invoke their ‘inherent right’ to withdraw.
The two sides agreed informally about the timing of
the three major phrases of the system’s installation,
although they differed on the details of control post
ft 1installation in the various continents. In the words of
the informally agreed text:
The first phase shall begin within three months 
after the treaty enters into force and shall be 
completed within four years after the treaty 
enters into force.
The second phase would begin within one year after the 
treaty’s entry into force and be complete within five. The 
third phase would begin within two years and be complete 
within six.^
According to the Western timetable 'Asia (exclusive of 
the U.S.S.R.)’ was to receive 18 land control posts in Phase 
II.^ Since China could have been expected to resist the 
installation of posts on her soil during Phase II, the West
Fl
The Soviet proposal was contained in DNT/IO1!-, August 11, 
1960; the Western proposal in DNT/105, September 29, i960.
82
DNT/ 10*f and 105-
DNT/105.83
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might thus have had a strong ground for withdrawal by the
end of five years of the treaty.
According to the Soviet timetable ‘Africa’ would
84receive two posts in Phase I. Since there would have been 
little point in putting African posts anywhere but in French 
territories during Phase I, and since it seems unlikely that 
the French would have permitted this, the Soviets might have 
been able to argue that ‘timely installation’ had broken down 
before the end of four years after the signing of the treaty.
Nth country testing in itself would not have been a 
ground for withdrawal under either side’s proposals. y 
However the Commission could declare the adherence to the 
treaty of any power ’essential’. (Since neither side offered 
a definition of a ‘test’ explosion, nuclear war waged by 
parties would presumably have violated the treaty.)
The Soviet proposals for Annex I on the Detection and 
Identification System were much less comprehensive than the
dnt/104.
85
Cf. Annex IV of the ’partial agreement' initialled on July25, 1963.
Each party shall, in exercising its national 
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the 
treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, 
related to the subject matter of this treaty, 
have jeopardised the supreme interest of its
country. _ Sydney Morning Herald. July 27, 1963•
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Western proposals, partly because the Soviets made some of 
the relevant proposals in their draft articles for those 
parts of the body of the treaty dealing with the functions 
of the Control Commission and the Administrator. Thus some 
questions concerning the Detection and Identification System 
- the procedure for dispatching on-site inspectors, the number 
of on-site inspections, and the question of staffing - have 
already been adequately discussed above.
In the consolidated Western draft of Annex I, it was
stated that the provisions had been 'derived1 from the
recommendations of the Experts. The West made detailed
provision for System components. The Headquarters would
include Administration, Supply, Field Operations and
Technical Operations. Technical Operations would include a
Research and Development Center, and a Data Analysis Center
including a Central Radiochemical Laboratory for sample
testing. Field Operations would include a Central Inspection
Office to 'organize and maintain inspection groups on an
alert basis' and supervise their dispatch, a Communications
Center, an Operations Center to control air and water
sampling operations, and a Weather Center to forecast air
86movements to assist sampling operations. The Soviets made 
no structural proposals of this kind.
—
DNT/22/Rev. 1, July 7, i960. Other provisions of this 
document were amended later in the year.
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I n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  p h a s in g  o f  sys tem  i n s t a l l a t i o n  t h e  
most  s e r i o u s  E a s t - W e s t  d i f f e r e n c e s  co nce rned  numbers o f  land  
c o n t r o l  p o s t s  i n  v a r i o u s  a r e a s  and th e  t im in g  of  t h e i r  
i n s t a l l a t i o n .  The S o v i e t s  o b j e c t e d  to  t h e  W es te rn  p r o p o s a l  
f o r  20 p o s t s  on S o v i e t  s o i l ,  and t o  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  c o n t r o l  
p o s t s  i n  t h e  S o u t h e r n  Hemisphere  d u r i n g  Phase  I  of  t h e  
W es te rn  t i m e t a b l e .  The S o v i e t s  p ro p o sed  15 p o s t s  on t h e i r  
own s o i l  and 20 i n  t h e  o c e a n ic  i s l a n d s  o f  th e  U.K. and U.S. 
i n  Phase  1 . ^  Under t h e  f i n a l  W es te rn  o f f e r  o f  1960 Phase  I  
was d i v i d e d  i n t o  two su b p h ases  o f  two y e a r s  e a c h ,  and t h e r e  
would be 20 o c e a n ic  i s l a n d  p o s t s  i n  P a r t  A of  Phase  I .  
However t h e i r  l o c a t i o n  was n o t  s p e c i f i e d .  The p o s t s  on t h e  
m e t r o p o l i t a n  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  th e  o r i g i n a l  p a r t i e s  would be 
i n s t a l l e d  i n  two su b p h a se s  i n  o r d e r  t o  p e r m i t  o n - s i t e
0 0
i n s p e c t i o n s  b e f o r e  t h e  end o f  t h e  f i r s t  two y e a r s .
Under th e  S o v i e t  p r o p o s a l  t h e r e  p r o b a b l y  would have
b e en  no o n - s i t e  i n s p e c t i o n  b e f o r e  t h e  end o f  Phase  I .
I n s p e c t i o n  g roups  may be formed as  r e q u i r e d  on 
c o m p le t io n  o f  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and e n t r y  i n t o  
o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  p o s t s  o f  Phase  I . 89
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The West had proposed that the groups be ’established
90from the beginning of Phase I’.
The two sides adopted conflicting positions on the 
question of technical criteria to determine whether a seismic 
event should be eligible for on-site inspection. Although 
it is difficult for a non-specialist to grasp the issues, it 
is clear that the Soviet criteria were intended to minimize 
the number of seismic events eligible for inspection while 
the West was anxious to maximize the number to a point where 
no events which could conceivably be nuclear explosions 
would be ineligible. East and West also wished, respectively 
to minimize and maximize the area which would be subjected 
to inspection.
Thus the East insisted that ’an event may be regarded 
as suspicious and subject to inspection only if it is located 
/by control posts7...within an area up to approximately 200 
square kilometres' . Other criteria had to be also satisfied 
if an event was to become eligible, and any inspection team
sent to the site of a suspicious event would be restricted to
91an area of 200 square kilometres. ' The 'West was opposed to 
the Soviet location rule being a criterion, and proposed that
90D NT/105.
91PV.172, February 16, i960, p. 3*
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an area of 500 square kilometres should be eligible for
inspection if data from control posts were inadequate for
locating the epicentre of an event within a 200 square 
92kilometre area*
The West's article on inspection groups permitted * low 
altitude aerial inspection of the site of the /suspicious/ 
event'. Inspectors could employ photography, infrared 
survey, and other techniques around the selected area, and 
would be permitted to conduct 'drilling for radioactive 
s a m p l e s T h e  East made no proposals on these matters.
Annex II concerned privileges and immunities for 
representatives of the parties and for system personnel.
It was informally agreed with minor exceptions. Among 
other rights it
established, for representatives, the right 
to import free of duty their furniture and 
effects at the time of first arrival to 
take up their posts.
Test ban proposals are less open to the charge of 
vagueness than other arms control proposals.
Annex III on the Preparatory Commission was formally 
adopted on November 30, 1959. The Preparatory Commission
92
DNT/22/Rev. 1, July 20, i960.
93DNT/22/Rev. 1.
1G7
was to operate from the signing of the treaty by original 
parties until the election of a Control Commission. It 
would be composed of one delegate each from the Three. 
Until the Three had ratified the treaty it would, inter 
alia« make preliminary studies of ‘location, installation 
and equipping* of components of the Control Organization, 
draw up staffing regulations and invite applications for
Qlfposts, and arrange the first Conference.
• • • • •
What remains to be said about the military worlds 
implied by the test ban proposals of East and West at the 
end of i960? The common feature of these proposals is 
clear - they would have divided the world militarily into 
nuclear sheep and non-nuclear goats had they been widely 
accepted.
Under the jointly agreed treaty terms Nth powers which 
became parties could only have attained nuclear status by 
transfer of weapons from a nuclear power (which was not 
forbidden). While the agreed parts of the treaty expressed 
the joint interest of the original nuclear Three in stopping
92+
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the spread of nuclear weapons, the Three also proposed to 
dominate administratively and politically the arrangement 
which was going to work for their interests. The Three 
proposed: permanent seats for themselves on the Control 
Commission; a long list of questions requiring original 
party unanimity; a large element of ’sides’ or reciprocal 
inspection among themselves; and a dominant position for 
their experts and administrators in the control organization 
headquarters. The Soviets even proposed that two thirds of 
the staff for control posts and on-site inspection groups on 
the territory of non-original parties should be nationals of 
the Three.
Where the proposals of the Three diverged, conflict of 
their interests and ideologies lay clearly in the background. 
In fact, they were wholeheartedly agreed about only one 
thing, that all tests should stop.
For the Soviets, agreement to any measures of 
international control was a concession - both in principle, 
because of Soviet dedication to 'sovereignty', and in 
practice - because of cherished Soviet secrecy. From time 
to time between 1958 and i960 the Soviets threatened to 
return to their pristine line, that international control
95DNT/92, June 20, i960.
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was not necessary. 'After all* said the Soviet delegate,
Tsarapkin, to the Western press in November 19599 ‘when we
96let off a bomb...you know about it.'7
For the United States, to permit a ban on any tests, 
no matter how small, which could not be reliably detected 
and identified, was ideologically repugnant, and may have 
seemed militarily dangerous. The implications of the U.S. 
proposal for a moratorium are interesting in this connection. 
Under this proposal the West would inspect on the site in the 
Soviet Union a certain proportion of suspicious seismic 
events above magnitude 4.75 each year during the moratorium. 
According to the logic of the American proposal, even if the 
theory and technology of detection and identification had 
improved during the proposed seismic research program the 
threshold would not have been abolished at the end of the 
moratorium, but merely lowered. Parties would then have 
been free to resume testing below the new threshold unless 
yet another moratorium was agreed to. The Experts in 1958 
had reported that their system would detect five kiloton 
explosions underground reliably: they did not report that 
clandestine tests of under five kilotons were militarily 
insignificant. According to Ciro Zoppo the original goal
See The Times. November 17, 1959.
95
170
of the Western experts was a system with a 90 per cent
chance of detecting a one kiloton explosion; later in the
conference a 90 per cent chance of detecting a five kiloton
97explosion was deemed satisfactory. However at the
political conference, after the Experts’ conclusions had
been called in question, United States negotiators never
said that it would be tolerable for any tests to be
undetectable by the control system.
Hanson Balwin had this to say about non-clandestine
underground testing in 1963:
Practically, most underground tests are limited 
to small yields, usually a few kilotons, because 
of the extensive excavation required. Instru­
mentation permits collection of data about the 
explosion itself and its efficiency, and some 
limited data about the effect the heat, blast 
and radioactivity may have upon structures or 
weapons. Scientists can then extrapolate or 
calculate on the basis of the data gained what a 
larger explosion might do.98
It seems clear that the effect of nuclear explosions on 
communications and on ballistic missile warheads, for 
example, could not be effectively tested underground.
97Technical and Political Aspects of Arms Control Negotiation: 
the 1958 Experts’ Conference. The RAND Corporation, 
RM-3286-ARPA, September 1962, p. 7^ -
98Mew York Times. International Edition, July 21, 1963*
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What would have been the significance of Soviet tactical 
weapon tests of a ’few kilotons1 in i960? Brennan and 
Halperin believe that even a five-fold improvement in 
weight-to-yield ratios would not be 'militarily significant, 
whether achieved by both sides, neither side or one side 
only'.^
Presumably improved fission 'triggers' for exploding 
fusion weapons could be developed clandestinely, but, as 
Baldwin implies, tests of fusion devices themselves would be 
ruled out because of the size of the seismic signal resulting. 
In i960 U.S. fusion weapons already had been tested in which 
the fission 'trigger1 was responsible for only five per cent 
of total energy release. The Russians seem not to have 
tested such ’clean* weapons by i960, but clean weapons are 
chiefly of humanitarian interest. Pure fusion weapons were 
not feasible in i960, and are not in 1963.
Apart from the low military 'pay-off1 for a mature 
nuclear power in 'illegal* underground testing, there would 
always be an element of risk - from defection, miscalculation 
or inadequate secrecy - to deter it. As hinted above, the 
United States probably insisted on extensive inspection less 
from any military calculations than because principles were
99Op. cit., p. 257.
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at stake. The Soviets probably resisted inspection on the 
Western scale chiefly because it threatened their interests 
directly. However, they seem to have exaggerated the threat.
The Russians fear foreign inspection for two distinct 
military reasons - because it may reveal military technological 
secrets, and because it may reveal secrets about the size and 
disposition of Soviet forces and armaments. Western 
diplomats, attaches, tourists and businessmen have 
opportunities to conduct both types of espionage in Russia 
greater than those that would have been enjoyed by personnel 
at control posts living and working under the supervision of 
Russian nationals in restricted areas. Western on-site 
inspectors would have been unable to enter industrial 
installations, but they might possible have been able to 
observe military dispositions on a small scale, depending 
upon where inspectable events occurred. However, they too 
were to be accompanied by host nationals under both sides’ 
proposals.
The West’s complicated on-site inspection proposal 
would have led to inspection of over 20 (and perhaps many 
more) areas of 200-500 square kilometres in the Soviet Union.
The area of the Soviet land mass is 21 million square kilometres.
Unless the Soviets had cheated on an agreement there 
would have been no on-site inspections in Western Russia
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because it is aseismic. Thus the areas occupied by the 
bulk of the Russian land forces and I.R.B.M. force would 
not have been disturbed except by two control posts.
However in the rest of Russia the West could have selected 
which suspicious events to inspect with a view to getting 
inspection groups to areas of military interest. This helps 
explain the Russian desire to define criteria for on-site 
inspections very narrowly.
Since there were to be no regular aircraft overflights 
over parties* territories under either side’s proposals, 
a virtuous Soviet Union would have had nothing to fear from 
possible espionage by observers on special flights. In any 
case the aircraft would have been host planes equipped not 
for ground observation but radioactive sampling only.
At the conference the Soviets were not challenged in 
their assumption that there would be perfect transmission to 
unfriendly powers of military intelligence collected in the 
course of international inspection, whether inspectors were 
citizens of unfriendly powers or neutrals. By the end of 
1960 no provisions had been put forward for outlawing traffic 
in military secrets by inspectors, although a Soviet draft 
article of March 12, 1959» which was agreed informally between 
the sides, directed the Administrator and staff to ’refrain 
from any action which might reflect on their status as
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international officials’. ^ 0 However both sides agreed that 
original party nationals appointed to the staff by the 
Administrator must be •acceptable’ to their Governments. As
Lawrence Finkelstein says: ’This arrangement was bound to
101lead to confusion’.
Finkelstein discusses the merits of an ’impartial’ staff,
defined as one ’composed... of non-nationals of the major 
102parties’. He believes it would be superior to an
'avowedly national’ staff, ’provided adequate arrangements
could be made for the unimpeded flow of all inspection data
109to the participating governments'. J In fact it was not 
laid down in the test ban proposals of either side that 
information emanating from control posts and inspections 
should be made available to parties by the Administrator.
(In the West’s proposal the Administrator was only obliged to 
notify parties that an event eligible for inspection had 
occurred, and to inform them of the area eligible for
1 o4inspection. ) In any case it is an advantage of an
100
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entirely impartial staff that its members would not pass 
on as much inspection data to governments as a staff of 
nationals. Impartial staff could filter out sensitive data 
not needed to reassure governments. The weakness of 
impartial inspection is that the sides may not trust 
‘impartial1 inspectors to keep adequate watch on,or reveal 
suspicious information about,opponent activities. The 
Soviets seem to be infected with such distrust, and, 
moreover, they discount the impartiality of ‘neutral men*. 
In order to uphold the principle of parity and the 
principle of thirds they proposed far less impartial 
control for the test ban than the West.
In point of fact, Finkelstein*s two categories - 
‘impartial* and ‘avowedly national* - do not adequately 
distinguish between the types of staff proposed by East and 
West at the test conference. ‘Impartiality* is really not 
just a question of nationality but of whether staff of 
whatever nationality would be obligated to a major party 
under the terms of their appointment. Only under the 
Western provision for the ‘third third* of control post 
staff, whereby the Administrator was to make appointments 
at his own discretion without consulting the original 
parties, was a fully impartial staff envisaged. East and 
West agreed that Deputy Administrators - two from each side
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would be both national and obligated. The East required 
the first two thirds of control post staffs to be recruited 
in the same way - that is, ’on the recommendation* of the 
sides, but the West preferred a more impartial national 
arrangement whereby personnel need only be ’acceptable* to 
the two sides.
There is yet another way of analysing test ban 
inspection arrangements. Both sides proposed elements of 
’sides’ or reciprocal inspection, elements of self-inspection, 
and elements of inspection by third parties as part of what 
they called ’international’ control. And, as the Soviets 
so often stressed, there was already a system of informal 
’sides’ inspection in existence - the national detection 
and indentification networks for monitoring the other side's 
tests on a routine basis.
The opportunities for obstruction in the control 
arrangements would have been an important factor in 
determining their effectiveness. Fred Ikle distinguishes 
’external’ and ’internal’ obstruction of control - the one 
caused directly by the host government, the other by host 
country nationals in the control organs.
TÖ5
Alternative Approaches to the International Organization of 
Disarmament. The RAND Corporation, R-391-ARPA, February 1962,
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It is also helpful to distinguish 1 legal1 from 
’illegal1 obstruction - that which does not violate the 
letter of the treaty from that which does. Both sides' 
proposals would have furnished excellent opportunities for 
legal obstruction. Both proposed an original party veto 
over the appointment of the Administrator and much of the 
staff. Opportunities for illegal obstruction would have 
arisen chiefly in connection with undertakings for 
’co-operation with the control system', by which the host 
country would provide control staff with survey aircraft, 
transport, communications and right of passage.
A Note on the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1969
Until June 14, 1957? the Soviet Union favoured a total 
test ban policed by national means. The first Western 
proposal for a ban under pure national control was the 
Anglo-American proposal of September 3> 1961 for a three- 
power agreement ’not to conduct nuclear tests which take 
place in the atmosphere and produce radioactive fallout'.
A ban on atmospheric tests alone had been proposed by 
President Eisenhower on April 13, 1959? but it was to be
To5
White House press release, see Geneva Conference, p. 620.
based on ’a simplified /international/ control system for
atmospheric tests up to 50 kilometers...derived from the
Geneva Experts’ Report’."'0  ^ The agreement initialled by the
Three in Moscow on July 25, 19&3 forbids all non-underground
testing, and also any test explosion
in any other environment, if such explosion 
causes radioactive debris to be present outside 
the territorial limits of the State under whose 
jurisdiction or control such explosion is 
conducted.1 °°
Thus the new treaty in effect sets limits to national 
inspection in the same way as previous proposals set limits 
to international inspection. It declares ’illegal’ national 
inspection to be irrelevant. The treaty also indicates that 
the elaborate international arrangements for radio, acoustic 
hydroacoustic, high altitude and radioactivity detection 
recommended by the Experts and negotiated by the Three for 
over three years were not strictly necessary. It seems in 
retrospect that, apart from increasing slightly the chances 
of detecting tests in above-ground environments, the only 
advantage of these arrangements would have been the 
impartial gathering of suspicious evidence. However, even
107“ “  "
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under the arrangements agreed at the end of i960 the 
control organization could not brand violators or recommend 
sanctions. Self-help has been a basic ingredient of all 
test ban proposals.
CHAPTER 3
A GENERAL CRITIQUE OF PROPOSALS
In this chapter the analyses of the two preceding 
chapters are summed up in three broad criticisms, one or 
more of which can be brought against all of the arms control 
proposals dealt with. The viewpoint adopted is roughly that 
of a partisan of arms control who is indifferent to the 
outcome of any propaganda struggle over disarmament and 
pessimistic about an early end to the Cold War. This ideal 
critic is confronted with the major proposals 1955-60 as a 
body of working ideas to be evaluated for their usefulness 
in promoting arms control. His bias is for (1) the detailed 
proposal against the vague, (2) the moderate against the 
radical, and (3) the conciliatory against the intransigent.
(1) Vagueness
Proposals need not explain to the last dollar and rifle 
what disarmament involves; there is a fineness of detail in 
proposals appropriate to the degree of common ground between 
negotiating powers. If one side refuses to consider 
comprehensive disarmament it is futile (at any rate in the
180
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short run) for the other to propose a very elaborate 
comprehensive scheme. However it is not necessary to reach 
full ’agreement in principle1 to negotiate an issue 
effectively. The United States did not agree in principle 
to a test ban separate from disarmament until the Conference 
on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests was nearly 
three months old.
On the other hand there can be too much detail even in
a proposal which leads to agreement. As Schelling and
Halperin say, it may be
important to avoid freezing detailed answers 
to very dimly perceived questions in a 
document that is supposed to guide the 
participants in their relations to each other 
through fairly uncharted territory... 1
These authors also point out that it is simply
impossible to lay down ’an exhaustively explicit agreement,
leaving no details subject to subsequent interpretations and
misinterpretations, leaving no issues unresolved, leaving no
intentions inarticulate, and leaving no circumstances 
2unanticipated'. Because they believe that ’the technical 
and military details of an arms agreement might be subject
T~
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to very rapid obsolescence1, Schelling and Halperin 
suggest that an ’agreement* should set up procedures and 
institutions for its own interpretation and subsequent 
evolution'.. We have seen that both sides’test ban proposals 
provided not only for amendment of the treaty but technical 
improvement of the control system on the basis of research 
and development by the control organization itself. It is 
likely that effective control of more traditional 
disarmament measures would require constant technical 
improvement of inspection arrangements; however most 
proposals do not even suggest amending arrangements.
Proposals may be vague about ’ends* or about ‘means’.
A full statement of the ends implied by a proposal for arms 
control must mention not only the levels of armaments, forces 
and defence spending which would be permitted in a disarmed 
world or on the way to it, but also any mandatory political 
pre-conditions, the date by which various measures must be 
implemented, and the number of powers to be involved. It 
is clear from the analyses of Chapter 1 that most proposals 
are more like lists of what is to be agreed than proposals 
for an agreement. Schelling has written a brilliant paper 
which incidentally shows that even a numerically fixed
3
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armament level is difficult to define with precision. He 
is discussing the problems of a party to an agreement for 
a 200-missile celling -
Does it mean 200 on the average over a year; or 
the average over a month; or at any given moment 
....If he has exceptionally good luck in the 
production of replacements..and runs over the 
ceiling, must he destroy them, or can he impound 
them and use them at a later date when he’s under 
200?....Spare parts are significant, both in the 
possibility of putting an extra missile together... 
and in terms of how many of the 200 missiles are 
ready to go....The schedule relating missiles 
ready to the elapsed time from the decision to 
fire may depend on the spare parts allowance.... 
there must be some trade-off between the spare 
parts allowance and the number of missiles.*+
Schelling also points out the significance of the
following: weapon components in the production process;
weapons out of commission; test weapons; and the rate of
replacement of obsolete weapons (if replacement is permitted),
and of ’run-down’ weapons (if replacement is necessary). To
be really precise a missile agreement would have to specify
the size and nature of the permitted warhead, and the speed,
range, accuracy, readiness, mobility and protection of the
missile (which is not to say that it should necessarily
b
T.C. Schelling, ’’Some Implications of a 200-Missile 
Stabilized Deterrent Agreement” , Collected Papers. Summer 
/ 196Q7 Study on Arms Control, American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, Boston, 1961, p. 20*+.
Ibid.« pp. 20^-5.
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specify these things). It is true, as Schelling says, that:
If for reasons of cost, technology, geography, 
or sheer preference, we /the Americans/ and 
the Russians develop qualitatively different 
missile forces, the inspection problems will 
be very different on both sides...
It is also true that it would be very difficult to
negotiate agreement on characteristics of permitted missiles
if the sides’ forces were ’qualitatively different'.
If a bare proposal for a 200-missile ceiling is vague,
the great power proposals of 1955-6, which called merely for
armament reductions 'appropriate to', 'corresponding to', or
'in agreed relation to' fixed levels of armed forces, were
much more vague. The negotiating record of parties to the
1932 Disarmament Conference was much superior in this
n
respect.' The Western and Soviet proposals of 1957 and i960 
to exchange lists of armaments to be reduced were equally 
unspecific: no guidelines for the list-makers were laid down.
Proposals to reduce armed forces have in general 
attempted some precision. In 1955? for example, the West 
laid it down that 'all para-military forces and all internal 
security forces of a military type would be included in theg
armed forces'. The Soviets in 1957 required 'personnel
Z
Ibid., p. 207.
7
See Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race. Weidenfeld 
& Nicholson, London^ 1961 , p. 69.8
DC/SC.1/17, March 12, 1955.
185
employed by the armed forces of all States in a civilian 
capacity, but engaged in servicing military equipment and
9installations* to be considered part of the armed forces. 
Problems of definition would not be abolished by these 
formulae. As an example of a further problem, consider 
whether active and inactive reserves should be counted as 
'armed forces' in making reductions. If reserve training 
was permitted but reserves were not counted as 'forces' 
there would probably be an 'arms race' in reserve training. 
If reserves were counted as forces there might be 
considerable pressure put on reserves to become disguised 
regulars. If reserve training were forbidden conscription 
would presumably have to be forbidden also.
Proposals for defence budget reductions 'corresponding' 
to force or armament reductions may also be vague. We may 
mention here that budget cuts which were excessive in 
relation to permitted armaments and forces might encourage 
disguised military spending. If budget cuts were inadequate 
or not mandatory there might be a build-up of surplus 
armament production capacity or intense investment in 
research and development.
September 20, 1957.
9
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A distinct kind of vagueness is the frequent failure 
of negotiators to make clear whether the links between the 
parts of a plan (or the strings binding the package, if 
that image is preferred) may beTxoken or not - that is, 
whether or not the parts may be agreed and implemented 
separately. We distinguish ‘spatial1 links (those which 
join the parts of a stage) from ‘temporal’ links (those 
which join the stages together). The West failed to make 
its insistence on spatial links clear until the end of the 
1957 negotiations; and the Western powers have usually 
failed to explain whether there were temporal links in 
plans where it seemed to be implied that there were not.
For example, in the Anglo-French three-stage comprehensive 
plan, March 19. 1996. participants were given a virtually 
absolute right of refusing to proceed at the end of the 
first stage. Agreement on later stages meed not have been 
kept.Thus there was little point in the Anglo-French 
insisting on agreement to the contents of the second and 
third stages. In fact by i960 the West was using second 
and third stage proposals purely as a way of avoiding 
propaganda pitfalls. First stage proposals were declared 
to be separable.
As a matter of theory a stage itself may consist of 
measures which succeed each other in time (the later being
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implicitly conditional on the performance of the earlier), 
and are thus linked temporally. In fact if proposal-makers 
intend such links they rarely make their intentions clear. 
One case from each side of the Cold War will suffice here 
to illustrate this type of vagueness. In the comprehensive 
partial plan, August 29. 1957« the West provided inter alia 
for a first step in conventional disarmament within one 
year, and for the 'materials' cut-off within one month of 
a control system reporting itself ready to inspect the 
measure. The measures of August 29 were declared 
'inseparable', but the proposal failed to say what would 
happen to the agreement on conventional reductions if the 
cut-off had not been implemented by the end of the first 
year. On the other hand, the extension of another measure - 
the test ban - beyond the first year was explicitly made 
to depend on the cut-off being implemented.
Soviet plans usually call for stages to be completed 
within strict time limits, but fail to specify the order in 
which measures will be executed, and the pace at which 
each will proceed. For example the conventional disarmament 
plan, March 27. 1956, called for drastic force reductions 
1 during...1956-8' and for control posts to guard against 
surprise attack, but it failed to break down or provide for 
coordination of either of these measures.
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About the ends of disarmament the West was more vague 
than the East. In what might be called a classically 
vague proposal, March 19* 1956, Britain and France proposed 
world-wide three stage force reductions without specifying 
any force levels at all. The Soviets, on the other hand, 
were vaguer than the West about the ’means’ of disarmament 
- inspection and control. The vagueness in both cases was 
of course probably rather studied: it is natural to be 
vague about something which is expected of you but finds 
you unwilling.
Neither side ever explained how total nuclear 
disarmament might be controlled, yet both proposed it.
The Soviets proposed the abolition of military research 
and development in 1960 without in the event attempting 
to define the activities, much less suggest how laboratories 
might be inspected to determine whether work was peaceful 
or not. Soviet control proposals tend to be vague about 
the definition of key terms such as ’objects of control*
(May 10, 1955), and about the means by which a control 
organ is to know that X-A armaments in fact remain when a 
declared but unverified level, X, has been reduced by a 
verified amount, A, and no further inspection is permitted.
It is almost a ’law’ of disarmament propösals that the 
more drastic they are the less detail will be supplied about
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them. The test ban proposals are a sort of reproach to 
all other disarmament proposals. Apart from the fact that 
the test ban was defined more precisely than any other arms 
control measure (it virtually defined itself) , the lesson 
of the test ban proposals is that the West, at any rate, will 
not execute even a very modest measure of arms control without 
elaborate investigation of its inspection requirements, which 
must be reflected in control proposals.
The political meaning of absence of detail in proposals 
is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is worth mention­
ing that omissions may occur for a variety of reasons - 
government lack of interest or inertia, a temporary hiatus 
in policy, unresolved bureaucratic conflicts, despair of 
agreement, propaganda motives or, perhaps, political distaste 
(as when the United States fails to propose force levels for 
China).
(2) Overambitiousness
It can also be argued that disarmament proposals are 
too detailed, in that it is futile to attempt to get agree­
ment on all the stages of a radical plan before a first 
step has been devised. Proposals may be judged radical not 
only because they call for drastic measures, but because of 
their political, geographical and military comprehensiveness.
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A few proposals of the period under study -. notably 
May 10, 1955 - called for important political settlements; 
all radical proposals implied them. All comprehensive 
plans - both radical and partial - of the period, with the 
possible exception of the Western pjan, August 29« 1957« 
required or implied wide cooperation of middle and perhaps 
small powers from the beginning. The Russian plan for 
conventional disarmament of March 27, 1956 set a maximum 
force level for middle powers - 200,000 men - which would 
have required intricate extra negotiations if the 
Sub-Committee negotiations had succeeded. Even comprehensive 
first-step plans confined to the great powers might be 
criticized on the ground that coordination of measures for 
nuclear and conventional armament, force, and budget 
reduction among five powers was too ambitious as a start.
It is useful to put the case against proposals for 
comprehensive and near-universal disarmament abstractly.
For example, in arranging arms control between two powers 
only one military relationship has to be ordered, while 
there are three separate relationships between three powers, 
six between four, ten between five, and so on. Of course 
relationships between allies are - usually - easier to 
order than relationships between opponents, and not all 
pov/ers in a multi-power system have military relationships
I9i
with each other in practice, but nevertheless the chances 
of agreement clearly tend to decrease the more powers are 
to be involved. Similarly the attempt to reach agreement 
on many rather than a few measures tends to reduce the 
chance of agreement. On the other hand some powers will 
not consider implementing some measures unless other powers 
can be involved, and the West has always argued against 
conventional or nuclear disarmament as opposed to 
comprehensive disarmament that it would create an imbalance 
of forces and accelerate the arms race in the uncontrolled 
category. However experience of the test ban indicates 
that agreement between a few tends to generate agreement 
among many and pressure on the recalcitrant, while we shall 
see in the next section that limited conventional or nuclear 
disarmament can be made ‘balanced* (in one of several senses) 
as well as comprehensive disarmament.
(3) Qnesidedness
All proposals ’ought’ to be self-interested in the 
sense that they should increase the security of their 
proponent. However, they are unlikely to be accepted if 
they decrease or do not improve the security of the 
opponent - unless, perhaps, they benefit him adequately in 
other ways. Despite the vagueness of proposals they tend 
to be self-interested in the undesirable manner. Each
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party proposes to dismantle the chief elements of its 
opponent's power first and its own second (if at all). Of 
course, negotiation may be a bargaining situation in part
- in which case selfishness in first offers is to be 
expected, but the parties tend to change to a new tack in 
their policy before they make a satisfactory compromise 
offer on any given tack.
Many examples of onesidedness have been given in 
Chapters 1 and 2. What follows is a critique of the most 
common notions of fairness, especially those which lie 
behind the disarmament proposals and which constitute what 
might be called ideologies in the mouths of disarmament 
negotiators. The tactical use of these notions is discussed 
in Part Three: here our concern will be with their 
'objective' merits. To demonstrate that a proposal is fair 
in that it promotes some form of military-political balance, 
however, does not mean that it will necessarily be accepted; 
we shall see in Part Three that the most effective proposal 
may be one which is abstractly unjust but becomes acceptable 
because of political or military pressures applied by its 
proponent. And of course governments are not swayed merely 
by military or political considerations in formulating 
their disarmament policy. There is a continuing but also 
varying (and 'asymmetrical') economic incentive to disarm
- the welfare incentive.
In the quest for disarmament more security, more 
welfare, an improvement or guarantee of the nation*s
relative or absolute power position are all possible
goals. Nations’ views on the requirements of fairness will 
vary accordingly.
It is only some national interests of military value 
that are at stake in disarmament negotiations. Disarmament 
agreements cannot affect the size of the population, the 
geography and natural resources or the civilian industrial 
strength of a nation (unless disarmament in the aftermath
of conquest includes industrial plunder, as when the Red
Army carried off East German factories to Russia in 19*+5> 
or unless disarmament would tend to hamstring some 
’peaceful’ industry with vital military implications, such 
as missile exploration of space or nuclear power production). 
Thus in general countries with superior industrial potential 
and strategic position rather than usable military power 
would be advantaged by disarmament. The military ’interests 
in being’ of nations also differ - as for instance when one 
country relies on a standing army and another on a standing 
air force to deter opposition. Military interests also fade 
and change over time, especially in a qualitative arms race 
where the life expectancy of an operational weapon system 
may be as little as five years. Missile disarmament will 
disadvantage the first power to deploy missiles.
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The impact of the various formulae with a claim to
promoting ’fairness* which we sha}.l consider must be very
different upon the various powers and must also vary over
time. (It is possible to 'balance unfairnesses’ over time.
Power A's position might be slightly worsened for one year,
10Power B ’s for the following year. ) Nevertheless the
application of quite rigid formulae seems inevitable if
only to make the disarmament problem conceptually manageable.
More importantly, as Schelling has pointed out:
In bargains that involve numerical magnitudes 
there seems to be a strong magnetism in 
mathematical simplicity.1'
We shall now consider some ’magnetically simple' 
methods of force reduction and control, mainly as applied 
in two-power situations, because of their simplicity and 
because all multi-power relationships can be reduced to 
two-power relationships.
It must not be forgotten that allies as well as 
opponents may arm against each other. The French atomic 
bomb is part of a challenge to U.S. foreign policy although
To
It will be recalled that the Soviets argued, in their 
proposal of September 20, 1957, that they could not agree to 
remain at a force level of 2.5 million because it disadvantag­
ed them as compared to a 1.5 million level.
11
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960, p. 67.
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n o t  i n t e n d e d  f o r  u se  or  t h r e a t  o f  u se  a g a i n s t  Am ericans .
Or a l l i e s  may c o m p e t i t i v e l y  d i s a r m  f o r  w e l f a r e  r e a s o n s  -  
as  d i d  European  NATO members i n  t h e  l a t e r  1950s. I t  i s  
s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  o n ly  tw ic e  i n  th e  pe r iod  1955-60 d i d  a 
l e s s e r  W es te rn  a l l y  f e e l  t h a t  t h e  U.S. arms c o n t r o l  
p o s i t i o n  t h r e a t e n e d  i t s  i n t e r e s t s .  Germany i n  e a r l y  1957 
o b j e c t e d  t o  arms c o n t r o l  c o n f in e d  t o  E u ro p e ;  F r a n c e  i n  1958 
and s u c c e e d in g  y e a r s  o b j e c t e d  t o  t h e  t e s t  ban .  The two 
n e g o t i a t i o n s  c o n c e rn e d  a r e  u s u a l l y  a c c o u n te d  t h e  most 
v a l u a b l e  and r e a l i s t i c  o f  t h e  p o s t - w a r  p e r i o d .  An a l l i a n c e  
o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  powers seems t o  f i n d  ag reem en t  e a s i e r  t o  
r e a c h  on g e n e r a l  and ’ com ple te '1 d isa rm am en t  t h a n  any l e s s e r  
m easures  -  p r o b a b l y  b e c a u se  ’ g . c . d . ’ i s  u t o p i a n .
The methods o f  c o n t r o l  and r e d u c t i o n  which have  a 
c l a im  t o  be e q u i t a b l e  may be ra n g e d  on a s c a l e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e  d e g re e  of  damage t h a t  t h e y  i n v o l v e  f o r  t h e  s e c u r i t y  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  weaker  p a r t y .
Most damaging i s  a method n e v e r  p ro p o se d  a t  t h e  
d isa rm am en t  t a l k s  -  n u m e r i c a l l y  e q u a l  r e d u c t i o n s  f o r  a l l  
powers .  The c h i e f  a d v a n ta g e  of  t h i s  method (and o f  o t h e r  
methods which s im p ly  c a l l  f o r  r e d u c t i o n s )  i s  t h a t  i t  does  
n o t  r e q u i r e  a s e c r e t i v e  power t o  r e v e a l  i t s  o v e r a l l  f o r c e  
t o t a l s  and d e p lo y m e n t s .  The method w i l l  t e n d  t o  be f u t i l e  
u n l e s s  combined w i t h  a c u t - o f f  -  w h e th e r  o f  armament
production or of troop production (recruitment), but if 
the reduction proposed is small, and if national 
intelligence has a reliable estimate of the opponent’s 
strength, the method may be safe. It would seem to be an 
ideal way to begin disarmament with the Soviet Union. In 
fact the West’s comprehensive partial plan of August 29-*
1957 did not propose that all nuclear bombs and warheads 
should be subject to inspection, yet it did propose 
transfers of fissionable materials to peaceful uses 
nevertheless.
Much less damaging to the weak is proportional force 
reduction, which, in general, tends to preserve the 
relative power position of parties. Proportional or ratio 
reduction may, however, seriously decrease the security of 
the weaker side if the cuts are too drastic. Students of 
missile duels point out that the higher the level of forces
for a given ratio of forces the less the chance of a
12successful disarming first strike. The same case may 
apply against drastic conventional disarmament, but it was 
not the case urged by the West against the Soviet proposal 
for a one-third cut of all forces in the early 1950s.
~
'...a limitation on the number of missiles would appear to 
be more stabilizing the larger the number permitted*. The 
Strategy of Conflict, op. cit. , Chapter 10, ’’Surprise Attack 
and Disarmament” , p. 23b.
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Rather it was held that any ratio reduction would preserve 
the Soviet’s superior capability for land warfare, which 
was unfair. Fairness is thus identified with the interest 
of the weaker, as in Christianity and socialism. But it 
might be argued, in a quasi-ethical way, that the stronger 
power has ’earned’ its right to superiority under 
disarmament by its peacetime sacrifice of welfare, and 
that if the weak power felt its inferiority keenly enough 
it could increase its forces. A proponent of ’negotiation 
from strength’ in disarmament during the early 1950s might 
have urged that the Communists would never be interested 
in anything but proportional force reductions. It was 
often argued that Western conventional rearmament was a 
necessary precondition of general disarmament negotiations 
in those years, even after the Soviet Union dropped
the proposal for ratio reductions in 1955.
Closely related to proportional reduction is the
freeze, which has never been proposed except as a
1 9preliminary to disarmament. - Like proportional reduction 
the freeze may be applied to weapons, forces, or budgets 
- with different effects on the power balance in each
T3However the Soviet Union did propose a comprehensive 
freeze as a preliminary to nuclear disarmament only, in 
February 25« 1955.
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case. Only production points need be inspected for the 
freeze.
The first method which advantages the weak that we 
shall consider straddles the ‘realist1 position (which 
favours preservation of a ratio) and the ’moralist* 
position (which favours abolition of inequality). As with 
progressive taxation, under this method nations are 
penalised for superior ’ability to pay*. The strong disarm 
a higher fixed proportion of their forces than the weak. 
Armies over one million might be reduced by ten per cent; 
those over two million by 20 per cent; and so on. The 
Faure Plan of 1955 involved budgetary reductions of this 
progressive kind.
The moralist position in the West seemed to be 
vindicated in May, 1955 when the Soviets adopted the 
Western proposal for two tiers of great powers, each power 
to be permitted the same force level as the other powers in 
its tier. Since 1955 whenever either side has proposed 
specific force reductions the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China have 
been put in one category and the U.K. and France in another. 
However it is unlikely that the conversion of the Russians 
was due to Western moralizing; it should be remembered that 
the Soviet leadership decided in 1955 and again in later 
years to reduce ground forces substantially. If one side
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plans to make most of the reductions the other side is 
proposing agreement becomes more attractive.
A special case of the demand for equality is the
demand for abolition. There have been proposals for
abolition of (a) certain categories of armament, (e.g.,
nuclear weapons), (b) certain modes of weapon deployment,
(at foreign bases, in space), and (c) certain development
activities (nuclear testing). Abolition is unfavourable
to the nations strong in the category to be abolished
except in cases such as the test ban, where the relevant
assets (knowledge gained from previous tests) cannot be
14taken away, and abolition favours the s trong.
As we have seen in discussing the test ban, even the 
components of international inspection can be quantified, 
and mathematical formulae can be applied to them. East and 
West clashed early about the definition of equal treatment 
at the test talks. The East proposed that East and West 
should submit to the same number of on-site inspections 
and should enjoy equal representation in the Control 
Organization. These proposals meant that two great powers 
(one of which was the greatest in the world) would have
T4
Of course, in disarmament proper, the knowledge how to 
make missiles, for example, cannot easily be taken away 
from those who have it, although the missiles can be.
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been forced to consider themselves as one. The Soviets 
succumbed to Western ’technical determinism’ (as I have 
called it) in allowing that the number of control posts 
in Russia should be determined by scientific and not 
political criteria, thus marring the consistency of their 
position. It might be said that the West, too, was 
inconsistent in demanding greater representation than the 
East on the Control Commission, but acquiescing in 
East-West equality on the lesser control organs. Since 
inspection is far more damaging to Soviet than Western 
interests, the Soviets may be justified in their conception 
of equality. The small risk the West would take that the 
Soviets will cheat under hamstrung inspection may roughly 
balance the small risk the Soviets would take in permitting 
this inspection. At any rate it is certain that the less 
inspection needed for control of a measure the fairer it 
will seem to the Soviets. Unhappily the Soviet Union has 
built no aircraft carriers, the abolition of which would 
seem to be as easy to inspect by national means as a ban 
on atmospheric tests.
Finally we shall deal with formulae for fair compro­
mises gleaned from a study of negotiating records,1955-60. 
There are two logically distinct forms of compromise which 
we shall call qualitative and quantitative.
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One type of qualitative compromise - synthesis - is 
the combining together of disparate elements from rival 
plans. Synthesis of course suits a situation in which 
opponents propose plans on different subject matters; 
quantitative compromise can only be employed if rival 
proposals concern the same subject or subjects, preferably 
related. But when Jules Moch announced the doctrine of 
synthesis in 1955) J its obvious weakness was that great 
power positions were very different. A major policy change 
by one or more parties was needed. The Americans favoured 
an isolated agreement for measures of inspection against 
surprise attack, while the Russians and Anglo-French still 
favoured a comprehensive and radical agreement.
Another type of qualitative compromise can be 
employed when two sides have made conflicting comprehensive 
proposals on several subject matters. Instead of finding 
a quantitative compromise between the two positions on the 
several subject matters, the negotiators can adopt one 
side’s proposals on some subjects and the other side’s 
proposals on others. In the test negotiations several 
complicated bargains of this kind were offered.
7T~
See  DC/SC. 1/PV. 53 ? August 31) 1955) i n  Cmd. 9&51 ? p. 701-
16
For example, on December 14, 1959? the Soviets dropped 
their demand for a veto over the budget in the Control
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Quantitative compromise is of course never possible 
unless nations have made proposals on the same subject or 
subjects. After proposing a quantitative compromise on a 
subject negotiators often call for an equal step towards 
agreement by the opponent, but of course this method is 
bound to advantage the side which makes the most extreme 
demands in the first instance, as will compromise which 
halves the difference between rival positions. Despite the 
obvious inadequacies of these formulae for quantitative 
compromise and of the methods of qualitative compromise 
outlined above, it seems that effective negotiation is 
impossible without the use of simple methods of compromise 
because of the tendency for expectations to coalesce 
around them.
Commission, and agreed to the Western proposal for staffing 
of control posts by thirds, provided that the West agreed 
to a 3-3-1 composition for the Control Commission.
- Statement by Tsarapkin, GEN/DNT/PV. 1*+8, pp. 6-14.
APPENDIX
A GLASSIFICATION OP PROPOSALS
This appendix provides a method for schematic 
classification of the major proposals and components of 
those proposals for the period 1955-60. Some proposals 
made by authorities other than the great powers are 
included for completeness. The terminology recommended is 
derived chiefly from the best negotiators’ usage.
Three ways of classifying proposals are employed.
A. Type of Control
1. Limitation of Research and Development. (This was 
specifically proposed in the Soviet plan, June 2. 1960; it 
would be an indirect effect of the test ban.)
2. Limitation of Testing. (E.g., of nuclear warheads, 
long range rockets.)
3. Limitation (Freeze) of Material and Weapon Stockpiles. 
of Forces and of Military Budgets.
Strictly speaking, a freeze is possible without a 
cut-off - weapons might be replaced at the same rate as they 
are being scrapped. However, it is usually proposed or 
assumed that the cut-off of weapon production will accompany
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any freeze. The ’cut-off1 or control of production of 
forces - i.e. , of recruitment - has never been proposed 
except in radical plans.
4. Reduction (’Disarmament’) of Forces. Armaments. 
Materials and Budgets.
Formulae for effecting reductions were discussed in 
Chapter 3* It should be noticed that the setting of force 
levels will not mean reduction if some party has a level 
already lower than the one proposed. (E.g., the Western 
proposal, June 27. 1960, provided for first stage force 
levels of 2.5 million for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. In 19&0 
U.S. forces were below this figure, Soviet forces above it.)
Reduction of armaments may involve either destruction, 
storage in depots or conversion to peaceful uses. Reduction 
of budgets has been separately proposed twice - in the Faure 
Plan of 1955,^ and on March 27, 1956 when the Soviet Union 
proposed ’to reduce the military budgets of States by up to 
15 per cent as against their military budgets for the 
previous year’ in isolation from disarmament measures.
5. Limitation of Disposal (Embargo, Ban on Transfer, 
Controlled Transfer.)
These methods of control may be applied to materials
T7
See August 29. 1955.
and techniques as well as weapons. (E.g., the partial test 
ban treaty of 1963 required parties ’to refrain from 
causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in* 
nuclear tests in the controlled environments. The Soviets 
proposed a ban on transfer of nuclear weapons in September 
20, 1957. The West proposed in August 29. 1957 a ban on 
transfer except where 'armed attack has not placed the 
party /^transferee’L7 in a situation of individual or 
collective self-defence'.)
6. Limitation on Deployment. (E.g., arms control in
18outer space; nuclear free zones; abolition of foreign 
forces and bases; abolition of extraterritorial atomic 
overflights.^
7. Limitation of Use. ('Moral Disarmament') (E.g., non­
aggression pact, alliance (?), ban on use of atomic weapons 
ban on first use, ban on first use except in self-defence.)
8. Monitoring and Notification. (E.g., of weapon tests, 
troop movements, activity at bases, etc.)
Monitoring and notification have been frequently 
proposed for safeguarding against surprise attack.
See U.S. proposal, June 27. I960.
19See Soviet proposal, November 28, 1958.
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B. Type o f  Armament In v o lv e d
1. C o n v e n t i o n a l  D isa rm am en t .
2 . N u c le a r  D isa rm am en t , ( C o n t r o l  of  n u c l e a r  d e l iv e ry -  
v e h i c l e s  may be s p e c i a l l y  p r o v id e d  f o r . )
3* B i o l o g i c a l  and Chemica l  ( 1B and C )  D isa rm am en t .
4 .  Com prehensive  ( G e n e ra l )  D isa rm am en t .
Com prehensive  i s  n u c l e a r  p l u s  c o n v e n t i o n a l  d i s a rm a m e n t ,  
o f t e n  p ro p o se d  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  s a f e g u a r d s  a g a i n s t  s u r p r i s e  
a t t a c k ,  arms c o n t r o l  i n  E u ro p e ,  t h e  t e s t  b an ,  and o t h e r  
m e a s u re s .
Comprehensive  p l a n s  may be e i t h e r :
20(a)  P a r t i a l  -  i n v o l v i n g  m o d e ra te  n u c l e a r  c o n t r o l ,  
l e s s  t h a n  50 p e r  c e n t  c o n v e n t i o n a l  d isa rm am en t  and no B 
and C d i sa rm a m e n t .
( b )  1 C o m p l e t e ^ -  i n v o l v i n g  t o t a l  n u c l e a r  (and  c h e m ic a l  
and b i o l o g i c a l )  d i sa rm am en t  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  c o n v e n t i o n a l  
d isa rm am en t  t o  th e  p o i n t  where f o r c e s  a r e  supposed  t o  be 
a d e q u a te  f o r  i n t e r n a l  s e c u r i t y  p u rp o s e s  o n ly .  ( ’G e n e r a l  and 
c o m p l e t e ’ d isa rm am en t  i s  a lways a l s o  ’u n i v e r s a l ’ -  i t  i s  
p ro p o se d  f o r  a d o p t i o n  by a l l ,  o r  a l l  ’m i l i t a r i l y  s i g n i f i c a n t ’
20
I s o l a t e d  p r o p o s a l s  such  as  b u d g e ta r y  r e d u c t i o n s ,  a n u c l e a r  
f r e e  zone and t h e  t e s t  ban have  a l s o  been  c a l l e d  ' p a r t i a l  
m e a s u r e s ' .
21
T h is  word s h o u ld  rem a in  i n  q u o t a t i o n  marks .
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states. The word ’general’ is sometimes used as though
it could do the work of both ’comprehensive' and 'universal*.
22This is surely unreasonable. )
C. Number of Powers and/or Geographical Area Involved 
1. Number of Powers.
(a) Two. (E.g., the Eisenhower Plan on surprise 
attack.^3)
(b) Three. (E.g., the initial stages of the test ban.)
(c) Four. (U.S.S.R., U.S., U.K., France; e.g. the 
first stage conventional reductions of the Western plan, 
August 29. 1957.)
(d) Five. (The Security Council's veto-wielding powers, 
where 'China' is, presumably, People's China. First stage 
conventional reductions in most comprehensive plans apply to 
the Five only.)
22
For example Nosek, the Czech delegate to the Ten Nation 
talks, on March 17, 1960 declared:
The term general disarmament means that 
disarmament measures include all States.
He went on:
"General disarmament" means further that it 
includes all armed forces and all weapons.
- TNCD/PV.3, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 50. 
Khrushchev's original General Assembly proposal of September 
18, 1959 called for 'complete and general disarmament by all 
States'. On Nosek's interpretation 'by all States' would 
be a redundancy in Khrushchev's formulation.
See August 30, 1955.
23
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(e) Ten. (The members of the Ten Nation Committee on 
Disarmament were to accede ’in the first instance’ to a 
first stage of ’initial and controllable measures’, 
according to the U.S. proposal, June 27. 1960.)
(f) 'States having a significant military potential'. 
(E.g., U.S. comprehensive plan, April 3, 1956.)
(g) 'All states'. (E.g., Western plan, March 8, 1955. 
Soviet plans for radical disarmament usually imply the 
participation of all states.)
2. Area. Geographical areas for which separate arms 
control agreements have been proposed include:
(a) Germany. (E.g., Soviet proposal for nuclear-free 
Germany in March 27. 1956.)
(b) Central Europe. (E.g., the Eden Plan for joint 
inspection, July 21, 1955.)
(c) Balkans. (E.g., Soviet proposal for ’the erection
in the Balkans and the region of the Adriatic of a zone free
2bof atomic and rocket weapons’, June 25, 1959» )
(d) Europe. (E.g., Soviet proposal for reductions in 
the European forces of the Four, in September 20. 1957.)
2*+
In Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1423.
20S
(e) Middle East. (E.g., Soviet proposal for ’a zone 
of peace, free of nuclear and rocket weapons’, January 21, 
1958.25)
(f) Arctic. (E.g., U.S. proposal for Arctic
P A
inspection zone, April 28, 1958."“ )
(g) Antarctica. (The 13-power Antarctica Treaty of
December 1, 1959 provided that the area ’shall continue
27forever to be used for peaceful purposes’. '
(h) Asia. (E.g., Chinese proposal for nuclear-free 
zone in ’East Asia and the Pacific region’, April,18,
1959.28)
25Tass Statement, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II,
p.“ 9 ^  ~~26
U.N. document 3/3995 (Security Council), in Documents on 
Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1005.
27Conference document 28, in Documents on Disarmament, 
vol. II, p. 1550.
28
Chou En-lai, ’’Report on Government Work”, at the Second 
National People’s Congress. Quoted in Alice L. Hsich, 
Communist China’s Strategy in the Nuclear Era. Spectrum 
Book, New Jersey, 1962, p. 1^8.
PART THREE
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NEGOTIATING PRESSURE
"It’s really dreadful,” she muttered to 
herself, ’’the way all the creatures argue. It’s 
enough to drive one crazy!”
The Footman seemed to think this a good 
opportunity for repeating his remark, with 
variations. ”1 shall sit here,” he said, ”on
and off, for days and days.”
— Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
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INTRODUCTION
A GENERAL THEORY OF PRESSURE FOR ARMS CONTROL
The most signal failure of the analysts of disarmament 
negotiations, and perhaps of the negotiators themselves, is 
that they have not fitted proposals and negotiating tactics 
into a theory of the military-political relations between 
participants. Schelling and Halperin have shown the 
identity of aims that a particular nation may have in both 
arms control and strategy; a theoretical enquiry not yet 
attempted is to estimate the pressure that arms proposals, 
arms policies, military strategy and political strategy 
exert on the negotiating opponent. What follows is a 
theory of pressure in negotiation for arms control. Without 
the context of a theory of all relevant pressures in 
negotiation the study of ’proposal pressures’ and ’conference 
pressures’, which follows in later chapters, cannot be seen 
in perspective.
The pressures that nations bring to bear on each other 
in connection with disarmament are far more diverse than is
1 -
Strategy and Arms Control, op. cit.
2ii
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commonly realized. ‘Disarmament of opponents’ sums up the 
most important aim that any foreign policy can have. This 
may be achieved in whole or part by political victory, by 
military threats based on superior armament, by war itself, 
by disarmament agreements, or by some combination of these 
things. The aims of disarmament negotiation , armament 
policy and war are identical in so far as the military 
impotence of antagonists is the most valued outcome. If a 
nation cannot weaken its opponents; if indeed the degree of 
its own weakening is at issue - nevertheless, armament, 
disarmament and war policies may all be relevant in averting 
a needlessly disastrous shift in power relations. War 
itself is 'compulsory disarmament’ of the opponent; 
participation in the arms race causes the disarmament of 
the opponent indirectly, since he must retire his obsolete 
and worn-out weaponry in order to remain competitive. In 
both cases there is much pressure but little argument and 
cooperation. Arms control is diplomacy first and then 
organized cooperation, but it is also a continuation of war 
and the arms race by other means, or, rather, these may and 
to some extent must promote its purposes, and it theirs.
If the mutual destruction of forces in the course of 
war is a little like partial disarmament (perhaps 
accompanied by an intensified arms race), then the total
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success of one side results in something like general and
complete disarmament of the other. This result is
commonly brought about or sealed by treaty, and a surrender
treaty is in part a disarmament agreement - either
completely unilateral, as in the case of Japan in 19*+5? or
with a promise of multilateral disarmament to follow, as at
Versailles in 1919. For our purposes war may be regarded
as one type of maneuvering in order to obtain as favourable
2arms control terms as possible. Except in total war 
(which under modern conditions could produce involuntary 
general and complete disarmament) the factor of bargaining 
and negotiation is important: easy terms may permit the 
wasteful exercise of war to be called off; hard terms may 
indefinitely delay agreement. Maximum violence in the 
prosecution of war is not necessarily conducive to early 
agreement. Restraint may be politically valuable. It has 
often been argued that the appalling Allied attacks on 
German cities in 19^-5 hardened the popular will to resist 
Allied surrender terms, just as the terms themselves are 
commonly supposed to have delayed agreement.
2 ”’Arms control' after limited war may be merely an 
agreement to suspend attempts to push forward the area of 
military occupation. Korea and Vietnam come to mind.
There is even less threatening and promising 
(bargaining behaviour) in most arms races than in war, and 
they are less likely to ’end* in an arms control agreement, 
but once again arms policy not only causes the involuntary, 
semi-compulsory disarmament of the opponent, it may also be 
employed in the service of obtaining desired forms of arms 
control. As in war, restraint or increased pressure may 
have political value or not, according to circumstances.
An increased tempo of armament production by A coupled with 
a demand for disarmament may decide B either to try to keep 
up with A or to accept inferiority, depending on B‘s 
political and economic calculations and A's terms.
In general arms races are disadvantageous and nations 
feel impelled to limit or abolish them for three reasons - 
they are an economic drain, and they involve both physical 
and political danger. All powers except those enjoying 
overwhelming military superiority and those with virtually 
no arms to bargain away must at least consider arms control 
because of the pressures generated by the arms policies of 
opponents. Such consideration will be influenced by 
estimates of what military power the opponent has in the 
present, what he may have in the future and, in particular, 
by what he is planning or threatening to have in the near 
future.
Decisions on ‘military magnitude’ - the size of the 
defence budget and force levels - generate pressure for 
comprehensive disarmament. The details of arms policy - 
decisions on the number of military missiles to be produced, 
or whether nuclear testing will be suspended - may generate 
pressures for particular items of arms control, such as a 
missile freeze, or a test ban. One nation’s arms policy 
may influence the other’s in a desired direction before 
there is an arms control agreement - as did the Soviet 
suspension of tests in 1958, which led to a Western 
suspension in the same year. However it is arguable that 
there would have been a test ban earlier if both sides had 
gone on testing instead of stopping for nearly three years.
Before we come to conventional arms control diplomacy 
we should consider the relation of the pressures generated 
by political conflicts and crises to arms control. These 
are generally overlooked. From our poiht of view Cold War 
disputes are conflicts about the location or size or 
loyalty of armed forces. Each side opposes the other’s 
stationing of troops on foreign soil, its build-up of the 
forces of disputed countries, and its alliances which press 
lesser countries into hostile military service. Each side’s 
demands are demands for arms control, although only the East 
habitually includes them in disarmament proposals. (I have
called the negotiated dissolution of military blocs part
of arms c o n t r o l . B u t  of course the effect of Cold War
demands is to keep the level of armaments high. Arms
control - local or general - would be likely to follow if
one side either withdrew some of its demands or decided to
acquiesce in the demands of the other.
Crises are created by peremptory demands backed by
threat of force; here we find usually not just demands for
disarmament but promises to execute it. Sometimes the
disarmament proposal is kept in the background - as when the
Soviets call for a 'free city* of Berlin and play down
their demand for the withdrawal of the Western garrison.
However the disarmament demand may be sent naked into the
world, as when President Kennedy called for withdrawal of
Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles from Cuba in October 1962,
and backed the 'proposal' with strong explicit and implicit
4threats of force. This was a conventional proposal in so 
far as Kennedy offered to impose a limitation on American 
forces in return for the withdrawal of the Soviet weapons.
3 See Part Two, Appendix.
4-
The explicit threats forbade only the further import of 
weapons into Cuba.
However his promise not to invade Cuba was conditional on 
inspection of the Soviet withdrawal.
This brings us to conventional arms control proposals 
and negotiations ‘proper1 (and very proper - and 
ineffectual - they are in practice compared to some of the 
activities we have been considering). At this point we 
shall make a rough distinction, which will be elaborated 
and modified later, between strategy (proposals) and 
tactics (negotiation) in arms control diplomacy.
A nation1s strategy in arms control may derive its 
efficacy in promoting agreement from being combined with 
political and military pressures, as we have seen, but it 
also will constitute pressure in its own right in so far 
as proposals for agreement appeal to opponents by 
comparison with the military worlds to be expected in the 
absence of agreement. A concession by definition will 
increase the military appeal of a proposal for opponents.
A concession adds to the pressures making for agreement, 
including those pressures generated by the original proposal.
In Part Two we studied the merits of plans more or less 
in the abstract; what ought to be stressed here is that the
For a discussion of the Cuba crisis, see J. Malcolm 
Mackintosh, “Soviet Motives in Cuba“, Survival, January- 
February, 1963.
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overall ’appeal’ of a plan may depend crucially on how and 
when and in what context it is proposed; it is always 
relative. A proposal may be regarded as a way for one 
side to bring into focus the disparate pressures which are 
pushing opponents in the direction of agreed arms control. 
Proposals are invariably presented as promises: ’Disarm on 
my terms and you will enjoy the following benefits...’
But it is equally legitimate to regard a proposal as an 
implied threat: ’If you do not perform so-and-so, the 
following deprivations will ensue for you...’
We have yet to consider conference-room behavbur as
a separate pressure for arms control, but we should notice
first that it is dispensable; in theory agreement is
possible by an affirmative by one side to the other’s plan:
’negotiation’ might be reduced to proposal-making and
£acceptance. What can a conference add, in theory?
Firstly, conference enables each side to elaborate 
and explain its proposals to the other, and to attempt to 
show that they are in the general interest. In addition, 
each side may communicate the importance it attaches to the
T> This is virtually what happened to end the Cuban crisis 
of 1962, although no document was signed, and the Soviets 
could not or at least did not make good their acceptance 
of on-site inspection.
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various parts of its plan and the degree of its disapproval 
of the parts of the opponents plan. Developments in 
tactics may thus determine the direction of strategic 
shifts. Let us call these various types of communication 
examples of ’intramural pressure*.
Secondly, in so far as conferences are not confidential
they may he used in various ways by each side to influence
various publics in favour of particular proposals, and in
this way increase the pressure on the opponent to accept
7them. This we shall call ’extramural pressure’. It is 
taken up in Part Four, Chapter 1, which discusses the 
propaganda impact of negotiations.
We have now surveyed the pressures - general and 
particular - making for arms control, and it should at 
least be clear that ’disarmament’ is not one thing. Unless 
one makes idiosyncratic assumptions it is simply absurd to 
say that ’X does not want disarmament’, or that ‘Disarmament 
assumes...’, or that ’Disarmament involves...’, as in so 
much (usually hostile) discussion of the subject. A 
convenient way to summarize the discussion so far is to list 
the bargaining assets relevant in disarmament negotiation:
7 "Proposals, in so far as they are revealed, also exert 
extramural pressure, of course: more than negotiations in 
some cases.
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it is because these are unequally distributed and very 
diverse in nature that possible disarmament agreements 
themselves differ so greatly.
The core of these assets is military forces and 
armaments in being; but plans, possibilities and threatened 
developments are (intangible) assets too. Secondly, 
willingness to run risks by threatening the use of 
armaments is an 'asset1 - as we saw in discussing the Cuban 
missile crisis, and so is the maintenance of a continuing 
politico-military challenge to an opponent in disputed 
areas. Finally, a nation's strategic position in war is a 
potent bargaining lever in determining arms control 
arrangements for peace, among other matters.
Several qualifications and distinctions flow 
immediately from this general statement. Firstly, in a 
sense there are no 'objective' assets in negotiation for 
arms control: the nation's assets are what the opponent 
thinks they are. He may err - by being bluffed, or by 
underestimating - and suffer for his error. It is fairly 
easy for closed societies to attempt bluff about some 
components of their existing armed strength - such as 
numbers of missiles and troops; it is open to all nations 
to 'bluff* about their future intentions and prospects in 
the arms race. In fact in the years under study the West
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seems n o t  t o  have  a t t e m p t e d  b l u f f  o f  any k i n d ,  w h i l e  t h e  
E a s t  ha s  p e r s i s t e n t l y  s i n c e  1957 e x a g g e r a t e d  i t s  p r e s e n t  
and p r o j e c t e d  lo n g  ra n g e  r o c k e t  s t r e n g t h  -  b o th  a t  
d i sa rm a m e n t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and e l s e w h e r e  -  w i t h  some im pac t  
on W es te rn  t h i n k i n g ,  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  1961. On th e  o t h e r  
hand t h e  E a s t  h a s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  d e n ie d  t h e  h i g h e r  Western  
e s t i m a t e s  o f  i t s  o v e r a l l  f o r c e  l e v e l .
S e c o n d ly ,  t h e  v a l u e  o f  a s s e t s  i n  any n e g o t i a t i o n  i s  
r e l a t i v e .  I t  depends  b o th  on what a s s e t s  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
o pponen t  h a s ,  and on t h e  i s s u e  u n d e r  d i s c u s s i o n .  Let  us 
c o n s i d e r  a n e g o t i a t i o n  f o r  m i s s i l e  d isa rm a m e n t .  O the r  
t h i n g s  b e in g  e q u a l ,  i f  one s i d e  t o  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  has  no 
m i s s i l e s ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  i f  i t  has  shown l i t t l e  a b i l i t y  to  
p ro d u ce  them, an opponen t  which has  m i s s i l e s  w i l l  be 
v i r t u a l l y  a b l e  t o  d i c t a t e  t e r m s ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  t h e  s h o r t  r u n .
I f  b o th  s i d e s  t o  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  have  c o n s i d e r a b l e  m i s s i l e  
f o r c e s  b o th  w i l l  p r o b a b l y  have t o  compromise f o r  a g reem en t .
So long  as  n e g o t i a t i o n s  c o n c e rn  o n ly  long  ra n g e  m i s s i l e s  i t  
w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t  f o r  a n a t i o n  s t r o n g e s t  i n  ground f o r c e s  t o  
b r i n g  t h i s  s t r e n g t h  t o  b e a r  i n  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n .  A c r e d i b l e  
t h r e a t  o f  i n c r e a s e d  a i r c r a f t  p r o d u c t i o n  would be more u s e f u l  a s  
an a s s e t .
T h i r d l y ,  a b a s i c  d i s t i n c t i o n  must  be made between 
a s s e t s  which  a r e  n e g o t i a b l e  and t h o s e  which a r e  n o t .  The l i n e
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of this distinction will vary according to the proposal 
being made, but some assets are not negotiable at all in 
conventional negotiations. In the missile example above, 
bomber aircraft were not negotiable, although they would 
become negotiable in a negotiation about curbs on the means 
of strategic delivery. Even in negotiations for general and 
complete disarmament such factors in the power balance as 
geography, population, industrial potential and morale - 
while of key importance in bargaining - could not themselves 
be bargained away. However some of these factors would 
become ‘negotiable’ if the side possessing them decided 
upon backing its proposals with risky behaviour - war or 
threats of war.
Fourthly, one asset not immediately apparent as such 
is the intrinsic appeal of certain types of proposals - 
those that have a quality of simplicity, obviousness or 
apparent fairness. Of bargaining in general Schelling has 
written:
It often seems that a cynic could have 
predicted the outcome on the basis of some 
“obvious” focus for agreement, some strong 
suggestion contained in the situation 
itself, without much regard to the merits 
of the case, the arguments to be made, or 
the pressures to be applied during the bar­
gaining.
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Furthermore::
.••it often looks as though the ultimate 
focus for agreement did not just reflect 
the balance of bargaining powers but 
provided bargaining power to one side or 
the other.o
We have seen in Part Two, Chapter 1 that the call 
for round numbers, proportional reductions, equal 
treatment, abolition and total suspension are common 
characteristics of the more radical proposals, but it 
would be difficult to say whether East or West has improved 
its bargaining power by its choice of radical proposals.
In the test negotiations, however, a judgment may be 
possible. It appears that the most preferred Soviet 
position, first put forward strongly in early 1957? was 
•Ban all tests without /international/ controll1 The 
preferred American position seems to have been that reached 
early in 1959: *BgLn all tests that can be controlled!1 Both 
these positions had simplicity superior to earlier test ban 
proposals, but most underground tests could not be controlled 
by national means and many could not be controlled even by 
international means. The American position, moreover, 
involved a complicating distinction between underground 
tests above and below the If.75 seismic threshold. The
Strategy and Conflict, op. cit. , p. 68.
partial agreement of 1963 which banned all (or nearly all) 
tests which can be controlled by national means may be 
regarded as a compromise sharing in some respects the 
simplicity of the preferred positions of both East and West.
It is worth stressing finally, once more, that the 
assets of the parties to a negotiation do not closely 
determine the pattern of bargaining. In any negotiation 
there will be an infinite variety of ways of manipulating 
assets, even leaving aside the use of war and war threats.
One side may offer disproportionately sharp cuts in its own 
strength to induce agreement, or threaten a sharp increase 
in its arms production unless the opponent agrees to an 
unfavourable balance. Or agreement may be induced by one 
side’s proposing minimal inspection in order not to 
compromise its opponent’s intelligence advantage unduly. If 
we consider the test ban we can underline sharply the point 
that willingness to abstain from doing something one has not 
done while being in fact able to do it may be a key bargaining 
asset. France's chief asset in test ban negotiations with 
the Three would be her clear ability, willingness and need to 
continue testing. Once she had conducted extensive testing 
her bargaining position would be much weaker because 
suspension would no longer so strongly favour her opponents' 
interests.
CHAPTER 1
THE STRATEGY OF NEGOTIATION
The strategy of a negotiating power in its narrowest 
sense would be its negotiating aims, defined as the 
achievement of certain military worlds through arms 
control. Negotiating strategy in its wider meaning would 
involve the conscious coordination of grand political and 
military policy to promote arms control aims. This was 
discussed in the preceding Introduction. The determinants 
of negotiating strategy were also hinted at there; a 
complete ‘dynamics of proposal-making’ would take us too 
far afield, but a word more is offered here.
A nation* s negotiating aims may be expected to evolve 
in accordance with the following factors (which overlap and 
interact with each other): changes in the existing and
ipredicted technology of war; shifts in the halance of
1
Such changes will not necessarily affect the formulation 
of very general proposals: for example, proposals for 
’armament reduction’.
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power; changes in one’s own and the opponent's political 
and military strategy; the pressure of domestic interest 
groups and domestic and foreign opinion for or against 
particular kinds of arms control; changes of calculation 
about the effects of particular measures; and so forth.
It should be noticed immediately that proposals may
not represent 'real' aims accurately or at all. Nations
have aims apart from agreement (or immediate agreement)
when they send proposals into the world. Proposals may be
designed primarily to promote various propaganda objectives,
2some of which are not connected with arms control at all, 
and since nations are expected to take positions on questions 
concerning which they have not decided their position, or 
on which they do not - perhaps for the moment - wish to 
take a position, it is only to be expected that negotiations 
will be always clogged with pseudo-proposals. Nations have 
overlapping 'action' and 'declaratory' policies in arms 
control as well as military strategy, and the sifting of the 
two is difficult in both cases. We shall see that the 
revelation of real negotiating aims and final-offer positions 
poses important tactical problems.
2
See Part Four, Chapter 1, "Propaganda and Political 
Warfare Theories".
In Part Two we studied the military implications of 
important declaratory policies for arms control in the 
period 1955—60• ’Suspension of disbelief’ was practised
there for reasons given in the Introduction to Part Two.
To avoid undue complication we shall once again assume that 
proposals are meant to be accepted, and enquire into the 
first principles which we should expect to govern strategic 
decisions in arms control. We distinguish four key 
questions which strategic decision must answer.
1. Which proposal(s) should one sponsor and for how long? 
(What attitude should be adopted to one’s former proposals?)
2. Which parts of a proposal are essential, which 
dispensable? (What concessions will be made if necessary?)
3. Should one support one’s allies* proposals, oppose them 
or reconcile differences before negotiating?
4. How much of the opponent’s proposal should one reject? 
How much accept? (Accepting part of an opponent’s proposal 
may amount to making a separate proposal.)
Let us discuss each of these problems in turn.
1. The most general pattern perceptible in proposal-making 
is that most nations most of the time have a ’preferred' 
proposal - usually some variant of ’general and complete 
disarmament’, plus a series of ’second-best’ proposals of
which one or two will he negotiated very vigorously from 
time to time or perhaps for a long time - as with the test 
ban.
The Russians, perhaps because they have always 
negotiated in the absence of allies or in the presence of 
subservient allies, have usually managed to keep more 
proposals afloat than the Western Three combined. However it 
has proved difficult or perhaps undesirable for a power to 
press hard for more than one plan at one negotiation. The 
Russians did achieve this in 1957 and thereby contributed 
greatly to the beginning of separate negotiation on the test 
ban.
Proposals are usually put forward as though they might 
be permanently open for acceptance by opponents. However 
few proposals manage to survive more than a year in their 
original form, even though very general proposals are not so 
prone to obsolescence as detailed ones. To assign a time 
limit to an offer may mean that one wishes to accelerate the 
opponent’s decision-making process, or that the military 
situation will be very different after the time limit expires. 
For example, the Kennedy-Macmillan offer of a ban on 
’fallout’ tests in September 1961 was made at the beginning 
of a Soviet test series and remained open for only one week.
3 See Part Two, Chapter 2, Note.
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2. The wording of proposals may indicate the hierarchy 
among a nation*s goals in arms control, and usually-does in 
Russian proposals, but negotiating tactics are a more 
refined tool for this purpose. Since assigning priorities 
is a question of strategy, and deciding when and how to 
communicate them a question of tactics, we may say that even 
the way proposals are worded is a tactical question, as is 
the timing and place of their publication and the timing of 
concessions. Among strategic moves the ‘package deal* is 
perhaps the most precise way of communicating priorities: 
the essential part of one’s plan is explicitly indicated
at the same time that a concession is offered.
3. In the period under study the Soviet Union had one
independent ally (China), which showed very little interest
in the arms control problem, and several subservient allies,
one of whom was permitted to cut a seemingly independent
figure (Poland), but none of whom could undermine Soviet 
1+policy. Unlike France, China did not publicly oppose a test 
ban during 1955-60, and apart from somewhat nebulous proposals
4
However, Albania resisted the Soviet proposal of May 1959 
for an atom-free zone in the Balkan-Adriatic region. See 
Herbert Ritvo, "Internal Divisions in the USSR", in Seymour 
Melman (ed.), Disarmament: Its Politics and Economics. The 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston, 1962, pp. 
217-3. For the texts of various Soviet proposals on this 
subject and the U.S. response, see Documents on Disarmament, 
vol. II, pp. 11*23, 11+31+ and 1436.
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for atom-free zones in the Far East, her disarmament
diplomacy was confined to general support for Soviet
policy,^* and reminders to the world at large that she had
not been invited to negotiations.
...any international agreement concerning 
disarmament, without the formal participation 
of the People1s Republic of China and the 
signature of its delegate cannot, of course, 
have any binding force on her (sic.)7
The major Western allies were united for three bouts
of negotiation in our period - the early months of the 1955
See A. Doak Barnett, nThe Inclusion of Communist China in 
an Arms Control Program", in Arms Control. Disarmament and 
National Security, on. cit. , pp. 293-*+»
o ~ ~
See,for example, the speech by Lin Chang-sheng to the 
World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking on June 8, 1960, 
quoted by the British delegate to the Ten Nation Committee.
We support the proposal for disarmament 
put forward by the Soviet Union. It is, 
however, inconceivable that imperialism 
will accept a proposal for general and 
complete disarmament. The purpose of 
putting forward such a proposal is to 
arouse the people...
Ormsby-Gore invited Zorin to ’say that he does not agree 
with the.,.analysis...put forward in Peking’.
- TNCD/PV.1+5, June 23, i960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 839. 
Peking has lately - July 1963 - proposed general and 
complete nuclear disarmament on its own initiative, thereby 
moving closer to self-confessed cynicism in disarmament 
diplomacy than any other power.
7 Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, January 21, i960, in Documents on 
Disarmament. 1960. p. 25-
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Sub-Committe, the later months of the 1957 Sub-Committee, 
the surprise attack conference and 1960. The U.S. 
’reservation* of positions in 1955 produced disunity which 
disappeared gradually over two years. The test ban 
negotiations beginning in 1958 never had French support and 
especially not after the Western Two broke the link between 
the test ban and disarmament in January 1959. Unity was 
based on the initiatives of an informal Anglo-French entente 
in 1955) on protracted detailed negotiations in the NATO 
Council in 1957) and on conventional diplomatic consultations 
in i960.8
Of course it matters profoundly on what program unity 
is based. Differences with allies may be ’resolved’ by 
being obscured in a general proposal, by being ignored in 
a search for ‘areas of agreement’, or by being compromised -
Qeither ’quantitatively’ or ’qualitatively’.
*+. The acceptance of the enemy’s plan means agreement, 
but there are degress and kinds of agreement. In our period 
an opponent’s plan was never amended in detail to indicate 
what was acceptable in it. Once - in September 195^ + - the
E
See Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms 
Control, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1961, Parts 
Five and Six.
9 See Part Two, Chapter 3*
232
S o v i e t s  a c c e p t e d  a W es te rn  p l a n  as  t h e  ’ b a s i s*  f o r  
a g r e e m e n t , and r e p r o d u c e d  many of  i t s  m ajo r  e le m e n t s  i n  
a p l a n  e i g h t  months l a t e r  (May 10, 1955) .  I n  t h e  t e s t  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  t h e  s i d e s  g r a d u a l l y  a d o p te d  t h e  key p o r t i o n s  
o f  e ach  o t h e r * s  p r o p o s a l s  be tw een  1957 and 19&0: t h e
d r a m a t i c  moves o c c u r r e d  when t h e  S o v i e t s  a c c e p t e d  t h e  need
11f o r  c o n t r o l  p o s t s ,  and when t h e  West c u t  t h e  l i n k  w i t h  
d isa rm a m e n t  i n  J a n u a r y  1959. Much more u s u a l  i s  a 
v i r t u a l l y  r o o t - a n d - b r a n c h  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  o p p o n e n t ’ s p l a n :  
h i s  p r o p o s a l  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  as  b e in g  an i m p o s s i b l e  b a s i s  
f o r  arms c o n t r o l ,  and so th e  q u e s t i o n  of  which d e t a i l s  a r e  
a c c e p t a b l e  h a r d l y  a r i s e s .
The f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  s t r a t e g y  f o r  a n e g o t i a t i o n  i s  n o t  
co m p le ted  i n  a d a y ,  and i t  i s  t h e  p r o s p e c t  and p r o c e s s  o f  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  which e l i c i t s  t h e  d e t a i l  w i t h o u t  which  ’ a im s ’ 
a r e  l i t t l e  more t h a n  p io u s  g e n e r a l i t i e s .  The v a g u en ess  of
10
The S o v i e t  d r a f t  a s sem b ly  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  Sep tem ber  30? 
195*+ p ro p o se d  t h a t  a t r e a t y  be d r a f t e d  ’ on t h e  b a s i s  of  
t h e  F r e n c h  and U n i t e d  Kingdom p r o p o s a l s  o f  11 June  195*+* •
-  A/2742 and C o r r .  1.
D C/SC.1 /PV.121, Ju n e  14,  1957-
11
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proposals may be due to inertia; it may be inadvertent; 
and it may be tactical. In the last case, the motive may 
be either to keep the proposal simple for propaganda 
purposes, or to draw an opponent into negotiations by 
seeming to accept a cherished proposal of his in principle. 
We might call an example of an ’enticing offer’ the Soviet 
acceptance of the principle of a controlled test ban in 
June 1957.
12
12
Witness the reference of the American delegate to the 
test talks to 'problems of whose existence we were 
originally only dimly aware Zwhich7 have moved to the 
forefront1.
- GEN/DNT/PV.2^ -6, August i9 6 0, p. 26.
CHAPTER 2
THE GRAND TACTICS OF THE NEGOTIATING POWERS 
AND OTHER PRELIMINARIES
The t i t l e  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  r e s t s  on a d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  
d e t a i l e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and n e g o t i a t i o n  or  m aneuver ing  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  d e t a i l e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  The ' p r e l i m i n a r i e s ’ i n c l u d e  
t h e  s e t t l i n g  of  w here ,  when, w i t h  whom and sometimes a l s o  how 
( i . e . ,  by what methods and p r o c e d u r e s )  and a b o u t  what t o  
n e g o t i a t e .  These  l a s t  two i s s u e s  t e n d  t o  r e m a in  c o n t e n t i o u s  
i n  d e t a i l e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  ' D e t a i l e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s '  f o r  t h e  
p e r i o d  1955-60 a r e  t a k e n  t o  have  been  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  t h e  
Disarmament C o m m iss io n 's  Sub-C om m it tee ,  1955-6-75 th e  
C o n fe re n ce  of  E x p e r t s  on th e  t e s t  ban ,  1958; th e  C o n fe re n ce  
on th e  D i s c o n t i n u a n c e  of  N u c le a r  Weapon T e s t s ,  1958-60;  t h e  
c o n f e r e n c e  on s u r p r i s e  a t t a c k ,  1958; and th e  Ten N a t io n  
Committee on D isa rm am en t ,  1960. With t h e  e x c e p t i o n  of  t h e  
s u r p r i s e  a t t a c k  c o n f e r e n c e  and t h e  C o n fe re n ce  of  E x p e r t s ,  a l l  
t h e s e  c o n f e r e n c e s  were ch a rg ed  w i t h  d r a f t i n g  an a rm s  c o n t r o l  
t r e a t y ,  i f  p o s s i b l e ,  ( i n  f a c t  o n ly  t h e  t e s t s  c o n f e r e n c e  
began t o  do so)  and a l l  were t h e  o c c a s i o n  f o r  d e t a i l e d
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negotiation of proposals. The surprise attack conference 
is included in the list because the Eastern experts treated 
it like any other disarmament conference and the Western
experts’ ’technical* findings may be treated as an arms
1control proposal. In the Conference of Experts the 
Easterners at first attempted to persuade the Western experts 
to agree to ’recommend’ a test ban to governments, but 
eventually agreed to merely draft ’technical’ findings on the 
design of a control system - which, however, proved to have 
profound political implications.
Before proceeding it may be wise to justify the somewhat 
artificial distinction between preliminary and detailed 
negotiation recommended above. We shall also note several 
distinct analytical ways of breaking down the process 
(negotiation) into units (individual examples of 'a 
negotiation’).
Schilling and Halperin may have the first word:
In addition to the deliberate formal and informal 
communications (public and private) coordinated 
by the head of government, there is a good deal 
of activity designed to impress the other side 
with the firmness of one’s own position, the 
pressures that one is subject to, and the areas 
in which one is willing to make concessions....
America speaks to Russia not only through its
See Part Two, Chapter 1, where this has been done.
1
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ambassadors, but through Senators and 
Congressmen of both parties, through pressure 
groups and lobbyists, through columnists and 
scholars.2
(The authors go on to argue that in negotiating 
’informal understandings...actions speak loudly’, and they 
mention changes in the defence budget, troop withdrawals 
and new treaty arrangements. My Introduction above gives 
reasons for believing that action speaks just as loudly in 
the negotiation of formal understandings.)
The present study is focussed on what Schelling and 
Halperin call 1 formal...communications...coordinated by the 
head of government’*, and in the period 1955-60, in addition 
to the examples of detailed negotiation already listed, 
there was debate on proposals for arms control ’coordinated’ 
or actually conducted by heads of government annually in the 
General Assembly, occasionally in the Disarmament Commission 
once (in 1955) and almost (in i960) twice at a heads of 
government meeting, and once (also in 1955) at a foreign 
ministers’ conference. Heads of state also corresponded 
about arms control proposals at intervals during the period. 
However not only the private activity mentioned by Schelling
2 Strategy and Arms Contol. o p. cit. , p. 80.
Ibid., p. 81.3
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and Halperin but all the non-detailed official 
negotiation is viewed as a post-mortem on, or as a 
necessary preliminary to, one or other of the detailed 
negotiations of the period.in this study.
The regular U.N. debates were in fact viewed in this 
way by most participants. The summit meeting in 1955 was 
too short (July 18-23) to permit detailed negotiation, and 
the foreign ministers’ conference was, like the summit 
conference, both brief (October 27-November 16) and charged 
with negotiating matters other than arms control. As for 
the summit correspondence, it was never expected to reach 
a disarmament agreement by post.
For this study I have decided on the ’unit’ of 
negotiation in two different ways. (1) I consider each of 
the three separate bouts (1955-6-7) of Sub-Committee 
negotiation and also the Ten Nation talks as a unit.
(2) I regard as units each of the two expert conferences on 
specific issues in 1958, and also the ’political’ 
negotiations concerned solely with the test ban, 1958-60.
If the ’issue’ method of analysis is applied to the 
period as a whole the result is worth noticing. Let us say 
that there was ’negotiation about’ a subject when one side 
(or both) made a proposal on it. In that case the test ban 
negotiation began on May 10, 1955(when the Soviets proposed
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a ban  l i n k e d  t o  com prehens ive  disarmament),  c o n t i n u e d  i n  
1956, i n t e n s i f i e d  i n  1957? and a c h i e v e d  in d ep e n d en c e  i n  
1958 . N e g o t i a t i o n s  on th e  p r e v e n t i o n  of s u r p r i s e  a t t a c k  
c o n t i n u e d  s t e a d i l y  d u r i n g  1956-7 a f t e r  a b l a z e  of  i n t e r e s t  
i n  1955 was damped by l a c k  o f  c l e a r  ag reem en t  on t h e  
meaning o f  t h e  c o n c e p t ,  r e k i n d l e d  t o  a c h i e v e  b r i e f  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  i n  1958, and te n d e d  t o  f a d e  away i n  i9 6 0 .
T h e re  were n e g o t i a t i o n s  a b o u t  c o m p re h en s iv e ,  ‘ complete* 
d isa rm am en t  i n  1955? 1956, 1957 and 1960 , and n e g o t i a t i o n s  
a b o u t  c o m p re h e n s iv e ,  p a r t i a l  d i sa rm am en t  i n  1956, 1957 and 
1960 .^  T here  was n e g o t i a t i o n  a b o u t  c o n v e n t i a l  d isa rm am ent  
i n  1956.
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h i s  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  e f f o r t  i n  c e r t a i n  
f i e l d s  o f  arms c o n t r o l ,  e ac h  o f  t h e  u n i t s  o r  b o u t s  of 
n e g o t i a t i o n  was s e t  up i n  th e  wake o f  e l a b o r a t e  p r e l i m i n a r y  
n e g o t i a t i o n  -  e i t h e r  ’ i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d '  ( e . g . ,  t h e  G e n e ra l  
Assembly and Disarmament  Commission debates) , o r  ad hoc 
( e . g . ,  t h e  exchange  o f  d i p l o m a t i c  n o t e s  which  e s t a b l i s h e d  
t h e  two e x p e r t  c o n f e r e n c e  and th e  ' p o l i t i c a l ’ t e s t  
n e g o t i a t i o n s ) .  I n  one c a s e  -  t h e  Sub-Committee  o f  1955 -  
h e a d s  o f  governm ent  renewed w i t h  f r e s h  d i r e c t i v e s  (which 
i n c l u d e d  new p r o p o s a l s )  a t e m p o r a r i l y  a d jo u r n e d  c o n f e r e n c e .
Y ears  o f  maximum a c t i v i t y  u n d e r l i n e d .
5 “
238
Progress in the test ban negotiations was reviewed by the 
General Assembly in 1958-9-60, but the greatest impact of 
the Assembly on the test issue occurred in earlier years - 
that is, in the preliminary phase of the test ban 
negotiations.
We shall now examine the tactics employed during the 
preliminaries by the principal powers involved in detailed 
negotiation, and will go on to discuss the attempts of 
other powers - particularly the attempts of neutrals in 
the United Nations - to influence the major conferees by 
their behaviour in the preliminaries.
I propose to call the preliminary maneuvers of the 
principal powers a part of their ’grand tactics’ in 
negotiation. Grand tactics lay down the conditions under 
which a nation is prepared to negotiate and to continue 
negotiating ’in depth’. Grand tactics need not be sharply 
distinguished from procedural tactics inside a negotiation. 
However, for the sake of simplicity we shall regard the 
whole of a nation’s ’preferred negotiating conditions’ 
before a detailed negotiation, whether insisted on or not, 
as part of its grand tactics, while we shall regard only 
those conditions which a nation decides to insist on during 
a detailed negotiation as part of grand tactics. The
intramural procedural struggle is further discussed in 
Chapter 3«
Nations usually have both a preferred position and 
a compromise position in preliminary grand tactics. In so 
far as a nation insists on certain conditions being met 
before agreeing to negotiate its grand tactics determine 
whether or not negotiation will occur, or at least whether 
the nation’s representative will be present if negotiation 
does occur. Thus a nation's grand tactics may range from 
the absolutely permissive - if it is prepared to negotiate 
anywhere, at any time, with anyone, in any fashion, about 
anything, indefinitely; to the absolutely restrictive - if 
its conditions are never satisfied. For the first three 
years of our period negotiations succeeded each other almost 
as a matter of course. We shall glance at these years first 
and then show how the composition, content, forum, method 
and duration of negotiations all became hotly contested 
issues in the later years.
The Soviet Union voted against the Disarmament 
Commission resolution establishing the five nation
c? 6Sub-Committee in 1954, it had previously proposed adding
5 DCA9, April 19, 1954.6
DC/48, April 15, 1954.
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China, Czechoslovakia and India to a Sub-Committee 
consisting of the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., France and Canada. 
However the Soviets tolerated the Western-dominated 
Sub-Committee with its ’confidential’ procedure (of which, 
as we shall see in Chapter 3, the Soviets also disapproved) 
until late in 1957*
Neither side attempted to dictate by threats of 
non-cooperation what was to be negotiated in the years 
1955-7» An almost bewildering variety of proposals was 
negotiated in 1955 and 1956, and there was substantial 
agreement for only two periods about the kind of treaty 
which should be negotiated - towards the middle of 1955 and 
for most of 1957» But at no time did policy disagreement 
jeopardize the holding of regular negotiations.
In the First Committee of the General Assembly in 1957 
the Soviet delegate attacked the Western-dominated
7structure and the confidential procedure of the Sub-Committee: 
He submitted a resolution to enlarge the Disarmament 
Commission in order to include all members of the United 
Nations. (Since its foundation the Disarmament Commission 
had comprised current members of the Security Council only.)
7
A/C.1/SR.885, October 29, 1957, P» 98.
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The new, ’permanent disarmament commission1 would, on 
its formation:
(a) /he assigned/ the task of examining all 
disarmament proposals submitted to the United 
Nations and of drafting appropriate 
recommendations for the session of the General 
Assembly;
(b) ...function continuously. The meetings of 
the commission shall be open;
(c) ...elect a chairman and...vice-chairman, 
whose task will be to direct the current work 
of the commission and also to assist States 
Members of the United Nations in organizing 
consultation, meetings and the like on 
disarmament problems
Gromyko had announced on the first day of the First 
Committee’s session on disarmament that the Soviet Union 
wished the Twelfth General Assembly to make ’an effort to 
reach a specific agreement on one or more separate questions’, 
and he mentioned six possibilities: a test ban, a temporary 
ban on use of nuclear weapons, reduction of NATO and Warsaw 
Pact forces, limited elimination of foreign bases, a ban on 
extraterritorial nuclear bases, and an agreement on ’control
Qposts’. The Soviet delegation had also taken the 
unprecedented step of tabling in the First Committee a 
detailed disarmament plan, September 20. 1957. These Soviet
8
A/C.1/797, Ocotber 28, 1957- 
9 A/C.1/SR.867, October 10, 1957-
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tactics may be viewed as an attempt to establish detailed 
negotiations de facto in the General Assembly in line with 
the policy of radically enlarging the Disarmament 
Commission and charging it with primary responsibility for 
disarmament.
The Western delegations, in their draft Assembly
resolutions of late 1957, urged the Disarmament Commission
to reconvene the Sub-Committee ’as soon as feasible’ for
the purpose of drafting a treaty based on the Western
proposals in the 1957 Sub-Committee,"^0 and they proposed an
increase of 14 members, including Western, neutral and
11Eastern countries, in the Disarmament Commission. Both 
Western resolutions were carried in the teeth of Soviet bloc 
opposition at a plenary Assembly session, and comprehensive 
disarmament negotiations languished for over two years after 
the Soviet bloc boycotted the new Disarmament Commission.
The Soviets launched a campaign for a summit 
conference on disarmament on February 28, 1958, proposing 
a list of measures similar to those put forward by Gromyko
To
Resolution 1148 (XII) A/3805, pp. 3-4, November 14, 1957«
11
Resolution 1150 (XII) A/3805, p. 4, November 19, 1957- 
Before passing this resolution the Assembly rejected an 
Albanian amendment adding seven neutral sind communist 
countries to the Western list of new members.
- A/PV.719, p. 490, November 19, 1957-
a t  t h e  T w e l f th  Assembly.  P r e s s u r e  f o r  a perm anen t
1 2Disarmament Commission was n o t  r e l a x e d .  J The U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  a t t a c k e d  t h e  S o v i e t s  i n  March f o r  r e f u s i n g  t o  a t t e n d  
t h e  new Disarmament Commission or  t o  heed  t h e  W este rn  c a l l  
f o r  a  ' p r o c e d u r a l 1 m ee t in g  of t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  ' t o  l e a d  
t o  an  e a r l y  r e s u m p t io n  o f  d isa rm am en t  d i s c u s s i o n s  t h r o u g h  
o t h e r  c h a n n e l s ' .  A c co rd in g  t o  t h e  S t a t e  D epar tm en t  a summit 
was o n ly  a c c e p t a b l e
p r o v id e d  p r i o r  p r e p a r a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
i t  would r e s u l t  i n  r e a c h i n g  a g r e e m e n t s . . . .
The r e c e n t  S o v i e t  s t a t e m e n t  i n  t h e  f i e l d  of 
d isa rm am en t  / o f  F e b r u a r y  2§7 i s  h a r d l y  
c a l c u l a t e d  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e s e  e n d s . 14
The S o v i e t s  have f r e q u e n t l y  t r i e d  t o  r a i s e  t h e  l e v e l  
a t  which  governm ents  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  a t  d i sa rm am en t  
n e g o t i a t i o n s .  The S o v i e t s  seem to  f a v o u r  summit m e e t in g s  
(and a l s o  p u b l i c  n e g o t i a t i o n )  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e i r  t h e o r y  
(which  w i l l  be t a k e n  up i n  P a r t  F o u r ,  C h a p te r  1 ) ,  t h a t  th e  
m asses  can  be m o b i l i z e d  t o  e x e r t  p r e s s u r e  f o r  p o l i c y  changes  
on i m p e r i a l i s t  g o v e rn m en ts .  At any r a t e ,  i n  r e j e c t i n g  t h e  
S o v i e t  p r o p o s a l  o f  1958, t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  was employing  t h e
12
12
See  S o v i e t  Aide-Memoire o f  F e b r u a r y  28 ,  1958 i n  D ep ar tm en t  
of  S t a t e  B u l l e t i n . March 24 ,  1958, pp. 4 5 9 -6 1 .
13
See S o v i e t  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t r y  S t a t e m e n t .  March 14, 1958, i n  
Documents on D isa rm am en t , v o l .  I I ,  p. 9d8.
T4
D ep ar tm en t  o f  S t a t e  S t a t e m e n t ,  March 1 5 ? 1958, i n  i b i d . ,
P. 971.
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tactic of making negotiation conditional on either a change 
of disarmament policy or a change of grand tactics by the 
Soviet Union.
Pressure for general disarmament negotiation relaxed 
later in 1958 because of the succession of ‘single issue' 
conferences which occurred. However in 1959 Soviet 
persistence in rejecting the old Sub-Committee structure 
bore fruit and general disarmament negotiations were revived 
in 1960 as a result of an agreement among the U.K., U.S., 
U.S.S.R. and France, announced on September 7> 1959« The
Four had agreed to set up a ten-nation committee which would
1 5meet outside the U.N., but would report to it. y
With five Western members (Italy being the newcomer) 
and five Eastern members (U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia 
Poland and Rumania), the new committee had the same 
ideological proportions as the two expert conferences of
1958, whose genesis we shall now study. The tactical 
preliminaries in these two cases were conducted mainly by 
means of a summit correspondence and diplomatic notes.
TTFour Power Communique on Disarmement Negotiations, in 
Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1441. The communique 
was foreshadowed in an announcement at the Foreign Ministers 
Conference on August 5 that a new disarmament forum had been 
discussed. See Department of State Bulletin, August 24,
1959, P. 269.
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The idea of an expert conference to study the control
of a nuclear test ban originated in the Western delegations
to the 1957 Sub-Committee.*^ Ciro Zoppo points out that
the expert conference was first conceived as following a
political agreement to ban tests, and only later as
17facilitating agreement on a test ban. ' General Assembly 
Resolution 1148 of November 1*f, 1957 had called for 'groups 
of technical experts to study inspection systems for
disarmament measures on which the Sub-Committee may reach
18agreement in principle*, but the United States whole­
heartedly adopted the originally British proposal for 
expert conferences as a preliminary to a political decision 
early in 1958.^^
The Soviets insisted on reaching a political agreement 
to ban tests in isolation from disarmament before partic­
ipating in expert discussions throughout 1957 and early 
po1958. On May 9? 1958, Soviet policy finally changed.
16
See Ciro E. Zoppo, The Issue of Nuclear Test Cessation at 
the London Disarmament Conference of 1957% The RAND Corpor- 
ation, RM-2Ö21-ARPA, September 1961, pp. M+ and
17Ibid., p. M+.
18
A/38o 5 ? op», cit.
19
See, for example, letter from Eisenhower to Khrushchev, 
April 28, 1958, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1006.
20
See, for example, DC/SC.1/PV.132, July 8, 19575 p. 16.
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...in spite of the serious doubts on our 
part /because of the possible delay in 
reaching agreement which an expert 
conference might cause7...the Soviet 
Government agrees to having both sides 
designate experts who would immediately 
begin a study of methods for detecting 
possible violations of an agreement on the 
cessation of nuclear tests.21
The Conference of Experts (July 1-August 21)
succeeded. On August 22 the United States professed itself
‘prepared to proceed promptly to negotiate an agreement for
22the suspension of nuclear weapon tests’.
The Soviet Union agreed to begin political negotiation
in Geneva on October 31? 1958, but proposed that:
In order to avoid any protraction of the 
negotiations, it would be desirable to 
agree beforehand to limit their duration 
to a definite period. For its part the 
Soviet Government proposes that the period 
be fixed at two to three weeks.23
24The United States gently demurred, but the Soviet 
delegation appeared at Geneva anyway.
21
Letter from Khrushchev to Eisenhower in Documents on 
Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1038.
22
Statement by President Eisenhower, August 22, 1958, in 
Geneva Conference. p. 310* The British Government made a 
similar statement on the same day. See ibid.. p. 311*
23Note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American 
Embassy, August 30, 1958, in Documents on Disarmament, vo. II, p. 1120.
24
American Note of September 10, 1958, ibid., p. 1126.
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Thus the political negotiations followed the expert 
negotiations almost automatically. When political 
negotiations began the West had held out for expert talks 
and had succeeded in committing the Soviet Union to an 
international control system, while the Soviets had failed 
to commit the Western Two to suspend their tests 
permanently before reaching agreement. However the West 
had agreed
unless testing is resumed by the Soviet 
Union, to withhold further testing...for 
a period of one year from the beginning 
of the negotiations.
However, year-by-year extension of this voluntary
moratorium would depend on the control system ‘working
effectively’ and on ‘satisfactory progress... in reaching
agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms
29control measures’. y In fact, the Western Two unlinked the
26test ban from disarmament on January 19, 1959, and 
continued their voluntary moratorium until the Soviets broke 
theirs in 1961. The Soviets may have calculated in 1 9 5 8  
that to begin rather than to refuse to begin expert and
25
Statement by President Eisenhower, August 22, 1958, ££. cit. 
in Geneva Conference, p. 310- The British Government made a 
similar statement on the same day. See ibid., p. 3 1 1•26
See speeches by Wadsworth and armsby-Gore, in 
GEN/DNT/PV 37, p. 6.
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political negotiations might promote these two desired 
developments.
The preliminaries leading to surprise attack
negotiations in 1958 were similar to those leading to the
Conference of Experts. The United States urged a technical
approach to surprise attack negotiations in summit and
27diplomatic correspondence early in 1958.""'
Khrushchev agreed in a letter of July 2 that
it would be useful if in the near future the 
appropriate representatives - including 
those of the military agencies of both sides, 
e.g., at the level of experts - designated by 
the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., 
and possibly by the governments of certain 
other states, met for a joint study of the 
practical aspects of this problem and developed 
within a definite period of time, to be 
determined in advance, recommendations regarding 
measures for the prevention of the possibility of surprise attack.28
The United States replied in a Note of July 31 that 
experts should make a
study of the technical aspects of safeguards 
against the possibility of surprise attack.
They should concentrate on the means and 
objects of control, and on the results which 
could be secured from these safeguards.
27See, for example, Eisenhower Letter of April 28, o£. cit.
28
In Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1084.
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The Note went on to attack Khrushchev1s proposals on
inspection zones, which were still substantially the same
as those of September 20, 1957» It concluded:
The United States assumes....that the Soviet 
Government agrees that these discussions would 
take place without prejudice to the respective 
psotions of the two Governments as to the 
delimitation of areas within which safeguards 
would be established, or as to the timing or 
interdependence of various aspects of disarmament 
....The United States believes, however, that 
joint technical studies would make it easier to 
reach agreement later at a political level on 
the definition of the regions in which the 
safeguards would apply.29
In its reply of September 15 the Soviet Foreign
Ministry declared that
the assertion...that allegedly the Soviet 
Government agrees that these discussions should 
not predetermine the corresponding positions of 
both governments...has no foundation. Moreover,
/sic7 it is clear that the experts will have to 
give serious attention to such technical 
questions as means and objects of control.
The Soviet Note went on:
Of course...the experts...will only conduct 
preparatory work. However, the working out by 
the experts and /sic7 practical recommendations 
on concrete ways to prevent surprise attack 
will necessitiate fruitful examination of the 
question...at a meeting of heads of Government.
29Note from the American Embassy to the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry, July 31? 1958, ibid., p. 1087.
30
Ibid., p. 1129.
Thus both sides approached negotiation with policy 
differences in plain view and with partially conflicting 
notions of the tasks of the conference. However, neither 
was prepared to insist on its view to the extent of 
making participation conditional. The Soviets seemed to 
agree to the main American proposal on the tasks of the 
conference, but the reference to ’practical recommendations’ 
and other passages in the Note must have made it clear to 
the sophisticated Note reader that the Soviets would take a 
position at the conference.
The U.S. stratagem seems to have been to hint that 
American policy might be made more palatable to the Soviet 
Union if the Soviets would agree to engage in ’purely’ 
technical discussions of monitoring systems. It is arguable 
that both sides should have urged their procedural proposals 
more forcibly until a workable compromise appeared. The 
conference which did take place - from November 10 to 
December 18 , 1958 - was hopelessly in conflict about method 
of work.
_  -
The correspondence continued, with no change of position 
on either side, through October and November. Participation 
was settled in this later correspondence. See Documents on 
Disarmament. vol. I, pp. 1145, 1213, 1219 and 1222.
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The Soviets wished to continue the surprise attack 
conference after it had met for nearly six weeks despite 
previously having proposed a time limit of ’four to five 
weeks’ on its work.^ On January 10, 1959 the Foreign 
Ministry proposed a resumption on January 15* J The United 
States in reply said that ’the experts from the two sides 
were operating under different terms of reference’ and 
opposed resumption ’until governments had resolved these
94differences’. The United States might easily have 
predicted the conflicting ’terms of reference' in advance. 
Soviet reasons for wishing to continue the negotiation are 
not clear.
The Soviet Union itself staged the only emphatic 
walk-out of the period under study at the Ten Nation talks 
in 1960. On the ground that the negotiations were ’being 
used as a cover designed to conceal the armaments race that 
has been unleashed by the Western Powers', the Soviet 
delegate withdrew ’in order to place before...the General 
Assembly the question of disarmament and of the situation 
which has arisen’. Zorin also promised to raise the
32
Note of September 15? 1958? ojo. cit.
33
Note, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 1336.
Note of January 15, 1959? ibid. , p. 1337*
3*+
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question of 'participation...of some other States’ in 
negotiations.^’ Further negotiation was thus made to depend 
on Western policy changes and a new structure for negotiations. 
The walk-out heralded a lapse of almost two years in general 
disarmament negotiations.
We turn to study the attempts of powers not 
principally involved in negotiation to influence the major 
negotiating powers. Although some neutral nations attempted 
to secure representation in the major negotiating forums 
and also to initiate detailed negotiations in the regular 
U.N. organs during the period 1955-60, it was not until 
1962 that a number of neutrals were actually seated beside 
the great powers and able to exert a direct influence on a 
detailed negotiation. Thus neutral and other 'outside* 
efforts to promote agreement in the period under study are 
treated as part of the preliminaries.
In the General Assembly, where the Nth negotiating 
powers carried on most of their efforts, and also in the 
Disarmament Commission, the United States could almost 
always command a majority for a resolution on disarmament
TNCD/PV.47, June 27, i960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 882.
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i n  t h e  p e r i o d  s t u d i e d .  We s h a l l  he d e a l i n g  m a in ly  w i t h  
d r a f t  r e s o l u t i o n s  and o t h e r  moves which  f a i l e d  t o  o b t a i n  
m a j o r i t y  s u p p o r t  i n  t h e  G e n e r a l  Assembly o r  t h e  
Disarmament  Commission.
The Disarmament Commission met b r i e f l y  i n  November 1955 
t o  r e v i e w  t h e  S u b -C o m m it tee ’ s work.  At a m e e t in g  i n  J a n u a r y
1956 i t  o r d e r e d  t h e  Sub-Committee  t o  r e c o n v e n e .  I t  had i t s  
l o n g e s t  and most  s u b s t a n t i v e  s e r i e s  o f  m e e t in g s  f o r  t h e  
p e r i o d  u n d e r  s t u d y  i n  J u l y  1956 when i t  r ev ie w ed  t h e  1956 
S u b -C o m m it tee ’ s work and h e a rd  an I n d i a n  s u b m i s s io n  on 
n u c l e a r  t e s t i n g .  I t  p r e p a r e d  a r e p o r t  t o  t h e  G e n e r a l  
Assembly i n  December 1956. I t  met f o r  one day i n  S e p tem b er ,
1957 f o r  t h e  same p u rp o se  and d i d  n o t  meet  a g a i n  u n t i l  two 
y e a r s  l a t e r  when t h e  g r e a t  powers e x p l a i n e d  t h e  fo r th c o m in g  
Ten N a t io n  t a l k s  t o  o t h e r  Commission members. I t  r ev iew ed  
t h e s e  t a l k s  i n  August  1 9 6 0 . ^
The G e n e r a l  A ssem b ly ’ s F i r s t  Committee d e b a t e d  an 
i n c r e a s i n g  number o f  arms c o n t r o l  t o p i c s  a t  i n c r e a s i n g  
l e n g t h  i n  e v e ry  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  p e r i o d ,  u s u a l l y  i n  O c to b e r -  
November. P l e n a r y  Assembly s e s s i o n s  on d i sa rm am en t  were 
i n v a r i a b l y  p e r f u n c t o r y  and co n f i rm ed  d e c i s i o n s  t a k e n  i n  
t h e  F i r s t  Committee w i t h  r a r e  e x c e p t i o n s .
3S
See  DC/FV.s 4 8 - 7 0 .
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A large part of U.N. debate on disarmament was taken 
up with evaluating the record of negotiations recently held. 
Powers which had not been directly involved awarded marks to 
or subtracted marks from those who had, or self-consciously 
refused to do either. Apart from Communist bloc members 
the most vociferous supporter of a superpower was the 
Republic of China. In 1955» for example, its delegate 
urged ‘first priority' for the Eisenhower Plan on surprise 
attack, and declared that the Soviet proposal of May 10,
1955 on force levels (which had been borrowed from the West)
0 7was inspired by 'malicious political motives'. ' To the
delegate of another small U.S. ally, Australia, in 19572
It seemed...that the Soviet proposals /of 
November 17, 19567 were loaded and had been 
contrived either for propaganda advantage 
or as traps in which to catch the Governments 
of the free world.3°
This tone in attack was never heard in speeches by 
Western members of the Sub-Committee.
Most neutral delegates leaned now one way and now 
another, and made occasional original policy contributions, 
as will be seen. It was a rare example of a neutral 
attacking both blocs at once when, in December 1955) the
37 ~ “A/C.1/SR.803, December 5, 1955, p. 237.
38
A/C.1/SR.828, January 25, 1957, p. 82.
Swedish delegate criticized the U.S.S.R. for having failed
to shift its position since May; and the U.S. for causing
’a deplorable uncertainty in the situation* by reserving
its former positions in September. 7
Yugoslavia was the most consistent of all powers in
urging compromise among the chief negotiating parties. In
1957, for example, her delegate argued that the General
Assembly should itself suggest compromises, and proposed
‘partial measures* to be adopted alone or together which
4-0would reconcile the blocs. Although carried along on the
surge of enthusiasm generated by Khrushchev*s general and
complete disarmament plan in 1959 to the extent of proposing
that it become *a basis for discussions', the Yugoslav
delegate in October 1959 still commended the United
Kingdom approach, and continued to urge 'as initial steps'
the reduction of military budgets, the 
transfer of fissionable materials to 
peaceful purposes and measures of dis­
engagement .4-1
These proposals nicely combined favourite Eastern and 
Western measures. However Yugoslav policy had no successes.
39
A/C.1/SR.799, December 1, 1955, p. 219.
4-0
A/C.1/SR.886, October 31, 1957, pp. 101-2. The specific 
proposals were contained in the Yugoslav draft resolution 
A/C.1/L.180.
4-1
A/C.1/SR.1031, October 23, 1959, pp. 26-7.
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India interested herself in many aspects of arms
control, but the consistency of Indian disarmament policy
lay in a single-minded determination to bring about a test
ban. In this it was more original than Yugoslav policy,
which simply composed and decomposed great power proposals
in novel ways; and also more successful. In 195^ - the Indian
Government proposed that the Sub-Committee negotiate a
‘standstill agreement’ on tests pending an examination of
1+2controls by the Disarmament Commission. The Soviet Union
proposed a test ban 'as one of the first measures’ in its
proposal of May 10, 1955* India proposed negotiation for
a test ban by ’all the States concerned’ in December,
1955« J The test ban appeared in Western proposals in
1956. The Indian delegate, Krishna Menon, was invited to
appear before the Disarmament Commission (India being
unrepresented there) in July 1956. He supported Indian
1+1+proposals for a test ban at length. ' Test ban discussions 
came near to dominating the Sub-Committee negotiations of 
1957- In the First Committee on November 1, India proposed
¥2
Statement by Nehru to Parliament, April 2, 195*+. Tabled 
in the Disarmament Commission at the request of the Indian
delegate. _ Aprii 8, 195*+,and Corr. 1, April 9.
^3A/C. 1/L. 1*+9/Rev. 1 , December 6, 1955.Vl* I
DC/PV.58, July 12, 1956, pp. 2-27.
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a ' s c i e n t i f i c  t e c h n i c a l  co m m iss io n ’ t o  1 d i s p e l , . . d o u b t s 1 
a b o u t  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  a t e s t  b a n ,  and c a l l e d  f o r  ag reem en t
Ll£
’w i t h o u t  d e l a y ’ . y T h is  a p p ro a c h  b r o u g h t  I n d i a  be tw een  t h e  
E a s t e r n  and W es te rn  p o s i t i o n s ,  a l t h o u g h  much c l o s e r  t o  t h e  
E a s t ,  which f a v o u r e d  a b an ,  had c o n s e n te d  t o  c o n t r o l s ,  b u t  
opposed  a t e c h n i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n .
I n  1958 when th e  T h ree  were on t h e  b r i n k  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  a t e s t  b a n ,  t h e  U.S. d e l e g a t e ,  Lodge,  p a id  
a u n iq u e  t r i b u t e .
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  p o l i c y  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  
n u c l e a r  t e s t s  had e v o lv ed  c o n s i d e r a b l y  i n  
t h e  p a s t  y e a r , and one o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  
f a c t o r s  i n  t h a t  e v o l u t i o n  had been  t h e  
U n i te d  S t a t e s ’ Government’ s r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e  
o p i n io n s  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  m i n o r i t y  v ie w s .
I n d i a  had been  th e  acknowledged m i n o r i t y  l e a d e r  on the  
t e s t  ban .
I r e l a n d  f i r s t  t r i e d  t o  s e c u r e  ag reem en t  t o  p r e v e n t  th e
’ f u r t h e r  d i s s e m i n a t i o n ’ o f  n u c l e a r  weapons i n  1958. A
r e s o l u t i o n  e x p r e s s i n g  c o n c e rn  a t  t h e  ’d a n g e r ’ o f  such
d i s s e m i n a t i o n  was p a s s e d  w i t h o u t  d i s s e n t  by t h e  F i r s t
1+7
Committee on O c to b e r  31• But  a more s u b s t a n t i a l  I r i s h
45
A / C . 1 / L . 1 7 6 / R e v . 4 .
46
A / C .1/ S R . 945,  O c to b er  10,  1958, p. 14.
47
A / C . 1 / L . 206.
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48proposal, amending the eventually successful Western
4qdraft resolution, was withdrawn on the same day for lack 
90of support. The withdrawn proposal urged the powers 
negotiating at Geneva for a test ban not to furnish nuclear 
weapons to other powers, and called on other powers not to 
manufacture nuclear weapons while negotiations for the test 
ban continued.
In 1959 the Irish Foreign Minister, Aiken, proposed a 
less radical variant of the ’non-nuclear club’ in his 
introductory address to the Assembly. Nations ’in certain 
restricted areas, particularly...where the interests of the 
two great-Power groups are entangled’ would forego nuclear 
status.
The non-nuclear nations in such an area 
would undertake,...not to manufacture or 
acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons 
of mass destruction.
They would submit to U.N. inspection, and the nuclear
powers and all U.N. members would guarantee them from
51attack ’by means of a standing U.N. force’.
A/C.1/L.207.
>+9
A/C.1/L.205.
50
A/C.I/SR.969, p. 132.
51
A/FV.805, September 23, 1959, p. 130*
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However, the Irish draft resolutions of 1959 suggested 
that the Ten Nations 1 consider... the feasibility1 of 
completely closing the nuclear club. It was passed without 
opposition in the General Assembly, but the Ten did not 
take it up. Nevertheless the idea of the closed nuclear 
club, crystallized by Ireland, was one clear motivation of 
the test ban negotiations.
Neither Indian,Yugoslav nor Irish proposals would have 
involved important military changes for those countries 
themselves, and in fact no ’outside1 nations made proposals 
for ending or preventing or even discussing those local 
arms races which were habitually overlooked by the chief 
negotiating powers. Indeed Arab powers resisted fiercely a 
suggestion for arms control by embargo in the Middle East. 
In 1955 the Syrian delegate called such a suggestion 
’intervention in their /Riddle Eastern states 17 domestic 
affairs'.
What authority had they /the Western 
powers/...to deal with the balance of arms 
in the Middle East, the Far East or any 
other part of the world...?53
52
A/RES/138O (XIV), November 23, 1959. France and the 
Soviet bloc were among the abstainers.
53
A/C.1/SR.805, December 7 , 1955.
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A u s t r a l i a n  d e l e g a t e s  were a lm o s t  a lo n e  i n  w o r ry in g  
a b o u t  a l o c a l  b a l a n c e  o f  armaments u n d e r  a d isa rm am en t  
a g re e m e n t .  They r e p e a t e d l y  c r i t i c i z e d  ( i n  S i r  P e rcy  
S p e n d e r ’ s words)  o n e - s i d e d  c o n c e rn  w i t h  ’ th e  E u ro p ea n -  
A t l a n t i c  r e g i o n ’ . But no c o n c r e t e  p o l i c y  p r o p o s a l  emerged 
f rom  A u s t r a l i a ’ s w o r r y i n g .
I t  was a c o n t i n u o u s  c o n c e rn  o f  a l l  U.N. d e l e g a t e s  t o  
keep  n e g o t i a t i o n s  g o i n g ,  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  had i t s  l i m i t s .  We 
have  s e e n  above t h a t  an  Assembly m a j o r i t y  v o t e d  an 
e n la r g e m e n t  o f  t h e  Disarmament Commission i n  1957 which 
i t  knew d i d  n o t  s a t i s f y  t h e  S o v i e t  Union.
N e u t r a l  n a t i o n  s u g g e s t i o n s  on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
n e g o t i a t i o n  were o f  two k i n d s  -  t o  u se  t h e  l a r g e r  U.N. 
o rg an s  f o r  s u b s t a n t i v e  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  and t o  i n c l u d e  n e u t r a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  d e t a i l e d  d isa rm am en t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
o r g a n i z e d  by t h e  g r e a t  powers .  The S o v i e t  IJnion sp o n so red  
I n d i a  f o r  t h e  Disarmament  Commission and as  a p a r t i c i p a n t  
i n  d e t a i l e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s  r e p e a t e d l y ,  b u t  t h e  West r e s i s t e d  
n e u t r a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  d e t a i l e d  n e g o t i a t i o n  t h r o u g h o u t  
our  p e r i o d .  I n  1959> when I n d i a  had a t  l a s t  become a 
member o f  t h e  e n l a r g e d  Disarmament Commission,  she  welcomed 
t h e  p ro p o se d  Ten N a t i o n  t a l k s  b u t  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  ’ i t  would
A /C .1 /S R .8 0 6 ,  December 7 ,  1955, p. 259.
35
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be open to the Disarmament Commission itself to take an 
initiative for studies in various fields of disarmament’. y 
However the Commission did not meet again until the Ten 
Nation talks had collapsed. It is difficult to see what 
point such studies could have had while the neutrals 
remained interested solely in measures of arms control 
chiefly involving the great powers.
DC/PV.65, September 10, 1959, P. 15.
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INTRODUCTORY
204
No sharp distinction is possible between strategy 
(proposals) and tactics (negotiation, including 
preliminary maneuver). Apart from the fact that quite 
formal proposals are often not made formally but left 
embedded in the verbatim records (this was common at the 
test ban conference), negotiators also convey details 
beyond the letter of their proposal by what they say to 
opponents in negotiation. Negotiation is akin to formal 
proposal - making in several other important ways. 
Negotiators should in theory hope by discussion to clarify 
any obscurity in their negotiating position; to convey what 
are vital and what marginal interests; and to announce 
their military and political expectations. Negatively, 
criticism of the opponents plan informs him what parts of 
his plan are acceptable and which not, what must be 
clarified and what must be detailed. Tactics is the sharp 
cutting edge of strategy’s sword, and even when it is not 
urging strategy’s objectives directly, but waging 
procedural struggle, discrediting the opponent or educating 
him (showing him that one has * reasonable ideas *, in
2G5
Schelling/Halperin*s phrase ) - even then, tactics is 
biding its time and easing the way for a renewal of the 
direct assault.
The theory and practice of pressure resulting from 
‘intramural* communication will concern us for the rest of 
Part Three. The relatively confidential and detailed 
negotiations listed at the beginning of Chapter 2 have been 
chosen for special study and for furnishing illustrations.
Our task in this chapter will be to collect, classify and 
in some cases evaluate examples of the techniques by which 
negotiators seem to believe they can influence each other 
and each other's governments. In the concluding chapter 
negotiating tactics are evaluated in more general terms, 
and some suggestions for improving communication are put 
forward.
The collection of ‘examples* has involved drastic 
selection from a vast bo£y of materials; nor are the examples 
fully representative of the material. Apart from personal 
pleasantries, trivial procedural discussion, and other 
lesser matters, the body of the chapter contains no examples 
of patriotically motivated discussions with no bearing on 
the question of an arms control agreement. For example
Strategy and Arms Control, op. cit.. p. 82.1
2G6
United States negotiators often commended the American 
role in Atoms for Peace during the Sub-Committee years.
The Two swore fealty to peace many times, while the East 
throughout the period often specifically commended its 
peaceful policy of unilateral force reductions as an 
example for the Western powers. The Western powers rarely 
offered to defend their military policies except when they 
came under Soviet attack. Nevertheless the United States 
was frequently involved in defence of foreign bases and 
her nuclear strategy. Often, of course, defence of or 
attack on a particular proposal leads to or directly 
involves defence of or attack on a particular strategy.
It is interesting to note that seemingly exaggerated 
rejection of or adherence to a proposal may be motivated 
simply by a desire to emphasize and justify one’s strategic 
attitude^, as when East and West spend considerable time 
in heated debate about the timing and merits of a ban on 
the use of nuclear weapons.
The classification used in this chapter does not 
stress distinctions (1) between national 'styles’ in 
tactics, or (2) between tactics adopted at the various 
negotiations (or to promote various types of plan), or (3) 
between the tactics of 'defence* and 'attack*. It will be 
well to say a word about these distinctions first.
2G7
(1) All the techniques we shall discuss were used 
by East and West, although in varying proportions. 
Differences of national approach will be made clear in 
discussing examples-of the use of the various tactics.
(2) Basic tactis vary little from year to year or 
issue to issue, but of course the nature of the proposal 
being sponsored and the degree of agreement already 
achieved predetermine much of the case for a proposal, the 
gist of attack on proposals of opponents, and whether there 
will or can be close tactical cooperation with allies. 
However, part of each side’s 'structure of justification' 
(such as basic Eastern and Western views on control) is 
virtually permanent; and, again, temporary and specialized 
pleading will be discussed within the broad categories.
(3) The tactics for the defence of one's own plan 
either determine or at least imply the tactics of attack 
on the opponent's plan. The arguments used in attack and 
defence tend to be similar or identical. When we speak of
a'case for* or a 'case against* a proposal, we must remember 
that there is a case against the case for, a case rebutting 
the case against, and so on - ad infinitum, in theory. In 
practice the case against the case for is answered by a 
restatement of the case for; it is a striking feature of
2G8
negotiations that the ability (or desire?) to show 
empathy towards the opponents view is very limited.
In the body of the chapter no special note has been
taken of the personal factor in negotiation. In the
negotiations studied the chief Soviet negotiators were
professional diplomats in every case except the Conference 
2of Experts. These negotiators displayed virtually 
indistinguishable styles. All were capable of rehearsing 
and elaborating the basic arguments (which were usually 
set out in Soviet proposals) with few personal idiossyn- 
cracies intruding. Variations of tone and emphasis seem to 
have been almost invariably laid down in Moscow, usually 
according to the stage of negotiation reached. Even 
vocabulary tended to be borrowed from the highest authority, 
as when Zorin announced at the Ten Nation talks that 
agreement on general and complete disarmament was dictated 
by life'.2 3
2
Yet Expert1 Y.K. Fedorov, a corresponding member of the 
Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., strove skilfully for 
several days to have the Western experts recommend an 
immediate agreement to ban all tests - control arrangements 
to follow. See Ciro E. Zoppo, Technical and Political 
Aspects of Arms Control Negotiation: the 1958 Experts’ 
Conference. RAND Corporation. RM-^256-ARPA. September« 19&2, 
PP. 31-2.
3 -
TNCD/FV.15, April 4, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 287.
2GS
If we take the vague concept * personal style' to
cover differences of intelligence, emotional make-up and
ideological commitment, there were considerable differences
between the Western negotiators of the period. None of the
chief negotiators of the Western Three was a professional
diplomat, although several - notably Jules Hoch (1951-60)
for France, David Ormsby-Gore (1957-60) and Anthony
Nutting (195^-6) for the United Kingdom, James Wadsworth
(195^-60), Henry Cabot Lodge (1953-60) and Harold Stassen
(1955-7) for the United States - were, or became,
experienced in arms control negotiation both at detailed
ktalks and in the regular U.N. disarmament forums. Of these 
men Moch was the most able as well as the most experienced, 
showing a keener grasp than his fellows of both the 
negotiating situation and of a number of military-technical 
and military-industrial questions raised by proposals. 
However the quality of British representation was consist­
ently high; the chief of delegation was always a Secretary 
of State at the Foreign Office in the years under study - 
a promising young Conservative politician. American
The years indicated refer to both types of experience.
See, for example, his intervention on budgetary control, 
DC/SC.1/PV.56, September 7? 19559 in Cmd. 9o51* p. 757; and 
his exposition of the cut-off, DC/SC.1/PV. 131, July 5> 1957j
p. 2.
representation, apart from Wadsworth, was less
£impressive. Stassen and the inexperienced lawyer Eaton, 
who led the U.S. delegation to the Ten Nation Committee, 
were forensically mediocre and reticent, by comparison with 
Anglo-French representatives. Americans in general 
displayed a more ideological style in negotiation than 
other Westerners. The contrast can be neatly made by 
studying two speeches in the Disarmament Commission by 
Lodge sind Moch respectively. At the Disarmament Commission 
meeting of January 1956, convened to reconvene the 
Sub-Committee, Lodge urged acceptance of the Open Skies 
plan in these terms:
By agreeing to this plan...we would at one 
stroke free the world from the fear of its 
final war7...#
Gentlemen, let us face it: The world 
cannot believe that any nation which truly 
hates war, which harbours no agressive intent, 
which is ready to outlaw surprise attack from 
any quarter, can fail to open up its skies to 
this peaceful inspection...8
6
Deputy chiefs of Western delegations at the test ban 
conference frequently were in charge of negotiation. These 
were Charles Stelle for the U.S., and Sir Michael Wright 
for the U.K., who often stood in for Wadsworth and Ormsby- 
Gore, respectively, during 1958-60. Both were able career 
diplomats.
7 DC/PV.50, January 23, 1956, p. 20.8
Ibid., p. 22.
which drew aMoch, in a speech later the same year,^
tribute to its ‘eloquence’ and ’mastery' from the
1 0Australian delegate, displayed typical intellectual
flexibility and patriotic and ideological aloofness in
evaluating the work of the 1956 Sub-Committee* He began by
remarking, wryly, that
Mr. Lodge...has pointed out the Soviet 
responsibilities Z?or the failure of the 
talks/ with a vigour sometimes polemical but 
often convincing.
He went on:
I should like for the moment to pass over 
the fact that we each represent a Government, 
and to recall only that we are all men... 
and that we are all imbused with the same 
good faith, and with a common desire to 
build for peace. Hence, it is with the 
independence of speech of a plain citizen 
of an old democracy that I tell you...that 
we have all committed mistakes or errors in 
the Sub-Committee.11
According to Moch, the Soviet Union should not have 
separated nuclear and conventional disarmament; the United 
Kingdom and France should have specified final force 
figures; and the United States had specified force levels
9 DC/PV.55, July 10, 1956, pp. 1-11.
10
Ibid., p. 11. M. Moch's speeches frequently elicited 
spontaneous tributes in all negotiations he attended.
11
Ibid., p. 2.
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12for non-Five powers that were too high.
In theory the personal qualities of negotiators are 
important in several ways, especially in the West where 
negotiators have always played a considerably policy-making 
role. Negotiators can facilitate communication between 
governments and help reconcile negotiating positions because 
of their considerable knowledge of the negotiating opponent. 
It seems likely that the personal deficiencies of some U.S. 
negotiators have influenced the course of negotiations, and 
that, in view of the structure of Executive authority in 
the United States, the personal qualities of American 
negotiators may be of key importance in the evolution of 
U.S. policy towards arms control.
SECTION A. THE CASE : PRO AND CON
•The case* of a negotiating nation consists of the 
body of arguments put forward at negotiations to Justify 
the nation’s own proposals, to criticize the opponent’s 
proposals, and to rebut the opponent’s arguments pro and con. 
’Argument’ for andagainst ends and means in arms control
12 ™
LfeJLä. > P* 3- 13This large subject is discussed briefly in Part Four, 
Chapter b.
includes adducing and interpreting historical and technical
facts, predicting and comparing future situations, and
asserting values. Argument is frequently buttressed by the
citing of authorities - an activity separately treated here.
The tactical attitude of allies to each other is also
discussed separately in this section. To anatomize the case
vis a vis the opponent we begin by glancing at the use of
historical perspectives by negotiators.
All negotiators express anxiety about the arms race,
but negotiators pressing for radical measures are
perceptibly more anxious than others. This may lead to
hyperbole or untruth. Late in the 1957 Sub-Committee Zorin
read a Soviet Government statement which attacked, inter
alia, the allegedly Western view ‘that possession of nuclear
weapons by States acts as a deterrent and reduces the
likelihood of atomic /sic7 war'. He continued:
This is pure illusion. On the contrary 
history teaches us that every arms race has 
always resulted in its logical conclusion, 
war. That lesson is convincingly borne out 
by the events which, preceded the First and 
Second World Wars.^
The negotiator of a conservative power inclines to 
find a different lesson in history. Speaking in the
T5 "
DC/SC.1/PV.15 1, August 27, 1957, p. 15. Cf. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results’1, in Public Policy. 
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previous year, Lodge noted disastrous failures, marked
in history, of efforts at disarmament without inspection'.
...if the United States had not disarmed 
unilaterally without international 
inspection after World War I , World War II 
might not have taken place....A good case 
can be made for the fact that if we had not 
disarmed unilaterally and without inten­
tional inspection at the end of World War 
II, we would not have had the dreadful 
fighting in Korea.
Lodge's view is also tendentious as historical analysis 
for suggesting that the lack of inspection somehow 
contributed to the outbreak of war.
Negotiators regularly use the history of post-19^5 
disarmament negotiations to scourge opponents. It would be 
tedious to recount examples, but all the major powers defend 
their negotiating record as spotlessly virtuous, especially 
the Soviet Union. On the Western side, Moch's doubts about 
the Anglo-French proposals of 1956 have already been 
mentioned, and the United States did 'reserve' its radical 
positions in 1955) but these were exceptional events which 
did not recur, and in any case neither Western power 
repudiated any of its record.
Negotiators also devote much of their time to 
analysing the current military sind political situation,
DC/PV.1, July 3, 1956, p. 16
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especially when introducing proposals. Usually, such 
analyses are tendentious in one of two ways: either they 
attack the opponents military strategy and foreign policy 
explicitly, or they reinforce the case for the proposal 
being sponsored by the negotiator.
There is a well-established ritual of deploring 
international tensions and disputes in the abstract; but 
negotiators also attribute responsibility for them to 
opponents. The East*s favourite political complaint is 
against the West*s encouragement of the Federal Republic 
of Germany; the West blames the East for dividing Europe 
and keeping tension high in this way. However, the West 
is much less addicted to political complaints than the 
East, because it has rigidly maintained that political 
issues (which are defined so as to include arms control 
arrangements confined to Germany) should be excluded from 
disarmament negotiation.
The highly armed peace and the nuclear balance of 
terror are also deplored, but the West is apt to lag a 
little in this regard when resisting Eastern nuclear 
proposals. In 19579 defending the link between a test ban 
and other measures of disarmament, Selwyn Lloyd, then 
British Foreign Secretary, declared in the Sub-Committee 
that:
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The Soviet Union, with its vast superiority 
in conventional armies, has consistently 
sought to prohibit the use of nuclear 
weapons. For geographically small 
countries such as the United Kingdom, the 
advent of nuclear weapons has provided 
greater security and greater sense of 
equality. 16
Wadsworth had shown in the 1955 Sub-Committee that
one of the geographically large countries also was not
over-anxious for nuclear disarmament.
Nuclear weapons to-day are regarded by some 
nations as the mainstay of their freedom...•
Plain common sense requires that this great 
asset should not be surrendered lightly.17
At the same meeting the Soviet delegate reacted
sharply:
In justifying M s  position, the United States 
representative has made a monstrous assertion 
in this Sub-Committee....Hitherto, atomic, 
hydrogen and other weapons of mass 
destruction have been regarded as weapons for 
the mass extermination of human beings.,..
Obviously it will be difficult to reach 
agreement with the United States representa­
tives if they approach the question of atomic 
weapons from this angle; for agreement must 
be difficult with persons who set these 
weapons on a pedestal.•.1°
American delegates from time to time in the late 1950s 
defended the existing military balance by implication in
16
DC/SC.1/PV.128, July 2, 1957, p. 2.
17DC/SC.1/PV.39» April 5, 1955, in Cmd. 9649, p. 365-18
Ibid.. p. 372.
order to justify U.S. reluctance to consider drastic force 
reductions.
It is the United States view that low force 
levels and drastic reductions in armaments - 
even though carried out under an armaments 
agreement - would not, if they were not 
accompanied by progress in the settlement of 
major political issues, be in the interest 
of any country represented at this Sub­
committee table. These reductions would 
increase the danger of the outbreak of war 
at some point in the world, and of such a war 
in turn spreading to involve all nations, 
particularly major nations.19
The Soviet Union is a persistent critic of Western 
armament policy and military strategy at negotiations. 
Especially at the beginning and towards the end of 
negotiations Soviet delegates attack NATO as an aggressive 
alliance, the United States for maintaining overseas bases 
designed for nuclear aggression, and the Western powers in 
general for the existence of an armaments race. Eastern 
criticism often extends to the details of American military 
policy, as when Kuznetsov berated the United States in 1958 
for
the fact that the danger of a surprise attack 
is substantially increased by flights of 
military aircraft with atomic or hydrogen 
bombs on board over the territories of foreignstates.20
19Speech by Stassen. DC/SC. 1/PV.86, May 4-, 1956, in 
Documents on Disarmament, vol. I, p. 62o.20GEN/SA/PV.2, November 11 , 1958, p. 16.
The Western powers presume far less to lay down a 
desirable Soviet arms policy, and scarcely ever criticize 
particular Soviet military arrangements or strategy.
Western negotiators acknowledge Soviet superiority in 
ground forces, but it is rare that they question the Soviet 
right to such superiority. American negotiators occasion­
ally complain that Soviet secretiveness is a force for 
insecurity and an obstacle to arms control, but in general 
Western negotiators show a much greater tendency to accept 
the facts of a hazardous international life: their scolding 
and moralising are addressed almost entirely to Soviet 
proposals.
When negotiators come to commend or criticize 
proposals they must explicitly or implicitly compare the 
ends laid down in proposals with predicted future 
situations, and must also show that the means or control 
arrangements provided in the proposal are appropriate or 
inappropriate to achieve the given ends. However there 
cannot be a firm philosophical distinction between ends and 
means in arms control. Every military-political situation 
envisaged by a proposal is an end, but also a means, because 
it is a pre-condition of, and will be superseded by, 
another situation. Moreover even the armament balance at 
the end of a disarmament program may be regarded not as an
end in itself but as a means to greater security (or 
prosperity) for the parties involved. However, for the 
sake of convenience we shall regard as ends those parts 
of an arms control proposal which are set as goals - both 
intermediate and final - in the proposal itself. We shall 
regard as means those parts which are provided in order to 
verify the execution of the goals. Surprise attack schemes 
providing for nothing but inspection present a difficulty, 
but we shall regard their inspection arrangements as ends 
rather than means.
1. Ends in Arms Control
A proposal for arms control states or implies that a 
nation prefers a hypothetical military situation to 
situations likely to continue or emerge in the absence of 
agreement on the proposal. In so far as a nation rejects 
the proposals of opponents and allies it exhibits a 
preference not only for the world of its own proposal, but 
also for worlds evolving as a result of the arms race, above 
the worlds proposed by others. Negotiating tactics consist, 
in the first place, of propagating and justifying these 
two kinds of preference.
To propagate values is often no more than to assert 
them, but bare assertion may be made to seem scientific by
280
elaborate use of tautology and similar kinds of empty
expression. This tactic is particularly favoured by
negotiators defending radical proposal or attacking an
21opponents proposals for inadequate radicalism. We 
shall consider the tactics of radicalism first of all.
There are three types of empty statement dear to 
negotiators with a radical brief. The first states; ’If 
you accept my plan we shall get disarmament.1 The second 
states that: ’The way to achieve radical disarmament is 
to agree to radical disarmament.' The third and most 
popular category is of the form: *X plus Y is greater than 
X'; or, even more simply, 'X is not Y'.
A frequently repeated example of a truism arose from 
the Soviet Union’s hostility to a nuclear cut-off in 
isolation from total nuclear disarmament. Zorin declared 
in 1960 that
the mere discontinuance of the production of 
fissile materials can contribute nothing at 
all even from the standpoint of stopping the 
atomic armaments race. For States will be 
able to produce atomic and hydrogen bombs by 
using the huge reserves of fissionable 
materials that have already been built up 
and stockpiled by certain States.22
21
Perfect radicalism is here defined (somewhat arbitrarily) 
as total disarmament of everyone immediately and for ever 
without controls or political and technical preconditions. 22TNCD/PV.13, March 31, i960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 261.
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That is, the cut-off is not nuclear disarmament*
In fact the West professed itself in favour of total 
nuclear disarmament in i960, but only if a joiat 
scientific study made it possible to detect hidden 
stockpiles.23 For the Soviets this was an unacceptable 
condition because, in Zorin*s words, study * could be used 
by the opponents of disarmament...to stave off the
24practical achievement of disarmament indefinitely*.
The radical East was also * concerned* in 1960 that
the West refused to assign time limits to its overall
21?disarmament program. , The Soviet Union had proposed
* total* disarmament in four years without any preconditions,
and the West could not fault this program on the score of
radicalism except by arguing that the Western plan would
bring earlier disarmament, because of
the apparent /Soviet7 insistence that before 
any measure of disarmament can be undertaken 
the whole range of general and complete 
disarmament must be negotiated and agreed... 
by all the nations of the world.26
23June 27. 1960.
2h
TNCD/PV.2, March 18, i960, in Cmnd.1152, p. 39.
25Speech by the Polish delegate. TNCD/FV.1, March 15, i960, 
in Cmnd. 11^2, p. 15.26
Speech by Eaton. TNCD/PV.36, June 10, 1960, in Cmnd.
1152, p. 681.
282
In general, however, considering the question of 
radicalism versus moderateness in isolation from questions 
such as balance, fairness, etc., the proponent of 
thoroughgoing radicalism is only vulnerable on one flank, 
whereas the proponent of moderateness is vulnerable on two 
flanks, unless his proposal is modest enough to defy the 
charge that it Complicates* disarmament. The Soviet test 
ban proposal of June 1*+, 1957* for example, notably 
achieved this, where the Western and Soviet comprehensive arms 
control proposals of 1957 did not.
Before January 1959 there had been argument about ends
- first at the technical and later at the political
conference on the test ban - whenever the Soviets pressed
for a Western commitment to a ban separate from
disarmament. Argument stopped when the West dropped the
link with disarmament and did not begin again until
February 11, i960, when the United States proposed a partial
treaty (with international controls) to cover cessation of
nuclear weapon test explosions in those environments where
27adequate control Was possible 1 in the first instance - that 
is, *in the earth*s atmosphere, in the oceans, and in outer 
space up to the greatest height with respect to which
GEN/DNT/PV.170, February 11, i960, p. b.27
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agreement can be reached on the installation of 
effective controls*•
Underground tests would be included ’down to the lowest 
limit of size, or threshold, for which, in our judgment,
pOadequate control is now feasible*. Tsarapkin objected 
that no international control was required for tests above 
the suggested threshold of seismic magnitude 4.75, and 
that the U.S. proposal * would lead to the resumption of
PQnuclear weapon tests’ in all environments presumably 
because the Soviets were not prepared to engage in a race 
in underground testing. The later Soviet ’acceptance* of 
the U.S. proposal for a partial ban plus moratorium on 
underground tests below the threshold was shown to have 
been spurious in Part Two, Chapter 2. For the Soviets it 
was impermissible conservatism to divide the test ban into 
parts until 1963. Thus during 1957-60 the Soviets were at 
first more moderate on the tests issue than the West, 
according to the definition adopted above; while in i960 
roles were reversed. At first the West ’complicated* the 
test ban by refusing to separate it from disarmament; later 
the East complicated the question by refusing to separate 
controllable and uncontrollable tests.
28Ibid., p. 5- 
29GEN/DNT/FV.172, February 16, 1960, p. 3.
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The case for moderateness, of course, always implies a 
case against radicalism, although a power putting forward 
a moderate measure is usually careful to re-endorse previous 
radical proposals simultaneously or after getting into 
difficulties. Wadsworth, in the speech quoted, declared 
1 that the United States would much prefer to be able to 
enter into an agreement for the cessation of all nuclear 
weapon tests*.30 In the 1956 Sub-Committee the Soviet 
delegate reaffirmed the comprehensive proposal of May 10, 
1955 after he came under withering Anglo-French fire for 
excluding nuclear disarmament from the plan of March 27, 
1956.31
The Western philosophy of comprehensive partial
disarmament was first formulated concisely by Moch late in
1955 when he called for:
Neither control without disarmament. /Meaning 
the Open Skies plar}7
Nor disarmament without control. /Meaning 
Soviet plans7
But agreement on disarmament which can really 
be controlled.3^ /Anticipating the Anglo-French 
plan of March 19, 19567
30GEN/DNT/PV. 170, 0£. £it. , p. 4.
31
’...our earlier proposals of May 10, 1955 still stand’. 
Statement by Gromyko, April 26, 1956. DC/SC.1 A 3, May 3, 
1956, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. I, p. 6l4.
32
DC/SC. 1/PV.68, October 7, 1955, in Cmd. 9652, p. 1009.
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Later Moch made it clear that the Anglo-French
wished all controllable measures included in an agreement.
Thus he criticized the Soviet conventional disarmament plan
of 1956 because ‘it rejects certain measures which are
susceptible of control here and now*.33 (Moch also
condemned the proposal as obsolescent and superfluous.
♦..the reductions that you are proposing... 
relate to what I shall call the out-of-date, 
department of military science. You are 
hastening the scrapping of equipment which 
will be discarded in any event, as a result 
of technological progress.34)
The Soviet position in 1956 was that nuclear
disarmament had proved impossible in the past because
Soviet nuclear proposals had been called unfair by Western
n e g o t i a t o r s . G r o m y k o  therefore argued that nuclear
measures should be excluded at first in order to obtain
agreement ‘at the earliest possible date’.3^ The perennial
weakness of proposals supposed to produce early agreement
is that it requires at least two powers to achieve any
33DC/SC.1/FV.78, April 3, 1956, p. 5.
34
Statement by Moch at the 86th Meeting. DC/SC.4/48, 
May 4, 1956, in Cmd. 9770, p. 52.
DC/SC.1/PV.74, March 28, 1956, p. 20.
Ibid., p. 18.
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sort of agreement. Negotiators are ordinarily too polite
to make so crude and obvious an objection.
In 1957 the Soviet Union fitted three strings to its
negotiating bow - the plan for comprehensive radical
disarmament, March 18T 1957: the comprehensive partial
plan of April 30 which reached its final form as September
20. 1957. and the developed test ban proposal of June 14
which provided for international control. Thus Zorin was
able to argue that the ‘materials* cut-off, the West's
favourite nuclear measure, was both (a) not radical enough
and (b) too radical, in consecutive paragraphs.
The cut-off of the production of fissionable 
material for military purposes will be of real 
significance in eliminating the threat of 
atomic war only when it is indissolubly linked 
to the prohibition of nuclear weapons, their 
elimination from the armaments of States, and 
the destruction of atomic weapons stockpiles...
The linking by the Western Powers of the 
cessation of nuclear weapons tests with the 
cut-off of production of fissionable materials 
for military purposes shows that they are far 
from desirous of contributing towards the 
halting of nuclear weapon tests.37
When Moch criticized the Soviet comprehensive partial 
plan of April 30? 1957 by saying 'that the Soviet Union 
must agree to discontinue the production of fissionable 
materials for military purposes' because it was part of
DC/SC.1/PV. 151 , August 27, 1957, p. 13.37
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‘all the disarmament which can currently be controlled*,-^ 
the Soviets were able to retort that the Western proposals 
on force levels did not measure up to Western principles 
because they involved no ‘significant reduction* for any
•30Western power in the absence of political settlements. '
We have been discussing arguments which boil down to 
asserting that there should be more or less disarmament 
than the opponent proposes. We turn to arguments about the 
fairness and 'balance* of the military worlds implied by a 
proposal. (Such arguments may of course lead to demands 
for more or less disarmament, but generally do not.) We 
have already considered abstractly the merits of the 
principal conceptions of fairness employed by negotiators in 
Part Two, Chapter 3. Here we shall briefly study some of 
these conceptions in action.
Demonstrating that a plan or part thereof is *fair* 
may involve: arguments to prove that it is in the 
proposer*s interest (usually not felt to be necessary)5 
arguments to prove that it serves the interests of all 
implicated parties; arguments to prove that it is in the 
opponent*s interest; and, finally, arguments to show that
DC/SC.1/PV.109, April 30, 1957, pp. 35-6
39DC/SC.1/PV.153, August 29, 1957, p. 47.
it is not hostile to the opponents interest - reassuring 
arguments. ’Arguments’ in this context vary from bare 
abstract assertion (often spurious or at least superficial) 
to detailed analysis of plans and prediction of their 
effects.
The Soviet Union has always been ambivalent about the 
idea of balance in disarmament; her negotiators regard it 
sometimes as a dangerous rationalization of the arms race, 
sometimes as a temporary necessity in judging plans of 
arms control. They are consistent in denying that the 
idea is relevant in a fully disarmed world where, they argue, 
’advantages* will have been abolished. Malik nicely 
expressed Soviet ambivalence in the Sub-Committee on May 5> 
19??. He rejected the idea of balance and then immediately 
used it to scourge the West for its comprehensive proposal 
of March 8, 1955s
The Soviet delegation has never shared the views 
on the subject of balance propagandized by the 
Western representatives. We are only speaking 
about it now, because this is the idea advocated 
by the Western representatives, and in so far as 
it is necessary to demonstrate its worthlessness.
We all know from the unhappy experience of the 
League of Nations that...the British and French 
representatives...tried countless times...to put 
across the idea of balance....To weight the 
"balance of forces’* in the scales as the 
reduction of armaments and the prohibition of 
atomic weapons proceeds would be an extremely 
complicated task which it would be scarcely 
feasible to undertake. Moreover, it must also
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be quite obvious to any impartial person that 
there is not a vestige of balance in the 
programme the Western Powers are proposing...
The whole /Western/ purpose...is to take an 
interminable time over the disclosure and 
verification of conventional armaments and 
armed forces, while postponing the prohibition of atomic weapons to the very end...™
(Incidentally, this speech suggests that the Soviet
delegation may not have been told of the change of policy
which was announced five days later, and which accepted the
Western timing of nuclear disarmament. At any rate after
May 10 the Soviet switched to the tactics of pressing for
Western re-endorsement of the provisions of March 8. 1955:
criticism of them virtually ceased.)
At the surprise attack conference in 1958 Kuznetsov,
the Soviet delegate, attacked the Western powers for
regarding the negotiation
as a means for attempting to obtain one-sided 
military advantages for the Western Powers 
and to weakening /sic7 the defensive power of 
the countries of the Socialist bloc.
The ’obvious purpose' of Western control proposals
'was to get as much military information as possible about
the newest weapons such as, for example, long distance
If 1rockets'. Soviet spokesmen at this time were proclaiming
40
DC/SC.1/PV.46, in Cmd. 9650, p. 571.
41
GEN/SA/PV.30, December 18, 1958, p. 39.
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Soviet superiority in long range rocketry, but Soviet 
negotiators never rest their case against Western control 
proposals on comparison of the impact of inspection 
proposals on East and West; they simply assert their 
onesidedness. The West did not attempt to reassure the 
East on inspection at the surprise attack conference; we 
shall notice shortly an attempt to reassure at the test ban 
conference.
In 1960 the Soviets argued that ’a radical solution
of the disarmament problem’, as Zorin called Khrushchev’s
plan of September 19, 1959, at the first of the Ten Nation
meetings, would cut through the problem of balance.
General and complete disarmament....places all 
States in an equal situation. It will make it 
possible to overcome all those difficulties in 
the solution of the question of control which 
arose when attempts were made to solve the 
disarmament problem partially.^ /Zorin was 
referring to the Soviet objection to ’control 
over armaments' J
At the 36th Meeting Eaton attacked the first stage 
provision of the Soviet proposal, June 2, i960, because it 
would have caused
liquidation of all free world collective 
security arrangements through the complete 
and immediate withdrawal of all United States 
forces from areas overseas.^3
b2
TNCD/PV. 1, March 15, I960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 19.
TNCD/PV.36, June 10, i960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 681.3^
29i
In reply, at the same meeting,Zorin pointed out that
Soviet forces on foreign soil would also be withdrawn,
and returned to his theme of the first meeting.
That we have an identical approach here is 
quite obvious, as is also the fact that 
identical conditions apply to all. Why this 
should give military advantage to anyone... 
is incomprehensible. ^
In opposing the Western proposal for an international
police force in 1960, the East professed the same doctrine
as it espoused at the test talks - that international
institutions without benefit of veto will be dominated by
the West or its hirelings, and are unfair.
Instead of national armies there would be 
created an international army, which would 
in fact be the army of one side directed 
against the other side.1*?
Western negotiators have always been dedicated to the 
ideas of fairness and balance, but at the surprise attack 
conference the Western experts favoured the overlapping but 
distinct idea of ’stability' even more strongly, since they 
were not seeking to recommend any change in the balance of 
forces. The East denied that inspection would lead to 
stability.
Ipf
Ibid., p. 687.45
Speech by Zorin, TNCD/PV.33, June 7> 1960, in Cmnd. 1152
p. 658.
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•..in view of the mistrust and suspicion 
among governments, the establishment of a 
control and inspection system,..without the 
parallel application of disarmament 
measures, cannot be otherwise regarded than 
as an attempt to take advantage of the 
control for purposes of reconnaissance....
In actual fact, a Power, learning in the 
course of such '’universal" control that it 
is bdhind its rival, and receiving definite 
military-technical information, would do 
everything in its power to catch up. And 
judging by the policy of the Western Powers 
this dangerous rivalry can only end in acatastrophe, h-6
A basic tactic of negotiators defending a first-step
proposal is to argue that their limited measure would have
such excellent military, political and psychological effects
that radical disarmament would become easier to achieve.
Coining a famous phrase Stassen declared to the 1955
Sub-Committee 'that the /Open Skie§7 proposal of the
President of the United States...is in fact the gateway to
I1.7the reduction of armaments'. 1 Sobolev was quick to ask: 
'Can we not define more closely precisely what measures for 
the reduction of armaments are envisaged...?' But the 
United States' answer did not appear until the comprehensive 
proposal, April 1956. was made. Usually powers maintain
bb
GEN/SA/FV.30, December 18, 1958, p. 40.
b?DC/SC.1/PV.?8, September 9, 1955, in Cmd. 9651, p. 811.
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a strong tactical position by having radical proposals 
available if necessary.
Gateways may be declared undesirable in themselves, of 
course; and it is common to argue that the more remote and 
disputable effects of plans are undesirable. Nutting 
argued that one of the Soviet’s separable measures in the 
plan of March 27, 1956 - providing for the exclusion of 
nuclear weapons from German soil - would tend to seal the 
division of Germany.
...proposals on European security are... 
inseparably linked with the reunification of Germany in freedom.
Perhaps the most daring of all suggestions that one 
measure might be the key to the whole disarmament problem 
because of its indirect effects was made by Jules Moch in 
1960 when he argued that the control of nuclear delivery 
vehicles was that key. He had begun to suggest as early 
as 1956 that the various nuclear controls would make the 
residual stocks of nuclear weapons which could not be 
controlled seem ’unnecessary in a world almost completely
L.Q .disarmed where confidence continued to grow*. y By 1960
¥3
DC/SC.1/PV.82, April 23, 1956, p. 3 8.
49DC/FV.55» July 10, 1956, p. 6.
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Moch* s argument had become that negotiators should agree 
to ban
the means of carrying these /nucleac7 
weapons - satellites, missiles, aircraft, 
aircraft carriers, submarines, launching 
ramps, etc. Once the vehicles have been 
banned and destroyed, the military stocks 
will appear worthless.5°
The Eastern delegates chose not to dispute this 
questionable analysis. They perceived the advantages of 
appearing to defer to French sensibilities by transferring 
the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles to the first 
stage in their revised general and complete disarmament 
plan of June 2, i960.
2. Means in Arms Control
Over-simplifying the true position, it might be said 
that the East wills the end while the West wills the means 
of disarmament. However the conflict over means was much 
more sharply focussed and usually more heated than the 
conflict over ends in the period under study. The two 
superpowers, and especially the United States, as we shall 
see, commit their ideologies emphatically to the continuing 
debate on the control of disarmament. The Soviet Union
TNCD/PV.1, March 15, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 11.50
295
declared in its proposal of May 10, 1955, and Soviet
negotiators frequently repeated, that
the necessary conditions for the institution 
of a control system which would enjoy the 
trust of all States...do not at present exist 
...Such a situation makes difficult the 
attainment of agreement regarding the 
admission by States to their enterprises... 
of foreign control officials...
While the political theories incorporated in this
proposal were far from clear, they seemed to imply that
mere agreement on comprehensive disarmament would bring
about sufficient trust for control of a first stage in
disarmament, but that political solutions would be
required to 1 create the necessary atmosphere of trust' for
51the second stage. The demand for political pre-conditions 
had been completely dropped by 1960, but the suspicion of 
foreign control officials continued. It was defended by 
emphasis on national sovereignty - a key part of Soviet 
ideology. The argument from sovereignty was employed in 
the struggle against wide powers for the Administrator and 
for unanimity of the original parties in important decisions 
of the control organization at the test talks. 'Legitimate 
(national) security interests' were often invoked to resist 
Western proposals for extensive control operations. We
T\
DC/SC.1/26/Rev. 2, May 10, 1955, in Cmd. 9636, p. 33-
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have discussed Soviet security anxieties aroused by 
Western surprise attack proposals in 1953.
The Soviet Union declares that the effects of control 
are more likely to be bad than good unless very carefully 
established; the United States, faithful to the principles 
of the 'open society1, argues that inspection is bound to 
be good.
We believe that on the day these two Powers 
decide to open up to each other and to lay 
bare their military potential, the security 
of the whole world will be increased. A 
climate of greater confidence will surelyprevail.52
Arguing the necessity of particular measures of 
control, the West appeals to facts. Western negotiators 
regularly deliver lectures on the control problems 
associated with the various disarmament problems, and move 
on to defend the quantity and type of inspection proposed 
in connection with particular problems. At the test talks 
the United States early in 1959 announced that it had 
revised its opinion of the reliability of the Geneva System 
as laid down by the Conference of Experts in detecting and 
identifying underground tests. Tabling the Report of the 
Berkner Panel on Seismic Improvement on June 12, 1959? the
52
Speech by Stassen. DC/SC.1/PV.68, October 7, 1955? in Cmd. 9652, p. 1011.
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U.S. delegation quoted the two most serious findings -
that there would be 1 ,500 rather than 20-100 unidentified
earthquakes in the world per annum under the Geneva
System, and that there were 'decoupling' techniques for
concealing underground tests
which could reduce the seismic signal by a 
factor of ten or more. Moreover, preliminary 
theoretical studies have shown that it is 
possible in principle to reduce the seismic 
signal from an explosion by a much greater 
factor than this.53
The United States used the Berkner findings' to
demand improvements in the Geneva System and also to defend
its proposal for a partial treaty in 1960.
The Soviets responded in two ways. Firstly,
Tsarapkin argued that:
We may be sure that there will never be any 
lack of new data...and we shall never reach 
a point where no more progress can be 
achieved either in the concealment of 
underground explosions or in their ascertain­
ment sind identification... .This is an endless 
process. The only purpose which can be 
served by insisting on it is to drag out 
negotiations endlessly...55
DNT/55, in Geneva Conference, p. 335*
54
The Berkner Report, dated March 3 1, 1959) is reprinted 
in Geneva Conference, p. 340.
GEN/DNT/FV.97) June 17, 1959, pp. 23-4.
Secondly, at the end of 1959? after agreeing to a
further expert inquiry into seismic detection, Soviet
experts concluded that the U.S. facts and theories were
56wrong.y
In 1960 both sides proceeded to attack the motives of 
the other1s experts. Wadsworth declared that the Soviet 
delegations views * seem to me to presuppose that science 
will always be the servant of politics and that objective
c>7facts must be subordinated to political aims*. ' At the
same meeting Tsarapkin accused Wadsworth of * casuistry1 on
the ground that 'the United States scientists came to the
Meetings with a quite obvious political purpose* - namely,
to prove * that...underground explosions should be deleted
*8from the treaty*.
The Soviet Union flatly opposed what we may call 
'political determinism* to Western 'technical determinism* 
on one question - the number of on-site inspections to 
investigate suspicious seismic events. We saw in Part Two 
Chapter 2 that the West in i960 proposed that the number
See Part Two, Chapter 2.
57GEN/DNT/PV.151, January 12, i960, p. 9.
should be a fixed percentage of unidentified suspicious
events. The East counter-proposed a fixed quota. Why?
The point here is that we must reach a 
sensible political compromise, because any 
attempt to deal with this question on 
purely technical lines would lead us down 
a blind alley.59
At the previous meeting Tsarapkin had explained that
1 this /WesterxJ principle for the despatch of inspection
teams would leave the door open to exaggeration, abuse and
6owould without doubt threaten the States concerned*.
Another variant of Soviet political determinism is 
that cooperation of parties which have signed an arms 
control treaty is inevitable. To discuss the problems 
which might be created by obstruction is ‘speculative and 
imaginary*.
You should not indulge in speculations, 
because what is important here is co-operation, 
and if there is no co-operation between the 
three nuclear Powers there simply will be no 
control organization.^
Again, arguing for a veto over on-site inspections:
In actual fact you do not really believe 
that...the Soviet Union, the United States 
or United Kingdom will carry out secret
Speech by Tsarapkin. GEN/DNT/PV.8*f, April 28, 1959, p. 11.
60
GEN/DNT/FV.83, April 27, 1959, p. 9.
GEN/DNT/FV.58, February 19, 1959, p. 22.
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nuclear explosions.•..The States that sign 
the treaty will honour it.62
However, the East was capable of devising pragmatic 
Western-style defences for its position concerning on-site 
inspection.
The very fact that investigations might 
be carried out in areas where instrument 
readings indicated events suspected to be 
nuclear explosions would restrain any States 
or individuals who wished to carry out 
explosions in violation of the obligations they had assumed.63
At the test conference the Western Two made occasional
efforts to demonstrate not only that their control proposals
were necessary, but that they would not upset Soviet
security. Upholding Western staffing proposals in February
1959* Wadsworth argued that:
...we are talking about some twenty to 
twenty-four control posts in the entire 
Soviet Union, and...a control post staff of 
thirty technical people....we can say that 
the total of foreign technicians in the 
Soviet Union would be well under 500 people.
It seems inconceivable to me that this 
group of people.,.which would be scattered 
in small units, often in isolated localities 
...could represent a threat to the security 
of a Great Power of 210 million people. Not 
only would these foreign technicians be 
working alongside Soviet technicians and a 
Soviet administrative staff which, taken 
together, would considerably outnumber them, 
but all of the resources of the Soviet State
62
GEN/DNT/FV.29, January 5, 1959, p. 14.
63GEN/DNT/PV.83, April 27, 1959, p. 5-
would be available to ensure that the 
activities of all personnel were in 
conformity with the treaty.64
However, Soviet delegates were never drawn into
discussing the size of any security threat found implicit
in Western proposals: such a threat either exists or does
not exist, depending on the proposal. This view emerged
clearly at the i960 negotiations when Zorin at the seventh
meeting attacked the Western proposal for 1inspectors...to
verify armed forces and armaments which are not subject to
6 *)reduction or abolition*. J Zorin had explained at the
second meeting that under the Soviet proposal *States will
supply information about their armed forces and
conventional armaments' in the first stage.^ Moch had
proposed calling the figure supplied *X*, and the figure
67 68remaining after reductions 'A', { Zorin set out to follow 
this terminology at the seventh meeting:
64
GEN/DNT/PV.11 9, August 4, 1959) p. 7• (Neither East nor 
West ever mentioned that the unprecedented social and pro­
fessional mingling of Eastern and Western experts would have 
given rise to unprecedented opportunities for mutual 
corruption.)
65TNCD/FV.7) March 2 3, i9 6 0, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 141.66TNCD/FV.2, March 1 6, i9 6 0, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 3 8.
6 7TNCD/FV.4, March 18, i9 6 0, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 6 6.68He got it wrong. Moch had spoken of 'putting a quantity 
X-A in store*.
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We will supply the X, and then verify /sic7 
what is to be deducted (the A).69 /Zorin 
must have meant that the inspectorate would 
do the verifyingJ
According to Zorin the West*s wish to verify forces 
remaining
can only be attributed to a desire to 
learn what those armed forces are, and 
that cannot be regarded as other than 
military intelligence or, to use a coarser word, spying.70
Moch objected at the next meeting that
we shall be entitled to verify the amounts 
removed, but...we shall have to rely on 
simple declarations of the amounts existing 
before the removal.71
Zorin was once again employing in a concealed fashion 
the assumptions made explicit at the test conference, that 
cooperation of the powers is inevitable, that states honour 
their treaties.
The argument over control in the years of the 
Sub-Committee (1955-7) had flowed mainly from Western 
attempts to elicit, and Eastern attempts to resist giving, 
detailed statements on control. In Section C we shall study 
the tactical implications of vagueness and clarity in
69
TNCD/PV.7, op. pit., in Cmnd 1152, p. 140.
7°Ibid. I p. 14|.
TNCD/FV.8, March 24, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 149.71
proposals. In this section we shall examine next a 
tactic employed in both offence against, and defence of, 
ends and means - the appeal to an authority.
3* The Appeal to Authority
The appeal to the views of various authorities with 
an £ priori claim to the attention of the opponent 
negotiator is a highly developed art. We shall consider 
five varieties of the appeal to authority - (1) appeal to 
the terms of reference set by the authority which 
established negotiations; (2) appeal to a more or less 
bjnding technical authority; (3) appeal to oneself and 
authorities on one's side; (4) appeal to neutral opinion; 
and, most important of all, (5) appeal to views of the 
opponent or his citizens and to his previous negotiating 
position.
(1 ) The chief establishing authority in the years 
under study was the General Assembly which first (in 1953) 
moved to establish the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament 
Commission and later passed resolutions annually which both 
expressed general hopes and issued directions with 
substantive implications in advance of detailed negotiations. 
Controversy about General Assembly resolutions was most keen 
in those two years of negotiation when the Assembly had
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previously passed resolutions agreed to by East and West,
but East and West appeared at the conference table with
sharply conflicting proposals - 1955 (early) and 1960,
However in 1955 the West relied more on an appeal to Soviet
policy in 1954 (when the Soviets accepted the Anglo-French
plan of June 11 as the ’basis' of agreement) than to the
text of Resolution 8o8 (IX) ^ 2 which called for the measures
contained in the Western plan of March 8 , 1955*
In 1960 the West defended its proposal by one
interpretation of General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV) of
November 20, 1959,^ and by an appeal to the Four-Power
7LCommunique of September 7» 1959» which in fact established
the Ten Nation Committee. The Soviet Union favoured
another interpretation of the resolution in question and
claimed that the communique was obsolete. On March 17 Moch
defended the Western search for a first stage agreement by
-• 75quoting a passage from the communique. y
The four Governments conceive of this 
committee as a useful means of exploring 
...such agreements...as may, in the first
72
A/2890, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. I, p. 441.
73A/RES/1378 (XIV), November 23, 1959, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 920.
7b
DC/144, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 906.
TNCD/PV.3, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 54.75
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instance, be of particular relevance to 
the countries participating in these 
deliberations, /deletions min§7
Zorin replied immediately.
Mr. Moch has made one mistake.••.on November 
20, 1959..«the Western Powers voted for the 
General Assembly resolution in which it is 
quite clearly stated which tasks...all the 
eighty-two Member States regard as the most 
important for the present stage of work...
He then quoted the resolution*. ^
The General Assembly.... considering that the 
question of general and complete disarmament 
is the most important one facing the world 
today,
1. Calls upon Governments to make every 
effort to achieve a constructive solution of 
this problem;
Moch counterquoted part of the conclusion of the
resolution,^ which states in full that the General Assembly:
3. Expresses the hope that measures leading 
towards the goal of general and complete 
disarmament under effective international 
control will be worked out in detail and 
agreed upon in the shortest possible time.
In 1958 the two expert conferences and the political
conference on tests were established by an exchange of
correspondence. Thus each side quoted itself rather than
any establishing authority in defending its proposals.
76
Ibid., p. 56. I have filled out this quotation.
77Ibid.. p. 58.
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(2) At only one conference has there been an agreed
technical foundation for political negotiations. The
Report of the Conference of Experts in August 1958 quickly
became and remained contentious at the Geneva Conference
on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests which began
in October of that year. The United States entered
negotiations committed to 'the actual establishment of an
international control system on the basis of the experts*
report',^ but as early as January 5, 1959 the U.S.
delegation tabled new data at variance with the experts'
79findings on seismic detection. Tsarapkin refused to agree
to a new technical group to discuss the data. He declared
that the experts' conclusions 'have been approved by the
three Governments...It would not further our work here to
revise those conclusions'.
The stage of technical study is behind us; 
our main test is to work out a political agreement...00
If it becomes necessary to obtain more 
precise scientific and technological data, 
that should be the task of the control organization.81
78Statement by President Eisenhower, August 22, 1958, in 
Geneva Conference, p. 310.
79U.S. Working Paper on New Seismic Data, DNT/25, in Geneva 
Conference, p. 331*
80
GEN/DNT/PY.31, January 7, 1959, p. 25.81
Ibid., p. 27.
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As we have seen, the Soviets did agree to discuss the 
new data in November 19595 but only in order to discredit 
it and vindicate their preferred authority, the Experts’ 
Report,
There were many disagreements at the test ban 
conference about the meaning of the Experts’ Report and of 
their debates which led to it. We shall consider one.
At the Conference of Experts the West had proposed 
permanent stand-by on-site inspection teams, while the East 
held out for special teams to be constituted for each 
occasion. The Experts’ Report merely stated (in Annex VII) 
that ’the international control organ can send ango
inspection group to the site’, if necessary. At the
political conference Tsarapkin claimed that permanent
teams ’had been considered and rejected’ by the Experts. ^
He pointed out that the Report had specified that ’the group
would be provided with equipment and apparatus appropriate
84to its task in each case’.
Wadsworth refused to be convinced:
$2
EXP/NUC/28.
83
GEN/DNT/FV.57, February 18, 1957, P- 21.
84
EXP/NUC/28.
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It was decided that a position would not 
be taken* We see nothing in the...report 
which points to a decision in favour of ad 
hoc working groups.“?
This issue was not resolved.
(3) The citing of oneself as authority is of course
natural and not just a way of emphasizing some point, but
also of indicating the continuity of one's view from year
to year. Thus the verbatim records are littered with
self-quotations often harking back several years, but also
with attacks on opponents for proposing ’nothing new* - that
is, nothing which was not opposed by the speaker's side in
the past. Explicit citing of one's own side's opinion may
lead to absurdity, as when Zorin declared in 1960
that an indication of the realism and feasibility 
of the Soviet disarmament programme is the 
readiness of the Soviet Union...to conclude a general disarmament treaty.86
(4) The appeal to neutral opinion is favoured most by 
the Soviet Union, which enjoyed close working cooperation 
on disarmament with the leading neutral, India, during the 
years under study. The Soviet delegate occasionally cited 
the disarmament provisions of the Bandung Conference
w ~GEN/DNT/PV.57, oß. £i£. , P- 21.
TNCD/PV.2, March 16, i960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 40.
86
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Communique of April 14, 1955^ in the 1955 Sub-Committee.^
In 1960 the Soviet delegate claimed the Support* of the
governments of India, Indonesia, Burma and Afghanistan
* for the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament
...testified to by...joint communiques’ published during
89Khrushchev’s recent Asian tour. x
(5) Appeals to the opponent as witness against his 
own proposal are of two basic types. They cite either 
(a) his previous suggestions or proposals, or (b) his 
current or past arguments. We may call the appeal to the 
opponent’s past proposals a demand for strategic stability.
The East has exploited this appeal most, especially in the 
years 1955-7 during which the West retreated increasingly 
from the radical proposals of 1954-5. In the 1956 
Sub-Committee Gromyko criticized the Western delegates because 
they
have tried to make out that their previous 
proposals on the question of levels were... 
tied to the solution of political problems.
He claimed *that no such conditions were put forward
previously*. He also reminded the Western powers
See Documents on Disarmament, vol. I, u. 455.
88
See, for example, DC/SC. 1/PV.44, May 3, 1955} in Cmd.
9650, p. 521.89TNCD/FV.1, March 15, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 20.
that they altered their position on the 
question of levels after the Soviet Union 
had accepted /on May 10, 19557 their qQproposal for the establishment of ceilings.
At the same meeting, Nutting quoted one sentence of
his maiden speech in the 1955 Sub-Committee to refute
Gromyko*s first criticism:
The process of disarmament and the building 
up of international confidence are inevitably 
interdependent.91
He did not dispute the second point.
However the West also quoted the Soviet Union*s major 
1955 proposal against it in 1956. Opposing the Soviet 
refusal to make agreement on low force levels conditional 
on political settlements, Moch cited the provisions of the 
Soviet plan of May 10, 1955 for easing tension.^ 2 The 
Western delegate also cited the May 10 plan in opposing 
separate agreement on conventional disarmament. Gromyko 
held that the British Foreign Minister Macmillan had 
suggested this approach at the Foreign Ministers’
90
Statement by Gromyko at the 86th Meeting, May *+, 1956. 
DC/SC. 1A8, in Cmd. 9770, pp. 58-9.
91Statement by Nutting. Ibid., p. 63.
92
Statement by Moch. Ibid., p. 62.
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Conference of November 1955«^
Macmillan had actually said:
I think it is clear that any,..preliminary 
agreement would have to concentrate 
principally, though not exclusively, on 
reductions in the size of armed forces and 
conventional armaments.,.94
The Soviet interpretation of this statement was clearly
tendentious, as Nutting pointed out.
At the test ban talks the East repeatedly pressed for
a quota of on-site inspections on the ground that:
This is a political question and must be 
approached from that a$gle, as was done by 
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 
when he was in Moscow.95
Macmillan had discussed the quota proposal with
Khrushchev early in 1959 9 and on the day before Tsarapkin’s
speech of April 28 Foreign Secretary Lloyd had explained
96it to the House of Commons. The West eventually adopted 
the British proposal formally, but the West*s negotiators
Statement by Gromyko at the 86th Meeting, May 4, 1956.
DC/SC. 1A 7, in Cmd. 9770, p. 50.94
Statement by Macmillan, November 10, 1955* in The Geneva 
Meeting of Foreign Ministers. October 27-November 16. 1955. 
Department of State Publications 61^6, December 1955* p. 198.
95
GEN/DNT/PV.84, April 28, 1959* p. 7-
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See extract from Lloyd*s speech in Documents on Disarmament, 
vol. II, p. 1400.
professed to base their figure for the number of
97inspections on technical criteria. '
The demand that the opponent make his proposal 
conform to the arguments and guiding principles declared 
unofficially by citizens of his side is possible only for 
the East in practice, since the Western negotiators seem 
unable or unwilling to identify unofficial Eastern opinion 
on military affairs and disarmament. Both sides quote 
official opinions of the other against the proposals of 
the other.
The East relies on Western expert opinion for much 
of the straightforward technical analysis it usee in 
negotiation. It scarcely ever cites its own experts on 
such questions as the characteristics and effects of atomic 
weapons, probably because there is so little declassified 
Eastern information available on technical military 
questions. However contentious opinions of Western experts 
on strategic matters are also frequently quoted. In i960, 
attacking the Western proposal for ‘unlimited control and 
gathering of information without the achievement of 
disarmament measures1 the Czech delegate quoted an article
97See Bart Two, Chapter 2
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by General Genevey (who was actually a member of the
gO
French delegation) in the Revue de Defense Nationale.
The quotation read in part:
.•.the aggressor...by taking the initiative 
...can be sure of reducing the counter-attack 
in advance to a very low level. In the war 
of tomorrow, for a nation which has no 
aggressive intentions, a prior exchange of 
information will be a factor not of security 
but of insecurity.99
Albert Wohlstetter*s famous article, *The Delicate 
Balance of Terror'1 (Foreign Affairs. January 1959)* was 
also quoted in i960 by the Bulgarian delegate to prove that 
foreign nuclear missile bases are inherently aggressive 
because of their 'potent ability for striking first by 
surprise* (Wohlstetter).^00
The most important official Western principle 
borrowed by the East in the years under study was Moch's 
famous slogan, 'No control without disarmament', which was 
used against Western proposals from 1956-60. Moch 
reissued it in i960:
We agree with the Soviet delegation that 
there should be no control without
9B
No. 11, 1957-
99TNCD/PV.6 , March 22, i960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 114.
100
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disarmament just as there should be no 
disarmament without control.101
At the sixth meeting of the Ten Nation Committee the 
Czech delegate quoted this statement against the Western 
proposals of March 1 8 , 1960.^^ In fact most Western 
proposals in the period 1955-60, leaving aside 'pure* 
inspection proposals, made elaborate provision for advance 
positioning of and preliminary inspection of forces and 
armaments by control personnel before disarmament, and 
often did not provide for force reductions at the first 
stage. Moch’s slogan, which was in any case originally 
directed against the U.S. Open Skies proposal, fitted 
Eastern requirements perfectly.
The West was as much if not more blessed in being 
able to use two celebrated Soviet statements of mid-1955 
on control. The Western delegates quoted them repeatedly, 
especially in 1955-6. On August 29, 1955 Nutting actually 
quoted Moch* s quotation of the Soviet doctrine announced 
on May 10, 1955 that
there are possibilities beyond the reach of 
international control for evading this 
control and for organising the clandestine 
manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons...
101TNCD/FV.lf, March 18, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 68. 
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TNCD/FV.6, March 22, i960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 11*f. 
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In the same intervention Nutting quoted the following
part of a speech by Marshall Bulganin to the Supreme Soviet
on August 4, which also achieved more fame of the wrong kind
than its author intended.
As the United States Presidently justly 
pointed out, /at the Summit Conference in 
July7 every disarmament plan boils down to 
the question of control and inspection.
This question is indeed very serious and we 
must find a solution to it which would be mutually acceptable.104
These two statements, particularly the first, 
undoubtedly eased (in the case of the United States) and 
accelerated (in the case of the United Kingdom and France) 
the fundamental changes which overtook Western arms control 
policy in and after 1955«
4. The Case Against the Ally
The strategic problems of allied cooperation were 
mentioned in Chapter 1. It was pointed out there that 
the Soviet Union negotiated either alone or with 
subservient allies in the period under study, but that 
the Western allies were in partial conflict at conferences 
in 1955-6. We shall study the expression of that conflict 
in negotiating tactics and also note some minor
104
Ibid.
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divergencies of 1957* French hostility to the test ban
and * extra-mural1 inter-allied conflict in general is
beyond the scope of this chapter on intra-mural tactics.
In the 1955 Sub-Committee Moch came closest to direct
criticism of the Open Skies plan in an intervention of
October during which he invoked his ’duty to be absolutely
frank’, and declared of the proposal that
some members of the Sub-Committee do not 
have a clear idea of its geographical scope 
and its evolution in time and have not 
understood whether it was - and, in 
particular, in what way it might eventually 
become - a prelude to effective disarmament. 5
Stassen’s defence against Moch (and Nutting) - if it
should be called that - was to gently deprecate ’pre-Geneva’
(summit conference) thinking and proposals in the
Sub-Committee.
Although the United States did make a comprehensive
1disarmament proposal in 1956, Moch was still not fully
satisfied. Of the U.S. proposal he said to the Sub-Committee:
I am very happy to see this rapprochement, 
even though I personally must make a 
reservation about certain points on which 
it differs from the Anglo-French plan1c>7 
Zi.e. March 19« 19567«.
TÖ5DC/SC.1/FV.68, October 7, 1955, in Cmd. 9652, p. 1007. 106
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Stassen took no position on the Anglo-French plan.
However the Western allies Joined together on May 4, 1956
to co-sponsor a ’Declaration1 of desirable ’measures’, which
was in fact little more than a summary of general principles
common to the two Western plans. The Declaration provided
for disarmament by stages, force reductions, the cut-off,
transfers, control and aerial reconnaissance, but it settled
1 oftnone of the specific differences between the two plans.
In 1957 the Western powers eschewed making formal
proposals individually to the Sub-Committee until the
British proposed registration and limitation of tests on
May 6^0<^  (with U.S. approval), and since the West did not
110begin making Joint formal proposals until July 2, the 
early months of the 1957 negotiations had some of the 
atmosphere of an academic seminar rather than partisan debate. 
However clear inter-allied difference appeared in the early 
months nevertheless. At the first meeting on March 18 
Stassen suggested that a comprehensive agreement should 
provide for *a first-step reduction in conventional 
armaments of 10 per cent of each major class’ of
755
DC/SC.1/46, in Cmd. 9770, p. 47.
109DC/SC. 1/56.
110
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111armament. He also proposed a ten per cent cut in 
budgets for a first twelve-month stage, citing the Soviet 
Union proposal for a percentage budget reduction of March 
27} 1956.112 Moch at the meeting of April 10, found it 
’illogical to speak of fixed levels for manpower /which was 
agreed doctrine among the Western Three for a first stage/ 
and of proportional reductions for armaments’. ^ ^ -
At the meeting of April 11 Noble, for the U.K., tabled 
a paper * on the relation of armaments to manpower*, which 
insisted on armament levels being determined by permitted
1 1 La.force levels and not by proportional reduction. In this 
paper the proposal for * standard manpower groups* was 
virtually identical with the American proposal of 1956 
whereby (for example) 1,000 men would entitle a power to 
one submarine or two bombers.11  ^ Under the British method 
powers would have complete freedom in determining the 
composition of their armaments within the limits imposed
_  _
DC/SC.1/FV.87, p. 18.
112
Ibid., p. 19.
113DC/SC.1/PV.100, April 10, 1957, p. 2k.
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DC/SC.1/53, April 11, 1957, in Cmnd. 333, p. 38.
115See discussion of April 1956.
by manpower levels. Explaining the United Kingdom’s
objection to Stassen’s proposal Noble said that a ten per
cent reduction of armament ’could not easily be carried
out by all of us at this table’.
However the maneuvering inside the Western camp was
not over, Stassen announced on 26 June after the recess
of the Sub-Committee that his government had noted ‘the
comments' of his Western colleagues, and he proposed yet
another method of reduction.
If...the Soviet Union will present its 
/comprehensive partial/ proposal of 30 April 
...in the form of...a specific list of 
armaments reductions which the Soviet Union 
is prepared to make in relation to the 
reduction of military forces to 2.5 million 
men, the United States will present in return 
a proposed list of armaments reductions which 
it would be prepared to make...
Stassen also proposed placing weapons in storage depots
whereas the West previously had always seemed to assume
117that armaments would be quickly destroyed. ' It was 
Stassen1s scheme which eventually found its way into the 
Western comprehensive partial plan of August 29, 1957*
116
DC/SC.1/PV.101, p. 4.
117DC/SC.1/PV.125, pp. 4-5.
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Although Stassen*s proposal for a ten per cent 
budget cut was not directly opposed by other Westerners, 
Moch*s finding of illogicality applied to it by 
implication, and it was dropped in the final Western offer. 
In 1960 no significant differences were allowed to
appear among the Western allies. Moch*s plea on behalf of
118France for special control over nuclear delivery vehicles 
was never made into a formal French proposal or even a 
specific suggestion. Neither of the two Western plans of 
1960 provided for reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles 
during a first, detachable stage.
SECTION B. TONE AND EMPHASIS
So far we have been studying the structure of 
rational argument used by negotiators. The Hone* of a 
negotiation is inevitably determined in part by which 
arguments negotiators choose. (There are *hard* and * soft* 
arguments as well as positions; the distinction is well 
understood by Soviet negotiators.) However in this 
section we shall be exclusively interested in tone 
deliberately created by the manner in which arguments and 
proposals are presented. (Of course chance and personal
ITS
TNCD/PV.1, March 15, i960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 11.
factors, especially on the Western side, also play a part 
in creating tone.) We shall also examine the significance 
of emphasis through repetition, insistence and persistence.
Tone is deliberately created by what we shall call 
the ’orientation* of a nation’s tactics. A nation’s tactics 
in negotiation can in principle be ’placed* on each of the 
following spectra: (1) flexible - intransigent; (2) 
amicable - hostile; and (3) optimistic (’accentuating the 
positive') - pessimistic (’accentuating the negative').
The tone of a negotiation is the resultant of the 
orientations of the participants. The methods of 
classification will be briefly explained and discussed in 
turn.
It should be said immediately that it cannot be 
simply inferred from the orientation of a nation's tactics 
whether it ’desires agreement* or not. Whatever the 
negotiating stance, pressures of some kind for agreement 
will be set up - directly or indirectly - in the opponent's 
camp. For example intransigence may persuade the opponent 
to make his concessions where flexibility would not. We 
cannot even - except by benefit of hindsight - infer from 
a nation's stance what its next move is likely to be. For 
example tactical intransigence may be combined with 
strategic flexibility. This description fits Soviet
negotiating behaviour from February to May, 1955. On the 
other hand the West usually advertises its strategic 
flexibility by ’thinking aloud* well in advance of actual 
policy changes, Moch*s interventions late in the 1955 
Sub-Committee come to mind, as well as British activity to 
promote the idea of on-site inspection quotas at the test 
talks,
(1) Tactical flexibility is defined as a negotiating 
stance which professes readiness to find and help enlarge 
areas of agreement. It puts forward its proposals 
tentatively and rejects the opponent*s proposals 
constructively. In the 1956 Sub-Committee Stassen*s 
position on his own proposals was a paradigm of flexibility. 
April 9t 1956 was put forward, according to a note in the 
text itself, as *not binding upon any one of the five 
Governments *. Manpower levels given in the plan were 
*for illustrative purposes only*. Introducing a further
1 IQSummary Memorandum 7 on May 3, Stassen said it was *not
intended to indicate any change' in Ü.S. policy.
Rather it is to be regarded as a further 
indication that the United States Government 
is not rigid in its attitude,...For example, 
the summary memorandum...makes no reference 
to a preliminary armaments regulation
Ti9
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commission. That does not mean that we 
do not continue to think that some 
preliminary organisation might be advisable.
It does mean, however, that we do not have rigid ideas. «20
Stassen*s attitude was so flexible as to render U.S. 
policy nebulous. While the tactical flexibility of France 
represented by Moch did not lead to all the strategic 
changes hinted at, it may be said that Soviet tactical 
flexibility was routine and perfunctory in the years under 
study. As mentioned before, Soviet policy decisions seem 
to have been taken in Moscow and often kept secret from 
Soviet negotiators until publicly announced.
Intransigent adherence to one’s proposal is expressed 
by declaring that one has made a ’final' or 'maximum' offer 
on a point, or that one's plan is the only basis for 
agreement and must be agreed to toto. Intransigence is 
intensified by repetition of these formulae, and of 
arguments in support of the plan. (Repeated resubmission 
of a plan also enhances intransigence.) We shall consider 
some examples.
The original Western staffing plan at the test ban 
conference proposed that there be only a few 'observers' 
from the host country at control posts. Wadsworth put
120
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forward the plan
tentatively...this is a question which in 
a working draft form we would be willing 
to discuss at considerable length in order 
to arrive at an adjustment...121
However,when the West agreed to one third of the
staffs being host country nationals on July 17, 1959,
Wadsworth declared that
it must be understood that this is our final 
offer on control post staffs and that we can make no further concessions. 122
Tsarapkin also became intransigent after several Soviet 
concessions.
Having agreed that one third of the staff 
...may be foreign we have now reached our limit.123
Nevertheless both sides moved further together. (They
were agreed that one third should be Ü.S. or U.K. nationals
and one third Soviet nationals.) In December 1959 the
Soviets proposed that the 1 third third* be itself divided
i?4into thirds - neutral, Western and Eastern. The West 
did not accept the Eastern division of the third third, but
121
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its staffing proposal of May 9* 1960 required the 
Administrator to appoint the third third of the staff 
in 1 such proportions that the legitimate interests of the 
Parties.,.including the original parties, will not be 
prejudiced1.  ^^
The remaining distance between Eastern and Western
positions on this issue was never bridged.
The other face of intransigence is emphatic rejection
of the opponent’s proposals. In the previous section we
noticed that the Soviet tactical intransigence of February-
May 195? proved misleading. However it was effective in
one instance. Malik declared on March 30 that the West’s
proposal of March 8 to ’relegate* the prohibition of atomic
weapons to a ’final, remote and unspecified stage’ was
’unacceptable’ - a ’pernicious residuum of the ”Baruch Plan”
1 oA/which/ must be removed’. This argument was often repeated. 
On April 19? bowing to this pressure, the West proposed the 
’75 per cent arrangement’ whereby prohibition of use and 
elimination of nuclear weapons were to begin not after 
conventional reductions had been completed, but 
simultaneously with the beginning of the final quarter of
125DNT/89.
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armament and force reductions.
The West in general was less tactically intransigent
than the East in the period under study; its stance was
also less consistent, not only because of inter-allied
differences and because the personalities of Western
negotiators were more in evidence, but because neither
collectively nor individually, except on rare occasion, do
the Western negotiators seem to have adopted any stance
deliberately. For example Eaton in 1960 wavered between
a flexible negotiating stance and outspoken denunciations
of Soviet policy. On April 5 he attacked the ‘total
unreality* of the Soviet plan, but immediately went on -
I hope my remarks will not be treated as 
destructive criticism. My intentions are 
...to point out some of the major differences 
which exist...127
There is little evidence that tactical intransigence 
is either (a) believed in or (b) effective in persuading 
opponents. However it is clearly useful, as we saw in the 
test ban example, in signalling one*s approach to one*s 
final offer. For tactical intransigence to become 
convincing, its practitioner would have to establish a 
reputation for sincerity - for example by assigning a
TNCD/FV.16, April 5, 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, pp. 292-3
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time limit to his offers and refusing to negotiate 
thereafter. Of course even if the opponent can he 
convinced that a final offer has been made the chances of 
agreement will not necessarily improve.
(2) Direct expression of hostility to the opponent
is quite rare even though some criticisms and some examples 
of intransigence imply it strongly. Hostility becomes 
explicit in such tactics as impugning sincerity, discovering 
unworthy motives behind a proposal - for example propaganda, 
espionage or deliberate attempt to gain •advantages1 «- and 
attributing blame for the failure to agree; • Amicable 
tactics are even rarer than hostile tactics except at the 
beginning of negotiations, or in a period of carefully 
cultivated detente such as followed the summit conference 
of 1955. Amicable tactics consist of congratulating the 
opponent for shunning propaganda, or for the uprightness 
of the motives behind his proposal.
(3) Optimism about the proppects for agreement appears 
either baselessly - again, usually at the beginning of 
negotiation - or on a reasoned basis of agreements noted 
and emphasized. However the decision whether to add up 
agreements or disagreements is always really arbitrary,
and usually expresses a deliberately chosen tactical 
orientation, especially on the Eastern side. Pessimism of
course is never permitted to appear without good reasons 
given,and, although emphasizing of disagreements need not 
lead to denunciation, it usually does.
The Soviet Union* s negotiators use optimism and 
pessimism as a deliberate tactic, and are capable of 
sustaining the one or the other for many meetings together. 
On April 8, i960 the Soviet delegate tabled a document 
entitled "Basic Principles of General and Complete 
Disarmament”. It was submitted in order *to define a 
possible common basis for our further work*, and for 
several meetings the Soviet delegate stressed the alleged 
1 rapprochement* which had taken place, and which the
* principles* were meant to confirm. There had been
agreement on the goal (*set by life itself1) of general
and complete disarmament, on the * special importance* of
nuclear rocket disarmament, on the need for radical
conventional disarmament, x on the need for stages, and 
129so on. ' The list was not impressive, and the West would 
not be induced to share Soviet optimism or agree to the
* principles*, which Moch chose to regard as old proposals 
in new disguise.1-^0
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Soviet pessimism tended to appear towards the end
of negotiations - notably in 1957 and i960. It was then
coupled with both hostility and intransigence as I have
defined them, and was used to justify breaking off
negotiation in i960. Both in 1957 and i960 the turn to
calculated hostility predated major Western proposals -
August 29. 1957 and June 27. 1960. respectively. On August
27, 1957 Zorin read a Soviet Government Statement into the
Sub-Committee record which declared that there had been no
progress in negotiation, that the West was accelerating
the arms race, that NATO was increasingly aggressive, and
1 ^1that the talks were a 1 cover* for Western misbehaviour. J
The statement went on to vindicate Soviet policy and
1 *}2attacked Western proposals in detail. J A similar
statement was read by Zorin on June 27, 1960 before Eaton
1 ^could table the new United States proposal.
(Deliberatelyheating up the propaganda cold war towards 
the end of a negotiation which is clearly not going to 
succeed must seem natural to Soviet policy makers, but the 
device was also used sporadically in the test talks by both
W ~
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sides. The American State Department, for example, in a 
press release of February 3? 1959? strongly attacked the 
Soviet proposals of January 30^** for extensive use of the 
veto by original parties in the control organization as 
making 'a shambles1 of the whole project of control.
SECTION C. THE APPEAL FOR CLARITY : THE USES OF VAGUENESS
Vagueness of proposals may be desirable from the 
viewpoint of obtaining agreement for two reasons.
Excessive detail would clog the work of negotiators 
attempting to isolate areas of possible agreement, and 
some issues must be left to the control organization and 
to future negotiation and adjustment between the parties. w 
However, the vagueness of a proposal may be inadvertent.
The U.S. delegate to the test talks, Popper, has 
already been quoted in Part Two for his reference to 
'problems of whose existence we were originally only 
dimly aware'. ~ ( We shall be chiefly interested in
rF
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vagueness which is intentional and contentious - that is, 
which the proponent was probably aware of when he 
formulated his plan, and which the opponent seeks to have 
removed*
Vagueness of commitment arises not only in connection 
with one’s current plans, but from avoiding a clear 
statement of position on one’s own past plans and also 
from resisting the opponent’s demand for an explicit 
response to his own current plans. This section also deals 
with contentious vagueness which is a result not of a 
proposal but of military secrecy which makes the effect of 
a proposal unclear.
First we shall mention vagueness which is not due to 
lack of detail but to (alleged) ambiguity in proposals. 
Negotiators, especially Westerners, are fond of adumbrating 
multiple alternative hypotheses about the meaning of the 
opponent’s plans. In 1955 Moch and Nutting frequently 
wondered aloud what the Soviet political proposals of May 
10 implied. Sobolev merely replied that the Draft 
Declaration in which they appeared was 'still valid'.
The demand for detail or precision is accompanied by 
a polite threat - explicit or implicit - not to agree to 
the opponent’s wording because of the offending vagueness.
DC/SC.1/FV.62, September 19, 1955  ^ in Cmd. 9&52, P» 883«
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At the test talks, Tsarapkin refused to agree to the
Western draft of an article providing for establishment
in parties1 territory of ‘the necessary elements of the
detection and indentification system*. The Soviet draft
provided for ’an agreed number of control posts1.
In 1956 the Anglo-French plan, March 19. made no
specific proposal on force levels. Gromyko enquired
•whether the former proposal /of March 29, 19557...is still 
14oin force*. At the next meeting Nutting replied that
1 41force levels were ‘subject to negotiation*, and later 
he said they were *a detail*, not to be settled before 
there was agreement on the ‘principle* of a three stage 
plan. (In logic, any specific proposal for a time 
limit or a force level, etc. is a ‘detail*, but some 
details are more detailed than others; Nutting*s was a 
remarkable claim.)
Whereas the West tends to be non-committal on ends 
the Soviets incline to regard means - control - as a matter 
of detail. Western delegates in 1955 repeatedly asked
139GEN/DNT/PV.33, January 9, 1959, p. 16.140
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questions about the meaning of the passage in the Soviet 
proposal of March 18, 1955 which provided for the control 
organ to possess
3 u3
its own staff of inspectors having, within 
the bounds of the control function they 
exercise, unimpeded access to all objects 
of control.143
Malik invited the West to devise a formula to
establish which objects should be subject to control.
Are we to include everything from private apartments to atomic undertakings?»44
Moch improvised a formula concerning the number of
kilowatts used by an ‘establishment’. J Later in the year
the British delegation tabled a Memorandum on ‘methods,
146objects and rights of inspection*, but Sobolev made no 
response except to ask whether the memorandum was meant to 
apply to radical proposals like those of March 8 and May 10. 
Nutting said it was.1^
DC/SC.1/19/Rev. 1, in Cmd. 9636, p, 26. This plan was 
the precursor of May 10, 1955.
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Only the West seeks to elicit secret military 
information from the opponent. In March 1955 Moch asked 
Gromyko
whether...he would be good enough to tell 
us what figures would result for the Soviet and Chinese forces from the one-third cut.148
Gromyko refused, but promised that:
In the event of agreement being reached... 
all the states concerned will have to 
furnish the necessary information.149
Wadsworth at the same meeting felt ‘slightly sarcastic1
about Gromyko1s demand for a specific timing proposal from
the West, He likened the demand to the question -
...how long will it take to get from here 
to there? -
150with the location of ‘here* and ‘there1 being unknown. '
That is, the West would withhold a specific timing 
proposal until the Soviets revealed their current force 
level. Wadsworth also declared that 1 if Mr. Gromyko will 
not tell us what effect his proposal would have on the 
forces of the Soviet Union, I fail to see how he can ask us 
to agree to it1. ' Threats and retorts of this kind can and
1^ 9Ibid., p. 217*15oIbid., p. 197* 
i 5 i ^Ibid., p. 216.
148DC/SC.1/PV.32, March 23,
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do become a vicious circle. The Soviets did not in fact 
publicize figures on their force level until January 1960.^^
Criticizing the vagueness of the commitment of the 
opponent to his own past plans is an amicable version of 
the demand for strategic stability. Malik spent the closing 
weeks of the 1955 Sub-Committee chiefly in eliciting a 
response to the question: 'Do the Western powers still abide 
by their radical proposals?1 All the Western delegates 
except Stassen declared that they did. Stassen refused to 
go beyond his celebrated 'reservation* of 'pre-Geneva 
positions' on September 6.
...we are not disavowing any of them.
But...we do not now reaffirm them.153
The first and basic reply to the demand for a response 
to an opponent's proposal is to say that you are still 
studying it. (To some extent, delaying a response while 
'study* continues conveys an image of flexibility and 
care, and such delay may be genuine. Delay may also have 
an 'ulterior* motive. The opportune time to attack an 
unacceptable proposal is not immediately but when it has 
lost some of its original appeal. Thus the Soviet Union 
did not reject the Open Skies plan in 1955? but when the
V?2 ~
See Table 1.
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Western delegations appeared with similar ideas at the 
surprise attack conference of 1958 the Eastern rejection 
was immediate and emphatic.)
SECTION D. THE PROCEDURAL STRUGGLE
The question of procedure gives rise to a tactical 
struggle in so far as the sides attempt to control each 
other*s negotiating behaviour. The struggle may be 
limited but cannot be abolished by agreement on agenda and 
method of discussion, for substantive conflicts tend 
strongly to manifest themselves in procedural disagreements.
Except in the 1957 Sub-Committee there was no explicit 
agreement on agenda and method of work at general 
disarmament talks. It was agreed, however, that 
negotiations should be ‘confidential*. The meaning of this 
in practice varied much from year to year. Its ’minimum* 
meaning was that the press would not be admitted to 
meetings. Its ‘maximum* meaning was that the secrecy of 
information and views conveyed at purely private meetings 
(i.e. those held without benefit of verbatim record) would 
be preserved. This situation is best explained by tracing 
the origins of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament 
Commission and the history of the secrecy rule.
The Disarmament Commission has always held its
debates in public, A General Assembly resolution of
November 1953 ‘suggested* that the Disarmament Commission
study the desirability of establishing 
a sub-committee of the Powers principally 
involved* which should seek in private an 
acceptable solution and report to the 
Disarmament Commission as soon as possible. '
The Sub-Committee was duly established by the Disarmament
Commission in April 19^ +-* The procedure agreed to by the
five Sub-Committee powers in 195^ + was reaffirmed in 1955*
Dr. Protitch, the Representative of the Secretary-General,
reminded delegates of it at the first meeting of 1955. It
had been agreed
that there should be no specific rules of 
procedure but that all decisions of the 
Sub-Committee should be taken by general 
and unanimous agreement...Zand7 that the 
meetings should be strictly closed and 
private, with the possibility that 
occasionally the representatives of the 
Sub-Committee might meet even without a 
record being made by the Secretariat....
In the past no press information has been  ^
given except through the official communique.
Although 'It was so decided1 appears in the verbatim
1 56record, y Gromyko immediately made the following qualification:
Resolution 715 (VIII), A/2630, November 28, 1953* The 
vote was 54-0-5; the Soviet Union abstained.
155DC/SC.1/PV.22, February 25, 1955> in Cmd. 9648, p. 2.
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It sometimes happens that during the 
discussions on a particular question 
information about the Soviet Union*s 
position...leaks out to the press; and 
its position is often considerably 
misrepresented and described without 
objectivity....That being so we reserve 
the right to issue appropriate explanations 
to the press if need arises.157
The Western delegations promised not to indulge in
1 leaks*, expressed mild disapproval of the Soviet statement,
but acquiesced in it. J It was always understood that
verbatim records and proposals would be released in time
for the General Assembly debates towards the end of the
year, but it was not understood that proposals would be
released as they were made.^^ The Soviets broke with
convention, according to the West, when reports of the
Soviet proposal of February 25, 1955 appeared in various
1 AnCommunist newspapers. Mr. Gromyko denied that his 
delegation had leaked anything, and argued that the reports 
did not in any case contain matter not already publicized 
in a Soviet Government declaration of February 18. In
See U.K. delegate's statement, ibid.. p. 3«
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point of fact, the Western delegations themselves were
known to be continuing to support the Anglo-French
1proposal of June 11, 19* +5. Moreover, the three new 
Western proposals introduced and widely publicized at the 
Summit Conference in July were all taken up in the 
Sub-Committee in August. The U.S. proposal, in particular, 
was promulgated very emphatically outside the 
Sub-Committee during negotiations.
Thus then* secrecy* which the sides had agreed to was 
a relative thing - a temporary, but annually renewable 
moratorium on using disarmament negotiations for propaganda 
- and when the Soviets eroded it the West felt unable to 
use sanctions stronger than complaint. The Soviets incurred 
disapproval again when they released, during Sub-Committee 
sessions, the entire text of their plan of May 10, 1955» 
which had not been foreshadowed outside the Sub-Committee 
at a l l . M o c h  declared that the Soviet decision to 
publish ’signified nothing less than the decline of the
162
DC/SC.1/9. 
163Except by the Soviet draft General Assembly resolution of 
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Sub-Committee1; but the Western delegations again
164eschewed sanctions.
The secrecy rule was not an issue in the 1956
Sub-Committee; the Western powers had come to accept the
impossibility of keeping new proposals completely secret
or preventing delegations commenting to the press about
the progress and course of the negotiations - whether 1 out
of the blue* or in retaliation for another delegations
doing so. However even this degree of breach of secrecy
apparently did not satisfy the Soviets in 1957* In the
closing days of the Sub-Committee Zorin declared that
the Western Powers have compelled the 
Sub-Committee to work secretly, in 
private, with the result that public opinion 
has been kept in ignorance, and has on many 
occasions been completely misinformed about 
the true state of affairs in the Sub-Committee.
This situation apparently suits the ruling 
groups of the Western Powers. It enables them 
to use the secrecy of the Sub-Committee^ work 
as a pretext for evading direct answers to 
questions about the progress of the talks 
raised in parliament and by the Press, and to 
make out that serious talks are taking place, 
whereas in actual fact the talks are making 
no progress.165
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Despite this statement, and the campaign for open 
negotiations in an enlarged Disarmament Commission which 
it heralded, the Soviets entered yet another confidential 
negotiation - to ban nuclear tests - in 1958, and even the 
general disarmament negotiations of i960 were permitted to 
be conducted under the old rules. There was no controversy 
on secrecy early or late in the Ten Nation talks. The 
impact of fully confidential negotiation on tactics will 
be discussed in the next chapter. The theory underlying 
the Soviet belief in open negotiation is taken up in Part 
Four, Chapter 1 concerning disarmament propaganda.
Conflicts, or rather complaints, concerning method 
and order of discussion occurred throughout the period 
under study. In 1955-8 Western delegates complained 
frequently about lack of method in negotiation. In April, 
1955 Moch was
not certain that our procedure of flitting 
from subject to subject is very logical....
However I am not sure that we shall alter our methods. 186
Wadsworth agreed on the first point.
...if...we could...take up one subject and 
exhaust it, and then move in an orderly way 
to another subject...we would not have either 
to revert...to what I have termed distortions
DC/SC.1/FV.40, April 6, 1955, in Cmd. 9649, p. 405
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of what we say...or to ask over and over 
again for the answer to a question which . 
has already been answered categorically.1°7
Late in the 1955 Sub-Committee Moch proposed several
times that the method of seriatim discussion of issues be
employed to build an agreed * 1synthesis1 from the
conflicting proposals. In 1956, having made a synthetic
proposal (March 19. 1956) which was not acceptable to the
Soviet Union, Moch suggested that the Sub-Committee try
the method 1 of reaching agreement on each point by itself,
subject...to final agreement on the whole' - that is,
governments could reject what their negotiators had 
168accomplished. Gromyko declined to follow the suggestion 
on the ground that the question of comprehensive (Western) 
as against conventional (Soviet) disarmament 'is not simply 
a procedural o n e O ^
However in 1957 the Soviet view changed. At the 
opening Sub-Committee session the British Foreign Secretary 
Lloyd, suggested
that when the opening discussions are over 
the Sub-Committee might profitably consider 
whether it would be possible to investigate
Ibid., p. ^07.
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each of the important aspects of a 
disarmament agreement in turn* This 
might be done without rigidly insisting 
at the outset on the manner in which 
particular issues under examination would, 
if agreement were reached, eventually be 
fitted into the framework of a disarmament 
treaty.170
This method required rather less commitment of
governments during examination of the issues than Moch*s
suggestion. At the 88th meeting Zorin agreed to it,
provided that the year’s discussions began with ’an exchange
of views on the general problems of disarmament’.
Then, when some progress has been made in 
our discussions on important matters, our 
work could become even more detailed, and 
concrete proposals could be worked out for.. 7. 
subsequent incorporation in our agreement. (
The Western delegates acquiesced reluctantly in Zorin’s
first suggestion, and general debate continued for several
meetings. At the 92nd meeting Moch proposed discussion of
seven particular items to be considered in turn, beginning
with conventional disarmament, because ’this is obviously
172the item on which agreement would most easily be achieved'. f 
Zorin, speaking for the Soviet Union which was pressing for
170DC/SC.1/PV.87, March 18, 1957, P- 9.
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1 l'Kseparate agreement on tests, wanted the test ban 
discussed first rather than fourth because * this problem 
is stirring up feeling® and ®is the simplest of all* 
Negotiations on the test ban had begun. The West continued 
to resist Zorin*s procedure at the 92nd meeting, and at 
the 93rd meeting this exchange took places
Moch; ...if we do not accept his point of view, 
does Mr. Zorin intend that his delegation 
should withdraw and that we should end 
this session?
Zorins...I explained that the Western delegations 
sdemed to me to wish to end our discussion 
of the question whether we should or should 
not examine the problem of tests. I did 
say that it would be lamentable if that 
were so; that is, if we suspended discussion 
of that problem as a result of the position 
the Western delegations have taken.>75
Moch had virtually invited Zorin to make a threat, and 
Zorin had very nearly made one. Stassen, chairman for the 
day, recessed the meeting in order that delegates might 
decide *whether we shall adjourn until tomorrow*.1^  
Resuming the meeting 35 minutes later, Stassen spoke up to
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Suggest* a solution of the agenda crisis, which put
nuclear tests first. After the test item came:
second, conventional disarmament; third 
international control organization; fourth, 
nuclear disarmament; fifth, missiles; 
sixth, zones of armament limitation and 
inspection; seventh, other disarmament matters. ''
Zorin, however, refusing to follow the British
delegate's plea not to 'look a gift horse in the mouth*
succeeded in holding the West to a promise made at the
previous meeting that nuclear disarmament would be
discussed before the control organization.^^
Subject-by-subject discussion was interrupted by
discussion of the Soviet partial disarmament plan of
April 30 and resumed again after the recess of May 16-27*
with the West injecting the constituent elements of its
ultimate comprehensive proposal piecemeal, and the Soviet
Union making its first proposal for a controlled test ban
on June 1V. The formal Western comprehensive partial
proposal was not tabled until August 29.
Both the test conference of October 31, 1958 and the
surprise attack conference of November 10, 1958 attempted
to adopt an agenda, but both failed to register agreement
177Ibid.,
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and proceeded without agenda. However, although no 
agenda was adopted at the test conference a rational 
method of work did evolve. This cannot be said of the 
surprise attack conference.
At the first meeting of the test conference Tsarapkin 
tabled a draft treaty which was to be discussed and agreed 
immediately. It provided for an immediate end to tests.
The control system was to be agreed later, and
1 Qaseparately. The West proposed (in the words of
Ormsby-Gore) ’that our first substantive item should be
examination of the requirements for a control 
181organization*. ' Without waiting for agreement on an
1 ft?agenda, the West tabled working papers on control.
Finally, on November 29, the Soviet Union capitulated by 
agreeing ’that the basic provisions regarding control should 
be embodied in the actual text of the agreement*.
At the second meeting of the surprise attack 
conference Foster submitted a ‘Plan of Work* providing for
THo
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study of 'the objects of control', the 'means of control',
'the application of inspection and observation techniques
to the problem of surprise attack', and 'general technical
characteristics of systems to reduce the threat of surprise 
18b.attack*. Kuznetsov proposed 'adoption of the following 
agenda':
1. Exchange of opinions on practical steps 
that can be taken now with a view to preventing 
the danger of a surprise attack and on partial 
measures to be carried out in conjunction with 
those steps.
2. Consideration of the tasks of ground 
control posts and aerial photography.
3. Preparation of the experts' report to... 
governments...185
This time there was no relenting on either side; the 
conflict over agenda neatly reflected a policy divergence 
more fundamental than the one revealed early in the tests 
conference.
The method of work adopted almost de facto at the 
test conference was for both sides to submit draft articles 
which would be rejected, amended, or agreed to by the other. 
Throughout 1959-60 both sides refrained from submitting a
T84
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draft treaty and slowly built up a substantial part of
186an agreement by the method of accretion.
In 1960, although the Western powers made a
three-stage radical general disarmament proposal on March
16,^7 the burden of all their procedural suggestions was
as stated by Eaton at the first meeting.
Our most urgent task is...to sort out, to 
define and to agree on those initial steps 
which will bring increased security to each 
nation.♦..When these first steps have been 
agreed, we should then proceed to design those 
final measures necessary to attain the 
ultimate goal.188 Zi.e. general and complete 
disarmament/
The East insisted that the Committee agree first 'in
189principle' on general and complete disarmament. y At the 
fourteenth meeting the Bulgarian delegate objected to 'the 
fact that each weekend we are asked to consider a measure 
in the Western plan, as though we were concerned with one 
measure only'.  ^^ 0
186
The Western Two submitted their first draft treaty for 
banning tests on April 18, 1961. See Geneva Conference, 
p. 475.
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1 91At intervals 7 Eaton listed the steps proposed in
the Western first stage as being suitable for immediate
agreement, but the West did not make formal proposals for
partial disarmament in 1960. Zorin refused to adopt a
192method which would 1 divert us* from * the basic task1 7
(general and complete disarmament).
Western patience began to wear thin towards the
recess for the planned summit conference, Moch declared
that if a mutually acceptable solution is 
the Soviet solution accepted with hands and 
feet tied, then it seems to me pointless to 
continue these negotiations,193
These were stronger words than he had provoked Zorin to
use in 1957 during the incident discussed above, but it was
the Soviet delegation which walked out - without notice -
in 1960.
The West consistently in our period sought to 
establish joint technical expert discussions of various 
kinds in parallel with political negotiations on 
comprehensive disarmament. The East never agreed. The two 
expert conferences which did meet were established by 
correspondence in 1958. However, we shaHstudy some of
T91
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the Western suggestions and the rationale of Soviet 
rejection.
Although expert talks were suggested several times 
in 1955-6 it was not until 1957 that the West made a 
concentrated effort to involve the Soviet Union in such 
discussion. It was this effort which bore fruit in 1958.
At the first meeting of the 1957 Sub-Committee Lloyd 
suggested forming technical working groups1 to investigate 
in greater detail any issues we might refer to them*, while 
the Sub-Committee continued ‘its consideration of matters 
of principle*. On July 17 Lloyd recalled that various 
Western delegates in the preceding months had proposed 
particular working groups on control of fissionable materials 
production, the relation of conventional armaments to 
manpower and the definition of manpower. He also recalled
1 Q«5the Western proposal of July 2 77 for a group to study a
196control system for the test ban. 7 Finally he suggested a 
technical examination of ground and aerial inspection to 
guard against surprise attack. ^ 7
DC/SC.1/FV.87, March 1 8 , 1957, p. 10.
195
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196Lloyd mentioned * the composition, the powers and the voting 
procedures of the international /control7 commission1 as
* 8.‘matters of technical detail'!
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Zorin responded at the next meeting. After surveying
the disagreements visible in the Sub-Committee he
declared ’that the basic problems before us are
unfortunately still unsettled1.
Can such working groups help us to reach 
agreement on these problems?....I cannot help 
wondering whether Mr. Lloyd’s proposal is not 
intended as a response to the continuously 
increasing pressure of public opinion, which 
is calling upon us, not to create an illusion 
of progress, but to come to a genuine agreement 
on the major questions of a partial disarmament agreement.198
However, Zorin went on to say that the Soviet 
delegation ‘will also be ready to discuss the technical 
details of these problems in working committees, as soon 
as we have achieved genuine agreement on all these 
problems’. y7
In fact the Soviet Union agreed to expert talks on 
test ban control before ’genuine agreement’ was reached on 
the questions of principle, but the West’s position on the 
test ban had evolved even further under Soviet pressure by 
that time (July, 1958). It seems to be a basic Soviet tactic 
to use the promise of joining in expert talks (that is, also 
the threat of not joining in) as a lever to force the West
198
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to change its positions of principle. Except at the
political test ban talks (which were, in any case, far
more technical than any other political negotiation of the
period) the Soviets have never consented to join in expert
talks while political talks were proceeding. (Of the two
sets of expert talks which they did join, one - the Experts*
Conference - seemed likely to promote an evolution of
Western policy, while the other - on surprise attack - they
treated virtually as a conventional political negotiation.)
On the other hand the West, in 1958? encouraged the Soviets
to join in technical discussions by seeming to suggest that
expert talks would make compromise decisions of principle
200easier for the West to take.
Western proposals for supplementary expert talks and 
the results of them at the test conference itself were 
mentioned in Part Two, Chapter 2. It is worth remarking 
here that the West pioneered a new technique for putting 
pressure on the opponent to agree to expert talks at that 
conference. The U.S. delegate simply tabled and 
publicized technical reports which were though to indicate
200
See, for example, letter from Eisenhower to Khrushchev, 
April 28, 1958, in Documents on Disarmament, vol. II, p. 
1007# ’Studies of this /expert? kind are the necessary 
preliminary to putting political decision actually into 
effect*.
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the need for joint discussions. The tabling of the Berkner 
Report and other data on seismic detection led to the joint 
discussions of November 1959.
In the i960 general disarmament negotiations the West 
continued, although less emphatically, to propose expert 
working groups in parallel with negotiations, but it had 
also proposed that joint studies be held before and during 
the various stages of disarmament in order to prepare for 
measures to come. On June 14 Martino, the Italian delegate, 
welcomed the Soviet*s agreement to some of these provisions 
in its plan of June 2, However, he went on to propose a 
'working party* to study and recommend which öther questions 
should be studied.
Zorin replied immediately with a new argument which 
nevertheless was closely akin to the routine argument he 
used in 1957*
If the Italian representative regards these 
studies as a means of settling the question 
whether disarmament is possible or not, that 
confirms the impression that certain delegations 
have come here not to carry out the mandate of 
the United Nations General Assembly, but forother purposes.202
201TNCD/FV.38, June 14, i960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 713- 202
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While the West strives to involve the East in
technical studies, the East occasionally makes proposals
which have more political content than a proposal in a
disarmament forum should have, according to the West,
Western delegates in the 1955 Sub-Committee refused to
discuss, while guardedly welcoming, the political portions
of the May 10 proposal. It was mentioned in Section A that
Nutting refused to discuss the Soviet proposal of March 27,
1956 for arms control in Germany. The plea of incompetence
is also used at technical talks to resist discussion of
proposals which are held to be appropriate only to
disarmament negotiations. At the Geneva Experts' Conference
Fisk for the United States at the opening meeting hoped
that this inquiry can be kept exclusively 
technical. Our side is not empowered to 
discuss or reach decisions on any political matter.203
Fedorov for the Soviet Union was not deterred. At the
same meeting he declared
that the purpose of our conference..«is the 
all-round cessation of nuclear and hydrogen 
tests. In our view, only for that purpose 
is it worth spending time on a discussion of 
the technical aspects....do you agree that
203
EXP/NUC/FV.1, July 1, 1958. Quoted in Ciro Zoppo, 
Technical and Political Aspects of Arms Control 
Negotiation: the 195b Experts Conference, op. cit., p. 30.
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the work of the experts should and must 
lead to a solution to the main problem, 
namely the cessation of tests. • .?204
The Western experts resisted until July 4 when Fedorov
signalled defeat by proposing a technical agenda which the
205’Westerners promptly accepted. y
This was not the only example of Soviet efforts to
broaden discussion at the Experts* Conference. From July
30 to August 12 the Eastern experts tried, unsuccessfully,
to secure agreement that control post personnel be
recruited entirely from among nationals of the host country.^
Western procedural resistance to Soviet disarmament
proposals made at the surprise attack conference was
mentioned in Part Two, Chapter 1. The rationale was the
same as Fisk had used. Foster declared that
these proposals in the disarmament field 
are not within the jurisdiction of this 
Conference. The Western experts are not 
political representatives and are not 
authorizednto discuss general disarmamentproposals.207
The Western experts might easily have been suspected 
of cynicism (or naivety) in binding themselves to such
204
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narrow terms of reference that they were only permitted
to discuss pure inspection and monitoring schemes.
So far we have discussed procedural suggestions and
proposals which seek to lay down ground rules or modify in
some way both sides' negotiating behaviour. To conclude,
there are some attempts to secure unilateral changes in
the opponent's behaviour which are worth noting.
The attempt to make a substantive gain by a
procedural tactic is nowhere more blatant than in the
suggestion that the opponent amend the offending parts of
one's own proposal, which he can hardly do without accepting
the rest of it in the first place. Demands for
clarification, for details and for responses, which were
dealt with in the previous section, fall in the category
of attempts to control the opponent's behaviour, as do
criticisms of the content and tone of the opponent's
interventions. Tsarapkin at the test conference frequently
attacked the West for its pessimistic speculations about
possible violations of the treaty and for discussing
provisions which would permit parties to free themselves
from their obligations. At the thirteenth meeting
Tsarapkin complained that:
We have not assumed any commitments here 
as yet, but we have already spent a fantastic 
amount of time discussing,..under what
357
circumstances the agreement will have 
to be annulled....This is what you are 
talking about all the time.20°
The East*s desire in strategy to avoid detailed sind 
specific commitment to the means of arms control is 
paralleled in tactics by a desire to limit discussion of 
the problems which the means of arms control must confront.
2ÖB
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APPENDIX
THE SEMANTIC GOLD WAR
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty 
said in a rather scornful tone, "it means 
just what I choose it to mean - neither 
more nor less,"
"The question is," said Alice "whether 
you can make words mean so many different 
things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, 
"which is to be Master - that’s all."
—  Through the Looking Glass
Semantic disputation seems inevitably involved in 
negotiations for arms control. Each side strives (a) to 
appropriate commendatory terms for its own exclusive use and 
to resist the opponent’s attempts to discredit them; and 
(b) to fasten pejorative terms onto the opponent's policies 
and to render his favoured terms pejorative if possible.
Although many terms might be considered here, 
discussion will be confined to usage of two words - ’control 
and 'disarmament* - which most acutely reflect substantive 
conflicts.
* Control*
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Soviet policy on inspection for disarmament underwent 
no dramatic changes in our period. In 1955? as in i960, 
the Soviet opposed (a) active inspection by a control organ 
in advance of disarmament measures; (b) inspection of 
forces and armaments not actually being disbanded and 
disarmed. Curiously, in 1955 * control* was defined as 
(virtuous) inspection of disarmament, while the terms of 
disapprobation, disclosure* and * verification*, were 
employed to describe (vicious) inspection of armaments. On 
May 3 Malik attacked the Western disarmament plan in the 
following terms -
You propose that an international control 
organ should be established, positioned and 
brought into operation before any measures 
begin...We cannot agree to this. On this point 
it seems to us that you are proposing 
"disclosure" and "verification" instead of 
control....Any objective observer must 
inevitably conclude that this proposal 
represents not so much control as a plan for 
obtaining intelligence...209
By i960 the Soviets still favoured 'strict international 
control* of disarmament, but Eastern negotiators had 
perceived the value of making ’arms control* a pejorative 
expression, perhaps because of its increasing popularity in
DC/SC.1/PV.44, in Cmd. 9650, p. 531*
209
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the United States, At the 3?th meeting of the Ten Nation
Committee the Czech delegate attacked Eaton's suggestions
for a first-stage plan because they ’represent nothing but
control over armaments which could serve no other purpose
210than to seek intelligence data’.
Of course 'arms control' in the United States may mean 
restraint on arms competition as well as verification of 
aramament levels. The Russian 'kontrol'« like the French 
’controls', means checking merely, and cannot mean restraint 
as well; but since the Russians have denied any merit to 
such measures as the nuclear cut-off, which are often called 
'arms control* in the West, it is doubtful whether the 
Russians would abandon their hostility to 'arms control' 
if 'kontrol' had a wider range of meanings.
For the West's negotiators 'control' is entirely a 
term of approbation and there dannot be too much of whatever 
it describes. That a measure 'cannot be controlled' 
condemns it, and it is thus convenient to use the phrase 
simultaneously in different senses. Opposing the latest 
Soviet proposal (of April 30) for a ban on the use of 
nuclear weapons in 19579 Moch declared that
TNCD/PV.35, June 9, I960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 677.210
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we cannot place either the prohibition or 
the renunciation of use, which cannot be 
controlled...on the same footing as 
cessation of production which can very 
readily be controlled.211
Although nations cannot be physically restrained from 
using nuclear weapons without world government, neither can 
they be physically restrained from producing them. Both 
measures are controllable in the sense that violations of 
an agreement on them can be detected - especially violations 
of a ban on use!
»Disarmament1
’Disarmament1 is a widely accepted term of 
commendation in East and West; each side has been anxious 
to secure this label for its favourite measures at some 
cost to semantic validity. The East has always denied the 
title ’disarmament’ to the nuclear cut-off, the fixing of 
maximum force levels slightly above existing levels, and 
other measures favoured by the West as ’partial measures 
of disarmament’. That is perhaps reasonable, but at the 
height of the campaign to ban nuclear tests Eastern 
delegates occasionally bestowed the title ’disarmament’ on 
the test ban. At the first meeting of 1960 the Rumanian 
—
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delegate criticized the absence from the Western plan of 
* the only concrete measure of disarmament that was
212included in the former British plan for the first stage
the extension to all countries of the agreement on the
discontinuance of nuclear tests’.2^  In mid-1961, when
Soviet ardour for the test ban had cooled, Tsarapkin had
this to say at the test conference, rejecting separate
agreement on tests -
♦..the problem of cessation of nuclear 
weapon tests can be dealt with only in 
conjunction with that of disarmament.... 
the Soviet Union will be prepared to sign 
immediately a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament and to agree to any control of 
disarmament...But it will not agree...to 
control separated from disarmament.214
That is, the test ban was now 1 control separated from
disarmament*.
In the negotiations of i960 semantic disputation 
almost came to dominate substantive debate many times. At
212
I.e. Foreign Secretary Lloyd’s proposals to the General 
Assembly of September 17, 1959. See Part Two, Chapter 1, June 2. 1960.
213TNCD/PV.1, March 15? 1960, in Cmnd. 1152, p. 17* The new Western plan was not tabled until March 16, although the 
State Department had released the text on March 14.
214
GEN/DNT/PV.338, August 30, 1961, p. 24.
3G3
first (on March 16) the West sponsored a plan for 'general 
and comprehensive disarmament'• The East did not accept 
this form of words. At the third meeting the Czech 
delegate said:
The omission of one of these terms Z1'general" 
and "completeV would mean that we should 
never attain our goal,., - to £ule out 
forever the threat of war.,,21i
However, the East was anxious to prove that the West
was committed to general and complete disarmament
nevertheless. At the fifth meeting the Bulgarian delegate
quoted a speech of October 28, 1959 by Lodge in the General
Assembly, which in turn quoted a speech by the British U.N.
delegate, Ormsby-Gore, to the effect that (in the words of
Ormsby-Gore) 'this single adjective "comprehensive" has the
same meaning for us as the two adjectives "general" and 
21 £"complete".' The East often reminded the West that 
General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of November, 1959, 
which was supported by the West, called for general and 
complete disarmament. And indeed at the second meeting of 
the Ten Nation Committee Ormsby-Gore had introduced the 
Western plan of March 16 in these terms:
W>TNCD/PV.3, March 17, 1960, in Cnrnd. 1152, p. 51.
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The f i r s t  b a s ic  p r in c ip le  i s  th a t  th e
p lan  i s  a com plete and com prehensive o n e . . .217
Having committed i t s e l f  to  a r a d ic a l  form of words,
however, th e  West s t i l l  showed u n ea s in e ss  from tim e to
tim e . A lready a t  th e  fo u r th  m eeting E aton  had counted
135 uses o f th e  words 1 g en e ra l and com plete disarm am ent’
and d ec la red  th a t :
They h a v e .. .become hollow  w ords, words 
shorn  of a l l  meaning.218
But i t  was no t u n t i l  th e  30th  m eeting th a t  a W esterner -
Burns of Canada -  probed deep ly  in to  th e  sem antic q u e s tio n .
I would l ik e  to  p o in t out th a t  in  th e  p la in  
meaning of language th e  /S o v ie t /  p ro p o sa ls  
a re  n o t fo r  com plete disarm am ent. Why n o t?
Because they  leav e  arms in  th e  hands of 
p o lic e  fo rc e s  o r m i l i t i a . ..2 1 9
Of co u rse , th e  same could have been sa id  of th e  March 16 
W estern p la n , which provided  fo r  n a t io n a l  and in te r n a t io n a l  
p o lic e  fo rc e s .  N ev e rth e less  th e  West (o r  r a th e r  th e  U nited 
S ta te s )  went on to  propose, a t  l a s t ,  a s im ila r  p lan  (June 2«
1960) a c tu a l ly  e n t i t l e d  ’ g en e ra l and com plete disarm am ent*.
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CHAPTER k
EVALUATION OF TACTICS :
THE UNSOLVED PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION
Although the previous chapter made no pretence to be 
an exhaustive content analysis, it will be granted that the 
atmosphere of negotiations is more moralistic than 
realistic. The two test conferences were distinguished by 
the solid work done on drafting details, but even these 
negotiations were not remarkable for military realism, 
Soviet negotiators are moralistic - more so than 
Western negotiators - in several distinct ways. They are 
self-righteous on behalf of their own governments 
military and disarmament policies - past, present and 
future, and they blame the West for the arms race and the 
failure of arms control. They deplore rather than analyse 
the existing military situation, and they argue for their 
own disarmament proposals in utopian rather than practical 
fashion by means of a sometimes almost mindless radicalism. 
They reject Western plans because they do not meet certain 
principled desiderata rather than because they would damage 
certain carefully stated interests. Soviet negotiators are
3G5
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capable of practical reasoning - as when they claim that 
the Soviet Union needs a large land army to defend her 
frontiers, or that the Soviet Union has tested fewer atomic 
weapons than the United States. However they do not 
acknowledge Soviet superiority in land warfare or military 
intelligence gathering. Similarly, Western negotiators 
do not concede the value of Soviet secrecy in the nuclear 
balance, and regard the Red Army not as an important 
Soviet bargaining asset, but solely as a danger to be 
legislated into a position of equality with the Western 
conventional forces. Neither side acknowledges Western 
nuclear superiority.
Although East and West may have ways of establishing 
an effective dialogue about their military relations it 
is fairly certain that arms control negotiation is not one 
of them. The question arises whether this fact affects 
the chances of effective arms control. It is of course 
entirely possible that utopian and moralistic negotiation 
might lead to agreement, but there are reasons to doubt 
this which will be discussed below.
The questions which will be answered first are these: 
What is the effect of the quasi-ideological mutual 
indoctrination which constitutes so much of what is called
3 G 7
negotiations for arms control? What is the political
effect of negotiating arguments, of the techniques for
emphasizing a case, of the haze of vagueness which shrouds
proposals, and of the techniques of procedural struggle?
Chapter 3 accomplished little more than setting out
the varieties of negotiating tactics and speculating about
the motives behind some of them. Except in a few cases,
not enough evidence was presented to permit an attempt to
determine the efficacy of these tactics. In any case such
an enquiry presents formidable, possible insuperable,
difficulties of method which must be mentioned here.
As pointed out in passing earlier, the influences
affecting a nation*s arms control policy are numerous and
varied. To isolate the influence of the tactics of the
negotiating opponent would be always a work of considerable
delicacy and uncertainty. We might accept a negotiator’s
account of the matter. For instance in 1955 Moch explained
the concession of April 19 (which introduced the ’75 per cent
arrangement’ for the timing of nuclear disarmament into the
Western plan) as follows -
I am not at the moment discussing the merits 
of the Soviet argument with reference to the 
existence of an imbalance during the process
See Chapter 2, ’’The Strategy of Negotiation”.
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of disarmament...«But I must frankly admit 
that the misgivings voiced in regard to the 
balance of our plan have been so recurrent 
that they have...induced me to seek to set them at rest.2
In other words the emphatic Soviet tactics of early 
1955, which were described at several points in Chapter 3, 
paid off.
Or one might take examples of a change of policy and 
investigate the negotiating record to discover how much 
strategic and tactical pressure, and of what kind, had 
been exerted by the opponent in favour of the change in 
question. Ciro Zoppo has described the process by which 
Eastern and Western policies on the test ban moved much 
closer together in 1957, and suggests that Russian tactics 
were highly effective in bringing about the Western shift,
■5which was reluctantly executed. On the other hand Western 
pressure seems to have induced the Russians to propose a 
controlled test ban in June.
Taking a synoptic view it is clear that much of the 
time in negotiation there is a sort of gentleman1s agreement 
concerning the type of plan which should be negotiated -
2 DC/SC.1/P7.42, April 20, 1955, in Cmd. 9650, p. 432.
3 The Issue of Nuclear Test Cessation at the London 
Disarmament Conference of 1957. o p. cit.
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whether ‘general and complete’, or comprehensive but 
partial disarmament, or isolated measures of various 
kinds, notably the test ban. The events of 1955 seem to 
have led to the dropping of total nuclear disarmament by 
both sides at the beginning of the 1956 negotiations. 
Western pressure for a comprehensive partial agreement 
early in 1957 seems to have persuaded the Soviet to drop 
its radical plan, March 18. on April 30. Unremitting 
Soviet pressure for the test ban in 1958 finally helped 
persuade the West to drop the link with disarmament early 
in 19599 as Western pressure persuaded the East to enter 
technical negotiations and discussions in 1958-9-60. The 
East jumped back onto the bandwagon of general and radical 
disarmament in 1959» and all the somewhat half-hearted 
Western efforts to coax it back to the terra firma of 
comprehensive but incomplete disarmament in 1960 were of no 
avail.
Thus the tactics of the opponent seem to influence 
both sides toward periodic conformity in determining 
whether a radical or moderate agreement will be sought. 
There are two other types of change in negotiating strategy 
which also seem to be influenced by opponents’ tactics. 
These are (a) additions of detail, and (b) compromises at 
the level which negotiation has reached (as distinct from
compromises which bring both sides’ strategies down - or 
up - towards the same level).
Under pressure and prompting from each other, East 
and West progressively disclosed policy on scores of 
issues - some at first but dimly perceived - raised by the 
controlled test ban from 1958-60. Subtraction of detail 
has also occurred, as when the Anglo-French failed to 
propose force levels in 1956, but it does seem unlikely to 
occur in a sustained negotiation like the test conference, 
when it is probably easier to hold the opponent to his 
commitments.
Once the type of issue which will be negotiated has 
been agreed (e.g. general and complete disarmament or test 
ban) compromises seem to be elicited by tactical pressure. 
There were striking examples of this process from March to 
May 1955 and at the test talks. There were no compromises 
of this kind in 1956: East and West did not ’find a level’ 
on which to negotiate. In 1957 the Western position on 
comprehensive partial disarmament was not finally 
formulated until negotiations were almost over, although 
the Western negotiators (Stassen in particular) had taken
Although the Soviets virtually tore up the test accords 
of 1958-60 in 1961, this was not ’subtraction of detail’, 
but withdrawal of principles.
some account of Soviet views in drawing it up - notably 
on the questions of surprise attack and the test ban.
Once again in 19&0 negotiators did not * find a level1.
Although both sides made changes of timing in their 
radical blueprints, ostensibly in deference to the other, 
the West refused to negotiate radical disarmament in 
detail before getting agreement to a first stage.
The chief significance of general disarmament 
negotiation may be that it gives each side the opportunity 
to exert tactical pressure in favour of negotiation for 
isolated measures of arms control upon which agreement is 
relatively easy. (Only a comprehensive agreement would 
refute this interpretation.) Even negotiation about isolated 
measures such as the test ban seems likely to generate 
pressures for further subdivision of issues which were at 
first regarded as indivisible. (This interpretation implies 
that any sort of arms control negotiation is probably 
conducive to agreement.) Although a sharp distinction 
cannot be drawn between negotiation (including proposals) 
about what to negotiate about and negotiation to draw up 
an agreement, it is clear that the test ban talks of 
1958-60 were predominantly of the latter kind, while general 
disarmament negotiations are predominantly of the former kind.
An interesting question raised by the 1957 
negotiations is whether an opportunity for agreement was 
lost. The considerable Soviet concessions of September 20, 
made after the Sub-Committee suspended meetings, were 
never considered in detail by the West, although they were 
a response to the Western plan of August 29. It is 
possible that both sides have had further concessions in 
mind when negotiation of an issue ceased, or when one side 
lost interest, although there is no evidence for this. The 
Soviets did complain that the United States ceased to 
negotiate radical disarmament after May 1955» but the 
Soviets did not modify their plan of May 10 in ways 
acceptable to the West during the closing weeks of the 1955 
Sub-Committee, In the test ban negotiations the Western Two 
moved to meet many Soviet objections to Western proposals in 
1961-2, after the Soviets lost interest in an 
internationally controlled agreement, and it iä possible 
that these concessions might have been decisive had they 
been introduced in 1959-60. However there is no evidence 
that the Two had formulated these concessions in i960.
Although tactics have an important function it is 
fairly certain that they are not effective in forcing1 
changes in an opponent’s policy as compared with 
concessions in strategy, war threats, arms and foreign
r» oi «5
policy, although negotiating behaviour implies great 
confidence in the efficacy of tactics. There seems to be 
little point in ‘storing* concessions since they will have 
far greater impact than tactical maneuver. It seems likely 
that for comprehensive plans, at any rate, Western accord 
is so difficult to attain that there is an overwhelming 
case for announcing a final offer early in negotiation, 
or at least deciding what it will be when the Western 
position is formulated. The burden of concession-making 
seems bound to rest more heavily on the Soviets than the 
West in comprehensive negotiations, because of their 
greater freedom to display strategic flexibility.
Of course even if it could be settled that a particular 
tactic was effective in inducing a change in an opponent*s 
strategy, the significance of the change would still be a 
question. Changes in declaratory policy' are by 
definition insignificant, and changes of or towards a 
radical policy have yet to be proved significant. Changes 
in declaratory policy will usually be made for reasons of 
propaganda, but so may changes in actual strategy. The 
'legitimate* role of the propaganda struggle in producing 
agreement is considered in Part Four, Chapter 1.
See Chapter 1
However we shall turn to study a proposal favoured by 
the contrary opinion which holds that genuine* negotiations 
are invariably swamped by the rough seas of propaganda.
The proposal is for a radical reorganization of negotiations 
to ensure that what takes place is really confidential.
In this way it is hoped that the moralistic atmosphere of 
negotiation might be overcome by abolishing the propaganda 
motive, and by permitting utterance of what may not be 
publicly pronounced. The aim is to improve communication 
and the possibilities of genuine bargaining between opponents.
A verbatim record ensures that each side knows exactly 
what the other has said, but the mere withholding of this 
transcript from the public for several months has done 
virtually nothing to remove the inhibitions to plain 
speaking and very little to filter out propaganda. A 
comparison of speeches at the open U.N. First Committee 
sessions with those at Closed1 Sub-Committee sessions will 
show this.
This is surprising at first glance. When the verbatim 
records are released they have no news value and they 
receive attention only from writers of books and theses and 
other specialists. In this they must be contrasted with 
letters exchanged between heads of state, the record of 
summit and other high level conferences, regular U.N.
debates, speeches by high government authorities and the 
like - all of which are better news and hence, & priori. 
more likely to be the means of making propaganda*
However, apart from propaganda concerns there may be 
several other inhibitions to plain speaking* Governments 
wish to appear consistent before world opinion and history, 
and hence the fact of the tradition of continuous public 
debate about disarmament means that any negotiation whose 
records are ever made public takes its tone from the 
negotiations which are inevitably public. Also, habits 
established in public may be difficult to break in private, 
especially if the privacy is only relative. It seems quite 
possible that unreal negotiation may mesmerize intelligent 
men. Jules Moch had publicly doubted the possibility of 
effective nuclear disarmament from the early 1950s, but 
the routine of French-sponsored proposals for total nuclear 
disarmament was not broken until after the famous Soviet 
statement on nuclear control in the proposal of May 10, 1955> 
which seems to have had a considerable impact on British and 
French thinking.
The chief feature of a truly confidential negotiation 
would be confidential records, which, whether prepared
T>
See the verbatim records of the Sub-Committee, September 14- 
October 7* 1955* passim, in Cmd. 9652.
officially or by the delegations, would have to remain a 
guarded secret. Confidential discussion has taken place 
on occasion, most notably in Stassen’s communication of new 
American proposals to the Soviet delegation in the 1957 
Sub-Committee (which, however, ended in disaster for him) ^  
and there seems to be no insuperable obstacle to 
establishing a tradition, especially if the method were to 
be used merely to ’set up* formal negotiations. The method 
is not incompatible with a continuation of routine propaganda 
and even parallel negotiations in public.
The benefits that might be expected to flow from 
sustained confidential negotiation are both strategical 
and tactical. In tactics, the compulsion to denounce the 
opponent from time to time, especially when U.N. debates 
are impending, would vanish. Secrecy would encourage 
uninhibited assertion and acknowledgment of military 
interests, and frank exposition and criticism of arms 
control polieies. The realism of debate in public is 
severely limited by considerations not only of ideology but 
of something which can only be called propriety. Moreover, 
military information which is a secret only to the public 
could be injected into discussions.
7 See Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, 
op. cjlt., pp. 403-7.
In strategy, the method of confidential negotiation 
might promote a speed-up in the rate of proposal-making. 
Unacceptable proposals with good propaganda value could be 
quickly dropped if there were no propaganda stake, while 
acceptable proposals with poor propaganda value would be 
encouraged. There could be trial proposals and 
multiple-possibility proposals - neither of which is 
encouraged by conditions of publicity. Such possibilities 
presuppose rapt attention by governments to the disarmament 
problem, but the burden could be lightened by giving great 
authority to the principal negotiator, and checking his 
activities after he had reached preliminary understanding 
with opponents - a proceeding which would be difficult in 
semi-public negotiation, notwithstanding Jules MochTs
oespousal of it.
Under confidential conditions the possibility of 
secret agreements on delicate (or secret) matters arises.^ 
Informal agreements are also made possible. Presumably 
national intelligence would have to monitor such agreements.
While confidential negotiation might curb utopianism 
and moralism it could not abolish tactical maneuver and
B ~ ~
See Chapter 3? Section D.
9 See Schelling and Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, 
op.cit., p. 86.
the dilemmas which arise from it. However, it could purge
the bargaining process of moralistic clap-trap, and it
might lead to a clear distinction being perceived between
two distinct functions of fruitful negotiation - mutual
education and compromise of interests.
Objections to the confidential method are both
practical and principled (concerned with its undemocratic
character). Harold Stassen did not, unlike his other
Western colleagues in the Sub-Committee, deplore the
continual seepage of information about proposals and
negotiations to the press. Stassen believed in educating
and being educated by the public, but one of his last
remarks at the 1955 negotiations remains puzzling.
...perhaps the greater flow of information 
in fact assisted in our not having a propaganda approach to our problem.10
He also said that the ’spirit of Geneva’ was still
11abroad in October. This latter fact alone sufficies to 
explain the tone of the 1955 negotiations.
It is clear that if no information (except results) 
reached the press, propaganda at negotiations would be 
irrelevant. Actually, the public can be educated in 
_ _  —  —
DC/SC.1/PV.68, October 7, 1955, in Cmd. 9652, p. 1016.
11
Ibid.
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arms control without being permitted to eavesdrop on 
negotiations.
The Soviet objection to private negotiations is that 
the public ignorance which results tends to damp the 
pressure of opinion on the policies of recalcitrant 
governments. Perhaps the only way to appease this Soviet 
view (which has never been pressed very hard) would be to 
continue the periodic public negotiations. Confidential 
negotiations might have a reforming effect on them!
PART FOUR
THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION
nHow am I to get in? asked Alice 
again in a louder tone,
’’Are you to get in at all?11 said the 
Footman, MThat*s the first question, you 
know,"
—  Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
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INTRODUCTION
Part Two was theoretical in that it investigated the 
feasibility and fairness of arms control plans. Part 
Three offered a theory of effective pressure in 
disarmament negotiation, sought to relate the doings of 
negotiators to broader diplomatic and military policies, 
and to widen the notions both of disarmament proposal1 
and 'disarmament negotiation1 in order to break down the 
artificial isolation of 'disarmament1 from the rest of 
international politics. Part Four develops and tests some 
of this preceding analysis, and also uses it to criticize 
some of the better known theories and suggestions about the 
nature of post war disarmament negotiations. We shall 
discuss the genesis of these theories - their implications, 
their mutual compatibility and theoretical validity.
What exactly is meant by 'theory'? Theorists of arms 
control press in two distinct directions conveniently 
characterized as 'realist' sind 'idealist'. The realists are 
anxious to determine what the negotiations are 'really1 
about and to stress the political limitations on governmental 
maneuver; the idealists wish to show how the negotiations 
can be made to succeed if only governments will exercise
38i
their unrecognized freedom. Both realist and idealist 
have theories why negotiations ‘fail* (we shall see that 
one realist school believes that nothing succeeds like a 
well-planned ‘failure1); both schools believe disarmament 
may follow a political detente in the world, but only the 
idealist believes that disarmament negotiation conducted 
autonomously can succeed. Thus Chapters One and Two which 
follow are about ’realist1 theories; Chapter Three is 
mainly concerned with ‘idealist1 theories.
Another distinction to be emphasized at the start is 
between theories which address themselves to the 
determination of the negotiating motives of the participants 
and those which stress the constraints imposed by the 
various environments - political, military and social - 
which surround the negotiating process.
CHAPTER ONE
PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL WARFARE THEORIES
Writers who regard the negotiations as a sham devoted 
to propaganda usually phrase this by saying that the 
negotiators of one side or the other (or both) 'do not want 
disarmament* - an empty accusation. The one meaning this 
empty phrase can be given (unless 'disarmament' is carefully 
qualified) is that negotiators think the arms race the best 
of all possible military worlds - at best an implausable 
proposition. Clearly, a patriotic leader would prefer the 
unilateral disarmament of an opponent - with or without 
controls - to continued military competition with him. 
Presumably leaders would also prefer their own plans, which 
usually provide for rather one-sided but mutual disarmament. 
One might grant that the sort of limited, compromise plan 
which seems most likely to yield agreement will only 
sometimes be acceptable to negotiators; and certainly one 
would concede that nations are not inclined to accept each 
others' first offers in disarmament; but these contentions 
are not made explicit in the cant phrase, 'not wanting 
disarmament'.
The most ambitious theory of negotiations yet
published - that of Joseph Nogee - holds that disarmament
plans are designed for broad propaganda appeal, not
acceptance, and that non-acceptance is ensured by inserting
one or more ’jokers* or unacceptable proposals in plans.
Every plan offered by either side has 
contained a set of proposals calculated to 
have wide popular appeal. Every such set 
has included at least one feature the other 
side could not possibly accept, thus forcing 
a rejection. Then the proposing side has 
been able to claim that the rejector is . 
opposed to the idea of disarmament in toto.
Nogee maintains in effect that the will-not-to-agree is
constant because he believes that even when the sides have
apparently compromised - for propaganda reasons or perhaps
out of sheer boredom - agreement is no closer really. Nogee
collaborating with J.W. Spanier in 1962, put the point as
follows -
Admittedly, on several occasions during the 
last sixteen years, the Soviet Union and the 
United States have appeared to be reconciling 
their differences on some issues. But this 
has never meant that the two sides were finally 
about to achieve some sort of disarmament 
agreement. For the joker has been an integral 
part of each set of proposals. And it has 
always remained unnegotiable.2
1 Joseph Nogee, ’’The Diplomacy of Disarmament”, 
International Conciliation. No. 526, January 1960, p. 282.
2 J.W. Spanier and J.L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament. 
Praeger, New York, 1962, p. 52.
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In i960 Nogee wrote that jokers ’may have been
intended as bargaining points’ or ’may have been reflections
of incompletely resolved conflicts within the bureaucracies
of the proposing governments’.  ^ In 1962 Nogee and Spanier
went further and argued that jokers are vital to the
national security of the proponent.
...neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 
has been able to reject disarmament without 
suffering a severe propaganda defeat - or to 
accept an agreement without seriously jeopardizing 
its national security. It is our view that each 
power has coped with this dilemma by making 
proposals calculated to have wide public appeal 
and enhance military posture. But because one 
side’s security could be gained only at the expense 
of its opponent’s security neither side could 
accept a compromise agreement.
This claim has been examined in relation to particular 
proposals in Part Two. That analysis suggests that 
compromise agreements can serve the security of both sides.
Nogee’s suggestion that jokers are bargaining points 
is hard to settle. We might say that a joker is not a 
bargaining point when the proposing side fails to withdraw 
it during the course of negotiations on a particular plan. 
However the proponent may have intended to withdraw a 
joker until such a move became irrelevant*, or a joker which
"The Diplomacy of Disarmament”, ojd. cit., pp. 282-3. 
The Politics of Disarmament, op. cit., p. 5.
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does get withdrawn may not have been intended as a 
bargaining point originally. One weakness of the joker 
theory, which we shall return to, is that the significance 
of a joker can only be judged in relation to all other 
measures in a plan: there cannot be an Absolute joker1,
as Nogee seems to imply.
Arthur Burns has pointed out that Nogee’s theory may
be susceptible to interpretation by game theory, and even
if propaganda is only an aspect of the negotiating reality,
a game-theory analysis might be worthwhile. Burns1
analysis suggests that we should treat the negotiating
nations as opponents in a zero-sum game of propaganda where
the pay-offs are derived from increments of prestige
£distributed by a judge - world opinion. However it is not 
clear that negotiations are a zero-sum game from the 
viewpoint of propaganda. The ’marks1 which the audience 
of a disarmament negotiation allocates between the sides is 
not a total fixed beforehand, but may increase or decrease 
according to the performances of both the sides.
This leads us to a possibility overlooked by 
propaganda theorists. Disarmament negotiators show every
Arthur Lee Burns, "Prospects> for a General Theory of 
International Relations", World Politics. October 1961 , p. 43.
Ibid., p. 44.
387
sign of being aware that a degree of cooperation between 
opponents enables both to score more in propaganda pay-off 
than they would if both revealed nothing but hostility to 
each other.
What forms does this cooperation between opponents 
take, and can we make a sharp distinction between hostility 
and cooperativeness? It may help to imagine what total 
hostility and complete cooperation would be like.
Opponents would appear totally hostile by disagreeing 
about both the ends and means of disarmament, by impugning 
each other*s motives5 by evidently treating negotiation as 
nothing but an opportunity for exposing the opponent.
Total cooperativeness, on the other hand, would involve 
wide agreement on priorities and methods in disarmament; 
mutual attribution of the highest motives, frequent and 
flexible negotiations striving for the widest area of 
agreement. Clearly negotiations as we have come to know 
them are a mixture of these two ‘ideal types’, with now 
one, now the other type of behaviour predominating on 
both sides (and not always simultaneously).
The principle of what we may call mimesis, whereby 
each tends to adopt in whole or part the other’s policy 
innovations, is of key importance in propaganda
388
c o o p e ra tio n . For example, th e  R ussians f e l t  im pelled  
to  endorse th e  id e a  o f a e r i a l  in s p e c tio n  a g a in s t 
s u r p r i s e  a t ta c k  from 1956-8, w h ile  th e  Americans 
im i ta t iv e ly  adopted  th e  slogan  of g e n e ra l and com plete 
disarm am ent a f t e r  1959? d e s p ite  m isg iv ings in  bo th  c a se s . 
Three propaganda m otives l i e  behind m im esis. F i r s t l y ,  
th e re  i s  u s u a lly  some g a in  in  p r e s t ig e  fo r  seeming to  
compromise. S econd ly , one may f e a r  to  oppose a popu lar 
p o lic y . T h ird ly , u n le s s  bo th  s id e s  coopera te  to  produce 
a p a r t i a l  consensus about ends and means in  disarm am ent 
th e  p u b lic  may become r a d ic a l ly  s c e p t ic a l  about the 
n e g o t ia t io n s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  n e g o t ia t io n s  fo r  g e n e ra l 
disarm am ent. The o th e r  a sp ec ts  o f co o p e ra tio n  -  such as 
m utual im p u ta tio n  o f 1 s i n c e r i t y ‘, and sym pathetic 
n e g o t ia t io n  -  may be s im ila r ly  m o tiv a ted . I t  i s  no t 
n ec essa ry  to  m a in ta in  th a t  co o p e ra tiv en ess  i s  e n t i r e ly  
c y n ic a l  or even co n sc io u s ly  c y n ic a l a t  a l l ;  th e  s id e s  
have some i n t e r e s t s  in  common which a re  bound to  be 
acknowledged and exp lored  c o o p e ra tiv e ly . I t  i s  m erely 
n e c e ssa ry  to  n o tic e  th e  propaganda b e n e f i ts  fo r  bo th  in  
t h i s  b eh av io u r, which sometimes goes beyond what j o in t  
i n t e r e s t s  and p r iv a te  co n v ic tio n s  would in d ic a te .  A c tu a lly  
i t  i s  perhaps e x tra o rd in a ry  how l i t t l e  c y n ic a l behaviour
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there is at negotiations. The Soviets conscientiously 
oppose such measures as the isolated cut-off and extensive 
control early in disarmament, which could damage their 
interests; the complete cynic would not. Evidently 
policy-makers either expect to have to negotiate seriously 
at some time or find it hard for internal political 
reasons to venture wholeheartedly into the realms of 
cynicism.
Now we must examine more closely the motives of
propaganda-making. Nogee/Spanier discover one strong
and consistent motive behind disarmament negotiation
(which for them is almost synonymous with exchange of
disarmament propaganda), and that is the desire for the
prestige of virtue -
to portray one’s own plans as reasonable 
and realistic, and those of one’s 
opponent as unworkable and unfair, and 
to place the blame for the failure of 
negotiations on the other side.7
Is competition for prestige the chief or sole motive of
negotiations; or, to narrow the question, of disarmament
propaganda? We have already seen that the quest for
The Politics of Disarmament, op*, cit., p. 53*
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prestige is partly cooperative; which indicates that a 
reputation for lonely rectitude is not the only sort of 
reputation that interests negotiators.
On the other hand nations are not only interested in 
the prestige of seeming peace-loving, even in an age of 
intensive disarmament propaganda. Prestige1 and 
1 reputation1 are in fact thoroughly ambiguous terms.
Coral Bell has suggested that Secretary of State Dulles 
put a high value on a reputation for bellicosity in his 
diplomacy.
The Daily Worker portrait of Mr. Dulles as 
the reactionary straining every muscle to 
unleash a new war, might be said in a sense 
to have been carefully posed by the subject 
himself.°
It is doubtful whether Eisenhower*s earnest (but 
erratic) search for disarmament and detente detracted 
from Dulles’ efforts to secure U.S. diplomacy a reputation 
for somewhat adventurous firmness in the 19?0s. In the 
Eastern camp disarmament propaganda itself is regarded by 
high leaders as an effective means of waging political 
warfare.
3
Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength. Chatto & Windus, 
London, 1962, p. 91#
391
In the case of the struggle for peace, this 
is a question the solution of which can unite 
not only the working class, the peasantry and 
the petty bourgeoisie, but also that part of 
the bourgeoisie which sees the real dangerof 
a thermo-nuclear war.
Consequently, the slogan of the fight for 
peace by no means contradicts the slogan of 
the fight for Communism, The two go hand in 
hand, for in the eyes of the masses, Communism 
appears as a force capable of saving mankind 
from the horrors of a missile-nuclear war, 
whereas imperialism is, increasingly, associated 
with war as a system engendering wars,,«.
The fight for disarmament is an active 
fight against imperialism, for narrowing its 
war potential..,.
A primary condition for progress in 
disarmament is the mobilization of the people, 
their growing pressure on the imperialist 
governments.
Two trends can be observed in the policy of 
the capitalist camp in relation to the 
socialist countries - one bellicose and 
aggressive, the other moderate and sober.
Lenin pointed to the need of establishing 
contacts with those circles of the bourgeoisie 
which gravitate towards pacifism, "be it even 
of the palest hue". In the struggle for peace, 
he said, we should not overlook also the saner 
representatives of the bourgeoisie. 9
Of course the question immediately arises whether
peace campaigns have reduced or can reduce the * war
N.S. Khrushchev, Speech on the November 1960 Manifesto 
of 81 Communist Parties, January 6 , 1961. Reprinted in 
E. Lefever (ed.), Arms and Arms Control. Praeger, New York,
1962, pp. 72-3.
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potential’ of opponents, whether by undermining existing 
military policies or forcing dangerous concessions in 
disarmament policy.
It is interesting to note that when the Sino-Soviet
split came increasingly into the open in 19&3 the Chinese
denied the Soviet thesis.
If one regards general and complete 
disarmament as the fundamental road to 
world peace, spreads the illusion that 
imperialims will automatically lay down its 
arms and tries to liquidate the 
revolutionary struggles of the oppressed 
peoples and nations on the pretext of 
disarmament, then this is deliberately to 
deceive the people of the world and help 
the imperialists in their policies of 
aggression and war.10
On the Western side one Soviet disarmament campaign 
has been declared successful by a scholarly authority.
Ciro Zoppo has argued that in negotiations and maneuvering 
on the nuclear test issue in 1957-0 the Western position 
evolved in a direction unnecessarily unfavourable to 
Western interests as then conceived.
10
Letter of Chinese Communist Party to Soviet Central 
Committee, June 14, 1963, quoted in New York Times f 
International Edition, July 21, 19^3. Nevertheless in 
August China proposed total nuclear disarmament in rejecting 
the partial test ban treaty. Pravda replied on August 3 
by attacking ‘people...who cover up with a flashy phrase 
about the most radical disarmament measures their lack of 
readiness or desire to achieve disarmament'.
- Quoted in Canberra Times. August 5? 1963*
The progressive erosion of the initial 
Western stand probably led the Soviet 
leadership to conclude that a unilateral 
test suspension, aided by public opinion 
pressures favourable to test cessation, 
might force the American and British 
governments to negotiate.
The Soviet unilateral suspension of 1958 
was a decisive step in the sapping of the 
American effort to link test cessation with 
other arms control measures, specifically 
a cut-off in the production of fissionable 
materials for military purposes.
This may be true5 but since the test ban was very
favourable to the interests of the Western Two, as they
eventually came to conceive them, it is not very important.
Had Western interests been clearly at variance with a
separate test ban, it is very doubtful that Western policy
would have evolved as it did. No amount of forcing*
(i.e. propaganda and maneuver) would then have sufficed to
shift the West, or, even if it had, commitments might have
been withdrawn later, as the United States withdrew her
commitment to general disarmament in September 1955.
There is no example of one side forcing’ another
into an arms control policy position which would be
detrimental to its interests by mere propaganda in the
post-war period, partly because nothing is easier than to
T1
Ciro E. Zoppo, The Issue of Nuclear Test Cessation at the 
London Disarmament Conference of 1957: A Study in East-West 
Negotiation, op. cit.. dp. 86-7.
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seem to be ’for disarmament’. Being in favour of goals such
as free trade, economic aid and political freedom, for
12example, requires action to some extent. No such 
limitation hampers the proponent of negotiated disarmament; 
or, at least, in only one case has a particular practice 
been widely held to be incompatible with a disarmament 
policy - nuclear testing.
Has political warfare succeeded in the other task 
mentioned by Khrushchev - undermining the moral basis of 
the opponent’s militarv policy? Has Western willingness 
to defend allies, to use nuclear weapons, or to maintain 
foreign bases been undermined by Soviet propaganda? It 
seems likely that it has not. Nor has Western agitation 
against Soviet secrecy had any appreciable effect.
However, it is worth distinguishing the various audiences 
of the negotiations and their differing reactions to them, 
before we dismiss the question of the political efficacy 
of disarmament propaganda.
There has been no enquiry by governments or scholars 
on the nature, the composition, the demands, the 
attentiveness and the reactions of the disarmament audience.
T2
However in these fields, also, one’s policy may be 
conditional support for the goal in question.
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Most commentators tend to assume that the neutral nations 
are the major target audience and this view is lent some 
colour by the passages from Khrushchev5 s speech quoted 
above. However, there are two other mass audiences 
with potential importance - the domestic audience 
(including allied populations) and the opponent's 
population. Each of these audiences represent differing 
threats and opportunities. Khrushchev relies on 
influencing the 5 saner representatives of the bourgeoisie' 
in the West, as well as the neutrals, and this stratum 
probably has more influence on government arms-control 
policy than neutral opinion which, for all its 
attentiveness, lacks sanctions to influehce great power 
disarmament policy. (It was, however, important in the 
change of Western policy towards the test ban, and in 
persuading doubtful Westerners to adopt the slogan of 
general and complete disarmament in 1959-60.) One of 
Khrushchev's conceptions is that the peace movement, as 
the widest of the Communist-inspired political movements, 
will help ease or accelerate the adherence of the new 
nations to the socialist camp. But most neutral nations 
are already considered by Soviet Communists as part of the 
'forces of peace5 with a role to play. Moreover, 'the
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peace forces.•.have grown all over the world1, Khrushchev 
said in October 1961.
A few years ago there were two opposing camps 
in world affairs - the socialist and imperialist 
camps. Today an active role in international 
affairs is also being played by those countries 
of Asia, Africa and Latin America that have 
freed, or are freeing, themselves from foreign 
oppression. Those countries are often called 
neutralist though they may be considered neutral 
only in the sense that they do not belong to 
any of the existing military-political alliances.
Most of them, however, are by no means neutral 
when the cardinal problem of our day, that of 
war and peace, is at issue. As a rule, those 
countries advocate peace and oppose war....
Z^hey7 are becoming a serious factor in the .~ 
struggle against colonialism and imperialism..® ^
The Western, or at least U.S. approach to the new
nations has been far more defensive. Under Dulles, U.S.
diplomacy openly doubted the wisdom and even morality of
non-alignment, and membership of a Western military alliance
was regarded as the only policy for a new country which
could in any way serve the purposes of Western foreign
policy. Dulles1 attitude corresponded to the Soviet
attitude before 1955? the watershed year of military aid to
Egypt* the Bandung Conference and the Khrushchev-Bulganin
visit to India, soon to be followed by aid and credits.
Neutralism became respectable in the West more slowly and
13Speech by N.S. Khrushchev, 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U., 
October 17, 1961. Soviet Booklet No. 80, London, November
1961, p. 21.
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there has been little confidence like Khrushchev’s that 
the neutrals could be used to undermine Communist 
positions. Western policy has been primarily defensive 
- to save the neutrals from Communism. Certainly 
disarmament propaganda directed at the neutrals has never 
been considered part of a program for weakening Communism.
The enemy population, as a target for disarmament 
propaganda, is of far more significance for Communists 
confronting democrats than vice versa. Little Western 
propaganda is heard except on sufferance in the Soviet 
Uhion; Soviet propaganda has complete freedom of access in 
the great Western countries, whose governments are in any 
case more beholden to public opinion.
What opportunities do these audiences on either side 
present? Very few, in practice, it would seem. The 
Soviets may have won some ground among the American 
population in favour of the test ban from 1957 to 1958 
and this may have influenced the change of U.S. policy, 
but there is no evidence that general and complete 
disarmament has a high place in the affections of the 
American people, and the fact that armament spending is 
one of the most popular forms of all government spending14
75 “  —See Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defence, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 19^1, p. 242.
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suggests that the American public may be, at beat, 
indifferent to the leading theme of Soviet propaganda*
This is a vital consideration when we come to study 
the approach of the negotiating powers to their own domestic 
audience. It might be thought that disarmament proposals 
enable governments to say to their subjects: 'Look, we have 
done our best to make armaments unnecessary; now you must 
not mind if we continue to arm*. In fact such a stratagem 
is probably quite unnecessary in the United States because 
of the popularity of armaments and the Cold War, and because 
of the fear that disarmament would bring economic recession. 
The stratagem is perhaps also unnecessary in the Soviet 
Union for a different reason - the impotence of the masses. 
However, the Soviet government is aware of its public's 
discontent with shortages of all kinds caused by the 
one-side development of heavy and especially defence 
industry, and it is much more prone to justify its armament 
policy in terms of American intransigence on disarmament.
It has been argued so far that propaganda-making may 
be a competitive or a cooperative activity - or both at 
once; that it may be directed to winning a good name 
(prestige), undermining the bases of the opponent's support, 
or comforting a domestic audience which has to pay for 
armaments. It should be clear that disarmament propaganda
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is the public relations of disarmament proposals and 
positions, and that negotiations proper as well as U.N. 
debates, government statements and publicity contribute 
to it* Negotiation is not propaganda only when it is fully 
confidential, and this has happened very rarely. Much 
negotiating behaviour which is usually interpreted as being 
propaganda-free is, in effect, cooperative propaganda­
making, All the varieties of propaganda-making can in 
theory serve the purposes of agreement, and so Arthur Burns 
is not necessarily correct when he maintains that the 
negotiating contest by propaganda for prestige is ’parasitic 
upon the phemonema of genuine negotiation’. Admittedly 
he treats both the propaganda contest and ’genuine 
negotiation’ as models of a part of reality, but these 
parts of reality are inseparable in practice. The greatest 
propaganda pay-off may actually come from consummation of 
an agreement, or agreement may be chosen as a way of 
intensifying propaganda - a possible interpretation of the 
partial test ban treaty of 1963.
In an important sense negotiators ’know not what they 
do’. They make propaganda not knowing whether it will lead
_3
’’Prospects for a General Theory of International Relations" 
op. cit., p. ^3*
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to agreement or merely promote the prestige of their 
nation or the discomfort of opponents.
It is interesting to enquire what sort of proposals 
have given the best propaganda value to sponsors. In the 
period 1955-60 there were four outstandingly celebrated 
proposals or groups of proposals - the Soviet disarmament 
proposal of May 10, 1955) the Eisenhower surprise 
attack proposals of 1955) the Soviet test ban proposals 
of 1957-8) and Khrushehev*s general and complete 
disarmament proposal of September 18, 1959. These proposals 
achieved fame for different and instructive reasons - the 
May 10 plan because it was imitative and apparently 
compromising to a remarkable degree; the Open Skies 
proposals because of their novelty, their simplicity and 
their sweeping assault on secrecy; the test ban because of 
its simplicity, but also because tests were the most 
spectacular, frightening and intrinsically dangerous symbol 
of the modern arms race; general and complete disarmament 
because of its thoroughgoing radicalism.
It should be noticed that none of these proposals 
was especially altruistic and that perhaps the most 
altruistic proposal of the period - the Soviet conventional 
disarmament plan of 1956 - was a propaganda failure. One 
characteristic shared by most of the celebrated proposals
was novelty, which need only be relative. General and 
complete disarmament would have caused far less stir in 
1956 than it did in 1959*
Nogee*s theory is only one of a family of possible 
theories which assume the ‘insincerity* of negotiations.
For a start, we should notice that it is not necessary to 
postulate a joker in the original plan. Proposals generally 
are so lacking in detail that the negotiation of them 
affords ample opportunity for prevarication, and the 
insertion of jokers during the elaboration of details if 
this ever seemed necessary. Alternatively, reticence about 
a demanded detail may be regarded as a sort of jokers plans, 
especially comprehensive plans, are rarely spelt out in 
satisfying detail, as we have seen in Part Two.
Again, provisions of a plan may be so radical on the 
military or political side that they may be called jokers 
even though they would not be clearly damaging to either 
side*s interests. We shall return to this point.
The idea of the self-interested joker provision is in 
any case hard to make precise. Nogee/Spanier speak of *two 
categories*: ‘those which are riveted into disarmament 
proposals with full knowledge that the other side will be 
compelled to reject them’, and ‘the provision that...is 
considered to be a necessary safeguard of national
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tl6security.1' These categories clearly overlap.
We may devide the first category into those provisions 
which happen to be in conflict with the opponents policy 
for the time being but are no threat to his vital interests, 
and those which pose a clear threat to those interests. 
Clearly the Soviet proposal for the test ban in 1957 was 
in the former category, while Soviet proposals to abolish 
foreign bases in isolation from other measures are in the 
latter. We may call the first category 1 jokers pro tern1; 
the second ‘permanent jokers1, but we should beware. Many 
would have said the Western demand for equal force levels 
as between Russia, China and the U.S. until 1955 was a 
permanent joker since it would have abolished the vast 
conventional superiority of the Soviet Union, and indeed the 
Soviets vehemently opposed it - until 1955* when they began 
to reduce their forces unilaterally. In 1956-7 the Soviets 
accepted the Western demand not only for the world of general 
and radical disarmament, but for the world of 'partial 
measures' as well - for a world in which Western nuclear 
superiority would have continued. Thus the seeming 
permanency of jokers may be made illusory owing to 
military (or perhaps political) developments.
!Z
The Politics of Disarmament, o p. cit., pp. 53-^»
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Comprehensive plans commonly contain a mixture of
proposals some of which are favourable to one side, some
to the other. These individual elements of plans could
be described as ranging from ‘extremely self interested*
to ‘mildly altruistic’, considered injsolation. Compromise
plans for comprehensive disarmament are those which attempt
to strike a balance of ’jokers* - ingredients unacceptable
on their own but acceptable in combination with others, to
both sides. Nogee/Spanier accept the official case against
Soviet proposals for low, equal force levels.
...the United States actually needed to keep 
2-2.5 million men in uniform to maintain her 
bases in this /Western7 hemisphere and in 
Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and 
Asia.17
The 1.5 million force level would clearly be damaging 
to the West as long as the existing base system had to be 
kept up. But need the base system have been so extensive 
if Russia had reduced her forces to 1.5 million men? In 
fact low, equal force levels would have worked in favour 
of the Westj even in the middle 1950s. They were too radical 
for the taste of American policy-makers, rather than a 
threat to American interests.
The Politics of Disarmament, op. cit.. p. 88.V?
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Nogee/Spanier's discussion of the test ban concludes 
as follows -
The Soviet position does not...reveal a 
single-minded determination to consummate 
a test-ban agreement....The Soviets tended 
to press the issue the hardest when the United 
States was opposed to the idea, and they 
created obstacles when the West appeared to 
accept the idea.
This is also true, by and large, of the 
American position....As the Soviet negotiators 
tended to raise obstacles against implementing 
a real control system, thereby revealing 
fundamental objections to a test ban, the 
United States and her allies (sic) offered 
more concessions and redoubled their efforts 
to attain an agreement. They could afford to 
do so, once Soviet opposition had made this 
course safe and attractive.^
This interpretation assumes that both sides were 
strongly influenced in their proposals by (a) the 
expectation that the other side's position would not change, 
and (b) strong desire to avoid agreement. (Nogee/Spanier 
say that U.S. negotiators 'redoubled their efforts to attain 
an agreement' from time to time, but they strongly imply 
in fact that the negotiators only seemed - and of course 
wanted to seem - to be doing this.) That is why the 
authors liken disarmament negotiations to atminnet',^  
supposing that when one side was sincerely raising
To
The Politics of Disarmament, op. cit., p. 120. 
19
Ibid., p. 200.
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obstacles because of doubts about the test ban, the other 
side cynically began to compromise and appear enthusiastic 
despite its doubts.
This is a mechanical and symmetrical interpretation 
with several major flaws. It both assumes that there is 
a serious danger of being imprisoned in an unwanted 
agreement, and also that one of the two negotiating nations 
at any time is prepared to face this danger in the 
interests of propaganda. Actually there is no proven 
danger in this behaviour for the reasons given earlier.
(One may always withdraw a plan. The Russians did just 
this in 1961 when they resumed nuclear testing.) It is 
implausible that one side will be cynical while the other 
side is being sincere, and that at a given signal (whose?) 
they will suddenly exchange roles. The test ban 
negotiations require a far more complex interpretation 
than this. The Soviets by no means let up in their 
pressure for agreement when the United States began to 
show strong interest in the test ban late in 1958; nor did 
they significantly increase pressure for agreement when the 
U.S. began to display doubts and indecision based on new 
technical data early in 1959. The strong American pressure 
for agreement early in 1961 predated the Soviet retreat on 
inspection in that year.
m
It is a purely verbal paradox that the proposals 
most sincerely put forward - very self-interested proposals 
- are also those most insincerely put forward - since one 
cannot expect the opponent to agree. This paradox leads 
us to distinguish two types of insincerity. The first - 
which Nogee does not explicitly notice in the initial 
formulation of his theory - consists in proposing something 
you are not prepared to carry out. The second consists in 
proposing something so radical or self-interested that you 
'know1 the opponent will not be prepared to carry it out. 
(’Know1 is in quotation marks because it is a strong 
expectation, not true knowledge.) Radical proposals 
usually involve both types of insincerity, especially when 
addressed to a conservative opponent. Western negotiators 
from late 1955 to i960 made it fairly clear that while they 
had no overriding objections to negotiating about radical 
disarmament they did not expect to achieve it in the short 
run, and wished to agree on and implement a first phase 
plan for preference. The Soviets may be devoted to radical 
disarmament in the short run, but this seems doubtful for 
several reasons.
1. They apparently have not investigated the technical and 
political problems of a 'totally1 disarmed world.
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2. They have not reconciled the disarmed world with
20Marxist doctrine.
3. Soviet predominance in the Communist bloc and in the 
world would be undercut by total nuclear disarmament. 
(However, the spread of nuclear weapons may do this.)
4. Khrushchev has admitted 'ulterior* motives in 
proposing general and complete disarmament, and he showed 
little expectation of having to fulfil Soviet disarmament 
pledges in the key speech of January 6, 1961 already quoted.
20
See Richard J. Barnet, Who Wants Disarmament?. Beacon 
Press, Boston, i960, Part II, "Disarmament and Soviet Goals".
CHAPTER TWO
POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES
OF DISAGREEMENT
The previous chapter examined the varieties of actual 
and possible political motivation in disarmament negotiation. 
In this chapter attention shifts to the environment of 
political, ideological and psychological conflict 
surrounding negotiation, but we should remember that this is 
a resultant of conflicting national purposes. Our problem 
is to assess the relationship between political conflict 
and disarmament. We shall be dealing first with terms for 
two great variables characteristically preferred by modern 
analysts in describing great power relations - 'tension* and 
* distrust’.
Tension is usually discussed as though it resulted 
entirely from political disputes, but there is a military as 
well as a political component in tension; or, rather, 
tension is always a military-political phenomenon, for 
unless a conflict of arms is possible there can be little 
tension. Once political claims and counter-claims have 
been staked out, and once military commitments have been
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uttered, purely military moves (including disarmament) can 
exacerbate (or decrease) tension. For example, the rapid 
growth of the Soviet rocket threat to Europe after 1957 
caused the United States, moved by both military and 
political anxiety, to station her own rockets in the 
territory of Soviet neighbours. This action in turn caused 
the Soviets to bring heavy but ineffective pressure to 
bear on the countries involved to remove the threat to 
Soviet security. The Cuban crisis of 1962 was touched off 
also by a purely military move - a mere re-deployment of 
armaments.
The arms race can never be a pure expression of 
political conflict as some theorists would seem to wish or 
suppose. It must acquire some dynamic of its own, not 
only because of the vested interests and inertia of habit 
which it creates, but because participants never find 
themselves competing with an abstract political entity but 
always with an individual powerT having a unique strategic 
position, alliance, armaments, resource base and technology, 
which must be countered in unique and changing ways. Even 
if military power were all of one kind (say riflemen) it 
would be impossible to lay down what type, level, ratio or 
rate of armament would be appropriate to any situation of 
conflict and tension; yet the feeling that some such
prescription is possible lies behind the assertion that 
the arms race is a mere reflection of political conflict.
The overall military tension between the two super­
powers could in theory be arrived at by adding the tensions 
resulting from all local points of political conflict to 
strategic tension resulting from the fact that strategic 
nuclear armament makes possible an attack divorced from any 
local military situation which may have arisen as a 
consequence of a political dispute. In fact, the strategic 
arms race has a dynamic of its own based not only on purely 
military calculations but on the fact that two great 
societies regard themselves as being in competition in 
almost all aspects of technology and production.
Distrust has been treated by theorists as an entirely 
dependent variable; it has been assumed to bear a simple 
relation to the existence of disputes, and also of tension, 
in the rhetoric of disarmament negotiations. Both sides 
condemn it without agreeing exactly what it is or how it 
might be removed. Diplomats often speak as though it were 
pathological, something which they (presumably) suffer from 
without being able to help themselves. The word is used to 
describe not only fears that an opponent will not adhere to 
treaties, tell the truth and keep his word - a justified 
usage, but also apprehensions aroused by his stated foreign
political aims - an unjustified usage. ('You can trust 
the Communists to be Communists'.) Scholars have come to 
the rescue by pointing out that inspection for disarmament 
is predicated on the distrust of the parties for each 
other, and that this is as it should be. But the point 
may be generalized. Distrust, or readiness to suspect and 
detect double-dealing, illegal behaviour and unpleasant 
surprises, is a prerequisite of order between sovereign 
states.
Of neither tension nor distrust should it be said 'the 
less the better* in the abstract. A certain degree of 
tension is as it were appropriate to the number and degree 
of political conflicts confronting a nation, and distrust 
is a proper attitude for the nation at all times. Similarly 
political settlements are often discussed by both sides in 
the Cold War as though there cannot be too many of them, yet 
there is of course deep disagreement about the sort of 
solution which would be satisfactory in each case. Treaty 
confirmation of the status quo, enforced neutralism, 
self-determination, surrender of position - all these 
possibilities are potential 'solutions' for divided and
See, for example, Arthur Burns, Problems of Disarmament. 
The Australian Labor Party Club, University of Melbourne,1960, p. 21.
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disputed countries. Some of these solutions are immediately
available, in the sense that one side’s backing down - with
or without formal agreement - would reduce tension to the
point where one could speak of a solution. In fact each
side prefers the costs and tensions of maintaining its
position to a solution on the terms suggested by the other.
The analysis above is intended to introduce a discussion
of theories about the political obstacles to disarmament.
In this chapter only theories which may be considered prima
facie as examples of ’political determinism’ are discussed.
Examples of ’military determinism’, which are their chief
rivals, will be discussed in the following chapter. There
are two emphases in theories of political determinism:
(1) that particular political disputes prevent agreement on
disarmament; (2) that the struggle for power in general,
independently of particular disputes, prevents agreement.
Walter Lippman*s writing furnishes an example of the
first view. He believes it unrealistic for the major powers
to ’try to negotiate disarmament before they negotiate
settlements of the issues which divide them’. ’This cannot
be done. The powers will not and cannot disarm while they are
2in conflict on vital issues’.
2 ’’Today and Tomorrow”, Michigan Daily. 26 February 1960. 
Quoted in J. David Singer, Deterrence. Arms Control, and 
Disarmament. Ohio State University Press, 1962, p. 177-
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Western negotiators in the period under study usually
maintained that a 1 first step1 in disarmament was possible
in the political situation as it existed, but that before
major disarmament could occur, there would have to be
political settlements, especially in Europe. It was a rare
event when a rationale for this point of view was put
forward by Stassen (in a speech previously quoted) during
the 1956 Sub-Committee. Stassen did not say that
disarmament was impossible without major settlements - merely
that it was undesirable.
It is the United States view that low force 
levels and drastic reductions in armaments... 
would not, if they were not accompanied by 
progress in the settlement of the major 
political issues, be in the interest of any 
country represented at this table. These 
reductions would increase the danger of the 
outbreak of war at some point in the world, and 
of sucxh a war spreading to involve all nations, particularly major nations.3
Philip Noel-Baker believes that the Settlements first1
argument ’inevitably implies that the armaments are wanted
to secure settlements by the use or threat of force; it
L.cannot mean anything else1. In fact, no such drastic 
interpretation is ’inevitable1.
DC/SC.1/PV.86, May 4, 1956, in Cmd. 9770, p. 57. 
b
The Arms Race, on. cut., p. 86.
Granted that the motive of armament preparation may
be (or become) aggressive, yet a power may dispute control 
of an area and yet have entirely defensive military purposes 
there. Since 1956 it has been clear that American armament 
in Europe is intended to prevent Communist advance into 
Western Europe, not to alter the East European status quo 
violently or by threat of violence. On the other hand the 
United States still clearly hopes that political and 
economic pressures will cause an evolution of East European 
affairs favourable to the West.
We turn to theories which attribute disagreement on 
disarmament to the struggle for power itself, of which 
disputes may be both a symptom and an example. Hans 
Morgenthau has concluded from the history of disarmament 
that only agreements of a ’local* character are possible. 
Citing the Rush-Bagot Agreement, the Washington Treaty of 
1922 and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, he argues that 
they represent, respectively, ’the absence of competition 
for power*, ’the preponderance, unchallengeable for the 
time being, of one or more nations over another’ (i.e. of 
the United States and Britain over Japan), and *a temporary 
preference on either side for regulated rather than 
unregulated competition for power'. He continues:
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What, then, are the chances for agreements 
upon a ratio of armaments to be reached when 
most or all the major powers are seeking 
general disarmament, while at the same time 
pursuing their contests for power? To put it 
bluntly, the chances are nil. All attempts 
at general disarmament...have not failed 
primarily because of shortcomings in 
preparation and personnel or of bad luck.
They could not have succeeded even under the 
most favourable circumstances; for the 
continuation of the contest for power among 
the nations concerned made agreement upon the 
ratio of armaments impossible.?
Morgenthau easily shows that French and German
proposals for ‘general* disarmament in the early 1930s and
American and Soviet proposals in the late 19*+0s were
incompatible. However, his attempt to belittle historical
examples of disarmament is not altogether convincing: it is
incorrect to describe the Washington Naval Treaty as a
* local* agreement: it involved all the great naval powers
of three continents. This was surely an example of
world-wide (i.e. ’general’) great-power military competition
being subjected to limitations, even though it did not
settle ’the ratio’ of armaments among the powers involved.
In fact there is never only one but always many ratios to
settle (or ignore) in arms control.
Politics Among Nations. Alfred A, Knopf, New York, 19^ +9* 
P. 317.
Morgenthau1s account of the struggle for power is 
tautologous.
All politically active nations are by 
definition engaged in a competition for power 
of which armaments are an indispensable 
element. Thus all politically active nations 
must be intent upon acquring as much power as 
they can, that is, among other things, upon 
being as well armed as they can. Nation A 
which feels inferior in armament to nation B 
must seek to become at least the equal of B 
and if possible to surpass B. On the other 
hand, nation B must seek at least to keep its 
advantage over A if not to increase it.6
Morgenthau does not say whether the great powers in
the historical examples of disarmament which he cites were
politically 'active* or 'inactive'. They were in fact
mostly active, according to any reasonable definition. But
in that case his definition of a politically active nation
does not fit Britain, for example, who gave up the attempt
to keep her advantage over Germany in submarines in 193?
under the terms of the Naval Agreement - by allowing Germany
parity in that weapon.
When Morgenthau calls for a settlement of * the power 
conflict* before general disarmament, he artificially 
isolates politics from military competition, nor does his 
proposal on disarmament measure up to his theoretical 
absolute, political determinism:
6
Ibid., pp. 31^-5
Disarmament or at least regulation of 
armaments is an indispensable step in a 
general settlement of international conflicts.
It can, however, not be the first step,...a 
mutually satisfactory settlement of the power 
contest is a precondition for disarmament..,. 
Disarmament, in turn, will contribute to the 
General pacification....by lessening political 
tensions and by creating confidence in the 
purposes of the respective nations.?
This argument is untenable, indeed contradictory. It
might be argued that when conflict is very acute there can
be no disarmament, but Morgenthau does not so argue: he
offers his proposition apparently as valid for all epochs.
In Morgenthau’s world 'political tensions' would continue
despite a 'general settlement’, but could be mopped up by
disarmament. If disarmament can occur despite political
tensions (and even reduce them) it is not clear why it
cannot occur during ’international conflicts’. In any case
Morgenthau could hardly argue that there had been a general
settlement of Anglo-German relations in 1935 when the two
nations decided to regulate their naval armaments.
Hedley Bull asserts that ’unless there is a measure of
political detente’ among powers in a system 'there can be
Qlittle place for arms control'. This view at least suggests 
directly that arms control is impossible under conditions
7 Ibid., pp. 329-330.8
The Control of the Arms Race, op. cit. , p. 10.
of acute tension, but a detente is always relative and
Bull does not say how much relaxation in relation to what
degree of tension is necessary. Bull argues correctly,
against the view that all tensions must be removed before
disarmament can begin, that
it is only in the presence of political 
disputes and tensions serious enough to 
generate arms competition that arms control has any relevance.9
However the attempt to lay down a maximum of tension 
Ibeyond which arms control becomes impossible is futile and 
erroneous. As shown in the Introduction to Part Three, it 
may require precisely a sharp increase in tension, or even 
violence, to obtain arms control.
If a case for 'political determinism' in general is 
difficult to make good, how can particular failures to 
disarm be explained? A group of theories we may call 
examples of ideological determinism offer themselves.
Various authorities have argued that disarmament may become 
negotiable when particular regimes give up certain foreign 
policy goals, or when less aggressive elites become dominant 
in them. The Khrushchev speech quoted in the previous 
chapter expressed belief in the possibility of fruitful 
negotiation with the 'saner representatives of the
9 Ibid., pp. 9-10
bourgeoisie’. Richard Lowenthal has argued that Soviet
foreign policy moves through distinct phases of political
offensive and political detente: disarmament negotiation
can only be fruitful in the latter.
Even though the need for relaxing international 
tension seems to have been recognized towards 
the end of Stalin’s reign, the turn towards 
a new ’’breathing spell” was seriously carried 
out during the interregnum following his death; 
and it ended...as soon as Khrushchev was in 
full control.10
LowenthaJ believes that this offensive, beginning in
1957? lasted at least until the Cuban crisis of 1962. He
argues that negotiation in periods of offensive is undertaken
by the Soviets only in the aftermath of crises, and to
11achieve ’a substantial gain for the Communist cause’. If 
the Russians should abandon their offensive, even 
temporarily,
it would permit joint diplomatic efforts to 
reduce the risk of nuclear war, and it would 
open up a chance to stop the arms race and 
channel energies on both sides into 
competition in predominantly constructive rather than military efforts.12
10
’’The End of an Illusion”, Problems of Communism. January 
February, 1963) pp. 8-9.
11
Ibid., p. 1.
Ibid., p. 10.
12
(On this view disarmament should be possible on the
basis of the status quo. The conventional school of 
political determinists argue that the division of Germany, 
the existence of sattelite states in Eastern Europe and 
so forth preclude disarmament.)
It is true that Soviet disarmament policy became 
increasingly radical and intransigent after 1957 - 
increasingly more like part of a concerted program of 
political warfare. But the Soviet Union began to penetrate 
the Middle East in 1955 before Khrushchev1s victory over 
his opponents, and if 1958 was the year of Khrushchev’s 
first Berlin crisis it was also the year of suspension of 
nuclear tests. Khrushchev’s American tour of 1959 
convinced the Chinese Communists that Khrushchev could not 
be relied on as a political warrior. Thus it is doubtful 
whether the chances for disarmament fluctuate so violently 
as Lowenthal believes.
In the Communist tradition there is a strong strain 
both of hositility to disarmament (except in the wake of 
world revolution) and of scepticism concerning the chances 
of agreement with capitalist states. Richard Barnet has 
documented Lenin* s agitation against disarmament in the 
immediate pre-revolutionary periods ’Only after the 
proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie can it...scrap
1 qarms of all kinds1. - In our own day it remains a problem 
for Communists to reconcile ’complete’ disarmament with 
certain parts of current ideology. According to the latest 
Soviet party program -
The C.P.S.U. and the Soviet people as a whole 
will continue...to support the sacred struggle 
of the oppressed peoples and their just anti­
imperialist wars of liberation. I1*-
If general disarmament is achieved before the oppressed 
people have all been freed, how is the struggle to be 
conducted? Since 1955 the Soviets and their Czech ally 
have given or sold arms to the following nations or 
movements involved in ’anti-imperialist’ struggles: Egypt, 
the Algerian F.L.N., North Viet Nam (supplier of the Viet 
Cong and Pathet Lao), Cuba and Indonesia. One is faced 
with the conclusion that military support of anti-imperalist 
struggles is not compatible with reducing all arms to levels 
required for internal security.
However Communist scepticism about the willingness of 
capitalists to disarm has been much softened under 
Khrushchev’s ideological leadership, especially since 19&0,
_  - *
V.I. Lenin, ’’The Disarmament Slogan”, 1916. Quoted in 
Who Wants Disarmament?, op. cit., p. 61.
14-
Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Adopted by the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U., October 31?
1961. Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961, p* 58*
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when Khrushchev, reporting on his trip to the United States,
allowed that capitalist economy might be stabilized even
under conditions of general disarmament.
Some people in the West contend that disarmament 
is fraught with grave consequences for the 
economy of capitalist countries,...
The least one can say about such contentions 
is that they are utterly unsubstantiated. I 
had a chance to talk with many representatives 
of the American business world...who are 
confident that United States industry could 
well cope with the task of switching the entire 
economy to the production of peaceful goods.15
This statement should be compared with one of 1956,
when ‘militarization of the economy and the arms drive* was
portrayed as one of the (temporary) factors staving off the
16general crisis of capitalism. Even in the i960 speech
the traditional party line was also stated.
A thirst for profits makes certain imperialist 
circles continue the arms race and keep up the 
state of cold war.17
However presumably * the saner representatives of the 
bourgeoisie” can triumph over ‘certain circles1.
15Report by N.S. Khrushchev to the Supreme Soviet of the 
U.S.S.R., January 14, 1960. Soviet Booklet No. 64, op. cit., 
p. 24.
16
N.S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U. to the 20th Party Congress, February 1956, Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1956, p. 14.
Soviet Booklet No. 64, op. cit.« p. 17-17
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Khrushchev has confidence in the sobering effect of 
the 1 forces of peace1 on the imperialists. He argues that 
the Chinese comrades underestimate the peace forces when 
they attack or belittle the slogan of peaceful coexistence. 
It has become the Chinese contention that agitation for 
1 general and complete disarmament1 is precisely the way to 
weaken the forces of peace and their pressure on the 
imperialists because (they hold) it sows belief in the 
goodwill of imperialist statesmen, thus compromising 
Communist interests. Since 1957 China has attributed far 
more political significance to Soviet atomic and rocket 
strength and far less significance to the support of 
neutralist opinion (whose support is supposed to be
18obtained by disarmament diplomacy) than the Soviets, The 
Chinese position, if adopted by the Russians, would 
constitute not only an obstacle to disarmament, but an 
obstacle to negotiations.
Incidentally, Coral Bell has suggested that Dulles, 
like the Chinese, had a lively fear of negotiations quite 
apart from its consequences in the realm of disarmament.
T8
For a discussion, See Richard Lowenthal, "Schism Among 
the Faithful” , Problems of Communism. January-February, 1962,
p. 6.
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The real basis of the case against 
negotiations, as seen for instance by- 
Dulles, was not so much simply that they 
were likely to be unproductive, as that 
they would tend to induce a detente 
(whether or not they produced results) and 
that in conditions of detente it becomes 
impossible for the democracies to maintain a posture of strength.19
However, such a view does not seem to have affected 
willingness to conduct disarmament negotiations in our 
period, perhaps because less is expected of them than other 
negotiations.
Arising out of and merging with the political and
ideological impediments to disarmament are difficulties
which we may call psychological. * Tension1, distrust1 and
‘fear1 describe states of mind supposed by some authorities
to hamper sober evaluation of proposals. Jerome Wiesner
has put this case very strongly.
Experience indicated that individual projects 
or proposals, no matter how promising, 
always will be evaluated in a negative state 
of mind born of fear....In conflict situations 
...in which individuals act for nations, 
statements of antagonists are evaluated not 
in terms of the intended meanings, but rather 
in terms of the most threatening alternatives 
....When this happens, there can be no 
meaningful communication. Every proposal by 2o 
either side is scanned for the hidden purpose.
19Negotiation from Strength, op. cit., p. 209.
20Jerome B. Wiesner, ‘’Comprehensive Arms - Limitation 
Systems”, in Donald G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, 
Disarmament and National Secnnity. op. cit., p. 199.
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There are several objections to this view. Firstly, 
the negotiating nations have shown no reluctance in raiding 
each other’s larder of proposals. The propaganda pay-off 
for doing this is very high - especially if the other side 
withdraws what it had proposed. Admittedly this raiding is 
done piecemeal; neither side has ever accepted the other’s 
plan in toto. But we do have a priori grounds for doubting 
whether distrust is as acute as Wiesner suggests. Partial 
acceptance is almost a law of disarmament negotiations, and 
often acceptance is almost complete - as in the change of 
Western policy towards the test ban, 1957-62.
Of course, most proposals have deliberately self- 
interested elements which may have to be opposed. What one 
should question is the idea that a nation will develop an 
ineradicable prejudice against a proposal merely because it 
is sponsored by the opposition, regardless of its merits.
This seems to happen in some cases, but there are good 
reasons why nations should want it to seem that they are 
distrustful of each other’s motives. Firstly, they are 
engaged in a propaganda battle where points are scored for 
convicting the opponent of wickedness; and secondly, in order 
to put pressure on the opponent to modify his position in a 
desired way, it seems necessary to convince him that his 
proposals in their presented form are not trusted.
CHAPTER 3
“MILITARY DETERMINISM“
This chapter deals with variants of the theory that
some negotiated control of armament is possible without
a settlement of political questions. We shall begin by
examining the general case for 'military determinism1 2, or,
as J. David Singer Prefers to call it, the 'armaments-first'
approach, which may also be called the optimistic and
'idealistic* approach, in contrast to the pessimistic and
•realist* views examined in the previous chapter.
Philip Noel-Baker argues that it is not only possible
2to disarm without political settlements, but that:
If...a Treaty /for comprehensive and drastic 
disarmament/ were prepared...it is extremely 
probably that public opinion would insist on 
its being signed and carried out, whether the 
outstanding political problems had been 
settled or not. But it is also probable in a 
high degree that the mere preparation and
1
Deterrence. Arms Control, and Disarmament. Ohio State 
University Press, 1962, p. 179.2
The Arms Race, o p. cit., p. 85.
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publication of the treaty would do more 
than all else to advance the settlement 
of the political disputes.3
Noel-Baker calls the Treaty ’the first and
indispensable step to a more peaceful world*. This is
’armaments first1 with a vengeance. Nations must agree to
strip away their entire means of defence before the
political shape of the world is clear (except for a lightly
cf
armed U.N* peace-keeping force under the Secretary-General^), 
and this agreement will somehow lead to a political 
settlement. The argument assumes that nations disagree 
because they are armed, a neat reversal of the realist 
position.
Singer pointed out some weaknesses of the realist or 
1settlements-first’ position. Against George Kennan, a 
self-professed realist, he urges that European 
disengagement proposals have a military as well as a 
political component: they provide for the removal of 
foreign forces and bases from Central Europe as well as 
the neutrality of the host powers. However, Singer’s
3 Ibid.. p. 87.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid., p. 549.
1 armaments-first1 doctrine has weaknesses akin to that 
of Noel-Baker.
••.while accepting the proposition that 
unresolved conflicts and their accompanying 
tensions will certainly lead nations into 
armament programs, the arms-first position 
also recognizes that between competing nations 
which are heavily armed, there must be an 
impressive level of tension. Moreover - and 
this is the crucial point - once the armament 
process has gotten under way, tensions cannot 
be materially reduced and political conflicts 
cannot be resolved; the weapons have added a 
new variable to the equation, and until they^ 
are removed, the equation remains insoluble.
This perfunctory argument is nowhere expanded to show
why the particular Variable1 armament should make 'the
equation...insoluble' - that is, Singer does not show why
operation on the pre-existing variables, tension and
conflict cannot solve 'the equation*.
Most discussion of whether to deal with political
problems or armaments first is not only dogmatic but
excessively abstract and general. All armaments and all
conflicts are lumped together as though negotiators confront
only one armaments-conflict problem. In fact each local
conflict makes its own distinctive contribution to the arms
race, both by dictating what type and quantity of tactical
armament will be required for the conduct of that conflict,
6
Deterrence. Arms Control.and Disarmament, op. cit.. p. 179.
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and also by adding to the over-all tension between the 
powers involved, which is an important determinant of the 
scope and intensity of the strategic arms race. In its 
turn, the strategic arms race, by a sort of feed-back 
effect, may intensify local (and hence over-all) tension 
in so far as nations feel impelled to deploy strategic 
weapons locally. Soviet policy in Cuba, and American 
policy in Western Europe have provided clear examples of 
this feed-back effect. The necessary unravelling of the 
various and complex links between politics and armaments 
at both the strategic and the local levels is a task which 
an effective arms control policy must undertake. This 
task cannot be properly formulated in abstract and general 
propositions.
We turn to military (as opposed to political)
arguments against the view that armaments can (or must) be
controlled before disputes are settled. Nogee and Spanier
argue simply that the military interests of the two major
Cold War antagonists cannot be harmonized; that disarmament
proposals must have jokers - *to protect the proposing
7nation*s vital interest*. Without entering into an 
examination of this view in relation to particular_
The Politics of Disarmament, op. cit., p. 6*.
proposals, it can be shown that the reasoning about the
arms race from which it derives is faulty.
The crucial point...is that no nation can 
afford to be less strong than a possible 
opponent. No state can afford not to 
participate in the resultant arms race if it 
wishes to protect its vital interests. The 
nation that considers itself militarily 
superior can neither relax its vigil nor 
forget to forge new swords - let alone turn 
them into plowshares - if it wishes to 
preserve a favourable status quo and to deter 
hostile diplomatic pressure or military 
attack. And the nation that believes itself 
to be inferior militarily m^st strive to 
remedy this status in order to create a more 
favourable balance.°
This description is based on a vulgar Hobbesian view which 
colours most writing on international relations. In the real 
world no such determinism has operated or could operate. The 
impossibility of disarmament cannot be established by 
reasoning which ignores historical examples of disarmament, 
as well as the elementary facts of power disparity and 
political quiescence (even of potentially great powers).
We should notice that this theory implies much more than 
that interests are irreconcilable; it would be impervious to 
a demonstration that, for example, the interest of the United 
States in inspection can be reconciled with the Soviet interest 
in secrecy. The theory states categorically that all sorts
Ibid,, p. 13. emphasis added.)
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and conditions of nations will continue the uncontrolled 
arms race regardless of the existing power situation or the 
possibility of modifying it in a particular way favourable 
to all by arms control.
Nogee and Spanier buttress their case against disarmament 
with a semi-philosophical 'argument from uncertainty':
1) Armaments cannot be precisely defined.
Q2) Power cannot be precisely calculated.7
The two points are familiar in the literature of 
international relations theory, and are well argued by 
Spanier and Nogee. But the authors continue: 'One conclusion 
is therefore clear: namely, that the armed forces of the 
major powers are not comparable and are consequently not 
subject to ratio deduction1.^0
This is a confusion. Forces can be subjected to 
deductions of any sort, including ratio deductions, whether 
they are comparable or not. If they are not comparable (i.e. 
if we do not know how to compare them), all that follows is 
that force effectiveness may be reduced more for one power 
than the other, and we may not know which. To effect a 
ratio deduction all that need be known is the size of the
9 Ibid., p. 11.
10
Ibid., pp. 12-13.
respective ’forces’, be they the total military manpower of 
the nation, or the total of strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles* The East proposed a one-third cut in the former 
in 19^8; the West proposed a one-third cut in the latter
in 1962. " The incomparableness of the two sides’ forces 
and delivery vehicles was well known, yet both proposals 
gave rise to bitter complaints. Obviously comparison 
occurs even when it cannot lead to precise conclusions.
Theorists who use the argument from incalculability 
against disarmament overlook an obvious objection: the 
argument works equally well against participation in the arms 
race itself. Just as the effect of a decrease of one’s forces 
on the balance of power cannot be precisely determined neither 
can the effect of an increase, and for the same reasons.
Another form of argument from uncertainty stresses the 
continuing revolution in modern military technology. 
Uncertainty about future developments is supposed to teach 
nations conservatism in disarmament policy: ’Better the 
devil you know’ - the arms race - ‘than the one you don’t 
know’ - disarmament. This psychology may operate in fact,
11Soviet draft General Assembly resolution, A/658,
September 25, 19*+8.
12
See Way land Young, ’’Disarmament: Proposals and 
Concessions”, The Guardian* March 20, 1962.
but it is faulty. The future of the arms race is 
precisely what is not known: disarmament may result in 
there being less uncertainty about it.
Another theory holds that the interests of the Cold 
War sides are reconcilable, but that disarmament 
negotiators must wait for these interests to become alike 
(which may tend to happen over time) before trying to 
reconcile them. Actually, ‘like’ has two distinct 
meanings: my interest (an atomic force) may be ’like1 yours 
(i*e. you also have such a force), but our interests may 
also be called unlike in that you are interested in getting 
rid of my force while I am interested in keeping it, and 
vice versa. (Of course, it does not necessarily follow 
that our interests are irreconcilable, since we both may 
prefer joint reduction or abolition to the status quo, even 
though the unilateral disarmament of the opponent is the 
first preference of us both.) It has been argued, by 
Western strategists,^ that the invulnerability of the 
opponent’s strategic force is to the interest of both sides 
(i.e. that interests in respect of invulnerability may be 
alike in two senses); but military practice is contrary to
For example, see Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. 
o p. cit., Chapter 10, ’’Surprise Attack and Disarmament".
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this view: it perpetually strives to render the opponent's
force vulnerable where economically possible, particularly
in the United States, as pointed out in Part One,
According to P.M.S. Blackett it is the unlikeness of
interests in the first sense given above which renders
disarmament impossible. In 1956 he wrote that:
During the period of American atomic monopoly 
the short-range interests of America and 
Russia were inevitably poles apart. This is 
the essential cause of the failure of all the 
early attempts at atomic control, Nov; with 
the period of atomic parity approaching, the 
interests of West and East are coming much 
closer
Blackett, like the Western negotiators of the Baruch 
period, here ignored or discounted the possibility that 
Eastern conventional superiority might have been traded for 
the Western atomic monopoly. When he said the respective 
short-range interests were 'poles apart' he probably 
confused unlikeness of interests, which was a fact, with 
irreconcilable clash of interests, which had to be proved, 
since the short-range interests could have been brought 
into harmony, at least in principle, by a mixture of 
disarmament measures.
In discussing the situation of 1962, Blackett is still 
troubled by American atomic superiority and the resulting
14
Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations. Cambridge, 1956,
pp. 10 1 -2 .
unlikeness of American and Soviet interests. He does not 
actually argue that the United States must surrender 
superiority in the means of nuclear delivery before 
disarmament can occur, although he does argue that the 
counterforce strategy would have to give way to a
retaliatory, counter-city strategy in a first-step
1 1disarmament agreement. y He also maintains that American 
weapon policies probably made it impossible for the Soviets 
to accept the West*s test ban proposals in 1961 since:
1 The obvious Soviet fear of inspection may well have been 
because they had so little to inspect1.
The analysis and critique of proposals in Part Two 
was an attempt to pinpoint obvious defects (vagueness, 
onesidedness, over-ambitiousness). The critique implied 
theoretical assumptions, which were briefly stated.^ Here 
that discussion will be extended in order to examine 
suggestions by several theoreticians about the type of 
proposals most likely to succeed in the absence of 
political settlements. We might define an 1ideal1 proposal
T?"The Real Road to Disarmament11, Studies of War. Oliver 
and Boyd, Edinburgh and London, 19&2, p.1o4.
16Ibid., p. 161.
17See Part Two, Chapter 3.
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as one which somehow conforms to four partly conflicting 
desiderata: significance (impact on the arms race); 
fairness (promotion of the security of all parties); 
acceptability (conformity to real disarmament policies of 
interested parties); and feasibility (ease of execution and 
controllability). The discussion which follows merely 
compares the case for significant comprehensive disarmament 
with the case for isolated marginal measures of arms 
control from the viewpoint of feasibility.
Jerome Wiesner is the most powerful Western advocate 
of the case for regarding comprehensive radical disarmament 
as feasible.
There are many reasons why I suspect that a 
comprehensive system may be easier to negotiate 
than a series of independent limited measures 
worked through one at a time. If there exists 
an agreed upon long-term goal, a plan for 
reaching it by means of a sequence of 
arms-limitation measures and a timetable for 
doing so, there will be an enormous interest in 
the ultimate objective and individual steps will 
not have to be as finely balanced as if they 
were likely to persist for all time. Second, 
the inspection required to safeguard some limited 
measures absolutely may appear to be almost as 
great a breach of Soviet security as the inspection 
required for a comprehensive system. In fact, 
really adequate inspection for limited measures 
may be more difficult to achieve because the 
various components of an inspection system will 
reinforce one another. Finally, when extensive 
disarmament has taken place, there will be no
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need for military secrecy, so that the 
environment in which the inspection will 
have to function will be much more favourable 
for effective control.^
One might add to Wiesner's list of reasons in favour 
of comprehensive schemes two others - that they permit the 
inclusion of a balance of ingredients favourable to the 
various sides, and that they also, in theory at least, 
can prevent the extension of the arms race to new areas of 
technology, or at least can discourage this development by 
sealing off the most tempting avenues of military 
expansion, However, it remains a question whether those 
independent limited measures’, such as the test ban, 
which require least inspection may not appeal more to the 
Soviet interest than comprehensive schemes. Wiesner's 
belief that complete disarmament will abolish the 'need' 
for military secrecy is certainly not correct: secrecy 
would be a vital interest of a signatory who decided that 
the agreement could and therefore should be evaded.
The test ban and other measures which Wiesner would 
call independent and limited are favoured by many theorists 
because they would generate 'confidence1 and thus make 
drastic measures palatable. Political settlements have
T5-------
"Comprehensive Arms Limitation Systems", in Arms Control. 
Disarmament, and National Security, o p. cit. . p. 201.
438
been favoured on identical grounds, John Strachey argues
more specifically that the test ban might give rise to a
special form of Confidence1 - that it is a potential
lever which the superpowers could employ jointly to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons:
Their means for inducing the abandonment of 
the attempt to acquire nuclear capability, 
or in the case of Britain and France to 
abandon a small existing capability, would 
probably prove ample if they could employ them unitedly and determinedly.^9
Strachey suggests that the Two, having signed a test
agreement, could lead a campaign beginning in the General
Assembly and ending, if necessary, with the abrogation of
alliance agreements and the imposition of economic sanctions
in order to enforce the non-nuclear club. Otherwise the
20test ban would be ‘nugatory’.
It is a criticism of isolated proposals arranged 
between the Two that they would not be viable without Nth 
power cooperation. The way recommended by the 1disarmers1 
to ensure this cooperation, as opposed to Strachey*s 
political way, is comprehensive disarmament of all the 
powers. This was above all the way of France, who opposed 
the test ban, in the years under study.
19On the Prevention of War. Macmillan, London, 1962, p. 166.20
Ibid.. p. 167.
Strachey justifies his belief in the possibility and 
efficacy of joint action by the Two against lesser powers 
with a reference to the Suez affair. It is an insight 
to relate disarmament thus to the normal play of political 
forces instead of treating it jjn vacuo - the chief weakness 
of military determinism. But in 1963 it remains to be 
seen how effective the pressure of the Two will be in 
closing the nuclear club on the basis of a (partial) test 
ban. No measures comparable to those taken during the 
Suez crisis seem imminent, and they would be difficult to 
undertake in the absence of special provocation by the Nth 
powers.
Strachey clearly believes that unilateral (or rather 
bilateral) political action can be a sort of equivalent for 
un-forthcoming multilateral action on arms control in 
bringing about a desired result such as the test ban. It 
is clear that a theory adequate to account for all the 
factors making for disagreement and agreement on arms 
control would have to be a variant of ’military-political 
determinism'. Political determinism, in the extreme forms 
analysed in the previous chapter, is untenable; military 
determinism is tenable within limits suggested in this 
chapter. Political determinism, as conventionally 
formulated, ignores the efficacy of political pressure in
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promoting arms control, and concentrates on the benefits 
of detente. The conventional versions of military 
determinism fail to unravel the complex political causes 
of armament. Both political and military determinists 
fail to see the compatibility of arms control with a power 
struggle; the former mostly believe that the power struggle 
must be liquidated before there can be disarmament 
(overlooking the military element of power); while the 
latter incline to believe that arms control is bound to 
abolish the power struggle.
CHAPTER b
OTHER THEORIES : CONCLUSION
There are two groups of theories explaining the 
failure of negotiation which will merely be mentioned here, 
because they would otherwise carry the argument too far from 
the negotiating process. One group consists of ’devil1 
theories, which either identify political groups in the 
nation as exercising a baneful influence on arms control 
policy, or which stress institutional factors - such as an 
economy geared to military output - allegedly obstructing 
disarmament policy. The other related group consists of 
theories which argue that the national input of skills, 
thought and attention at high levels of government is 
inadequate to sustain serious negotiation for arms control. 
Theories of these two types have been addressed to the 
problems of Western policy mainly.
Communist negotiators frequently fall back on the 
theory that ’reactionary circles' in the West are 'whipping 
up the arms drive' and obstructing negotiations - that is, 
that Western governments have been at least temporarily
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captured by enemies of disarmament. The circles referred 
to are occasionally identified as arms manufacturers, 
reactionary generals, some heads of weapon laboratories, 
and so forth. Some Western commentators offer a similar
ianalysis of American defence preparations.
It is certainly true that in the United States the 
groups mentioned have been less flexible than the government 
on arms control policy. However Samuel Huntington has given 
good cause to doubt whether such groups can prevail against 
the civilian officials of the Administration in decisions 
on the size and nature of the U.S. military effort.2 His 
explanation of the lack of support for arms control in the 
United States will be mentioned bälow. Academic authorities 
in the West have frequently wondered whether the prospect of 
the conversion of the U.S. federal budget to peaceful 
purposes might not give pause to U.S. disarmament 
policy-makers, but economic considerations could scarcely 
discourage action on limited arms control measures which 
would require little if any budgetary adjustment.
There is a considerable literature on the shortcoming 
of U.S. government organization for disarmament in the 
_  —
See Fred J. Cook, The Warfare State. Macmillan, New York, 19&2.2
The Common Defense, op. cit., passim.
post-war period.3 Huntington sums up neatly the views
contained in that literature, finding a parallel between
arms control and civil defence.
For most of the years 19*+5 to i960 civil 
defense and arms limitation were the 
country cousins of American strategy.
The never quite belonged, yet they could not 
be disowned..../Theiry "outsider" quality... 
stemmed precisely from the fact that initially 
neither seemed directly related to or required 
by a strategy of deterrence. They were both 
alternative programs beyond the scope, of the 
foreign policy - strategic consensus.
According to Huntington, ’few officials... ever strongly 
supported’ the two programs, and both faced a serious 
’organizational dilemma’, whether they were entrusted to an 
independent agency or to ’an agency concerned with 
deterrence’. In the first case they met strong opposition; 
in the second case they were simply subordinated. Arms 
control began to be a serious influence only when it was 
’assimilated’ into the major, successful programs of 
deterrence.^
See Saville R. Davis, "Recent Policy Making in the United 
States Government"^ and .Hubert Humphrey, "Government 
Organization for Arms Control", in Brennan (ed.), Arms 
Control. Disarmament, and National Security, op. cit.
See also Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control. 
op. cit., p. 587ff and passim.
The Common Defense, op. cit. , pp. 353-*+•
* Ibid., p. 359.
Ibid., p. 364ff.
Another explanation of the shortcomings of American 
negotiation for arms control points to the lack of sustained 
and intensive technical and policy research into problems 
of agreement. Jerome Wiesner states the point in a precise 
and strong form.
Up to the present time, there has not been 
adequate examination of the technical details 
of any comprehensive system to make possible 
a really satisfactory evaluation of it.
Unfortunately, in this situation the West has 
always been suspicious of Soviet proposals, 
and furthermore has been ultra-conservative 
in the inspection requirements it places upon 
any system.7
This explanation, much favoured by scientists, belongs, with 
Huntington*s explanation, in a category which might be called 
'theories of inadequate input*.
'Adequate input*, in theory, would consist of 
governmental and diplomatic organization which tended to 
promote rather than thwart arms control negotiation, 
continuing interest by high government officials, 
adequate machinery for co-ordinating policy with allies, and 
extensive and intensive technical and policy research 
operations.
A final group of theories worth mentioning stresses 
not institutional, group or intellectual inhibitions on
7
"Comprehensive Arms Limitation Systems", in Arms Control, 
Disarmament, and National Security, op. cit.. pp. 200-201.
policy, but the alleged failure of governments (or of the 
masses, kept in ignorance by governments) to perceive the 
gravity of the military situation brought about by modern
Qweapons. There is a sort of Socratic determinism behind 
this theory: it is supposed that more perfect knowledge 
must lead to more perfect virtue (disarmament).
A similar view was voiced by a writer in the Economist, 
commenting on the final stages of the 1957 Sub-Committee.
The main lesson of the summer seems to be
that there is still not enough fear about.9
Views of this kind are of little value unless they lead 
on to a demonstration that feasible situations of arms 
control are safer than situations generated by the arms 
race. In any case those who hold these views must have 
difficulty explaining the innumerable government statements 
on both sides of the Cold War which do show a high 
awareness of nuclear dangers.
Negotiation for arms control failed in the period 
which has been studied intensively in this thesis, and
8
See Bertrand Russell, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare. 
Allen & Unwin, London, 19^9. passim.
Economist, August 10, 1957  ^ P* M+7-9
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negotiation has only partially succeeded in the period 
since. (It is noteworthy that the successful partial 
test ban negotiations were almost fully confidential, and 
were conducted by a high official apparently enjoying 
considerable negotiating freedom on the American side.) 
Failure is a fundamental fact that a theory of 
negotiations must explain. I have endeavoured to show 
the shortcomings of the proposals for 1955-60 in Part Two, 
the weakness of negotiating tactics in Part Three, and the 
nature of the political and military obstacles to arms 
control in Part Four. On the other hand I have also drawn 
attention to the pressures making for agreement on arms 
control in Part Three, and I have sought to dispel some 
of the excessive pessimism arising from contemplation of 
the propaganda struggle, political conflict and power 
competition in Part Four.
Perhaps the best way to sum up the experience of the 
post-1955 period is to criticize the intellectual 
assumptions lying behind disarmament diplomacy as practised 
and also the assumptions made by the critics of practice - 
notably Thomas Schelling - whose influence began to be felt 
in the West at the end of the 1950s. As Schelling has 
pointed out, conventional disarmament diplomacy conceived
arms control as an activity in opposition to strategy and 
military policy; however, the new school of critics in the 
United States hss so defined arms control as to make it 
indistinguishable from strategy and military policy.
Neither conventional diplomacy nor the new criticism has 
developed a doctrine adequate for relating arms control to 
political struggle. Moreover, while negotiators during 
much of the period studied were discussing utopian schemes 
for which the political preconditions did not exist, their 
critics often seemed to find difficulty in recommending 
any changes in the military situation at all. (’...it could 
be an open question whether we ought to be negotiating with 
our enemies for more arms, less arms, different kinds of 
arms, or arrangements superimposed on existing armaments’.^0 
Neither practitioners nor critics seemed able to define the 
distinctive potential of negotiation for arms control.
It is of course possible to identify specific causes 
of disagreement in the period studied by methods other 
than general intellectual criticism, During 1955-60 some 
of the Western powers virtually excluded the possibility 
of arms control confined to Europe by their fear of seeming
To”
Schelling. ’’Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization”, 
in Brennan (ed.), Arms Control. Disarmament, and National 
Security, op. cit.. pp. 168-9.
to endorse the political status quo. Should the West, and 
Federal Germany in particular, ever become reconciled to 
the division of Europe, local disarmament might be possible.
On the Eastern side, the liberalizing of Soviet society 
seems bound to work in favour of arms control, by making 
inspection more ideologically palatable, while development 
of mobile and protected nuclear weapons may greatly weaken 
the military case against inspection. Now (1963) that 
both superpowers have consolidated their nuclear 
technological position, joint action to discourage the 
spread of nuclear weapons seems more likely, although 
formal negotiation may be a subsidiary means to this end.
It would be easy to make policy recommendations for 
the coming period. Perhaps it is more proper and important 
for the academic outsider to simply insist that the potential 
scope of negotiation for arms control has not been recognized, 
either conceptually or in practice. Negotiated arms control 
should be conceived and treated as a distinctive method of 
serving the goals of strategy, of arms policy, of diplomacy, 
and even of war.
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Part One
The modern arms race is a resultant of competition in 
numerous military programs, contributing either to the 
strategic or tactical balance of power. Innovation and 
change of programs both determines, and is determined by, 
innovation in weapons.
Part Two
Proposals for arms control, 1955-60, with few 
exceptions, notably proposals concerning the test ban, had 
the following defects from the viewpoint of achieving 
agreement: vagueness, overambitiousness, onesidedness. 
Proposals have never been rationally classified or named.
1
2Part Three
The full range of pressures tending to promote 
negotiated arms control has not been recognized or analysed. 
Wars, arms policies, crises, political conflicts, as well as 
arms control proposals and negotiation generate pressures 
for agreement. The goals pursued in war, in arms policy, in 
crisis diplomacy, and in Cold War conflict are arms control 
goals in part. Arms control diplomacy in turn can promote 
the wider goals of foreign and defence policy. The 
bargaining assets of the nation in arms control have gone 
unrecognized.
Arms control diplomacy consists of a strategy 
(expressed in proposals), grand tactics (the conditions 
under which a nation prefers or insists on negotiating), and 
tactics proper (the negotiating case, tactical 'orientation1, 
and procedural maneuver). 'Intra-mural* tactical pressure 
is relatively ineffective in practice, and semi-public 
negotiation inhibits effective communication between 
negotiators.
Part Four
'Extra-mural' tactical pressure (disarmament 
propaganda) is probably ineffective in promoting either arms 
control or wider political objectives. The disarmament
3propaganda of East and West is both competitive and 
co-operative. The propaganda motive need not hinder, and 
may promote, effective negotiation.
Both theorists who espouse 'political determinism' as 
an explanation of disagreement on arms control, and those 
who espouse 'military determinism' as a proof of the 
possibility of agreement, are inadequate.
